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2ABSTRACT
This study traces the attempt by Pol Pot's Communist 
Party of Kampuchea (CPK) - renamed the partie of Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK) in 1982 - to regain the power it lost in
January 1979 as a result of a Vietnamese invasion. It 
describes broadly the CPK/PDK armed struggle from 1979 to 1991 
and examines in detail PDK efforts to return to power through 
the 1991 Paris Agreements, a peace settlement implemented by 
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) .
The study reinterprets the determinants of PDK political 
behaviour between its signature of the Paris Agreements and 
its decision in June 1992 not to implement the Agreements' 
provisions for demobilization of its armed forces under UNTAC 
auspices. It argues that despite the bitter souring of 
relations between Pol Pot and the Vietnamese Communists, PDK's 
turn-around can only be understood by taking seriously the 
doctrinal roots of PDK thinking within the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition, and in particular by treating it as an offshoot of 
the Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese Communist Party that gave 
birth to the CPK. It shows that the key concept upon which 
Pol Pot relied to fight his enemies after 1979 was the 
Vietnamese doctrine of "people's war", including its tactical 
prescriptions on Communist participation in parliamentary 
struggle and "peace agreements", such as that which the 
Vietnamese had signed in 1973.
A major theme of the study is the self-delusional aspects 
of PDK's obsession with the Vietnamese-derived notion of 
people's war. The key self-delusion was the belief that by 
ever-more-correctly following properly-selected aspects of the 
script of people's war, PDK could renew the political support 
among the Cambodian peasantry that had supposedly been the 
basis of Pol Pot's seizure of power in 1975. The study shows 
how such hopes were revealed as illusory under the domestic 
political circumstances resulting from UNTAC's implementation 
of the Paris Agreements. UNTAC created political openings 
that PDK's non-Communist rival, the National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC) , was able to exploit, while PDK was too unpopular 
to take advantage of similar opportunities and thus 
floundered.
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4ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ANKI: National Army of an Independent Kampuchea
CGDK: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CPAF: Cambodian People's Armed Forces
CPK: Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP: Cambodian People's Party
DK: Democratic Kampuchea
FUNCINPEC: National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
ICP: Indochinese Communist Party
KPNLF: Khmer People's National Liberation Front
NADK: National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
PDK; partie of Democratic Kampuchea
PRK: People's Republic of Kampuchea
SoC: State of Cambodia
SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
UNAMIC: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia 
UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
VGNUFC: Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia 
VoDK: Voice of Democratic Kampuchea
VoNADK: Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
5Map I: Cambodia's Provinces
6Map II: PDK Sectors, ca 1982
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INTRODUCTION
The Collapse of Democratic Kampuchea and the Emergence of the 
Partie of Democratic Kampuchea
On 7 January 1979, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) collapsed in the 
face of large-scale military operations against it by the 
armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which then 
oversaw the establishment of a rival regime, the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) . The rapid collapse of the DK 
regime reflected the unpopularity ensuing from the results of 
the CPK's three-year, eight-month, 20-day rule, during which 
perhaps 1.7 million of Cambodia's population of more than 
seven million had died of execution, starvation or disease. 
It also reflected institutional weaknesses brought about by 
ever-widening waves of murderous purges within the CPK that 
had eliminated perhaps half its membership and were continuing 
to tear its top leadership apart. Purges earlier in 1978 had 
liquidated four of the nine members of the CPK's top 
leadership body, the Standing Committee of the Party's Central 
Committee. The Standing Committee members left alive were 
Party Secretary and DK Premier Pol Pot, Party First Deputy 
Secretary and DK Assembly of People's Representatives Chairman 
Nuon Chea, Party Second Deputy Secretary Ta Mok (who was 
concurrently Secretary of several of the "zones" into which 
the CPK divided Cambodia, including his old base area in the 
Southwest Zone), DK Deputy Premier in Charge of Foreign 
Affairs Ieng Sary (whose wife was the sister of Pol Pot's 
spouse) , and alternate member Son Sen, who was DK Deputy 
Premier in Charge of National Defence and had also, until late 
1978, overseen the CPK's purge apparatus on behalf of Pol Pot 
and Nuon Chea, By the end of the year, however, Pol Pot had 
set the purge apparatus against Son Sen and against almost all 
of Ta Mok's closest associates. The purges that were in 
process when the Vietnamese invasion was launched in late 
December 1978 continued into early 1979, but were then
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suspended in an attempt to rally and consolidate the remaining 
leadership to fight the Vietnamese and the PRK, Among those 
thus saved was Son Sen.1 Despite his survival, however, 
decades-old suspicions about him lingered in Pol Pot's mind,2 
and a long-standing animosity between Ta Mok and Son Sen 
remained barely below the surface. As a confident of Ta Mok 
later said with reference to 1975-1978, Mok denigrated Son Sen 
as "a very arrogant intellectual type" who was "was good at 
talking and using big words, but . . . lacked practical 
experience with the grass-roots and the front-lines on the 
battlefield.1,3 Former cadre speaking about events after 1979 
continued to talk in terms of "profound rivalries" and "severe 
tensions" between the two men "linked to their ... theory and 
practice of war".4
Most of 1979 spelt destruction and chaos for the CPK and 
its armed forces, which were repeatedly hammered by the
1 For accounts of CPK in power, see Elizabeth Becker, When 
the War Was Over: Voices of Cambodia"s Revolution and Its People 
(Second Edition) (New York: Simon and Schuster, forthcoming);
David P Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War 
and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1991) ; David P Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political
Biography of Pol Pot (Bangkok: Silkworm, 1993) ; Ben Kiernan, The 
Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the 
Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); 
and Steve Heder, "Racism, Marxism, Labelling and Genocide in Ben 
Kiernan7 s The Pol Pot Regime", in South East Asia Research (Vol 
5, No 2: July 1997); Karl D Jackson, ed, Cambodia, 1975-1978: 
Rendezvous with Death (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), Frangois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero (London: Penguin 
Special, 1978); Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Boston:
South End Press, 1984).
2 According to Ieng Sary, Pol Pot had had doubts about Son 
Sen's "courage" since at least the early 1960s, when the three 
men and a number of other senior Cambodian Communists had taken 
refuge in Vietnam. Author's interview, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 
17 December 1996.
3 Author's interview with former courier for the Southwest 
Zone office, Thai-Cambodian border, 27 July 1990.
4 Christophe Peschoux, Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979-
1990 (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp.64-65. The English
rendering is from a translation prepared by Peschoux.
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Vietnamese military and shunned by a population profoundly 
alienated from it politically. However, by the end of the 
year, the CPK moved to reconsolidate itself politically and 
militarily. Overt political and military organizations were 
reshuffled, and its armed forces were renamed. In December, 
the CPK staged a series of meetings that announced decisions 
"to improve the composition of the Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea"5 in the hope of regaining some popular support. 
These included removing Pol Pot as Premier and replacing him 
with Khieu Samphan, a member of the CPK Central Committee who 
also retained his pre-invasion position as Chairman of the DK 
State Presidium. Although Khieu Samphan was deeply implicated 
in the pre-1979 purges and had been unswervingly loyal to Pol 
Pot, these facts were not well-known among Cambodians 
generally, with whom Khieu Samphan retained a reputation for 
incorruptibility and political moderation dating from the 
early 1960s.6 Whatever might have been gained by replacing 
Pol Pot with Khieu Samphan was probably offset, however, by 
the retention in the government of I eng Sary and Son Sen, 
whose reputations were much more sullied, as Deputy Prime 
Ministers in charge of Foreign Affairs and National Defense, 
respectively. Moreover, Pol Pot was publicly designated the 
Chairman of a "Supreme Commission" of the "National Army of 
Democratic Kampuchea" (NADK) , the new name for the CPK's armed 
forces, of which Pol Pot was also designated Commander-in- 
Chief. Nor did the appointment of Ta Mok as Vice-Chairman of 
the NADK Supreme Commission help. This was because of his 
reputation for arbitrary brutality, which was well-known in 
CPK circles and reinforced at the popular level through the
5 Democratic Kampuchea, "Press Communique and Statement of 
the Congress of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the 
Kampuchean People's Representatives, the Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea, the Representatives of the Democratic Kampuchea 
National Army and the Representatives of the various Government 
Departments", nd.
6 See Stephen Heder, Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan (Clayton: 
Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper 
No 70, 1991) .
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role played by Southwest Zone cadre in large-scale and 
widespread executions of ordinary people before these cadre 
were themselves targeted for liquidation in the second half of 
1978. Although less well-known, Kae Pok, a CPK Central 
Committee who was named Commission Under-Secretary-General 
(under Son Sen) , was also notorious for involvement in 
killings.
By 1981, CPK and NADK had been revamped by the creation 
of a secret substructure that divided Cambodia into six 
politico-military sectors for which specific leading cadre 
were responsible and in which reorganized or newly-established 
NADK divisions operated. Running anti-clockwise around 
Cambodia starting from its northeast, the sectors were
designated 1001, 1002, 1003, 102, 32 and 505 (see Map II).
Sector 1001, comprising northeast Cambodia and Cambodia east 
of the Mekong, was headed by Son Sen. Sector 1002, which 
comprised central Cambodia, was headed by Kae Pok. Sector 
1003, which comprised north-central Cambodia, was headed by Ta 
Mok. Sector 102, comprising the northwestern quadrant of 
Batdambang, was headed by Ieng Sary. Sector 32, comprising a 
swath of Batdambang reaching from its western border down to 
the Tonle Sap lake, was headed by Ni Kan, Son Sen's younger 
brother. Sector 505, comprising southwestern Cambodia, was 
headed by Central Committee member Sam Bit, who had been
Deputy Secretary of Ta Mok's old Southwest Zone. Sectors 32
and 505 were overseen by Pol Pot and Nuon Chea after the 
headquarters of the Central Committee was moved from Preah 
Vihear in Sector 1003 to Posat in Sector 505.7
7 This summary is based on a collection of CPK 
organizational data and NADK order of battle information gathered 
by the author in Thailand and Cambodia between 1979 and 1983. 
The sources included various political and military organigrams 
and orders of battle drawn up by Thai, Chinese, Vietnamese and 
US intelligence and diplomatic services and by the intelligence 
services of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces 
and the Sihanoukist National Army. This information was 
supplemented by the author's interviews with former NADK 
combatants in 1979-1983.
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Each sector was governed by a Party-designated 
Battlefield Committee, which in turn supervised the Party 
Committees of the military units and organs for the 
administration of civilian populations under CPK control. 
General administrative work was assigned to committees 
composed predominantly of non-military cadre. However, almost 
everywhere, military cadre were predominant in the Battlefield 
Committees. This meant that civilian administrative bodies 
functioned to ensure that the people under their political 
control were fully mobilized to serve the NADK's military 
needs.8
One exception to this rule was Ieng Sary's Sector 102, 
the only place where the population and the administration 
were not fully organized "military style". This was in part 
because it had a relatively large civilian population, in part 
because it was the window on the movement which the CPK 
allowed the world to see, and in part because of Ieng Sary's 
political preferences.9 However, even in Ieng Sary's sector, 
military cadre formed the most powerful bloc within the 
Battlefield Committee to which the sector's military units and 
administration answered.10
As the new substructure was being consolidated without 
publicity, the CPK announced its self-dissolution on 6 
December 1981.11 This was another move aimed at allaying
8 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Kampuchea,: After the 
Worst (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August
1985), pp.182-184.
9 Author's interviews with a former CPK administrative 
cadre, Thai-Cambodian border, 11 November 1984; and with a former 
member of Ieng Sary's staff, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1993.
10 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview of Ieng 
Sary, 10 November 1985.
11 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
"Communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea Concerning the Dissolution of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea" (English typescript in the author's possession, dated
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popular fears and hatreds focused on memories of what PRK and 
Vietnamese propaganda incessantly called "the Pol Pot-Ieng 
Sary genocidal clique". By this time, the CPK Standing 
Committee had been expanded by the co-option into it of two 
Central Committee members: Khieu Samphan and Kbb Pok. Both 
ranked as alternates. Son Sen, meanwhile, had been granted 
full Standing Committee membership.12
In reality, the Party only went into deep clandestinity 
under Pol Pot's leadership. He and other cadre continued to 
play the same roles, relate to each other in the same way and 
function in the same manner as they had when the CPK's 
existence was publicly admitted. The Communist Party ceased 
to exist only in the sense that the terminology used to 
describe its structures, ideology and practices was 
euphemized. As Son Sen explained in a "guiding view" 
presented to former Party members on 17 January 1982, "we have 
,.. stopped using any terms which belong too obviously to the 
old Communist regime and which may lead others to suspect that 
we haven't changed."13
The fictitious dissolution of the CPK nevertheless paved 
the way for the formation in mid-1982 of a Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), in which what now 
called itself the partie of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)14 
joined in a "loose" coalition with two non-Communist, anti- 
Vietnamese groupings: the National United Front for an
6 December 1981), pp.3-5.
12 -phis conclusion is based on the author's discussions with 
former CPK cadre, Chinese journalists, Thai military intelligence 
officers and US diplomats in 1980-1981.
13 See the author's translation of the notebook of a senior 
PDK cadre: Dossier of Documents: 80-81 (sic), pp.148-150. I am 
grateful to Nate Thayer and David W Ashley for providing me with 
a copy of this document.
14 The French term partie is used here to translate the 
Khmer term pheaki, which like partie refers to a party to an 
agreement, rather than a political party.
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Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC) and the Khmer Peopled National Liberation Front 
(KPNLF) . FUNCINPEC was headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, 
Cambodia's chief of State from 1941 until 1970, while the 
KPNLF was headed by Son Sann, a former prime minister under 
Sihanouk. Both FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were constructed in 1979- 
1981 on the basis of dozens of small anti-Vietnamese, anti-CPK 
movements that had emerged under mostly local leadership in 
the period of political chaos and thus opportunities that had 
followed the collapse of CPK power but preceded the 
consolidation of the PRK. The core of movements upon which 
FUNCINPEC was built believed they could become popular by 
offering Cambodians the eventual prospect of social and 
political peace. While remaining anti-Pol Pot and anti- 
Vietnamese, FUNCINPEC thus presented itself as a core for 
national reconciliation among most followers of both PDK and 
PRK, under the flag of restoration of Sihanouk's pre-1970 
constitutional monarchy. KPNLF, the leadership of which was 
heavily influenced by professional military officers, was more 
stridently anti-Communist and more or less overtly critical of 
royalism. While some civilian KPNLF leaders, including Son 
Sann, talked seriously about making Cambodia into a 
parliamentary democracy, the movement's overall vision for the 
country's future was rule by highly-educated technocrats.15
Along with FUNCINPEC, KPNLF was forced into the CGDK 
arrangement by China, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the US. However, the terms of the coalition 
allowed all three parties to retain their own armed forces and 
administrative structures in separate "liberated zones", 
although these never extended far into Cambodia from the Thai 
border areas in which all three parties were given sanctuary.
15 These characterizations are based on numerous 
conversations with leaders of the movements upon which FUNCINPEC 
and KPNLF were based, who were interviewed by the author on the 
Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia during 1979-1981.
17
Ironically, the formation of the CGDK marked a further 
militarization of PDK at both the symbolic and substantive 
levels. The establishment of the CGDK meant the dissolution
of the DK government. Its structures were replaced by a 
three-man CGDK "inner cabinet", chaired by Sihanouk, who was 
declared President of the DK state. Khieu Samphan, who became 
DK state Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Affairs, was its 
number two figure. The third member was Son Sann, who was 
designated CGDK Prime Minister. The remainder of the CGDK 
Council of Ministers comprised four "Coordination Committees": 
Finance and Economy, Defence, Culture and Education, and
Health and Social Affairs. Each committee had one
representative of the three parties to the CGDK, and all 
members were of "ministerial rank". PDK's ministers included 
Ieng Sary for Finance and Economy and Son Sen for Defence.16
The structure of the CGDK might have suggested that 
within it, PDK was headed by Khieu Samphan, with Ieng Sary, 
Son Sen and other ministers working beneath him. These lines 
of authority, however, were never formalized. Instead, the 
Supreme Commission of the NADK, still headed by Pol Pot,
became the only publicly identified centre of PDK policy­
making,17 an arrangement that perhaps inadvertently revealed 
the reality of domination of PDK by Pol Pot and NADK cadre. 
At lower levels, this situation was reflected in complaints 
inside PDK ranks that after the formation of the CGDK, 
military men moved into posts previously held by non-military 
cadre and were "monopolizing" political influence in PDK
16 See Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Cabinet 
of the Prime Minister, Information and Press, Document No 
01/82/CG, "Declaration of the Formation of the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea", dated 22 June 1992; and 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Press Release, 
"Proclamation of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, 
President of Democratic Kampuchea, Signed on July 9 and Announced 
by the Radio of Democratic Kampuchea on July 11, 1982", dated 9 
July 1982.
17 After the Worst, p. 182.
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administrative bodies.18
PDK and the Indochinese Communist Party
The outbreak of full-scale war between DK and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 197 8, and the contest between 
PDK and PRK for administrative control of Cambodia after 1979, 
marked the final disappearance of the dream of Indochinese 
Communist solidarity originally fostered by the Indochinese 
Communist Party (ICP). Founded in 1930 to cover the whole of 
French colonial amalgam of Indochina, it had staged its 
dissolution in 1945, providing the script for CPK in 1981. 
CPK's leading troika, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, had all 
become members of the ICP during the First Indochina War 
(1945-1954). That conflict pitted Communist forces against 
what they denounced as French colonialism, US imperialism and 
their local lackeys, which in Cambodia meant then King Norodom 
Sihanouk. Nuon Chea and Ta Mok had first become connected to 
other senior leaders like Ieng Sary and Son Sen through Pol 
Pot, who had been peripherally involved in a Communist- 
sponsored circle of "Marxist-LeninistM students in France, of 
which Ieng Sary and Son Sen remained members when Pol Pot 
returned to Cambodia in 1953. Their sojourn abroad also 
connected them to Khieu Samphan, who later studied in France 
and headed a leftist student organization there, after the 
1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina had brought a period of 
peace and promised non-violent political party contestation to 
Cambodia.
The covert ICP ceased to exist in Vietnam in 1951, when 
it was replaced by the public, Vietnam-specific Vietnam 
Workers' Party (later the Vietnam Communist Party). However, 
the ICP had continued to function secretly in Cambodia until 
the mid-195 0s, after which a separate Communist Party had been
18 Personal Communication on 22 February 1985 from a source 
who wishes to remain anonymous, citing information from persons 
who left PDK zones in 1982-1983.
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clandestinely constructed, first as the Cambodia Workers7 
Party in I960, and then as the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 
1971. Attempts by Cambodian Communists at legal political 
struggle through a front organization that participated in 
elections and through covert infiltration of government 
political institutions were violently repressed by Sihanouk, 
and eventually they launched an armed struggle in 1968. The 
Party remained clandestine after the overthrow of Sihanouk by 
his adversaries to the right in 1970, and throughout its 
ultimately successful, Vietnamese Communist-backed guerilla 
war of 1970-1975, to which the deposed Sihanouk had lent his 
support. The CPK only publicly revealed its existence, with 
Pol Pot as Secretary, in 1977, two years after it had won 
power.
Despite the intertwined origins of the Vietnamese and 
Cambodian Communist parties in the ICP, they had become 
increasingly antagonistic to each another in the late 1960s, 
during the Second Indochina War, when the US intervened with 
troops and airpower on the side of anti-Communist forces in 
the civil war in Vietnam. Similarly, despite the appearance 
of cooperation between the overtly Communist Vietnamese and 
their covert Cambodian comrades after Sihanouk was overthrown, 
relations remained severely strained and deteriorated after 
both parties seized power in April 1975. Border conflicts fed 
into wider political differences and erupted into public 
hostilities in late 1977, which initiated the Third Indochina 
War and led to the Vietnamese invasion that overthrew Pol Pot 
the next year.19
19 For accounts of the CPK's ICP origins and the 
deterioration into war of the relations between the two Communist 
Parties see Christopher E Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina? 
Contesting- Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954 
(Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Report Series No 
28, 1995); Motoo Furuta, "The Indochinese Communist Party's
Division into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward 
Cambodia and Laos, 1948-1951", in Takashi Shiraishi and Motoo 
Furuta, Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s (Ithaca: Southeast Asia 
Program, 1992); Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E Goscha, 
Falling out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy
20
This Study
This study examines the attempt by CPK to recoup the 
political power it lost in January 1979. It looks broadly at 
the CPK/PDK armed struggle from January 1979 to October 1991 
and in detail at PDK efforts to position itself for a return 
to power through the political settlement crafted by the Five 
Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, 
which Khieu Samphan and Son Sen signed on PDK's behalf in 
Paris on 23 October 1991. This manoeuvring was subsumed in 
what PDK called a struggle to resolve one of two "key issues" 
of the implementation of the Paris Agreements by the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) . In PDK/ s 
negotiations with UNTAC, this issue was cast in terms of the 
extent to which political power was to be taken away from the 
State of Cambodia (SoC) , the successor to the PRK, and 
bestowed on the Supreme National Council (SNC) of Cambodia, 
the membership of which included PDK, SoC, FUNCINPEC and 
KPNLF. In practice on the ground, the issue was engaged 
through PDK's attempts to seize power in the Cambodian 
countryside through what it initially defined as primarily 
political means.20
Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975
(Monash: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies
Paper on Southeast Asia: 35, 1995) ; Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came 
to Power; A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975 (London: 
Verso, 1985) ; Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War, 
A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986); Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam 
Invaded Cambodia (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
forthcoming); and Becker, When the War Was Over.
20 This study does not cover the second "key issue", PDK 
allegations that Vietnamese "forces", including not only military 
forces but civilians who were supposedly Vietnamese military 
personnel "in disguise", remained present in massive numbers in 
Cambodia, contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreements. 
As noted below, this allegation was false. Further discussion 
of the issue is precluded by space limitations. However, the 
author believes that the evidence shows that the ways in which 
PDK's "anti-Vietnamese" struggle was conceived and pursued were 
very much Vietnamese Communist in origins and inspiration.
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The study attempts to reinterpret the determinants of 
CPK/PDK political behaviour between 1979 and mid-1992, in 
particular through an examination of PDK's decision to sign 
the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 and then - in June 
1992 - not to implement the Agreement's key military
provision, which required the demobilization of NADK under the 
auspices of international troop contingents operating under 
UNTAC command. This came amidst a resumption of NADK guerilla 
warfare in violation of the Agreements' cease-fire
requirements, and amidst clear signs that PDK was going to
boycott their main political clause, which provided for UN-
organized elections throughout Cambodia.
The study attempts to fill a recognized gap in the
literature on PDK's interaction with the Paris Agreements and 
the UN. Writing in 1996, peace-keeping researcher Wang 
Jianwei lamented that "exactly why the PDK changed its 
strategy" between October 1991 and June 1992 remained 
"anybody's guess".21 In 1997, Cambodian political scientist 
Sorpong Peou similarly wrote that "why the UN failed to coax" 
PDK "to play the political game" by the rules of the Paris 
Agreements was "a puzzle". PDK's "true motivations" in 
rejecting UN coaxing were still the subject of inconclusive 
debate.22 Certainly, literature on peace-keeping has 
continued to put forward alternative interpretations of PDK 
motivations, as overviews by conflict resolution scholars 
Michael Doyle23 and Trevor Findlay24 show. In particular,
21 Wang Jianwei, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia 
(New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
1996), pp.45-51.
22 Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia 
War; From Battlefield to Ballot-Box (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p p .177-178,270.
23 Michael W Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's
Civil Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995),
pp.24,32,68-69.
24 Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.49-51.
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questions remained about the extent to which, as international 
law scholar Steven Ratner put it, PDK signed the Paris 
Agreements "with the deliberate, hidden, intent of violating 
them".25 PDK behaviour left international organizations 
theorists like Stephen Stedman, who attempted seriously to 
work it into an overall taxonomy of what calls he "spoilers" 
of peace processes, perplexed. Even while fitting it into his 
category of "total spoilers", he described as "inconsistent" 
PDK's behaviour between the signature of the Paris Agreements 
in 1991 and the middle of 1992.2S
The study argues that despite the bitter souring over 
many years of relations between Pol Pot and the Vietnamese 
Communists, the PDK's turn-around can only be fully understood 
by taking seriously the doctrinal roots and parameters of PDK 
thinking within the Marxist-Leninist tradition. It argues in 
particular that although the general canons of Stalin and Mao 
Zedong thought laid out the broad parameters of its doctrine, 
the CPK/PDK is better understood as an offshoot of the 
Vietnamese Communist movement that gave birth to it in the 
1940s and against which it violently turned in the 1970s. In 
this sense, the study conceptualizes CPK/PDK as a "post­
colonial" product of the Vietnamese Communist project of an 
Indochina-wide revolution. It suggests that despite the 
bloody transformation of the Cambodian Communist movement from 
an Vietnamese-led auxiliary force of an Indochinese revolution 
into a vehemently anti-Vietnamese organization, it did not 
escape from reliance on Vietnamese Communist doctrine and 
tactics. It did not do so even though in 1975-1978 Pol Pot 
had purged tens of thousands of Cambodian Communists who were 
labelled "Vietnamese agents", and even though it was a
25 Steven R Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping-: Building Peace 
in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (London: MacMillan,
1997), pp.158-159.
26 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace 
Processes", International Security (Vol 22, No 2, Fall 1997), 
p. 27.
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Vietnamese invasion that precipitated the collapse of his 
Democratic Kampuchea regime in 1979. PDK nevertheless 
continued very much to carry within it more or less reworked, 
internalized and inverted elements of Vietnamese Communist 
doctrine, alongside other elements. Thus, "Pol Pot-ism" 
remained embedded in the original wider project of Indochinese 
Communism.27
The key concept upon which Pol Pot relied to fight his 
enemies after 1979 was the Vietnamese doctrine of "people's 
war", including its tactical prescriptions on Communist 
participation in parliamentary struggle and "peace 
agreements", such as that which the Vietnamese had signed in 
1973, two years before they seized power throughout Vietnam. 
Within this framework, this study therefore insists on the 
need to take seriously what it portrays as PDK's self- 
understanding. Doctrine is treated not as a justification or 
pretext for action, but rather something that "really" informs 
and constrains political behaviour.
The study also argues that although Pol Pot relied on the 
Vietnamese model, at the same time he characteristically 
assumed and demanded that the Cambodian revolution could and 
should out-do, out-achieve and thus somehow surpass the
27 For general presentations of this argument as applied to 
anti-colonial movements in the "Third World", see Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, "Shifting Imaginaries: 
Decolonization, Internal Colonization, Postcoloniality", in Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, Decolonization of 
Imagination (London: Zed, 1995), pp.2-9; Catherine Hall,
"Histories, Empires and the Post-Colonial Moment", Iain Chambers 
and Lidia Curti, eds, The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, 
Divided Horizons (London: Routledge, 1996), p.69; Gareth
Griffiths, "Representation and Production: Issues of Control in 
Post-colonial Cultures", in Harish Triverdi and Meenakshi 
Mukherjee, Interrogating Post-Colonialism: Theory, Text and
Context (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996) , p. 24; 
and Helen M Hintjens, Alternatives to Independence: Explorations 
in Post-Colonial Relations (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing,
1995), p.4.
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original.28 This particular nationalist twist in doctrine
stretched the spectrum of potential disagreement within its 
terms. Dissent took place as a debate about the extent to 
which the Cambodian revolution would be able to achieve more 
than the Vietnamese had tried to attain, although only 
occasionally was explicit reference made to the origins of the 
terms of debate in the doctrine of those who were now the 
enemy.29 Although the elasticity of a doctrine like people's 
war provided room both for self-interested behaviour and 
intense disagreement, it was not merely window dressing or a 
source of points for political debate by politicians 
manoeuvring for power position in a deadly political game.
This Study and the Literature on "Pol Potism"
This study thus contradicts the conclusions of works by
28 In his interview with the author Ieng Sary said the CPK 
Standing Committee had decided in September 1975 "to establish 
a more formidable communist foundation for the country more 
quickly than that of Vietnam," such that the Vietnamese Communist 
"wouldn't be able to keep up" with Cambodia's revolution. This, 
he said, "was the common view, the common understanding, of the 
leadership".
The post-colonial ambiguities in the CPK attitude toward the 
Vietnamese was summed up in the dictum of Party Deputy Secretary 
Nuon Chea that the Cambodian Communist movement was "racing to 
put distance" between itself and the Vietnamese "in every way". 
While he glossed this as meaning the CPK should not "owe them 
anything or be entangled with them in any way", the phrasing also 
contained the notion of outpacing them. See the "confessions" of 
Chou Chet alias Si, "IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978" 
(handwritten document with pagination illegible dated 9 May 1978; 
pagination starting from p.l supplied), p.13. The original Khmer 
versions of this and other "confessions" cited here and in 
subsequent chapters are on file in the Tuol Sleng Genocide 
Museum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, the site of the CPK's "S-21" 
Central Security Office when it was in power. Often extracted 
under torture or other forms of severe duress, these documents 
nevertheless provide largely factual autobiographical frameworks 
detailing the political careers and relationships of those 
detained at S-21, into which forced and fantastic "confessions" 
of their supposed "betrayal" of the CPK are woven.
29 As will be seen, however, Pol Pot himself was to do so 
in a speech in February 1992.
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historians such as Ben Kiernan and Michael Vickery, who have 
portrayed CPK/PDK as only superficially "Communist" or simply 
masquerading as Communist, and who suggest it is better 
understood as a racist, (auto)-genocidal, ultra-national, 
peasant populist and/or anarchistic organization. The 
argument here does not deny that CPK/PDK displayed some or 
most of these characteristics. Rather, it suggests that to 
the extent that it did, they were embedded in and acted out 
through self-beliefs that were thought by the actors in a 
particular set of historically-determined Marxist-Leninist 
terms. In this regard, the study also challenges the emphasis 
placed in the work of comparative political scientists such as 
Karl Jackson and Kenneth Quinn on "Maoist" influence over 
CPK/PDK. Again, the point is not to deny such influences, but 
to reveal extent to which the earlier, more formative and 
direct influences of Vietnamese Communism remained at least as 
important.
This study also suggests that these authors have 
overestimated the significance of "Cambodian culture" and the 
fact that some senior CPK leaders had once been students in 
France as explanations of CPK and PDK behaviour. Here they 
are echoing arguments originally put forward in the seminal 
book by the Jesuit historian Francois Ponchaud. Ponchaud 
identified Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan as 
the key "ideologists" of what he called CPK's "revolution of 
the ultras". He explicitly dismissed what he considered the 
fantastic belief of many Cambodians that the CPK's behaviour 
was "inspired by the Vietnamese" Communists. Instead, 
according to Ponchaud, "the methods employed" by the CPK 
showed "every mark of the Cambodian character", which he 
proclaimed reflected a "way of reasoning" that was 
"bewildering to Cartesian minds", even if it adhered "strictly 
to the rules" of its own culturally-specific "internal logic", 
which he denigrated as simple, absurd and unrealistic.30
30 Ponchaud, Year Zero, pp.156,159-160,164, 214.
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Kiernan's view that the CPK can neither be understood as 
a Marxist-Leninist movement nor comprehended in terms familiar 
from the practices of other Communist parties has been 
elaborated in a series of works since the late 1970s,31 
culminating in his 1996 book on the CPK in power. In the 
latter, he imputes a more generic totalitarianism to a CPK 
that he says is best understood in terms of the "racialist 
ideology and the quest for total power" by "the French- 
educated Pol Pot group" within its leadership.32 Such 
characterizations of CPK form the basis for the understanding 
of PDK behaviour vis-a-vis the Paris Agreements put forward by 
Kiernan in a 1993 book, where he also characterizes the PDK 
leadership not as Communists, but genocidists.33
Vickery is even more extreme in arguing that CPK and PDK 
were not Communists. He suggests that Pol Pot and other 
CPK/PDK leaders only claimed to be Communists on a few 
occasions when they hoped this would help bestow popular 
"affective value" on what they were doing, that is, help them 
tap pro-Communist sentiments among Cambodians. In his view, 
Pol Pot and those loyal to him consistently chose "a different 
path from any of the Asian" Communist movements that "could be 
considered either as potential models or relevant subjects for 
comparison." He suggests it would be better to explain both 
CPK policies in 1975-1978 and PDK policies thereafter in terms 
of Thomas More's Utopianism, Mikhail Bakunin's or Spanish 
anarchism, Pitrim Sorokin's peasantism or of some sort of
31 For an early summation, see Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and 
the Kampuchean Communist Movement", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou 
Boua, eds, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981 (London: 
Zed, 1982) .
32 Kiernan, Pol Pot Regime, pp.vii,26.
33 Ben Kiernan, "Introduction" and "The Inclusion of the 
Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and
Consequences", in Ben Kiernan, ed, Genocide and Democracy in 
Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the
International Community (New Haven: Monograph Series No. 41, 
Tale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993).
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Cambodian "old tradition". He argues that PDK's post-1979 
behaviour in particular proves its non-Communist nature.34
This study broadens and further refines my counter-case 
that CPK/PDK was very much inspired by the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition elaborated by Stalin and endorsed not only by the 
Chinese but also the Vietnamese Communists.35 It provides 
further evidence of the ahistorical nature of the picture 
constructed by Ponchaud, elaborated by Kiernan and endorsed by 
Vickery and others of a CPK and PDK leadership increasingly 
dominated (as Kiernan puts it) by a "Pol Pot Group" comprised 
of "most of Pol Pot's Paris friends", or (as Vickery puts it) 
resulting from a process whereby "an original group of 
Cambodian communists, closely tied to Vietnamese Communism, 
were gradually pushed aside by a group of young French- 
educated intellectuals" who abandoned Cambodian Communism's 
origins. It adds post-1979 evidence against the notion that 
"orthodox Marxist" elements were increasingly excluded from 
the CPK/PDK leadership by some sort of coherent "urban, 
French-educated, radical and anti-Vietnamese" faction. It 
buttresses my argument that this picture of a French-educated 
faction is a misleading political label with little 
explanatory power. It furnishes more proof that Pol Pot's 
purported "friends" from Paris days were not by definition his 
permanent political allies. Its documentation of the 
marginalization by mid-1992 of former students-in-Paris leng 
Sary and Son Sen shows that Pol Pot tended as before 1979 to 
place more faith both in Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, whose 
backgrounds were similar to that of cadre whom Kiernan 
describes as leaders of "the old, pro-Vietnamese generation of 
Khmer communists".36 It demonstrates that just as when CPK
34 Vickery, 1975-1982, p p .256-257,264,275,278-279,281-290.
35 For a full-fledged critique of Kiernan's perspective on 
CPK in power, see Heder, "Racism, Marxism, Labelling and 
Genocide".
36 Kiernan, Pol Pot Regime, pp.6,11,14,33,59-60,64,93,186.
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was in power, opposition to Pol Pot was just as likely, 
perhaps more likely, to come from within French-educated 
milieux as from other circles.
Contrary to Vickery, this study also shows that Pol Pot, 
Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son. Sen and Khieu Samphan were Communists 
who eschewed a label they feared would scare off many 
Cambodians, but dogmatically followed Communist policies and 
practices even if they disguised, in public at least, all debt 
to the Indochinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties.37 The 
post-1979 data is incomprehensible from the perspective of 
Vickery's argument that it contains no trace of any Asian 
Communist model. Ironically, it is precisely by Vickery's 
criterion of the extent to which CPK and PDK policies and 
practices are identifiable as Communist, including Vietnamese 
Communist, that the origins of CPK and PDK can best be 
identified, and it is precisely PDK's post-1979 behaviour that 
demonstrates its particular Communist origins.
Whereas Kiernan and Vickery seem to be proactively 
assisting in camouflaging CPK/PDK's Marxist-Leninist origins, 
political scientists Karl Jackson and Kenneth Quinn seem to be 
more naively taken in by its concealment of the extent of its 
doctrinal debt to Vietnamese Communism. Moreover, their 
essentialized Maoist-cultural explanations of CPK's policy 
choices in the 1970s cannot be squared with the evidence 
adduced in this study of PDK's readiness to negotiate in the 
latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s, its eagerness to 
participate in parliamentary struggle and its willingness to 
reduce its armed strength.
Thus, Jackson's notions of the CPK's "radical egalitarian 
political culture" help little to explain PDK's behaviour vis­
37 Vickery, 1975-1982, pp.256-257. Disguising was part of 
the same thinking that informed Son Sen's guiding view about 
using Communist terminology, while the denial of the debt was in 
line with Nuon Chea's insistence that Cambodian Communists should 
put distance between themselves and the Vietnamese.
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a-vis the Paris Agreements. Nor does his characterization of 
the CPK leaders as "sectarians". Even if they were "radicals" 
and "sectarians", that does not explain how they understood 
and approached the implementation of the Paris Agreements. It 
is difficult to reconcile his picture of a "peasant-led, 
completely egalitarian revolution" directed by those CPK 
leaders prone to act "immediately and with zealotry" to 
achieve "total revolution" in 1975-197838 with the choices 
later made by the supposedly most "radical" and "sectarian" of 
them all (eg, Pol Pot and the survivors of his purges).
The problem here is not an implausible general denial of 
Marxist, Leninist or Communist roots. Jackson has no 
difficulty in seeing that Pol Pot, et al, "were communists", 
or in including Stalin's and Mao's teachings in "amalgam of 
nostrums of the left" that were among their "intellectual 
antecedents". He stresses that the goals sought by the CPK 
when it was in power "were far from unique", and parts of them 
mirrored "the thinking of radicals surrounding Mao Zedong 
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution". 
However, influenced by Ponchaud and Kiernan, he accepts the 
notion that these goals were pursued mainly by a "small elite 
of French-educated intellectuals". Thus, not only does 
Jackson's work suffer from an overemphasis on the Maoist 
elements in CPK policies and practices,39 but wrongly 
hypothesizes that departures from it can be explained by Khieu 
Samphan's reading in Paris of Frantz Fanon and Samir Amin.40
38 Karl D Jackson, "Introduction; The Khmer Rouge in 
Context", in Karl D Jackson, ed, Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous 
with Death (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.5-9.
39 Jackson, "Introduction", pp.7-8; "Intellectual Origins of 
the Khmer Rouge", pp.241,245; and "The Ideology of Total 
Revolution", pp.3 8-39, all in Rendezvous.
40 Jackson, "Intellectual Origins", pp.241,247-249. There 
is no evidence to support the idea put forward by Jackson and 
others that Khieu Samphan's doctoral dissertation, completed in 
France in the late 1950s, was a basis for CPK policy. Moreover, 
although Khieu Samphan eventually became totally loyal 
politically to Pol Pot, the relationship was one of Pol Pot
30
Other deviations are explained in terms of 1 centuries-old 
Khmer" beliefs.41
Jackson accepts at face value the CPK leadership's 
expressions of "contempt" for Vietnamese models and 
precedents. He thus reproduces Ponchaud's rej ection of the 
possibility of Vietnamese influence on CPK and aligns himself 
with Kiernan and Vickery in not taking into account the extent 
to which this contempt masked emulation. In this regard, it 
is important to notice how Jackson misreads the significance 
of evidence that in seizing and exercising power, Pol Pot and 
other CPK leaders seemed "to glorify revolutionary violence 
for its own sake" and "relied disproportionately on raw 
physical coercion rather than on party organization, re­
education or the mass media to accomplish their ends". For 
him, it is significant precisely because of the extent to 
which they thus acted "in sharp contrast with their Vietnamese 
communist contemporaries". Indeed, he argues that their 
relative non-use of "political mobilization" was their key 
deviation from the Vietnamese Communist model. This seems in 
turn to be his explanation for their tendency to resort to "a 
steady stream of executions" in 1975-1978.42 The post-1979 
evidence presented in this study, and particularly the 
evidence of Pol Pot's personal obsession with the importance 
of "political mobilization" as opposed to military struggle, 
suggests that the problem was not the lack of aspirations to 
adhere to the Vietnamese model, but what to do when doing so 
proved unworkable and thus unsuccessful. This was not simple 
deviation, but rather a resort to violent methods in an 
attempt to appear to achieve what others, including the 
Vietnamese, had achieved (or more).
domination of Khieu Samphan, not one in which Khieu Samphan 
influenced Pol Pot, Heder, Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan, pp. 3, 8-22.
41 Jackson, "Intellectual Origins", pp.249-250.
42 Jackson, "Ideology", pp.63,73,77-78; "Intellectual 
Origins", pp.243-244.
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Kenneth Quinn similarly overlooks CPK"s Indochinese 
Communist origins and overestimates the importance of other 
influences. He goes too far in arguing that the CPK's 
"radical Communist programs in Cambodia were derived almost in 
toto from left-wing Chinese Communism". In his attempt to 
explain CPK violence and terror, Quinn also tries to fill in 
the gap that remains after Chinese Communism and Stalinism are 
factored in by falling back on Cambodian "cultural factors" 
and relating them to the supposed predominance in the CPK 
leadership of a small group of "alienated" intellectuals 
educated in France.43
The Vietnamese Model and the PDK's Approach to the Paris 
Agreements
This study's alternative emphasis on the internalization 
within CPK/PDK of Vietnamese Communist doctrine is woven into 
its account of the interaction between the PDK and its two 
main adversaries inside Cambodia from October 1991 to the 
middle of 1992. These were SoC and UNTAC. PDK had for years 
denigrated SoC officials as "puppets" of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, and resumed doing so shortly after the 
Agreements were signed. It eventually condemned UNTAC as 
dominated by "the Allies". This term, apparently drawn from 
the World War Two-era historiography of the Vietnamese 
Communists, was used by PDK to refer to "Western Superpowers" 
of the early 1990s, above all the US.
This study does not attempt a detailed assessment of the 
PDK assertion that SoC and UNTAC were dominated by external 
powers in the alleged manner. However, the extensive evidence 
on which it is based suggests that both assertions were very 
dubious. It indicates instead that the proclaimed withdrawal 
of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 19 89 indeed marked the
43 Kenneth Quinn, "Explaining the Terror", in Rendezvous, 
pp.219,231-236,240.
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end of substantial Vietnamese control over SoC,44 and that the 
numerous cross-currents of international influence upon UNTAC 
from the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and 
other signatories of the Paris Agreements meant that it was 
not a tool of any one superpower or group of powers, but a 
much more diffuse and relatively autonomous embodiment of the 
"international community" in Cambodia.
If the evident falseness of PDK7 s doctrinally-based 
beliefs about patterns of external domination of SoC and UNTAC 
is an aside of the study, the major theme is the self- 
delusional aspects of PDK7s obsession with the Vietnamese- 
derived notion of people7 s war. One key self-delusion was the 
belief that by ever-more-correctly following properly-selected 
aspects of the script of people7s war, PDK could eventually
44 UNTAC ultimately concluded that by the time of the 
October 1991 Paris Agreements, all formed Vietnamese military 
units had withdrawn from Cambodia. Although several thousand 
Vietnamese former troops may have remained in the country, most 
were "deserters or retired from the Vietnamese army" and had "no 
formal connection with the Vietnamese government". UN military 
analysts believed some still had weapons and connections with the 
SoC armed forces. Some of these individual Vietnamese may have 
"performed training and technical duties, such as armoured 
vehicle gunnery and maintenance and logistics coordination", or 
occupied staff positions in "operational planning or 
intelligence". However, most were unarmed and unaffiliated with 
SoC. UN information also suggested that although there were 
possibly some "Vietnamese forces in Cambodia working for [their] 
government", these were "small in number". Finally, some of the 
settled Vietnamese communities living in Cambodia were "'rather 
well-structured and organised7 into Associations of Overseas 
Vietnamese (Hoi Viet Kieu) with quasi-governmental functions 
often encadred by demobilized officers and men" of the Vietnamese 
armed forces. These Vietnamese ex-armymen were typically "not 
formerly residents of Cambodia, but had remained there after 
demobilization from the Vietnamese armed forces. ... As cadre 
in the association structure, they exerted some authority over 
people of Vietnamese extraction coming from families with 
generations of residence in Cambodia." However, except to lobby 
SoC on behalf of the Vietnamese communities, these former 
soldiers had little influence on the political process. UNTAC, 
Report on UNTAC's Activities: The First Six Months (15 March-15 
September 1992), p. 17; UNTAC, Cambodia: A Military Assessment of 
the Situation, "The Vietnamese Issue", pp.1-2; and UNTAC, 
Information/Education Division, "Background Note to the 
Vietnamese Massacre in Kampung Tralach", 6 February 1993, np.
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recapture the power CPK had lost when Pol Pot's regime had 
collapsed in the face of Vietnam's 1979 invasion. Another key 
delusion was that implementation of the script would make 
possible a recapturing of power through renewal of the 
political support among the Cambodian peasantry that had 
supposedly been the basis of CPK's original seizure of power 
in 1975. In this make-believe world, PDK was increasingly 
well-placed, as the result of its protracted implementation 
since 1979 of people's war, to build on popular support in the 
Cambodian countryside in order to switch over from military to 
political struggle. Participation in peace treaties and 
elections was fully compatible with accentuating and relying 
upon the "popular" aspect of "people's war", as long as 
precautions were taken to ensure that a return to armed 
struggle remained possible if it was judged necessary.
However, as this study shows, the reality was that the 
PDK was simply unable to erase or otherwise overcome popular 
memories of the CPK (auto-)genocide, which Pol Pot and other 
top leaders denied and probably believed had not occurred.45 
In this regard, this study takes up where earlier detailed 
research on popular attitudes towards PDK policies and 
practices has left off. This includes my own field inquiries 
between 1979 and 1983 and the work of Christophe Peschoux in
45 According to what Pol Pot told journalist Nate Thayer on 
16 October 1997, the leadership reviewed the events of 1975-78 
in 198 7 and came to a consensus view on what had occurred. The 
results of the review were made public in a pamphlet issued in 
the name of the Office of The Vice-President of Democratic 
Kampuchea in charge of Foreign Affairs (ie, Khieu Samphan) , 
entitled "What Are the Truth and Justice About the Accusations 
Against Democratic Kampuchea of Mass Killings from 1975 to 1978?" 
(np: 15 July 1987) . It vastly underestimated the true death toll 
and shifted almost all the responsibility for it to alleged 
"enemies" of the PDK. According to personal communications to 
the author from Thayer, in his interviews with Pol Pot, Nuon 
Chea, Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan in 1997-1998, they did not deviate 
significantly from the position outlined in the pamphlet. Ieng 
Sary conceded in his interview with the author that a genocide 
had taken place, although he argued it was not the result of a 
"planned genocide aimed ... at making a race disappear", but of 
a confluence of various other policies.
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19 8 9-19 9 0 . 46 Like these earlier efforts, it combines data
from interviews with former PDK personnel and "ordinary" 
Cambodians with close readings of internal PDK documents to 
build up a picture of PDK's self-understanding and popular 
reactions to it. It extends into the 1990s the conclusion 
that PDK remained politically crippled by its genocidal past, 
even if it had previously managed to obtain enough tactical 
popular acquiesce to persuade parts of itself and some foreign 
observers that it had overcome this past.
The study thus shows how the PDK leadership consistently 
misinterpreted popular dislike of SoC and tactical popular 
accommodation with its own armed forces as evidence of 
positive, dedicated support just waiting to be tapped and 
manifested in various ways, including through a "free and 
fair" election organized by the UN or anyone who would not rig 
the results against the revolution. It shows that, in fact, 
despite exhortations from the top to be more "political", 
PDK's guerilla insurgents cum would-be electoral activists 
could only advance to the extent that they relied on military 
means, and only under circumstances where Cambodian villagers 
had no political alternatives other than living with SoC or 
supporting PDK against SoC.
The article of faith that the political attitude of the 
peasantry was a critical political factor, itself embedded in 
the notion of people's war, was not implausible, if only 
because the peasantry comprised the overwhelming majority of 
Cambodia's population. The problem, this study suggests, was
46 For published and unpublished results of my own research 
see Steve Heder, Kampuchea: Occupation and Resistance (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 1980); Steve Heder, "Kampuchea: October 
1979-August 1980" (typescript, 1980); Steve Heder, "Democratic 
Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-Mortem", Indochina Issues (No 12, 
January 1981) ; Steve Heder, "From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the 
Villages" (typescript, 1981); Steve Heder,"The National Army for 
the Liberation of the Khmer Populace and the National Front for 
the Liberation of the Khmer Populace" (typescript, August 19 83).
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that peasant animosity vis-a-vis SoC, like urban opposition to 
it, rebounded not to the advantage of PDK, but above all to 
FUNCINPEC. Yet for the PDK leadership, this was simply not 
possible because it was contrary to every tenet of people's 
war. There was no place in the theory for this danger, which 
was contrary to the basic Marxist-Leninist manichaeism that 
underpinned the notion of people's war. Just as no credible 
third force had emerged in the course of the Vietnamese (or 
Chinese) Communists' struggle against their enemies, PDK
assumed, no such thing could well up from Cambodian sources. 
In the PDK view, FUNCINPEC (and KPNLF) could ultimately be but 
bit players on the people's war political and military
battlefield. Even if they could at times tip crucial balances 
in PDK's favour, ultimately what mattered for PDK was the 
political attitude of the peasantry, and PDK believed that 
peasant support for it meant that it would hold the whip hand 
over its former coalition partners in any political process, 
whether electoral or mobilization for political violence.
This study shows how such hopes were revealed as mistaken 
under the domestic political circumstances created by PDK's 
initial and partial commitment to the terms of the Paris
Agreements and the way in which UNTAC carried out those 
Agreements. Above all, UNTAC's implementation of the Paris 
Agreements created openings for FUNCINPEC and KPNLF to try to 
enhance their popularity, which FUNCINPEC soon began to do and 
which KPNLF was also able to do to some extent, even while PDK 
was unable to exploit similar opportunities and thus 
floundered. For Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders,
however, the fact that PDK was not advancing politically vis- 
a-vis SoC once the Paris Agreements were signed meant that 
their implementation was being sabotaged by Vietnamese and the 
US through SoC and UNTAC, just as the Vietnamese Communists 
argued the peace pact they had signed in 1973 was sabotaged by 
the US and its Vietnamese "lackeys". Pol Pot and other PDK 
leaders interpreted PDK's lack of popular support as a 
justification for withdrawing from an electoral contest that
36
they believed was being rigged against them, and then for 
falling instead back on violence. This formula for snatching 
military victory from the jaws of political defeat, however, 
also assumed much more popular support than PDK really had. 
Its popular base would not sustain even the kind of political 
fig-leaf for a military onslaught that characterized the 
offensive by the Vietnamese Communists in which they bypassed 
their 1973 peace agreement and "liberated" the whole of 
Vietnam of 1975. Instead, PDK's resort to violence only 
further isolated it from the population. The facts on the 
ground thus made a nonsense of Pol Pot's theory-based 
revolutionary optimism and determination that if only PDK 
adhered even more tenaciously to the formula that the 
Vietnamese Communists had successfully used in 1973-75, it 
could not fail to do as well if not better than that in 
Cambodia.
This study's narrative of events during the eight months 
from October 1991 to June 1992 also reveals more clearly than 
earlier treatments why PDK could find reasons for blaming its 
popular weakness not only on SoC, but also UNTAC. It comes as 
no surprise that SoC was determined to prevent PDK political 
advances, and was prepared to use violence to do so. However, 
some may be surprised at the extent to which the record 
demonstrates that UNTAC cannot be characterized as having 
appeased PDK, either in intent or in action. Overall, UNTAC's 
policies and practices did not facilitate PDK military or 
political advances, and to the extent that UNTAC tended 
occasionally to show bias, this was more against PDK than for 
it.47 Thus, while PDK was wrong to imagine that SoC was
47 In this regard, the evidence suggests that the direct 
cause of this tendency was not the influence of the US or other 
foreign political actors, but of Sihanouk, who had turned over 
leadership of FUNCINPEC to his son, Norodom Ranariddh, in 1991, 
and who from October 1991 aligned himself de facto with SoC 
against PDK. A full treatment of Sihanouk's motivations are 
beyond the ambit of this work, but an initial reading of 
Sihanouk's actions suggest his primary political goal was to 
achieve a position of direct influence over the existing SoC
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controlled from behind by the Vietnamese Communists and UNTAC 
by an alliance structure headed by the US, it is clear from 
the record that the combined effect of what SoC and UNTAC did 
(or did not) do was such as to ensure that PDK was forced to 
test its belief that the movement enjoyed widespread support 
among the Cambodian people.
The PDK's sole solution when it failed the test was to 
rejig the balance between the political and military aspects 
of people's war in favour of greater violence. It continued 
to assume that the political support was there; that if it was 
not manifest, then it was being repressed by SoC (acting as a 
puppet of Vietnam) with the help of UNTAC (subverted by the 
US) ; and that the repression could be swept away by renewed 
resort to revolutionary violence. The PDK presumption was 
that FUNCINPEC, Sihanouk and KPNLF would be swept along in the 
upsurge, and that UNTAC would be powerless to resist the 
popular tide. PDK's belief in its peasant support was so 
overwhelming that it was prepared to risk almost complete 
diplomatic isolation in order to capitalize on that support 
through whatever means. If the international community was 
prepared to allow the popular will to be manifest through 
elections, that was fine; but if it was not, then the domestic 
gains PDK thought would be achievable through using NADK to 
arouse the peasantry to revolutionary violence far outweighed 
the international risks.
But there was no pro-PDK upsurge, before or after PDK 
began increasingly returning to violence. On the contrary, 
the more violent it became, the more the population turned 
away from PDK toward FUNCINPEC. Thus, while SoC repression 
was real enough, and there was a popular will to sweep it away
administration and work through it to reestablish contacts with 
"his" erstwhile "subjects", while his primary policy goal was to 
work through SoC to restore the flow of international aid to 
Cambodia to hasten its economic reconstruction. In this case, 
too, PDK could only surmise that Sihanouk's perfidy was due to 
some sort of teleguiding by the US.
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electorally, there was no popular enthusiasm for rising up 
violently against SoC in order to restore PDK to power. As a 
result, this study shows, PDK's stepwise re-escalation of its 
guerrilla war had by mid-1992 gotten it nowhere militarily and 
was already proving diplomatically and politically counter­
productive .
Indeed, it is the argument of this study that by mid-1992 
the broad outlines of the outcome of the implementation of the 
Paris Agreements had been set. With hindsight, at least, 
PDK's political and therefore military and diplomatic failures 
were evident. Military escalation in a context of political 
weakness and diplomatic isolation only exacerbated the 
weakness and deepened the isolation, until the remnants of the 
movement finally self-destructed totally in 1996-1998 with the 
open defection of Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's assassination of Son 
Sen, Ta Mok's arrest and trial of Pol Pot, the "breakaway" of 
almost all NADK troops first from Pol Pot and then from Ta 
Mok, and their integration into political and military 
structures dominated by erstwhile SoC officials.
Sources. Style. Substance and Acknowledcrements
As readers will see, many of the materials used in this 
study were collected while I was working for UNTAC, as a 
Deputy Director of its Information/Education Division. A few 
sources used were written by me in that capacity. I cite 
myself as the author of these documents. However, other UNTAC 
sources are cited with reference only to the UNTAC component 
in which they were produced. This is in part because of the 
difficulty of tracking down all the individual authors to 
obtain their permission to name them, and in part because some 
documents were bureaucratically produced, so that the name of 
the person that appears on the document is not necessarily the 
author, but merely the head of the component in question. I 
apologize in advance to anyone who feels slighted by not being 
named. However, I trust that my former colleagues at the
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Information/Education Division, including its Director, Tim 
Carney, and my fellow "information officers" David Ashley, 
Penny Edwards, Kate Frieson, Jay Jordens, Judy Ledgerwood, 
John Marston and Christophe Peschoux, will appreciate being 
thanked for producing or passing on many of the UNTAC 
documents cited.
Other materials used in this study include interviews 
that I conducted with what UNTAC called "self-demobilizers" 
from the PDK armed forces. These were combatants who 
voluntarily left NADK ranks and agreed to speak to UNTAC, but 
with a promise of anonymity. That undertaking is maintained 
herein.
In addition, this study makes use of a number of PDK 
internal documents, mostly texts used within its ranks to 
indoctrinate its cadre about PDK policies and plans. Almost 
without exception, these documents came to me not through 
UNTAC channels, but from journalists and researchers 
interested in PDK motivations and intentions. Here I am glad 
to thank Christophe Peschoux (in his pre-UNTAC capacity), Nate 
Thayer and Nayan Chanda for their generosity.
In weaving the study's narrative, I have also made 
extensive use of public PDK propaganda as broadcast over its 
radio stations.48 These broadcasts, which were obligatory 
listening for all PDK cadre, NADK combatants and people under 
PDK control, signalled and explained PDK policy to those who 
were not made privy to or otherwise lacked access to 
relatively more sophisticated, explicit or secret
48 These broadcasts were monitored by the United States' 
Foreign Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), by wire services 
such as Kyodo and Associated Press, and by UNTAC. For most of 
the period covered by this study, the author had access to the 
raw results of such monitoring, only some of which was ultimately 
published by FBIS or its British counterpart, Summary of World 
Broadcasts (SWB). This is why there are no citations to FBIS 
or SWB.
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instructions. Sometimes wrongly dismissed as meaningless 
propaganda, the broadcasts in fact clearly revealed to 
experienced listeners key developments and shifts in the 
thinking of the PDK leadership, even if they intentionally 
left many things deeply obscured.
My use of UNTAC sources raises questions of ethics, 
selectivity and objectivity. The ethical problem of making 
use of material obtained while working for UNTAC appears to be 
moot. Many other authors, including both former UNTAC 
employees and scholars with no connection to the UN, have 
already relied on internal UNTAC sources in published books 
and articles, and to my knowledge neither the UN nor anyone 
else has suggested that they have acted unethically. 
Selectivity is always a danger in the use of any body of 
source material. On this front, I can only say that I have 
attempted to be as comprehensive as humanly possible when 
consulting sources. For example, the sometimes perhaps 
excessive detail contained in accounts of military activities 
reflects an effort to collate and synthesize every last daily 
military report from opposing Cambodian forces and from 
UNTAC7s military information system.
The question of the objectivity of a study by a 
participant-observer is more vexing. Some might suspect that 
the study attempts to justify and even glorify UNTAC7s role 
{and thus my own) in the context of one of the polemics that 
the study engages: whether or not UNTAC "appeased Pol Pot". 
Readers will have to judge from the evidence adduced whether 
this study7s conclusion that UNTAC did not is tendentious or 
justified. More generally, I draw readers7 attention to 
accounts by myself and my fellow information officers that 
describe the activities and characteristics of the 
Information/Education Division, and argue that it was hardly 
inclined to sing UNTAC7s praises or reach any pre-ordained
conclusions .49
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Other readers, particularly those with some combination 
of academic and bureaucratic background, may object not so 
much to the study7 s conclusions as to the style in which it 
attempts to make a contribution to knowledge. This involves 
not just the way in which it deploys the acronyms of UNTAC7s 
bureaucrat-ese, but the extent to which it can be read as a 
somewhat cross-dressed "end of mission report" that, as such 
documents typically do, paste together earlier documents in 
order to create a record of what was done and thought at the 
time. I apologize for the acronym use. It is inelegant but 
it saves words and space. I apologize less for the "end of 
mission" format. First, even if it was little more than that, 
it would still set out the narrative with a degree of accuracy 
that I believe has not hitherto been achieved. I also believe 
that, at some risk of tedium, its narrative "gives a feel" for 
the quotidian contest between PDK and its adversaries that in- 
and-of-itself reveals the tenacity with which it pursued its 
objectives and the extent to which it consistently failed to 
achieve them. The narrative helps thereby to capture the 
frustration that PDK must have felt, and thus to explain why 
it resorted to the violence of guerilla warfare. For PDK, it 
was not a matter of a few snubs or setbacks; rather, it was a 
daily struggle during which it found itself blocked at every 
turn.
I hope that this narrative, laid out in the eleven 
chapters that follow, develops and demonstrates the validity 
of my counter-arguments against the literature reviewed above, 
but it does not directly confront the works of the authors
49 See Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, "The Politics of 
Violence: An Introduction", in Propaganda, Politics, and Violence 
in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace- 
Keeping (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996), pp.33-37; John Marston,
"Cambodia 1991-1994: Hierarchy, Neutrality and Etiquettes of
Discourse" (unpublished PhD Dissertation: University of
Washington, 1997), pp.275-387.
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covered until the conclusion. There, I attempt such a 
confrontation, and the counter-arguments I have tried to build 
up on what I believe is a painstaking use of sources are made 
explicit and pointed.
Finally, before leaving readers to the mercies of the 
narrative, I would like to thank all those who have 
contributed to making this study happen in ways other than 
providing sources. Both Bob Taylor and John Sidel gave 
supervision without which this project could never have been 
completed. David Chandler and Demelza Stubbings read complete 
drafts and provided editorial comments and corrections that 
led to numerous improvements. And only my wife Marianne 
Lilliebjerg and our daughters Nina and Ella can possibly 
understand how much I owe them in terms of years of moral and 
other support, without which this study could not even have 
been begun.
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CHAPTER ONE
PEOPLE'S WAR AND PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE
PDK7 g People's War
In the eyes of the PDK leadership, its post-1979 
struggle, like the one that had brought the CPK to power in 
1975, was a "people's war" in which the emphasis was in theory 
on political mobilization of the peasantry.1 Its thinking in 
this regard remained profoundly influenced by its 
internalization of both Chinese and particular Vietnamese 
Communist dogma. Lin (jiao's famous 1967 codification of Mao 
Zedong's concept of "people's war" laid great stress "on the 
establishment of rural base areas and the use of the 
countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them." 
To expand Communist control to "the enemy-occupied ... 
villages", it was necessary to "combine . . . legal with illegal 
struggle, unite . . . the basic masses and all patriots, and 
divide . . . and disintegrate . . . the political power of the 
enemy so as to prepare ... to attack the enemy from within in 
coordination with operations from without when conditions 
[are] ripe."2
1 According to Pol Pot, the CPK's 1970-1975 struggle had 
been a "people's war" that took its strength politically from the 
"peasant people". Pol Pot, Chayo Khuop Ti-17 Pak Kommuynih 
Kampuchea ("Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea") [Pol Pot, Chayo] (Democratic Kampuchea, 30 
September 1977), pp.26,32,34. The extent to which the CPK in 
fact enjoyed popular peasant support in 1970-1975 and why remains 
disputed. For contending arguments see Kate G Frieson, "The 
Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants, 1970-1975" 
(unpublished PhD dissertation: Monash University Department of 
Politics, 1991) ; Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A 
History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975 (London: Verso,
1985), chapter 8; and Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, 
Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp.15-25.
2 Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.10-12,22,24.
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According to texts produced during the 1960s by 
Vietnamese military theoretician Vo Nguyen Giap, "people's 
war" required building up a "political force" of "all the 
people" to "participate in all types of uprisings" to seize 
administrative power. These political forces "must erode, 
annihilate, disperse and [harass] the enemy everywhere". To 
extend revolutionary bases into "areas under the enemy's 
temporary control" required the use of "various forms of 
struggle - from illegal to legal struggle, from economic to 
political and armed struggle." These could include "partial 
uprisings" carried out by "secret political and armed organs" 
to "overthrow the enemy's local administration ... in 
preparation for the general thrust to wrest political power by 
force". A people's war armed struggle aimed at "annihilating 
the enemy's military forces" in order "to support the 
revolutionary masses in conducting their political struggle". 
It would help the "people's political forces" to "advance ... 
from the ordinary aspects of political struggle toward 
conducting an armed uprising" to set up a "revolutionary 
administration."3 In the meantime, the "political army of the 
masses" must oppose enemy military conscription, labour corvee 
and economic policies and do "agitation work among the puppet 
soldiers" to urge them to come "over to the side of the 
people" in preparation for the day when it would "rise ... up 
and smash ... to pieces the enemy's rural administration".4
In accordance with such received Communist wisdom and its 
interpretation of the reasons for its success in 1975, the CPK 
defined its people's war against the Vietnamese invasion as 
one in which "the fundamental factor" was the "political 
factor, ie, popular strength". Thus, right from 1979, CPK
3 Vo Nguyen Giap, Banner of People's War, the Party's 
Military Line (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), pp.23,25-
29,34,44,57-58.
4 Vo Nguyen Giap, "The South Vietnamese People Will Win" (19 
July 1964) , in Russell Stetler, ed, The Military Art of People's 
War; Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp.214-217.
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armed forces were to devote themselves to "fashioning . . . 
political bases among the people . . . , especially in areas 
temporarily controlled by the ... enemy, in order to 
strengthen and expand ... popular forces in every domain ... 
so that they will become forces of opposition to the . . . enemy 
right in the areas that the ... enemy temporarily controls." 
This required "fashioning and leading" the people "as 
underground and covert forces ..., such as underground nuclei 
to propagandize, mobilize and whip up popular anger", to "act 
as couriers and guides for our cadre and guerillas" and to 
"provide food supplies to our guerillas and cadre at work in 
the grassroots, etc." This formation of covert CPK support 
nuclei in the villages aimed to transform areas under the 
administration of its People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
adversaries into "guerilla areas belonging to" the CPK 
politically.5 By 1980, its National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea (NADK) was already being instructed to try to 
intensify "mass popular work" to in order to foment "mass 
popular general uprisings" in the countryside. To create 
conditions for rural insurrection, it was to conduct 
"propaganda-education" among the people. Those who were 
successfully proselytized should be left in place as "two- 
faced" elements secretly assigned by NADK to carry out "clear- 
cut duties". Those who did well at their tasks would be 
selected as underground "leadership nuclei" and function as 
"strategic leading forces" for village uprisings. Such 
political work was the "utmost priority duty" of the armed 
forces, equal in importance to its military work and a 
precondition for it.6
5 [Communist Party of Kampuchea] , Teuh Nae~noam Muoy Chamnuon 
Ney Meakear Ydthea robah Pak Knong kar Thwoe Sangkream 
Pracheachun Vai A-Khmang Yuon Chhlean-pean, Veat-ti, Lep Toek- 
dei, Bambat Pouchsah Aoy Parachey Teang Srong Ti Chong Bamphot 
("A Number of Guiding Orientations of the Party's Military Line 
for Making People's War to Attack and in the End Totally to 
Defeat the Contemptible Yuon Aggressor, Expansionist, Territory- 
Swallowing, Genocidal Enemy") (29 June 1979), pp.21,17-18.
6 [Communist Party of Kampuchea] Sector 32, Kar-ngear 5 
Chumhean ("Five-Step Work"), May 1980, pp.1-2,6-7,9-10,12-14.
4 6
For several years, such plans were almost impossible to 
implement due to peasant fear and hatred of the CPK. The 
CPK7 s "political and popular isolation" remained "severe, 
despite a repudiation of its former radical policies, 
proclamation of a 'moderate7 political programme, an open-door 
call for the creation of a broad united front and a gradual, 
but significant reduction in the amount of violence and 
brutality involved in [its] dealings with the population." 
Thus, "most of the populated countryside was off limits to 
[PDK] fighters and agents" because villagers would summon ... 
security forces to deal with them if they appeared. There 
remained "such a large hard core of people completely and 
absolutely opposed to any return to power by [PDK] that no 
really fundamental shift in national sentiment seemed even 
remotely possible." Thus, it appeared unlikely that PDK would 
"be able to make any significant breakthrough" politically.7 
However, by 1983, there were signs it had begun to convince 
some elements of the population in areas it had penetrated 
that it no longer carried out systematic executions, and thus 
managed to gain a degree of peasant tolerance. Although the 
number of people prepared to cooperate with it remained small, 
the marginal increase was thus enough to encourage PDK visions 
of an ever-rising tide of popular support and to alarm its 
adversaries.8
NADK was constantly reminded that the key to turning 
hopes into facts was to "regard itself as both a political and 
a military army".9 It was to strive to go beyond simple
7 Steve Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime7s Post- 
Mortem", Indochina Issues (No 12, January 1981), pp.1,6-7.
8 Marcel Barang, "Rebirth of the Khmer Rouge", South, 
November 1983.
9 Radio Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 
[VoNADK], 2 March 1983. By convention, broadcasts by VoNADK and 
its sister radio station, Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VoDK) 
are dated at Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) . Because Cambodia is 
seven hours later than GMT and VoNADK/VoDK normally transmitted 
at 06.30, Cambodia time, broadcasts were heard in Cambodia a day
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military operations to organize rural uprisings carried out 
with the "direct participation" of villagers.10 The NADK's 
job was to create conditions for such peasant insurrections by 
militarily destroying "all the positions of the enemy" in 
villages that had already been penetrated politically, and 
then to declare the establishment of local administrations 
that supposedly answered to the recently-formed Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Senior PDK 
officials claimed these new administrations incorporated 
elements loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC and the 
third coalition partie, Son Sann's KPNLF.11 However, 
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF both dismissed these claims, saying that 
in fact NADK was setting up committees composed exclusively of 
its own underground nuclei. They demanded that PDK stop the 
pretending that these committees were structures of CGDK 
political power.12
PDK was thus left politically on its own to begin 
implementation in late 1983 of a plan that it hoped would 
accelerate village base-building activities in the five 
provinces around the Tonle Sap lake (Batdambang, Siem Reap, 
Kampung Thom, Kampung Chhnang, Posat), which were designated 
NADK's "Battle Zone Number One" . The orders were for NADK to 
concentrate its military efforts on attacking the subdistrict, 
the next administrative level up from the village. This aimed 
to create conditions to "mobilize" and "liberate" the 
population of nearby villages politically and to "persuade"
later than the date of transmission. For example, in this case, 
the broadcast would have been heard in Cambodia on 3 March 1983 .
10 VoNADK, 20 May 1983.
11 Author's translation of a journalist's interview with 
Ieng Sary, 22 May 1983.
12 Interviews with Nong Hean, G-l and G-2 of the General 
Staff of the Sihanoukist National Army, and with Thach Reng, 
member of the General Staff Committee of the Khmer People's 
National Liberation Armed Forces, May-June 1983.
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local PRK militia forces to "disperse".13 NADK was to promote 
"secret meetings of two, three, five or ten participants" to 
support NADK "deep operations".14 In describing NADK 
activities in 1984, cadre thus said that their first objective 
was to "establish contact with more villagers, explain our 
policy and gain their support". This took priority over 
efforts to "attack and knock out ... enemy forces", although 
the two goals went "hand-in-hand" and reinforced each other.15
No rigorously-collected evidence exist about the extent 
to which the hopes embodied in these plans were realized in 
the mid-1980s. However, evidence from later in the decade 
clearly indicates that the gap between theory and practice, 
plan and outcome, intention and result, remained enormous. 
The gap seems to have been covered up by wildly exaggerated 
propaganda claims that vastly overestimated NADK's successes, 
even if the statistics sometimes inadvertently revealed trends 
that suggested NADK was facing problems in making truly 
political gains.
From the mid-19 80s on, PDK propaganda talked increasingly 
about NADK actions to "disperse", "dismantle" and "liberate" 
subdistricts and villages. The emptiness of this talk was 
indicated by the lack of any explicit definition of such 
terms. However, it was clear from how they were used that 
dispersing and dismantling referred at best to fleeting 
disruption of PRK administrative control, and that even 
liberation could be a temporary phenomenon. In practice, 
liberation did not necessarily signify either permanent NADK 
occupation or full-fledged reorganization of the existing 
political structure to bring it under explicit PDK domination.
13 VoNADK, 6 January 1985; Permanent Delegation of 
Democratic Kampuchea to UNESCO "Press Release" [PDDK-UNESCO], 11 
February 19 85.
14 VoDK, 11 February 1985.
15 Nation Review (Bangkok), 19 July 1984.
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Rather, it was a term of self-congratulation for supposed 
success at serious disruption of PRK domination and at finding 
greater opportunities for recruiting or otherwise implanting 
covert or semi-covert PDK sympathizers. Already exaggerated 
statistics about NADK operations could be further upped 
because by these vague definitions, the same village or 
subdistrict could be "dispersed", "dismantled" and/or 
"liberated" again and again during repeated NADK attacks. 
According to an optimistic reading of the numbers, these were 
evidence of a process according to which these villages and 
subdistricts would gradually but eventually be brought under 
total PDK control, or would at least create conditions making 
this possible. To the extent that the numbers meant anything 
at all, however, they could also be read pessimistically as 
evidence that NADK was attacking again and again by force of 
arms to no positive political effect.
Still, during 19 84, the Vietnamese military became 
increasingly alarmed that the NADK had "created infiltration 
corridors to put forces and weapons inland for "building 
counter-revolutionary forces", and decided that in order to 
prevent further inroads, it must destroy NADK and other 
opposition rear military and logistics bases along the 
Cambodian border with Thailand.16 It did this with the help 
of PRK auxiliary units in a series of operations in late 1984 
and early 1985.
The Vietnamese operations initially seemed to have no 
great impact.17 In May 1985, PDK claimed that despite the 
Vietnamese offensive, NADK attacks that "dispersed 160 
subdistricts and liberated 82 others" had made it possible to
16 Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER] , 7 February 1985, 
quoting an article by Vietnamese Senior General Le Due Anh in the 
Vietnamese armed forces journal Quan Doi Nhan Dan.
17 FEER, 9 May 1985; Christian Science Monitor, 22-28 June 
1985; "Thai Marines Still Battling Vietnamese on Border", Reuter, 
Bangkok, 9 May 1985.
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"liberate" 972 villages in various parts of Cambodia during 
the six dry season months from October 1984 to April 1985.18 
Such NADK operations had supposedly "encouraged" villagers to 
"closely cooperate" with the NADK.19 However, NADK claims 
about its activities during the six rainy season months from 
May to September 1985 suggested the Vietnamese operations had 
a major delayed effect and belied any optimism about PDK 
political progress. NADK said it had been able to disperse 
only 82 subdistricts while liberating 3 0 others, and to 
liberate only 347 villages. Such a massive fall-off indicated 
that military disruption of the NADK had belatedly but clearly 
revealed PDK political weakness. It certainly gave a hollow 
ring to propaganda claims that NADK was continuing to get the 
people to "better understand the policies" of PDK and to "more 
vigorously assist" the NADK.20
Armed Struggle and Elections
The setback to the effectiveness of NADK's people's war 
to which the 1985 rainy season statistics pointed was 
reflected in shifts in the PDK's political and military 
tactics. Politically, it softened its stance toward the PRK 
and toward the notion of a "political solution" to the 
"Kampuchea problem" via internationally-supervised elections, 
something that Sihanouk and the United Nations had long been 
promoting.
Received Communist wisdom informed the PDK attitude 
toward elections just as much as its concept of people's war. 
According to the Stalinist, Chinese and Vietnamese doctrine 
codified in texts stretching from the 1930s to the 1970s, 
renunciation of armed struggle in favour of parliamentary 
struggle is not only permissible but necessary if this will
18 VoNADK, 5 May 1985.
19 VoDK, 3 0 June 1985.
20 VoNADK, 9 October 1985.
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further the objective of destroying a Communist Party's 
political enemies. However, such situations are rare and
fleeting, and thus such a renunciation can only be tactical
and temporary.
Stalin had insisted it was "absolutely wrong" for 
Marxist-Leninists to ignore opportunities offered by 
parliamentary struggle or peace agreements to further their 
interests. The key was to use "revolutionary tactics" to 
transform such opportunities "into an instrument for 
disintegrating" the power of the enemy.21
In their noisy polemics with post-Stalinist Soviet 
"revisionists", Chinese theoreticians had similarly admonished 
Communists that if "practical possibilities for peaceful" 
struggle "were to arise", they should "make timely use" of 
them "to win the support of the masses", while remaining
"prepared at all times to repulse counter-revolutionary
attacks . . . by armed force if" their enemies used "armed force 
to suppress the people's revolution".22
In texts in the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnamese also 
advocated tactical flexibility, but ultimate reliance on 
force. Thus, Giap explained that in organizing "the large 
mass of peasants" to carry out "revolutionary violence" to 
"win political power" via a people's war, Communists should 
always remember that there might be periods when the Party 
would rely exclusively on "the strength of the masses for ... 
political struggle" while surreptitiously making "preparations 
for an armed uprising". Properly handled, such episodes of 
"acute political struggle" could be developed "afterward into
21 JV Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism: Lectures 
Delivered at the Sverdlov University", in Problems of Leninism 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp.45,47,89-90,94-95.
22 "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition 
(November 10, 1957)", in The Polemic on the General Line of the 
International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1965) [Polemic], pp.105-107.
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political struggle combined with armed struggle".23 In 
endorsing the use of "a multitude of flexible and manifold 
forms of organization and activity", veteran Communist Party 
Secretary-General Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders pointed 
out that these included the utilization of legislative bodies, 
even those "set up by the ... colonialists". This was one of 
the ways in which Communists could succeed in promoting 
"struggles sweeping towns and countryside".24 Theoretician 
Truong Chinh recalled periods during which the Party had used 
parliamentary activities "to trigger off a seething movement 
of political struggle." This helped make it possible for it 
later to advance "from political struggle to the mobilization 
for armed struggle ..., properly combining ... political and 
armed struggle" into armed insurrection.25
Thus, "while always taking illegal action as the 
foundation", Communists should "skilfully combine ... it with 
all possibilities for legal action" and, in certain 
situations, "start an all-out drive for legality ... with a 
view to ... amplifying the influence of the revolution." At 
the same time, they had to remember that "Communist activity 
requires the strictest secrecy," and must therefore adhere to 
the "Party's principle of secrecy in organization" in case 
"there is a sudden shift in the situation, when the enemy 
attacks the revolution, and when the Party has to effect a 
quick and complete change-over to illegal action.26 Even in 
periods of political struggle, it was also imperative to have 
"places where ... armed forces could be hidden", either in a
23 Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Political and Military Line of Our 
Party" (22 December 1964), in Stetler, ed, Military Art, pp.163- 
170.
24 Le Duan, The Vietnamese Revolution: Fundamental Problems, 
Essential Tasks (February 1970) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1978), p.47.
25 Truong Chinh, Forward Along the Path Charted by K Marx 
(Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969), pp.60-64.
26 Le Duan, Vietnamese Revolution, pp.51-52,58.
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"strongly organized rear" or in "secret political bases" 
established among networks of politically loyal people.27
Misgivings About Elections: Disasters After Geneva
Doctrinal canons about the need for both flexibility and 
scepticism with regard to parliamentary struggle had 
particular resonances for Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and other senior 
PDK figures, who had first attempted to implement them under 
Vietnamese guidance and then later on their own. Their 
experiences suggested that any attempt to transform people's 
warfare into parliamentary struggle was likely to be fraught 
with dangers unless the transformation took place under 
circumstances that guaranteed a fundamental neutralization of 
the political structures and armed forces of their enemies. 
This had been shown in the "internationally-supervised" 
elections held in Cambodia in 1955 as a result of the Geneva 
Agreements that ended the First Indochina War (1945-1954), in 
which the Communists won no seats. At the same time, however, 
this apparent confirmation left unanswered questions about how 
well Cambodian Communists would have done if the elections in 
which they attempted to compete had been really "free and 
fair" . It left room for a^ f completely untested belief that 
they were so popular among the peasantry that they would have 
"won" (or at least done well) in a genuinely open contest.
The Geneva Agreements of 1954 had provided for a cease­
fire, the withdrawal of French colonial and Vietnamese 
Communist forces from Cambodia, the demobilization on the spot 
of Cambodian Communist and other armed Cambodian opposition 
forces, and elections by secret ballot in which all parties 
could freely participate. The Royal Government of Norodom 
Sihanouk, to which France had ceded independence in 1953, 
promised to ensure that "no reprisals shall be taken" against 
members of the former armed opposition, and that they would
27 Giap, "Political and Military Line", p.179.
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enjoy "all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection 
of ... democratic freedoms". The Agreements provided for an 
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) 
comprising representatives of India, Poland and Canada, to 
"fulfil the functions of control, observation, inspection and 
investigation" to guarantee their fulfilment.20 However, 
Sihanouk and his supporters successfully questioned whether 
the ICSC had a full mandate to supervise the elections. In 
practice, it mostly limited itself to "general observation" 
and did not attempt to ensure the neutrality of the state 
apparatus vis-a-vis the electoral process.29
The 1955 elections thus took place with the Cambodian 
state in the strong grip of Sihanouk and those politically 
loyal to him. They used the elections to preclude the 
possibility that anyone could challenge their political 
primacy via parliamentary representation. Through the Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum political organization that they formed, they 
thus shut the Cambodian Communists veterans of armed struggle 
who tried their luck with the parliamentary path completely 
out of the national assembly.
Pol Pot played a significant role in Cambodian 
Communism's early electoral gambits. After an introduction to 
Marxism-Leninism while a student in France, he had returned to 
Cambodia in 1953 to participate in armed resistance 
activities. He joined a rural branch of the Indochinese 
Communist Party in which the leading Cambodian cadre was Tou 
Samut. After the Geneva Agreements, Tou Samut took charge of 
underground Cambodian Communist activities in Phnom Penh, and 
brought Pol Pot with him to help set up the overt, Communist-
28 See appendices 1 and 2 in Robert F Randle, Geneva 1954: 
The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969): "Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities in Cambodia", Articles 6,11,13; and "Final 
Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring 
Peace in Indochina, July 1954", Articles 3 and 7.
29 Randle, Geneva, pp.491-500.
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front krom pracheachun (People's Group) . Both Tou Samut and 
Pol Pot continued to take their political lead from a 
Vietnamese Communist cadre who also accompanied them to Phnom 
Penh, Pham van Ba.30 His advice mirrored Communist policies 
inside Vietnam, where the Geneva Agreements also applied.31
In competing against Sihanouk, the Democrats and 
Pracheachun were up against a popular adversary. In 
particular, there can be no doubt that Sihanouk's 
accomplishments in achieving Cambodia's formal independence 
from France in 1953 helped significantly to make him popular 
within the ranks of the civil service and the population at 
large, and it is generally agreed that this was a major factor 
underlying the electoral success that Sihanouk scored later in 
1955.32 However, the overwhelming extent of that success can 
only be understood in terms of his increasing takeover of the 
state apparatus and his use of it before and during the actual
30 Author's interview with Mey Man, then a member of the 
Communist Party organization in the capital, Phnom Penh, 1 July 
1997.
31 See Carlyle A Thayer, War By Other Means: National 
Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60 (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1989), pp.1-91.
32 For discussions of the elections and the political 
context in which they took place, see David P Chandler, The 
Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 
1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.74-84;
Kiernan, How Pol Pot, pp.153-164; Marie Alexandrine Martin, 
Cambodia: A Shattered Society, translated by Mark W. McLeod
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.62-63;
Philippe Preschez, Essai sur la Democratic au Cambodge (Paris: 
Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales, Foundation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Serie C; Recherches, No 4, 
October 1961), pp.55-64; VM Reddi, A History of the Cambodian 
Independence Movement, 1863-1955 (Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara
University Press, 1970), pp.220-223; Philippe Devillers, "Livre 
VI: Cambodge", in Philippe Devillers, Pierre Fistie and Le Thanh 
Khoi, L'Asie du Sud-est (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1971), pp.610- 
614; Michael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-7 6", in Ben 
Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 
1942-1981, pp.96-97; and Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of 
Light, Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1994), pp.89-99.
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balloting. The key to Sihanouk's electoral destruction of the 
Communists was his control of the state, particularly the 
local administration and its security and information 
services, which Sihanouk and government officials used to 
harass, arrest, muzzle and sometimes kill their opponents, to 
stuff ballots and to doctor results when other measures failed 
to produce victories. Thus, a Sangkum victory was made 
total.33 The final official count confirmed the Sangkum sweep 
with 82 percent of votes cast and the Pracheachun at just four 
percent.34 Privately, the three members of the ICSC engaged 
in a "bitter debate" about whether the elections had been 
"free". The Indian and Polish representatives believed they 
had not been. However, after the Canadian representative 
threatened to disavow this view publicly, they agreed to 
comprise wording that left the opposite impression.35
‘ The fact that the Communists had clearly been cheated 
meant that a greatly exaggerated myth of what might have been 
could be formulated and nurtured in the minds of Pol Pot and 
other victims of electoral unfairness. Assessing the 
elections 22 years later, he asserted that "popular forces 
throughout the country supported the revolution and the 
progressives", but that "the people were unable to cast their 
ballots for the progressives because the power-holding classes 
were in possession of the guns, the weapons, the law, the 
courts, the prisons and of other tools with which to repress 
our people." Pol Pot declared "the victorious fruits" of the 
"popular revolutionary struggle" of 1945-54 thus "vanished 
into thin air". This "lesson in the fresh blood" of Communist 
martyrs had suggested that if it was to avoid future "defeats 
and destruction", it must recognize that "armed struggle is 
the highest form of struggle" . However, this did not mean
33 [US Embassy,] Phnom Penh, "Joint Weeka No 38" [hereafter: 
JW+No], 21 September 1955.
34 Preschez, p.62; Kiernan, How Pol Pot, p.162.
35 JW46, 9 October 1955.
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eschewing other forms of struggle that might be useful for 
what he presumed had always been and would always be a "mass 
revolutionary movement".36
In line with Communist orthodoxy about the need for 
tactical flexibility, therefore, the 1960 Cambodian Communist 
Party Congress at which Pol Pot rose to number three in its 
leadership did not reject in principle further participation 
in parliamentary struggle. Instead, as Pol Pot approvingly 
recalled, the stance was that "the parliamentary struggle was 
a struggle in which the Party must engage", although it was 
secondary and subordinate to covert and illegal organization 
of the peasantry in order to overthrow the existing regime 
with "revolutionary political violence and revolutionary armed 
violence."37 However, the Communists decided that [Ywas
pointless to put forward candidates of their own, even in the 
form of the Pracheachun. Instead, they attempted to
infiltrate the Sangkum, and through it, to achieve a voice in 
parliament and even in government. Its main asset in this 
regard was Khieu Samphan, who had come back to Cambodia in 
mid-1959 after earning a doctorate in economics in France. 
Upon his return, he had opened a French-language newspaper, 
1 '0bservateur.3B This publication, which was the result of
36 Pol Pot, Chayo, pp. 13 -14,18-2 0. The Vietnamese
Communists took a similarly dark view of the results of the 
Geneva Agreements in their country. They blamed US imperialism 
for having prevailed upon France so that, among other things, 
national elections were never held. Thayer, War By Other Means, 
p.41. They concluded that events after the Geneva Agreements 
proved that "to overthrow the enemy, ... there was no other way 
than to wage a revolutionary struggle" in which "persistent 
political struggle" must be "bolstered by an armed struggle". 
Through "hard-won experiences", it became clear that "the most 
correct path to be followed by peoples to liberate themselves" 
was "revolutionary violence and revolutionary war". Vo Nguyen 
Giap, "The South Vietnamese People Will Win" (19 July 1964), in 
Stetler, The Military Art, p p .186,190-191,213.
37 Pol Pot, Chayo, pp. 20,24-25.
38 Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction", in Khieu 
Samphan, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper Number 11,
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an initiative by Pol Pot,39 was soon shut down by Sihanouk, 
but not before Khieu Samphan gained a reputation for probity 
and sympathy for the poor. On this basis, he won election as 
a Sangkum candidate in elections in 1962, and was for a while 
a government minister.
Commenting on this two years after coming to power in 
1975, Pol Pot declared that the Party7 s "action line" had 
achieved victories during the 1960s in part because it had 
found ways to continue legal activities to the greatest extent 
possible. He credited the Party with judicious decisions 
about "who was to work as a representative in the assembly". 
While stressing the need for primary reliance on preparations 
for armed struggle in the countryside, he congratulated the 
Party for having "been able to struggle both in the assembly 
and in the government". He warned that neglecting such work 
constituted a "leftist" doctrinal error, just as 
overemphasizing its significance constituted a "rightist" 
deviation,40 either of which could presumably result in the 
Communists failing to make real their assumed popular support.
March 1979), p .8 .
39 According to the "confessions" of Pracheachun leader Non 
Suon, Pol Pot "created" the Party's French-language press, a 
statement which it appears must refer to 1'Observateur. See 
"Responses of XII: The First Step Toward Confession: Concluding 
Part: Part Six: XII Talks About a Number of Brothers in the
Leadership Organ", 21 November 1976, p.2.
40 Pol Pot, Chayo, pp . 20-21, 25-26 .
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CHAPTER TWO
PEOPLE'S WAR BY WAY OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
Vietnamese Communist People's War By Way of Paris Agreement
Whatever the reality of the Communist movement's
popularity and popular potential, Pol Pot's account of its 
electoral struggles in the 1950s and 1960s suggested severe 
scepticism about the chances for Communist exploitation of 
parliamentary path to make gains if it faced conditions like 
those of 1955. Things might be different, however, if PDK 
could get a better deal than the 1954 Geneva Agreements, a 
deal incorporating international supervision that would 
neutralize an enemy state rather than leave it overwhelmingly 
predominant as in the Sihanouk era.
In contemplating the possibilities in the latter half of 
the 19 8 0s, PDK leaders also had more recent experiences than 
Geneva to draw on. In 1972-1973, in the midst of the Second 
Indochina War, Pol Pot had rejected as a rightist mistake a 
political settlement with his then adversary, the Khmer 
Republic. He had decided instead to fight a people's war on 
his own even after the Vietnamese Communists reached an
agreement with the US in Paris in January 1973 to end armed 
conflict in Vietnam. Pol Pot reminded the Vietnamese that "in 
spite of all the support given by the Kampuchean people" to 
the Cambodian revolution during the First Indochina War, it 
"had obtained nothing from the elections" of 1955. In 1972- 
1973, Pol Pot refused to negotiate for a deal comparable to 
that obtained by the Vietnamese because, he said, fighting on 
would mean victory, whereas accepting a political solution 
could set off a chain of events that would allow the "US 
imperialists" and Khmer Republic to "extend the areas under
their control, get more people, develop their economy and
continue to further extend themselves, until the collapse of
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the revolution."1
Pol Pot's argument seemed to concede the possibility that 
in the absence of armed struggle, the Communists would not be 
able to manufacture the appearance of popular support. 
Certainly continuation of armed struggle made the extent of 
such support more difficult to ascertain and easier to 
mystify. Thus, although the CPK's seizure of power on 17 
April 1975 seemed to vindicate Pol Pot's intransigence, it 
left unclear the underlying reasons for that success.
On the other hand, the Vietnamese Communists' capture of 
Saigon less than two weeks after 17 April 1975 suggested that 
their decision to sign the 1973 Paris Agreement had not been 
wrong given their circumstances, and persuaded them of their 
popularity among the Vietnamese people, even if the evidence 
for this was problematic.2 In any case, the Communists had
1 Democratic Kampuchea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Department of Press and Information, Black Paper: Facts and
Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam 
Against Kampuchea (Phnom Penh: September 197 8) [Black Paper] ,
pp.7 3,7 5.
2 In the academic literature, vigorous but often still 
tendentious debate about the extent to which the Communist 
victory was a political or a military one cannot obscure the 
dearth of serious research, which can be explained in part by the 
great difficulties of widespread free access by independent 
researchers to ordinary Vietnamese in both the late wartime and 
early post-war period. For a sampling of the most serious 
efforts, see James W Trullinger, Village at War: An Account of 
Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
pp. 167-213; Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's 
Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1997), pp.271-352; Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: 
Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986) ,
pp.457-544; Donald W Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American 
Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Westport: 
Praeger, forthcoming), especially chapter 7, "Secondary 
Insurgency and the American Reaction"; Timothy J Lomperis, From 
People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the 
Lessons of Vietnam (Salem: University of North Carolina, 1996), 
pp.85-130; Michael A Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines 
and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corpst 1965-1972 (Westport: 
Praeger, 1997), pp.143-187; Eric M Bergerud, The Dynamics of 
Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder: Westview,
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successfully manoeuvred to turn the settlement into a seizure 
of power. Events would show that this path remained an 
inspiration for PDK in the late 1980s, even if Vietnam was now 
portrayed as Cambodia's greatest enemy.
As Gareth Porter has pointed out, the central issue in 
the negotiations that led to the 1973 Paris Agreement had been 
the sovereignty of the Saigon-based Republic of Vietnam. The 
US and Republic President Nguyen Van Thieu had insisted that 
any political solution had to maintain the Republic's 
constitutional structure, and that the Communists could 
participate in elections only on that condition. The 
Vietnamese Communists had initially rejected this, and 
demanded the formation of a coalition government. However, 
they had eventually accepted what was for them a disappointing 
compromise that "fell short of the removal of the US client 
regime in Saigon," and even though the Agreement provided for 
a cease-fire but failed to oblige the Republic to reduce its 
armed strength. The Communists nevertheless hoped such a 
"temporary compromise with their enemy" might "be 
advantageous". This was because although "the Saigon regime 
remained intact under the agreement," it "was obliged to 
loosen its grip over the political process before an election. 
If Thieu balked at this, the Agreement would still "provide a 
new legitimate basis for carrying on a political struggle and, 
at an appropriate time, an armed struggle, in order to 
overthrow [his] regime and replace it with one consistent with 
the objective of ... revolution."3
1993), pp.283-335; Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter 
Offensive/ America's Last Vietnam Battle {New York: Hippocrene,
1994), pp.527-545; Ken Post, Revolution, Socialism and 
Nationalism in Viet Nam Volume Five: Winning- the War and Losing 
the Peace (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp.237-355.
3 D Gareth Porter, "The Paris Agreements and Revolutionary 
Strategy in South Vietnam" [Porter, "Paris Agreements"], in 
Joseph J Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, Communism in Indochina: 
New Perspectives (Lexintgon: DC Heath, 1975), pp.61,73-74.
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The Communists seize the opportunity of the cease-fire to 
intensify a village-oriented political offensive that was 
supposed to capitalize upon and further previous successes of 
peopled war in the countryside. The revolution's "immediate 
task" was now to put forward slogans like "peace, democracy 
and national reconciliation" to "disintegrate and seriously 
collapse the puppet army and government, take over control of 
the rural areas [and] seize power at the base level."4
The strategy also called for promoting mass struggle 
actions against the revolution's enemies via new platforms 
provided by the Agreement. These included not only the
representative political institution that was supposed 
eventually to be elected in "genuinely free and democratic 
elections under international supervision", but also two
bodies to be formed beforehand. These were a symbolic 
"National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord", in 
which the Communists were supposed to be represented alongside 
the Republic and resolve remaining political disputes, and a 
"Joint Military Commission", in which the two sides were
supposed to sort out cease-fire violations and other military 
problems. While trying to advance the revolution's prospects 
in these forums, the Communists hoped to "maintain peace" and 
"prevent large-scale [military] conflicts" with Republic 
forces in order to proceed toward participation in the 
elections. They calculated this would help "bring the ... 
revolution toward the fulfilment of its basic objectives."5
However, the Paris Agreement was vague on how
"international supervision" would guarantee free Communist 
participation in elections, and the National Council for which
4 "COSVN Directive 02/73 'On Policies Related to the 
Political Settlement and Cease-fire, 19 January 1973," as 
reproduced with a commentary by Gareth Porter, ed, in Vietnam: 
A History in Documents [Documents] (Pine Plains: Meridian, 1981) , 
pp.425-427.
5 "Directive 02/73"
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it provided gave little promise of weakening Thieu's 
Republic.6 Given this the Agreement's failure to require 
either side to demobilize their armed forces, the Communists 
decided that even while preparing for elections, they "must 
build guerilla forces, armed security forces" and "make proper 
use of these forces to support the people's struggle movement" 
in the rural areas. Communist armed forces must stand by to 
"smash all enemy schemes to sabotage the Agreement" , For the 
Communists, therefore, implementing the agreement meant 
"simultaneously ... to build and develop our political and 
armed forces."7
Thus, as Porter explains, the Communists' post-Agreement 
strategy "relied primarily on political struggle in order to 
weaken the hold of the Saigon regime on the countryside as 
well as the cities and force the ultimate implementation of 
the Agreement's political provisions." Although the Party did 
not consider the Agreement a "complete weapon" that could 
fully "replace other types of struggle", new political 
struggles would be keyed around its provisions. Political 
action by "overt organizations" could be combined with 
intensification and expansion of mostly unarmed aspects of 
people's war at the village level. In contested and enemy 
areas, people would be urged to "disregard the enemy's 
reactionary policies and regulations". This was to be 
combined with attempts to persuade Republic soldiers not to 
use force against such political disobedience or against 
Communist military personnel. If such efforts failed, then 
Communist troops could always support political actions by 
"killing cruel tyrants and destroying enemy units".8
6 See "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam, 27 January 1973", Articles 9(b), 12(a) and 18(c); and 
"Protocol on the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision, Articles 2 and 3 (a).
7 "Directive 02/73".
8 Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.61-66.
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According to Republican accounts, implementation of this 
line meant that Communist activities in south Vietnam actually 
increased after the Paris Agreement. "Large Communist units 
were . . . broken down ... to occupy hamlets and villages" while 
cutting "main roads". While "urging people to fly National 
Liberation Front flags .... to present 'proof' of Communist 
sovereignty", they tried to persuade local officials to join 
or at least not to resist them, arguing that "peace had come", 
but threatened "villages and hamlets that did not cooperate 
... with attacks and shellings". In follow-up Communist 
actions, "military, political and proselytizing activities" 
were "closely coordinated to ... entice" the population "to 
rise up" to demand political change and the disbanding of 
anti-Communist armed forces. However, all this was countered 
by "forceful reactions" by the Republican side that frustrated 
Communist "land and population grab" tactics.9
The Communists denounced these "police operations" when 
they concluded in March 1973 that they had been right to 
expect sabotage of the Agreement by Thieu. The revolution's 
advance was being blocked because the US was "shielding its 
puppets" in Saigon "in their not implementing the cease-fire 
order and in violating the Agreement." The Communists decided 
that the proper response was not to abandon the Agreement, but 
to insist that the Communists were the ones who wanted its 
proper implementation. The way forward was to try to take 
advantage of the fact that "the puppets" were "still bound by 
the Paris Agreement, " and use this as a "weapon with which to 
attack the enemy" and thus to bring into play the Communists' 
popular support. Thus, the Communists must "bring the 
political and military-proselytizing movements of the masses 
up to meet requirements" and with their support the situation 
would "develop every day more to [their] advantage." They 
must use the Agreement as a "legal sanction" to give a 
"cutting edge" and thus "a new considerable strength" to the
9 Cao van Vien, The Final Collapse (Washington: Center of 
Military History Indochina Monographs, 1983), pp.29-31,39.
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Communist "assault posture" in the villages and other 
struggles where they could rely on popular support. And given 
that their enemies still had a repressive political structure 
and suppressive armed forces at their disposal, they had to 
continue building up Communist military strength.10
However, according to Porter, it was only after Republic 
troops seized "a significant chunk" of Communist-controlled 
territory that, in October 1973, the Party authorized its main 
force military units to launch coordinated offensive 
operations aimed "at Saigon's rear bases and at other points" 
of Communist choosing. The attack order told combatants that 
the solution to problems in the implementation of the 
Agreement was for them to attack to save the Agreement by 
fighting "the Saigon administration . . . any place and with 
appropriate forms and force." Saigon responded with "a new 
escalation of military force" and "continued its efforts to 
expand its area of control in the populated plains in late 
1973 and early 1974." This was coupled with open calls for 
attacks on Communist base areas.11
As the fighting escalated into 1974, the Communists 
issued a statement blaming their enemies for sabotaging the 
negotiating and consultative bodies set up to help implement 
it. They maintained that the function of these bodies had 
been "torpedoed" in such a way as to paralyse them and destroy 
all the "capacities of negotiation" with which they were 
supposed to be endowed. They asserted this had created "a 
complete deadlock in the implementation of the Agreement".12
This analysis laid the basis for a Communist directive in
10 Porter, "Paris Agreements", citing a Vietnamese Communist 
document, pp.66-68.
11 Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.68-71; for the Communist 
text ("People's Liberation Armed Forces Command Order, 15 October 
1973") and Porter's commentary, see Documents, pp.438-439.
12 Documents, pp. 439-442.
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August 1974 that concluded that the Agreement could not be 
implemented with the Saigon administration still intact. This 
determination came after Communist forces successfully overran 
a major Republican military base and a district town. The 
Party saw itself as operating from a position of unprecedented 
popular strength after having scored these "major full-scale 
and firm gains" against Saigon, Even though it admitted the 
Party/s "offensive at the grassroots" level in the countryside 
had achieved only "spotty" results and its political struggle 
in urban areas had achieved only "slow growth", the situation 
had evolved in a way that was greatly in the Communists" 
favour. The "road to success for the revolution" was now to 
translate popular support into an escalated offensive through 
"violence based on political and military forces." The 
Communists would thus be able to "wage a decisive 
revolutionary war to defeat the enemy to win total victory".13
As Porter concludes, the Communists were confident that 
a much more favourable balance of forces was developing that 
meant that escalated military action would help create a 
political "turning point" by encouraging an upsurge in popular 
anti-Thieu struggle. "Thus began a major shift in
revolutionary strategy, in which an offensive military 
posture, combined with stepped-up political struggle, would be 
aimed at forcing Saigon into a general crisis, from which 
there would be no exit except by a change in government." A 
Communist military campaign launched in early 1975 "aimed at 
forcing a political solution either by threatening to cause 
the disintegration of Saigon's forces or actually causing it". 
It began with an attack on one province. A second province- 
level attack in March precipitated a more rapid and complete 
collapse than the Party had expected.14
13 "COSVN Directive 08/CT 74, August 1974", Documents,
pp.442-445
14 Porter, "Paris Agreements", pp.68-71.
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As Communist troops positioned themselves for the final 
assault on Saigon in April 1975, the Party characterized the 
impending attack as the last step in an effort to force 
implementation of the political settlement. This now required 
popular insurrection to overthrow the Saigon regime, which the 
attacking Communist main force military units were supposedly 
only supplementing in order to give an additional, if final 
and decisive, impetus to people's war. The Party declared 
that what it described as the "popular uprisings" that were 
bringing the Republic down were "the culmination of [the] 
fierce struggle by our people to safeguard and implement the 
Paris Agreement." While the Communists had "scrupulously" 
implemented the Agreement, the people backed the Party's 
"combined . . . struggle against the enemy on three fronts - 
political, military and diplomatic" - to seize total, nation­
wide power.15
Regardless of the extent to which the Communist victory 
was in fact a political triumph or a military conquest, Pol 
Pot seems to have continued to believe in the script the 
Vietnamese had laid out, as long as it was properly 
implemented.
Negotiating the PRK's Destruction as a Condition for 
Participation in Election
The script suggested that continuation of people's war by 
peace agreement could be the correct path for Communists who 
were not in a position to win an outright military victory, 
but were popular enough to take advantage of the terms of a 
political settlement. Ideally, such a solution would give 
them some direct and immediate access to power. However, even 
if it did not, a peace settlement might substantially 
neutralize enemy strength and create a situation in which 
demands for a share of power could be more effectively pursued
15 "Editorial" in Hoc Tap, April 1975", Documents, pp.448-
449 .
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through mobilization of political and - ultimately - armed 
pressure. By the second half of the 1980s, Pol Pot and other 
senior PDK leaders evidently came to the conclusion that some 
such continuation of people's war via a political settlement 
was in the best interests of the Cambodian revolution.
The shift was, of course, tactical. As one internal PDK 
document warned the rank-and-file in 1987, ultimately 
"everybody" was "lying" when they "utter[ed] the phrase 
'political solution' of the Cambodia problem" . Even if PDK 
must be prepared to play the parliamentary game in order to 
take advantage of its popularity, it must always concentrate 
on building up its strength for all eventualities.16 On the 
other hand, PDK warned its cadre in April 1988, no one should 
underestimate the popular strength PDK had generated in nine 
years of people's war, or misunderstand the bitter lessons of 
the Geneva Agreements. Thus, an internal document gave 
reassurances that PDK was at that time already in a stronger 
politico-military position than the Cambodian Communist 
movement had been at the time of the Geneva Agreements and the 
elections of the 1950s. On the presumption that PDK would 
therefore obtain a more favourable settlement than Geneva, it 
should not be "worried" that it would suffer the same 
devastation as it had suffered while attempting to conduct 
political struggle in the post-Geneva period.17
This bravado was predicated in practice on its hopes that 
a political settlement would give PDK what the Vietnamese had
16 [PDK] , What Will Cambodia's Situation Be Like in the 
Upcoming- Decades? [Decades] (author's translation of Khmer 
typescript document obtained by Christophe Peschoux; dated by 
context to 1987), pp.23 [pagination in original].
17 [PDK] , Viewpoints on How Always to Organise and to 
Establish the Conditions for Ensuring Well the Livelihood of Our 
Ranks and Our People and Ensuring Well the Preservationr Defense, 
Consolidation and Expansion of the Forces in Our Ranks and Our 
People [Viewpoints] (author's translation of a Khmer typescript 
document obtained by Nate Thayer), 11 April 1988, pp.3-4 
[pagination in original].
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been unable to attain in 1973: a major share in political
power in the country before the elections took place. Thus, 
while the Vietnamese model remained relevant, PDK hoped to 
improve on what the Vietnamese had in fact achieved. This 
hope was in turn based on a belief that its people's war would 
recover from the Vietnamese offensive of 1984-1985 and 
intensify sufficiently to bring about an internationally 
guaranteed agreement that would achieve this objective. To do 
this, people's war would in theory have to further capitalize 
on PDK peasant support to create a political situation within 
the country and sustain a diplomatic posture that would force 
such a settlement. However, since such a deal would ensconce 
PDK partially in power without a popular vote, PDK would still 
be able to bypass even the semblance of such a test of the
sentiments of villagers and other Cambodians.
Between 19 85 and 1989, the PDK put forward or endorsed a 
series of initiatives formulated either on its own or by its 
coalition partners in the CGDK calling for a "political 
solution" that would achieve something like what the
Vietnamese Communists had originally demanded in the 
negotiations that led to the 1973 Paris Agreement. PDK's 
initiatives were centred around demanding that the enemy 
political structure be "dissolved" or "dismantled" and
replaced by a quadripartite political administration in which 
PDK would hold a full quarter of the power. They envisaged 
neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, either by placing 
them under quadripartite command or outright disarmament. 
They glossed over whether such domestic basis for the 
settlement as might appear to exist reflected PDK popularity 
or was being achieved by military means that imposed PDK 
political progress on a reluctant or fearful population.
A March 1986 proposal declared that a quadripartite 
political administration incorporating ex-PRK elements but 
dominated by CGDK figures was a pre-condition for a United
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Nations(UN)-supervised cease-fire and UN-supervised 
elections.18 A proposal of February 1989 explained that this 
meant dismantling the PRK' s "political and administrative 
apparatus" from "top to bottom" and its replacement "equally 
from top to bottom" by a provisional quadripartite government, 
which was to "organize free elections" with the help of the 
UN, which would "control and verify" the ballot, PDK warned 
that a political solution was inconceivable "if the regime 
installed in Phnom Penh were to be maintained in one way or 
another" .19
Chancrincr the Face of the PDK Leadership
To facilitate the Cambodian revolution's prospects of 
obtaining a favourable "political settlement" including 
elections, PDK's and NADK's public faces had been refurbished 
in September 1985. This was the first of the series of moves 
by which the top CPK triumvirate of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta 
Mok retreated further back into clandestinity in which the CPK 
had been shrouded since 1981. This was in line with the 
Vietnamese Communist script dating back to the 1940s, which 
justified such clandestinity as a necessity in order ensure 
correct but safely covert leadership of the longer-term 
struggle to achieve greater goals by whatever means 
necessary.20 However, it was also an inadvertent admission
18 "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea's Proposal 
for a Political Settlement to the Problem of Kampuchea" , National 
Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK] (Year 2 No 4: April 1986),
pp.10-12 .
19 "The Five-Point Peace Plan of HRH Samdech Norodom 
Sihanouk", "Modalities for the Implementation of the Five-Point 
Peace-Plan of HRH Samdech Norodom Sihanouk", "Note on the 
International Control Mechanism of the UN", and "The Sincerity, 
Realism and the Overture of the Five-Point Peace Plan Through the 
Modalities for Its Implementation", NADK (Year 5 No 21: February 
1989), pp.4,5-6,7.
20 For the Vietnamese Communist precedent in the 1945 
"dissolution" of the Indochinese Communist Party, see Huynh Kim 
Khanh, Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1982) pp.328-332, citing works by Communist
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of the enormous unpopularity particularly of Pol Pot and Ta 
Mok, because of their close association with the mass 
executions, starvation and death from disease under Democratic 
Kampuchea. Thus, the public announcement of their withdrawal 
was a manoeuvre that would avoid giving the electorate a 
chance to judge PDK for what it was, but in fact marked no 
loss of power by the three.
For this latter reason, the announcement did not resolve 
internal differences within the old CPK hierarchy dating back 
to its time in power. Thus, as the negotiations for an 
internationally-guaranteed settlement became more serious, 
there appears to have been some genuine dissent in PDK's top 
ranks about the troika's role. Son Sen, who had been slated 
for purge before the Vietnamese invasion, reportedly 
challenged continuation of their leadership. He is said to 
have questioned their advocacy of unreasonable negotiating 
demands and what he believed were unrealistic expectations 
about PDK's immediate political and military prospects. 
Although Pol Pot nominated Son Sen as his successor, in the 
meantime Pol Pot and Nuon Chea maintained their primacy with 
the backing of Ta Mok, whose animosity toward Son Sen remained 
deep, and Khieu Samphan, whose unswerving loyalty to Pol Pot 
remained intact.
On 24 August 1985, a new PDK "presidency" was established 
replacing the DK-era State Presidium. Khieu Samphan was named 
PDK President, reconfirming him in his perennial function as 
Pol Pot's chief front man. Son Sen became PDK Vice-President. 
Another decision abolished the old NADK Supreme Commission 
headed by Pol Pot and replaced it with an NADK Supreme Command 
headed by Son Sen as NADK Commander-in-Chief in place of Pol 
Pot. No other officers of the Supreme Command were named, 
which suggested that Ta Mok and Kse Pok had lost their top NADK
historian Nguyen Kien Giang and giving his own analysis; and 
William J Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p.112.
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jobs along with Pol Pot.
A third decision set the obligatory retirement age for 
PDK "civil and military cadre" at 60.21 As Pol Pot had 
purportedly turned 60 on 25 May 19 8 5 , 22 his formal 
"retirement" is dated from 25 August.23 Although nothing was 
said publicly at the time, the retirement age also had 
implications for Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, whose 60th birthdays 
were coming up in July and January 19 86, respectively. It 
therefore suggested that by the middle of 1986 the old CPK 
triumvirate comprising the Party Secretary and his two 
deputies would somehow be less powerful.24
However, the decisions had noted that retired cadre 
retained the right to be involved in "decisions on big and 
small issues" as "experts, advisers [or] teachers". Moreover, 
the decision that replaced Pol Pot with Son Sen "nominated" 
the former "to the position of director of the Higher 
Institute for National Defence". This body, of which nothing 
had previously been heard, was given "the task of ... summing 
up ... experiences in the field of national defence." This 
was Pol Pot's publicly admitted foothold in the decision­
making process. Khieu Samphan explained in late 1985 that Pol 
Pot was not going to cease his "political or military" 
activities until the PDK had obtained a satisfactory peace
21 VoNADK and VoDK, 1 September 1985; PDDK-UNESCO, 4 
September 1985; Xinhua News Agency, 2 September 1985.
22 On Pol Pot's "official" birthdate, see Pyongyang Domestic 
Service,"Biography of Comrade Pol Pot, Secretary of the KCP 
Central Committee and Prime Minister of Democratic Cambodia," 3 
October 1977.
23 VoNADK, 1 January 1986 and 4 June 1989.
24 The decision gave a few more years to other members of 
the old CPK Standing Committee. Officially, Ieng Sary and Son 
Sen would be 60 in January and June 1990, while Khieu Samphan 
would be 60 in July 1991. Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 
"Biography of Members of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea", 
18 December 1979 (typescript in the author's possession).
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agreement.25
In fact, although formal retirement may have signalled 
that Pol Pot was less involved than previously with day-to-day 
matters,26 he continued to dominate leadership functions
together with Nuon Chea and Ta Mok.27 The only reality was
that Kse Pok was genuinely retired some time after the
announcement and his old Sector 1002 integrated into Son Sen's 
Sector 1001 .28 Moreover, the announcements did nothing to 
resolve long-standing conflicts between Ta Mok and Son Sen, 
nor did it mean that there was complete unity within the old 
Standing Committee membership. In late 1986, the "split" 
between "followers of Son Sen . . . and Ta Mok" resulted in 
"armed combat" between them "on several occasions".29 This 
fighting occurred with Pol Pot absent in China for medical 
treatment. After his return, the leadership met to designate 
a successor to him as the head of the covert leadership
structure. To the surprise and consternation of Ta Mok and 
Ieng Sary, Pol Pot proposed Son Sen, and this nomination was 
supported by Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan and thus carried.30
25 VoNADK, 1 January 1986. Khieu Samphan said that Pol Pot 
would stop his activities once PDK and Vietnam had signed an 
agreement "on the withdrawal of the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressor 
forces from Cambodia."
26 Interview of a PDK representative abroad by a non- 
Cambodian source, September 1985. (The author has been asked to 
keep the identities of the representative and the interviewer 
confidential.)
27 Christophe Peschoux, Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979- 
1990 [Peschoux, Khmers Rouges] (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 
1992), p.72.
28 Christophe Peschoux, "DK-Bio and Military Data (June- 
September 1992)" [typescript in the author's possession]; 
author's interview of a 28-year-old former NADK combatant, 24 
October 1992; Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, 
"PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.
29 International Herald Tribune, 8 December 1986.
30 Interview of Ieng Sary, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 
December 1996.
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In 1988, Son Sen tried to push the succession issue toy arguing 
that Pol Pot and Nuon Chea should genuinely remove themselves 
from the scene by going into exile in China. He also put 
forward a set of "reformist" ideas, some of which were 
supported by Ieng Sary. However, the desire of Pol Pot and 
Nuon Chea to stay on was supported toy Ta Mok and Khieu 
Samphan, who argued that the presence of the old Party 
Secretary and First Deputy Secretary remained indispensable to 
the struggle. Therefore, it was agreed that they would 
promise to relinquish all political influence once there was 
a "genuine settlement" of the Cambodia problem. However, what 
such a settlement constituted was also in dispute at this 
time. Son Sen was prepared to accept a formula that achieved 
relatively less for the PDK than that demanded by its other 
leaders, perhaps something that was less of an improvement on 
the Paris Agreement of 1973 than they hoped for. A harder 
line was promoted by Ta Mok, whom Son Sen criticized for being 
"difficult" .31
Internal PDK Preparations for Parliamentary Strucrcrle
The PDK was meanwhile preparing its ranks for 
participation in elections under conditions of 
quadripartitism. It did so in ways that implied that 
everything PDK had achieved so far was proof that it need not 
worry about its popularity, but that at the same time seemed 
to provide further evidence that the contrary was true.
On the one hand, PDK's 1987 internal study warning 
against illusions about parliamentarism nevertheless affirmed 
that PDK could take advantage of its rural support base by 
"walking down the path of liberal democracy",32 Its April 
1988 study document confidently discussed in detail how the
31 Interview with a non-Cambodian source who requested 
anonymity, Bangkok, 23 July 1990. This source enjoyed access to 
Son Sen, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary.
32 Decades.
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PDK was planning to set up its "forces and. leadership 
apparatus to conduct work in the context of a bourgeois system 
in which a variety of political parties must compete". It 
confidently foresaw a situation in which PDK participation in 
elections in a "liberal democracy" would give it cabinet posts 
in a future government. On the other hand, this document went 
into a pessimistic mode when it suggested that PDK might only 
be "able to a certain extent to obtain a role and 
representation in legislative organs". It pointed indirectly 
to why this might be: the association of Pol Pot and most of 
his senior colleagues with the policies and practices of 1975- 
78. It indicated that it would be possible to put forward 
only one of them as a candidate, Khieu Samphan, who had 
retained his earlier reputation for probity and sympathy for 
the poor. It suggested that the party should be led by Khieu 
Samphan because he enjoyed more popular "political influence" 
than Pol Pot and his other superiors in the covert PDK 
leadership, and that the rest of the candidates should include 
only relatively powerless but palatable political 
personalities in the PDK ranks. The document thus implicitly 
admitted that because Pol Pot and other real leaders were 
likely to be un-electable, only a false and sanitized 
"political face" of the PDK could "be clearly displayed to the 
nation and the people."33
A secret speech eight months later by Pol Pot to the 
Democratic Kampuchea Women's Association34 insisting on the 
importance of PDK participation in parliamentary struggle was 
similarly full of blustering confidence, but also contained 
indications of profound anxiety. Pol Pot looked
optimistically forward to a national assembly in which up to
33 Viewpoints, "precis" and pp.3, 6-7,13-17 .
# 34 Pol Pot, What is the Current Situation in Kampuchea?
What Will It Be Like in the Future? [Pol Pot, Situation] 
(author's translation of a Khmer typescript document obtained by 
Christophe Peschoux), December 1988.
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40 percent of the membership was PDK. He expressed certainty 
that even if PDK had a smaller number of seats, it would 
"inevitably have some representatives in the government" who 
could advance the interests of the people and of the struggle. 
On the other hand, he expressed fears that if the PDK did not 
achieve parliamentary representation, it "would definitely be 
compelled to collapse and disintegrate and be completely 
dispersed, and our people would suffer further exploitations." 
He did not explain why the only way for PDK to have "a voice 
in parliament", and thus "to protect to an important extent 
the interests of the people", was to field a party comprised 
of what were, from a PDK point of view, relative or total 
political non-entities.
Revitalizing People's War
Meanwhile, NADK's people's war tactics had been rejigged 
in line with the notion of a political settlement and on the 
basis of the presumption that PDK's growing popularity among 
the peasantry was beginning to influence local PRK authorities 
in its favour. Thus, in July 1985, NADK vowed to begin 
attempting to "mobilize" and "win over" not only PRK militia 
and soldiers, but also PRK "civil servants" in the local 
"administrative apparatus".35 PDK pretensions aside, this 
policy of including PRK local officials in NADK proselytizing 
activities aimed ultimately to exclude them from political 
power unless they agreed to join covert networks of PDK 
counter-administrations in formation. It thus became part of 
what PDK dubbed the "two eliminations", that is, the 
neutralization of both the political and military foundations 
of the PRK in the countryside.36
Son Sen would preside over the publication of encouraging 
statistics that initially suggested that this new approach
35 VoNADK, 16 July 1985.
36 VoDK, 20 and 31 December 1985.
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defining local PRK officials and security personnel as forces 
with which PDK could develop "solidarity and collaboration" 
revitalized NADK operations. According to the statistics, 
between October 1985 and April 19 86, NADK "attacked over and 
over again" 682 subdistricts and also "attacked and liberated 
on several occasions" some 1,200 villages. Son Sen boasted 
that "the most striking fact" about these actions was the 
extent to which "the population, Khmer soldiers, self-defence 
guards and Khmer civil servants ... increasingly joined" in 
NADK activities.37 The purported success of this new NADK 
orientation was reflected in PDK propaganda claims that by 
1987 NADK had "repeatedly dispersed and destroyed" 3,500 
village and 440 subdistrict administrative networks". As a 
result, in 1,560 villages the PRK was said to have "lost all 
village administrative agents". 38
NADK was soon praised again for supposedly having done 
"well to promote" the inclusion of local PRK personnel in PDK 
support networks while "relying on the people and by actively 
and repeatedly attacking villages" and liberating "a greater 
number of village and subdistrict officials".39 As a result, 
Son Sen claimed, during the 1987-1988 dry season, NADK 
dismantled 4,033 village committees and 236 subdistrict 
committees. He described "thousands of villages" as 
"liberated", which he implied meant NADK had free access to 
them.40
By April 1988, PDK told itself that as a result of this 
people's war, a "nation-wide state power . . . predicated on the 
foundation of ... people in the villages" was taking shape 
under its control. This would form the basis for its
37 PDDK-UNESCO, 22 May 1986.
38 VoNADK, 6 October 1987.
39 VoDK, 2 0 February 1988.
40 PDDK-UNESCO, 24 May 1988.
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participation in elections through which it would attain 
representation in parliament and a role in government. This 
was now portrayed as the immediate reason why a people's war 
must continue to "fashion forces in the villages" by
establishing various covert peasant support nuclei. A hint of 
problems was contained in a caution to the effect that no one 
should think PDK was already in a position immediately to 
seize total power as the CPK had done in 1975 . However, if it 
were successful in expanding its support nuclei in the 
villages, PDK would be in a position to "emerge ... 
everywhere" and further its struggle via a legal political 
party that would reflect its support. It would be able to 
"conduct political party battles in every field by depending 
on ... the peasant people". At the same time, the PDK hope 
was that a political solution would give the PDK "even more 
possibilities" for doing rural organizational work in
preparation for whatever "sorts of battles might take place 
within the bourgeois system" in the future.41
Plans to conduct electoral battles through liberal 
democracy were portrayed as a correct extension of a people's 
war line. In particular, it was an extension of the 1979-1988 
"struggle to fight the . . . enemy" by using "the countryside 
(the peasants) as the base and mainstay for advancing upward 
(liberating the countryside step-by-step ... and surrounding 
the urban areas)." Thus,"the struggle via a political party 
in the days to come" would be following "the practices and
principles . . . adopted successfully in the past" to win
support and find appropriate means to transform it into 
advances down the road toward revolution.42
PDK's People's War Falters
41 Viewpoints, pp . 3-4, 6-7 , 13-14,16-17 .
42 Viewpoints, pp . 6-7,16-17 .
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However, over the following six months of 198 8, even 
PDK's own statistics suggested that something was wrong. The 
number of PRK village administrations supposedly "scattered 
and destroyed" per month steadily and dramatically declined, 
dropping from 560 in May to a mere 55 in October.43 Son Sen's 
pronouncements about the level of NADK's 1988 rainy season 
achievements revealed a drop of one-third as compared to the 
19 87 rainy season.44 This decline indicated that for some 
reason, PDK's rural people's war had peaked and was faltering. 
At best, it suggested that PDK was perhaps overextended either 
militarily or politically, or both, that PDK people's war was 
spreading itself so thin as to become ineffective. At the 
least, it implied a need either to consolidate existing 
advances or find some way to give a new impetus to the war. 
At bottom, however, it pointed to on-going problems of popular 
support, and suggested an irony of false optimism in this, 
regard; that the more PDK operated on the basis of an 
assumption that it had regained popularity, the more likely it 
was to take steps that would reveal the opposite.
However, in instructions that an NADK cadre who later 
defected said were given to a gathering of NADK cadre in 
September 1988, Pol Pot seemed to eschew any notion of a need 
for political consolidation and to be oblivious to the 
implications of the decline for the underlying strength of 
support for PDK. Instead, he called for a further extension 
of NADK actions to more villages, as if the only problem was 
a lack of effort on the part of NADK. The defector would 
quote him as saying that during 1989 and 1990 the PDK must 
accelerate its work of building up peasant support networks to 
surround the cities from the countryside, and portray him of 
being confident that this would ensure that the PRK would 
"fade" away politically after the departure of Vietnamese
43 VoNADK, 11 June, 3 July, 5 August, 4 September and 5 
November 1988.
44 PDDK-UNESCO, 1 November 1988.
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troops from the country. Pol Pot saw no political reason why 
NADK units of three to four men could not enter villages 
undefended by GPAF to establish support networks. It should 
be perfectly possible for the nuclei recruited in villages 
then to be sent to do initial propaganda work and gather 
intelligence in villages with substantial PRK troop presences 
as a prelude to NADK attacks. NADK should then "root out" PRK 
administrative and security personnel by seizing them for "re­
education" in NADK base areas. The cadre of the attacking 
NADK units would then face no obstacles to going "personally 
to every house to greet the villagers" and asking them to talk 
about their grievances against the PRK. Thus, both in 
villages that NADK was able to enter unopposed and those that 
it attacked militarily, it could and should be able to avoid 
use of force or violence against peasants and instead "use the 
weapon of the mouth" to expand and consolidate PDK popularity.
However, in an inadvertent recognition of problems, Pol 
Pot chastised those who were suggesting that PDK was too 
politically weak to proceed in this manner and declared that 
failure by NADK units to build up political support networks 
reflected their lack of understanding of the PDK strategy. He 
warned that unless the PDK accelerated its village "political 
warfare", the PDK struggle could be "set back many years", 
especially if a political settlement were imposed on it 
according to which elections would be held before it could 
achieve its goals in terms of building up a rural power base. 
Pol Pot described the threat of premature elections as a "big 
worry", and explained Khieu Samphan was using diplomatic 
tactics to try to "delay elections" until NADK had achieved 
"80 percent" of its current "military objectives". He 
explained that once Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, the PDK 
"must greatly accelerate" its village political work. NADK 
combatants would be instructed "to go to the villages and live 
in them immediately" to build up support networks. The PRK 
would then "disintegrate in one to one-and-a-half years 
maximum" after a Vietnamese withdrawal, because it enjoyed no
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real support. Pol Pot suggested that if PDK achieved its 
goals, it could hope to get up to half of the rural vote.
However, other remarks contradicted Pol Pot's 
protestations of belief that the PDK's popular political 
strength was what gave it electoral potential. Perhaps most 
self-contradictory of all was Pol Pot's a- comment to the
effect that PDK would want to hold elections only once PDK 
cadre living in the villages were in a position to "lead the 
vote" more or less throughout the rural areas. Also 
revealing, however, was his argument that if for some 
unspeakable reason PDK and its political allies did not win 
the elections, its rural networks would nevertheless somehow 
be able to "continue ... political warfare until the end" and 
ultimately "exercise power". It would merely be "a matter of 
spending more time" before PDK would be able to "control the 
country" as a whole. Meanwhile, he admitted, the PDK would 
have to keep "important forces" in the jungle, apparently 
including not only the covert leadership, but also troops 
capable of fighting in "self-defense". He suggested that such 
combat might be necessary if, for example, PDK was attacked to 
overturn the electoral successes he expected it was in a 
position to achieve. Although Pol Pot did not say so, some 
NADK cadre assumed that such armed forces might also be used 
to "fight militarily" if "the elections are lost".45
In his speech to the PDK Women's Association in December 
1988,45 Pol Pot again surveyed the situation but now shifted 
his emphasis to the need to consolidate PDK's village networks
45 See "Interviews with Khmers Rouges" conducted by Roger 
Normand in Sok Sann, July 1989, citing conversations with former 
NADK cadre and combatants; and Banhcheak Ampi JEkasar Ni-muoy Ni~ 
muoy Sangkhep ("Synopsis of Each Document"), January 1990, a 
report prepared by a former NADK battalion cadre. I am grateful 
to Christophe Peschoux and Roger Normand for copies of these 
materials.
46 Pol Pot, Situation.
82
qualitatively. The way in which he did this again revealed 
unself-conscious anxieties. He expressed satisfaction that 
PDK could claim its "liberated" and "semi-liberated zones" 
were "spread out into a lot of provinces". However, even in 
the liberated zones, he admitted, the PDK's enemies were still 
able to come and go, at least "occasionally" . Apparently 
referring to a supposed improvement on the figure of 1,560 
villages that Son Sen had given as the number in which the PRK 
administration was basically eliminated as of 1987, Pol Pot 
asserted that the PDK had already penetrated "more than 2,000" 
of the 7,000 to 8,000 villages in Cambodia to some extent and 
gone "all out refashioning them". However, he complained, 
this penetration was "not yet solid . . . because our nuclei 
still aren't good enough." He said, only NADK units "working 
in some localities" had "been able to do a good job of 
refashioning villages" and create a situation in which "the 
people themselves" were able to "administer things politically 
and deploy guerilla militia to defend their villages" without 
NADK assistance. In "a lot of places", no such village power 
had been established because NADK cadre still did not 
"comprehend the line", had "no practice in popular work" and 
simply did not "believe in or rely upon the people".
Instead of seeing this as indicative of fundamental 
obstacles to PDK popularity, Pol Pot criticized the "upper- 
level leadership" of the PDK for having long failed "to 
concentrate on giving training in and nurturing popular 
strength-building work". This was the "primary reason" why 
troops on the front lines and other PDK elements still did not 
"have much experience in building up popular strength".
Cl
Recently, however, the PDK finally begun "fashioning an army 
that knows how to do popular work". Obviously there was still 
a long way to go, although of course everything would be fine 
if NADK would only conduct proper political work.
Pol Pot declared that if his instructions were followed, 
the result would be an ever-expanding PDK rural political
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administration in which more and more villages would be 
autonomous and self-contained bastions of support for PDK. 
PDK's popularity would "constantly . . . swell and be solidified 
in an ever-increasing number of villages, starting in one 
village and moving on to two and then to four and then ten 
villages, to hundreds and then many thousands of villages."
Pol Pot warned, however, that until this happened, PDK 
would not be in a position to expect the kind of political and 
diplomatic solution that would make it possible for PDK to 
benefit from an electoral process. He declared that "only 
once 4,000 to 5,000 of the 7,000-8,000 villages throughout the 
country have been attacked a lot and well to eliminate two and 
build four" would the situation in Cambodia be ripe for a 
political solution. Once this goal of such penetration of 
something like 60 percent of the country's villages was 
achieved, the unpopular PRK would not "be able to hang on" 
politically. The majority of PRK forces and administrators at 
the village and subdistrict levels would "dissociate 
themselves" from it "and go back to being ordinary people", 
thus leaving PDK's network of popular support nuclei in a 
position to take over the countryside. Then, once the cease­
fire for which a political settlement would provide was in 
place, "the majority" of those in the ranks of the NADK and 
other PDK organizations would disperse themselves everywhere 
throughout the entire country to get a grip on thousands of 
villages and millions of people." Pol Pot did not explain the 
contradiction in his own presentation between the assumption 
of PDK political possibilities and the need for a "grip" of 
control over its supposed supporters. In fact, without being 
able to admit it to himself or others, Pol Pot was through 
such slips admitting that the establishment of PDK political 
control over the countryside was the basis for its hopes of 
successful participation in parliamentary struggle. As he 
put it in another unself-conscious moment, only by "being in 
possession of people in the villages and then having more and 
more committees to lead the villages" could PDK exert
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influence over how people voted.
NADK propaganda from late 1988 through the middle of 198 9 
suggests that it tried to focus first on political 
consolidation and then further expansion of the village war. 
Before the end of 1988, NADK had talked about the "liberation1 
of villages and NADK involvement in "dismantling" village 
structures of political administration, but did not report the 
establishment of new structures. From the end of 1988, 
however, it started highlighting claims that after having 
"attacked to disperse and dismantle the village administration 
of the ... enemy", the NADK was enlisting cooperation of 
villagers to "reestablish a village administration belonging 
to the nation" by setting up "new village committees".47 In 
other words, NADK attacks were supposedly now making it 
possible for the covert counter-administrations it had been 
striving to create through political work finally to begin 
coming out into the open and formally replacing PRK power 
structures. By mid-1989, this qualitative consolidation had 
supposedly laid the basis for a new quantitative expansion. 
Son Sen resumed putting forward extraordinary statistics 
suggesting that NADK was accelerating PDK's rural political 
advance, even if there remained a considerable way to go 
before reaching Pol Pot's targets. He claimed that NADK had 
done twice as well as during the 1988 dry season, crediting it 
with having "repeatedly attacked to eliminate, disperse and 
dissolve" the administrations of "more than 4,000 villages" 
and 300 subdistricts.48 At the end of the year, PDK was 
claiming that NADK was again hitting more than 500 villages a 
month.49 Independent research, however, demonstrated that in 
reality PDK was achieving much less both in terms of support 
and control.
47 See for example, NADK (Year 5 No 21: February 1989), 
pp.15,18,26, where events in late 1988 are discussed.
48 NADK (Year 4, No 23: June 1989), pp . 5 , 9 ,16 ,19 .
49 VoNADK, 6 January 199 0.
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CHAPTER THREE
ILLUSION, REALITY AND THE PARIS CONFERENCES
The Reality of PDK People's War
The research of Christophe Peschoux, the only person who 
seriously investigated PDK activities in the late 1980s, 
showed not only how vastly exaggerated Son Sen's statistics 
were, but more fundamentally the extent to which the political 
conclusions based on them were built on self-delusion.
Peschoux interviewed former NADK cadre and combatants, 
Cambodian peasants and other Cambodian sources to draw a 
composite picture of the reality of PDK's "people's war". He 
concluded that most NADK forces had indeed in theory been 
"primarily mobilized [for] political and not military work in 
the countryside" . As one of his sources put it, ever since 
1979, the "strategy was not to make military gains but to 
build up ... networks inside the country and build up ... 
forces politically." Thus, for NADK "attacking the villages" 
was not supposed to mean taking them over militarily, but 
politically, albeit using the military as a necessary tool to 
isolate the enemy from the population. NADK cadre and 
combatants were indoctrinated that even "if weapons are the 
key that give access to the villages, once they are opened, 
the guerillas" must concentrate on "winning over popular 
support".1
However, peasant testimony gave credibility to PRK 
allegations that NADK visits to villages were often little 
more than looting raids. Villagers recounted thefts during 
attacks in which NADK guerillas burned government buildings, 
blew bridges and seized villagers as porters to carry what was
1 Christophe Peschoux, Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 2979- 
1990 [Peschoux, Khmers Rouges] (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan,
1992), pp.21-22,27-30,198-202,209-215.
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being stolen from them. Even more seriously, NADK attacks 
often "resulted in the loss of numerous civilian lives". Even 
though NADK combatants were formally "forbidden to kill or 
harm a villager or captured soldier or civil servant," those 
"accused of collaborating closely with the Vietnamese or 
government" against PDK, such as alleged "spies" or 
"intelligence agents" or those who had allegedly "committed 
repeated violent abuses against the population", were "usually 
executed". If some peasants might otherwise have been willing 
to "forget the past", it was hard for them to do so given such 
reminders of indifference to death.2
It was in this context that NADK went about trying to 
"persuade" villagers "to withdraw their support for the enemy 
and to collaborate with the resistance against it", and to get 
villagers to tell them what they wanted to hear: that PDK was 
more devoted to the "nation and people" than any other 
Cambodian political movement, and that therefore villagers 
were happy to support its struggle. The key was to try to 
conjure away popular memories of the executions, starvation, 
disease and overwork under Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok in 
1975-1978. Claims that the three old men were no longer in 
charge were coupled appeals for villagers to cooperate with a 
PDK now supposedly led by Khieu Samphan, in order to render 
the PRK "powerless" in the countryside. At the same time, 
cadre and combatants were instructed simply to refuse to 
discuss the past in the hope that this would make it vanish as 
a political problem. Yet by avoiding this key issue, NADK 
cadre and combatants were creating a new unreality for 
themselves that allowed them to believe PDK had been truly 
able to put the past behind it. Non-discussion of the past 
made it possible for some to imagine that PDK was as popular 
as they wanted it to be, that "people's war" was working 
according to its script, and that therefore PDK participation 
in elections could advance the revolutionary cause, as long as
2 pp.141-143,168-171,175-180,204-2 09,255-266,271-2 80.
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conditions for elections were such as to allow "the people" to 
express their support.3
Peschoux thus shows how formal moderation combined with 
the threat or reality of violence gave the PDK the semblance 
of cooperation with NADK and of agreement with its self-image, 
but not much more.4 1 Spontaneous and sustained adherence" was 
lacking. Instead, PDK cadre were mistaking peasant fear of 
and deference to the armed authority of NADK combatants with 
popular support. One ex-cadre claimed that people supported 
PDK because it did not abuse them and helped the poorer strata 
by distributing medications and other material aid, and that 
the peasantry therefore accepted that PDK reforms were real. 
Others closer to the reality saw this as self-delusion, like 
a former combatant who explained, "when we enter the villages, 
we are armed, and the people do not dare to oppose us." A 
typical peasant view was expressed by a villager from Siem 
Reap, who declared of NADK combatants, "they are strong 
because they are heavily armed, not because of their 
politics." Peasants interviewed by Peschoux insisted that 
although they did not like PRK, they simply did not trust PDK. 
One from Kampung Speu province complained that PRK was "very 
oppressive", but of PDK he said, "I am afraid they may regain 
power and resume their past policies."5
Peschoux concluded that PDK had been able to "gradually 
erode . . . hatred and suspicion" toward it only among a few 
"fractions" of the population. Such support as did exist was 
"more passive than active". "Superficial cooperation" was 
the best PDK had obtained. Thus, more than a decade after the 
CPK had lost power, PDK still seemed to have "no chance to 
amass again the kind of large-scale support" that Pol Pot and 
other senior leaders attributed to their implementation of
3 pp.27-30,13 5-13 6,198-202,209-215.
4 pp.27-3 0,141-143,107-115,18 0-186,198-2 03.
5 pp.151-154,189-193,232-241,249-266,2 80-2 84.
88
"people's war" in the early 1970s, and that they assumed had 
laid the foundation for their military victory of April 1975. 
Nor, according to a peasant from Takaev, was it in a position 
to advance politically via elections. He told Peschoux that 
the PDK's continued underlying unpopularity meant elections 
were not a viable option for it. He suggested that unless its 
foreign or domestic allies conspired to put it in power, it 
would have no choice but to resort increasingly to force to 
achieve its objectives.6
Peschoux also concluded that PDK claims and self- 
delusions about popular support were matched by the 
unreliability of NADK statistics about the number of villages 
under PDK control or influence. In fact, "the real number of 
liberated villages under PDK's permanent control or to which 
its units had regular access" was "very small". His 
interviews with PDK veterans indicated that although the 
number of PDK "liberated villages" grew in the late 1980s, the 
increase was slight.7
The First Paris International Conference on Cambodia
If neither PDK statistics nor the reality were such as to 
suggest that Pol Pot's preconditions for a favourable 
settlement had been met, the PDK leadership as a whole was not 
prepared to back down from its demands for quadripartitism. 
Thus, public events in 19 89 reconfirmed the defeat both of Son 
Sen's attempt to manoeuvre Pol Pot and Nuon Chea out of the 
way and of his advocacy of agreeing to less in terms of a 
political settlement than they were demanding. The former 
defeat was signalled in the run-up to the First International 
Conference on Cambodia, which opened in Paris in July 1989, 
after Vietnam had announced that it would be withdrawing all 
its troops by September. The latter was demonstrated by PDK
6 pp.232-241,255-260
7 pp.226-232.
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demands at the conference for quadripartitism.
A month before the conference began, PDK backed off from 
the promise that Pol Pot would cease "all activities, whether 
political or military" once the Vietnamese signed an agreement 
to withdraw their troops. While PDK insisted the withdrawal 
announced by the Vietnamese would be a sham, Pol Pot gave a 
more qualified undertaking that suggested he would not fully 
retire until a "genuine settlement" had been "properly 
implemented" . This was signalled in a letter addressed to PDK 
President Khieu Samphan and Vice President Son Sen dated 4 
March 1989, but not made public until 5 June. Taking another 
step into clandestinity, he requested to be allowed "to resign 
as head of the High Institute for National Defence" . He said, 
however, he "would like to remain as a researcher" there 
"until all the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors are driven out of 
Cambodia." The reply said that after "several meetings" to 
discuss Pol Pot's "case", a "joint meeting of the Central 
Committee of the PDK and the Supreme Command held on 3 June" 
had "decided to follow [his] wishes."8 Nuon Chea and Ta Mok 
quickly chimed in. They now finally claimed publicly, three 
years after the supposed fact, that they had retired in 1986. 
However, these retirements and their promises as regards the 
future were at least as ambiguous as those of Pol Pot.9
The troika's determination to avoid exile and push their 
hard negotiating line was based on their on-going domination 
of NADK from behind the scenes. Yet again, little or nothing 
had changed. The reality was that Pol Pot's primacy continued 
to be manifest via his responsibility for "study and research" 
of all political and military affairs. He and Nuon Chea were 
still directly responsible for the western and southern parts 
of Cambodia covered by PDK Sectors 505 and 32, and it appears 
that worries about Ieng Sary's "liberalism" had resulted in
8 VoNADK, 4 June 1989.
9 VoNADK, 9 and 11 July 1989.
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him and his Sector 102 being placed under Nuon Chea's 
supervision. However, Ta Mok retained full direct
responsibility for the northern part of Cambodia covered by 
Sector 1003, while Son Sen was in full direct control of the 
eastern Cambodia Sector 1001.10
The Paris Conference provided a forum at which Khieu 
Samphan laid out in formal detail the troika's hard-line 
position of out-doing the Vietnamese achievements. In opening 
speeches to the Conference, Khieu Samphan demanded it "put an 
end ... to the Phnom Penh regime" . He said an end to the NADK 
armed struggle could come only "after the formation of a 
provisional quadripartite Government under the leadership of 
... Sihanouk". He insisted said that the old PRK, recently 
renamed the State of Cambodia (SoC)11 must be "dismantled" 
along with the CGDK "so as to enable the Cambodian people to 
freely, and without coercion, exercise their sacred right" to 
vote. Also required was either the "total disarming" of the 
armies of the four parties, or their "partial disarming" down 
to a force of 10,000 men each, and the "confining in barracks" 
of all their reduced forces. A UN Peace Keeping Force would 
assist in maintaining these measures in order to help "prevent 
any attempt at seizing or monopolizing power by one party to 
the detriment of others".12 Echoing Pol Pot's analysis of 
elections under Sihanouk in 1955 and 1958, he warned that if 
SoC handled "electoral preparations", it would "exert all 
sorts of pressure and coercion on electors so as to prevent 
them from voting for" the opposition and would "force them to 
vote" for the SoC ruling party, the Revolutionary People's
10 FUNCINPEC-ANKI Intelligence Report, "Activities of the 
Khmer Rouge", 12 July 1990.
11 The name change took place in April 1989.
12 "Address by HE Mr Khieu Samphan to the Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia, 31 July 1989", in Amitav 
Acharya, Pierre Li zee, and Sorpong Peou, eds, Cambodia: The 1989 
Paris Peace Conference, Background Analysis and Documents [1989 
Paris Conference] (Milwood: Kraus International Publications,
1991), pp.20-29.
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Party of Kampuchea (later renamed the Cambodian People's Party 
- CPP) .13 PDK's insistence on the dissolution of SoC and its 
replacement by a political administration in which the PDK 
held a quarter of the power was a major reason for the failure 
of the First Paris Conference to achieve an agreement. 
Nevertheless, the PDK continued to stick to this position.
A Shift in NADK Strategy
Khieu Samphan thus bought more time for NADK to pursue 
its people's war. However, it seems that after the CGDK's 
failure to achieve its goals in Paris, NADK military strategy 
shifted away from the village contestation toward 
concentration of troops to begin fighting "battles of 
annihilation" and other "decisive engagements"14 against major 
SoC targets. The objective was evidently to seize district 
towns and one or more provincial capitals in order to 
neutralize large numbers of enemy troops and to back up PDK 
demands for a one-quarter share in the national political 
administration. This shift neatly side-stepped the problems 
that NADK was having in winning over villagers politically by 
proceeding on the basis of a false assumption that PDK's rural 
support was already so solid that it was time now to turn to 
a more purely military push.
However, in an interview in early October 1989, Son Sen 
explained the new NADK approach in a way that tried to find 
excuses for PDK's political problems, but also seemed to 
signal some circumspection about what it could be expected to 
achieve. He said NADK would continue its war in the interior
13 "Statement by HE Mr Khieu Samphan, President of the 
Democratic Kampuchea party, to the Ad Hoc Committee, 22 August 
1989", 1989 Paris Conference, pp.328-330.
14 Mao Zedong, "Problems of Strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol I 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.223-239,248-249; and 
"On Protracted War", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol II 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.157-182.
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"to liberate villages and. eliminate the enemy's village-level 
political administration", but said that this war involved 
"hardship" for NADK because of logistical difficulties. This 
excuse covered up for political failures that could not be 
directly admitted. Anyway, Son Sen stressed, the extent to 
which the village war had already succeeded now made it 
possible for NADK units operating along the Thai border "to 
liberate more and more territory," and he highlighted PDK's 
hope that this "military aspect" of its struggle would "give 
an impetus to ... a diplomatic solution" that would open up 
the political prospects he asserted PDK enjoyed. The 
diplomatic solution would allow the people to manifest their 
supposed desire for PDK "to come ‘ and liberate them right 
away" . It would allow PDK to capitalize on the years of work 
to "propagandize and educate the people" carried out by NADK, 
as a result of which the peasantry was already "in substance 
... in serious opposition" to SoC, whose local administration 
was "isolated from the people". He unself-consciously 
insisted that although villagers might "seem to be with the 
enemy", and might "not dare to oppose" SoC "openly", they were 
"standing by, anticipating" the day when they would be able to 
manifest their support for PDK. Through this bit of logical 
acrobatics, he simultaneously explained away their lack of 
support for PDK and professed his confidence in the existence 
of that support.15
Son Sen also explained that in order to make it possible 
for the people to switch from pretending not to support PDK to 
openly supporting it, NADK would make "every effort" to 
liberate district and provincial towns. However, he also 
admitted that NADK forces were "limited" and could not easily 
be expanded, not - of course - for a lack of volunteers, but 
"because troops necessitate huge expenditure". Moreover, 
PDK's "constant desire to liberate places, to liberate as many 
as possible" might be thwarted not by a lack of popular
15 Author's translation of a journalist's taped interview 
with Son Sen, 3 October 1989.
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enthusiasm for liberation, but some sort of non-popular 
"resistance". Son Sen promised NADK would do its "best", but 
in conceding that it would have to "proceed step by step" 
because of its "limitations", he continued to insist that 
these were non-political in nature. Similarly, he argued that 
although the PDK leadership wanted "things to be ended 
quickly", Cambodia's people might have to "go on struggling 
for a long time to come" for the liberation by PDK he said
they wanted. The reality was instead that PDK might have to
wait a very long time indeed before the Cambodian people would 
want to be liberated again by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, 
or even by their front-man, Khieu Samphan.
In accordance with the change in military strategy 
outlined by Son Sen, NADK began pulling back guerillas from 
their attempts at political work deep inside Cambodia to
concentrate forces for a series of conventional multi-division 
attacks on static SoC positions near the Thai border. The 
first campaign seized the district town of Pailin in
October.16 In two more conventional battles, the NADK seized 
the redoubt of Phnum Malai in western Banteay Meanchey and the 
district town Anlung Veng in northern Siem Reap.17 The 
capture of these three objectives proved to be the highwater 
mark of NADK's conventional campaign, and in the absence of 
other advances, Pailin and Anlung Veng would have to serve as 
the "capitals" of PDK in western and northern Cambodia, 
respectively.
Maintaining- the Hard Line
PDK tried to build on NADK's limited conventional
16 Capt P Bartu, "Background History on Major Battles in 
Cambodia After the Withdrawal of the Vietnamese in September 
1989", 19 November 1992, pp.1-3/ NADK (Year 4, No 26: December
1989), pp.22-27. VoNADK, 22 October 1990; "Khmer Rouge Hold 
Pailin", AFP, Bangkok, 24 October 1990.
17 NADK (Year 5, No 27: February 1990), p p .12-13,20-21.
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successes by maintaining its political demands. The hard line 
was reiterated in a letter from Khieu Samphan addressed on 4 
February 1990 to Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, one 
of the Co-Chairmen of the suspended Paris Conference. Khieu 
Samphan reiterated PDK insistence on "formation of a 
provisional equal quadripartite government ... charged with 
the duty of organizing free, fair and democratic elections". 
He endorsed the concept "that the UN should play a vital, 
enhanced supervisory role" with regard to elections. He 
warned that if SoC and its army were "preserved" , the UN could 
not fundamentally alter the situation in Cambodia even "with 
... 10,000 or 20,000 personnel". Unless the PDK demands were 
met, "neither a settlement of the war nor the restoration of 
peace in the country could be achieved."18
However, SoC was determined to preserve itself. In 
February, it launched a major counter-offensive that 
recaptured some of the territory recently seized by NADK, 
although both Pailin and Anlung Veng remained in PDK hands.19 
Moreover, although Peschoux"s research shows that the 
Vietnamese withdrawal and first Paris Conference had indeed 
been followed by intensified NADK activity in some parts of 
rural Cambodia during which its guerillas penetrated into new 
areas,20 by mid-1990 SoC was countering these advances. Most 
notably, it initiated a programme of compulsory relocations of 
villagers out of contested territory into zones under solid 
SoC control. By July, some 100,000 people were thus put 
beyond NADK reach.21
The effect of such measures was reflected at a meeting on
18 VoNADK, 10 February 1990.
19 Sina Than, "Cambodia 1990: Towards a Peaceful Solution?", 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1991 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1991), pp.94,97.
20 Peschoux, Khmers Rouges, pp.249-284.
21 Sina Than, p. 97.
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13 April 1990 of senior NADK cadre from Sectors 1001 and 1003, 
over which Ta Mok presided. According to SoC intelligence 
reports corroborated by FUNCINPEC sources, he expressed 
concern that PDK had yet to achieve the objectives that had 
earlier been put forward as preconditions for PDK 
participation in an electoral process. Ta Mok had to admit 
that the situation in the countryside was still such that the 
PDK would "not be able to seize a victory over [its] rivals" 
in a general election. He also admitted PDK might 
nevertheless be unable to avoid imposition of a peace 
settlement by the "big powers" that fell short of 
quadripartitism, in which case its only choice would be to try 
to take advantage of whatever it was offered to "infiltrate" 
the existing political administration and apply "'rust eating 
away the iron" tactics". Anyway, Ta Mok predicted, under such 
circumstances, "the parties engaging in the conflict will not 
be able to compromise with each other" for any length of time. 
Instead of looking forward to elections, he foresaw that an 
armed confrontation would "break out soon" after the 
imposition of any agreement unfavourable to PDK. This gritty 
realism, however, was no less based on false assumptions of 
PDK popularity than Son Sen's argument about the need for NADK 
to move into conventional warfare or Pol Pot's soothing talk 
about PDK having 40 seats in some future national assembly. 
Warning against a collapse of NADK morale, Ta Mok expressed 
his confidence that - even under an unfavourable international 
agreement - PDK would benefit from the fruits of its 
subversive tactics, because "the masses whom we have been 
indoctrinating will certainly support us". If the path of 
advance via elections was blocked, PDK would thus still "be 
able to seize the final victory" through resumed armed 
struggle.22
The Peace Plan of the Permanent Five Members of the UN 
Security Council
22 VoCP, 2 September 1990; "FUNCINPEC-ANKI Intelligence 
Report: 12-7-90 'Activities of the Khmer Rouge'".
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Ta Mok's evocation of something resembling the Vietnamese 
model of 1973-1975 was followed at the end of May 1990 by 
indications that PDK might be prepared to back away from its 
insistence on the establishment of a quadripartite political 
administration. This apparent shift coincided with meetings 
of the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council,23 
during which they began formulating a settlement that they 
hoped would be acceptable to both SoC and to its PDK, KPNLF 
and FUNCINPEC adversaries. It offered PDK much less than it 
wanted, but significantly more than the Cambodian Communist 
movement had been promised by the 1954 Geneva Agreements and 
than the Vietnamese Communists had gotten in 1973. PDK 
reacted with public vacillation that reflected internal 
disagreement, but ultimately settled in form for what was on 
offer while continuing to hope and push for more in terms of 
actual political substance.
The Permanent Five approach rejected the concept of a 
quadripartite administration in favour of a formula according 
to which Cambodia would be represented symbolically by a 
quadripartite Supreme National Council (SNC) but its 
administration overseen by the UN pending elections.24 On 2 9 
May, VoNADK declared support for a communique issued by the 
Permanent Five describing the elements of their proposed 
settlement.25
However, by late June, the PDK reiterated its insistence 
on quadripartitism by demanding that the SNC be endowed with 
executive and legislative functions. Moreover, there should 
"be representatives of the four Cambodian parties on an equal
23 China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and 
the US.
24 "Background Note on the Negotiating Process" 
["Background"] , in UN, Department of Public Information, 
Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict (DPI1180-92077-January 1992-10M), p.iv.
25 VoNADK, 28 May 1990.
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footing1 not only in the SNC, but also "from top to bottom, in 
... all the ministries, as well as at the provincial, 
district, sub-district and village levels.1126
This renewed intransigence coincided with NADK's next 
major operation, which was launched in June in coordination 
with FUNCINPEC troops in Kampung Thom province. However, the 
operation had disappointing results. Although a district town 
was temporarily seized, and the provincial capital was 
penetrated for a few hours, the people did not flock to PDK's 
cause and SoC drove the attackers back.27 The Permanent Five 
then definitively rejected quadripartitism when it proceeded 
on 2 8 August 1990 to agree the text of a "framework document" 
to "define the key elements of a comprehensive political 
settlement of the Cambodia conflict based on an enhanced UN 
role" ,28
The framework called for the establishment of an SNC 
composed of "representative individuals" from the four parties 
as the "unique legitimate body and source of authority in 
which, throughout [a] transitional period, [Cambodia's] 
national sovereignty and unity would be enshrined". This 
political shrine "should be composed of representative 
individuals with authority among the Cambodian people". The 
Five said they would welcome a Cambodian decision that
26 "Proposal of the PDK for a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Problem Within the Framework of the 
Summary of the Conclusion of 26 May 1990 of the Five Permanent 
Members of the UN Security Council, dated 29 June 1990",
VoNADK, 30 June 1990.
27 Bartu, pp.5-6.
28 UN, General Assembly, Security Council (A/45/472- 
S/21689) , 31 August 1990, Annex: Statement of the Five Permanent 
Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia (28 August 
1990); Appendix: Framework for a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict [Framework] .
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Sihanouk be SNC president.29 Once a comprehensive political 
settlement was signed, the SNC would "delegate to the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] all powers 
necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive 
agreement, including those relating to the conduct of free and 
fair elections and relevant aspects of the administration of 
Cambodia." It specified this meant that all "administrative 
agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence 
the outcome of elections" would "be placed under direct UN 
supervision or control", particularly those responsible for 
"foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security 
and information". UNTAC was to be headed by a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN and 
was to "exercise such control as is necessary to ensure the 
strict neutrality of the bodies responsible for" these 
subjects. The framework did not refer to the existence of any 
government or governments in Cambodia, but only to "existing 
administrative structures".30
Accepting a Less Favourable Political Solution While P u s h i n g  
for More
While the framework thus did not provide for the 
establishment of a quadripartite political administration at 
any level, it held out the prospect of neutralizing SoC's 
political authority via a large-scale UN presence. It also 
envisaged total cantonment and de facto disarming of CPAF, as 
well as NADK.31 The PDK leadership evidently concluded that - 
for the time being at least - this was the best PDK could
29 Sihanouk had by this time relinquished his positions as 
President of the CGDK and of FUNCINPEC, leaving the latter under 
the leadership of his son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh.
30 Framework, Section 1, paragraphs 1, 4,5,8,9,10 and 12.
31 The framework provided for the "regrouping and 
relocating to specifically designated cantonment areas" of all 
armed forces "under the supervision of UNTAC" and for the storage 
of their arms "under UNTAC supervision". Framework, Section 2, 
paragraphs 15,17,18, and 19.
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hope to get. Thus, on 2 September, VoNADK declared that the 
PDK and its allies had "expressed their full support" for what 
it described as the framework's provisions for a UN "role to 
administer Cambodia during the transitional period" and in the 
"disarming of the armed forces engaged in fighting on the 
battlefield".32 In a meeting in Indonesia on 10 September, 
the PDK, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC and SoC agreed to a joint statement 
in which they declared their acceptance in principle of the 
framework document and to form the SNC.33 However, the 
meeting failed to achieve the PDK objective of designating 
Sihanouk as SNC president, and also resulted in an SNC in 
which the PDK received one-sixth representation rather than 
one-quarter, while SoC held half the membership. Khieu 
Samphan and Son Sen were the PDK figures named to the SNC.34
PDK's loud proclamation of its agreement with the 
approach of the Permanent Five masked its unhappiness about 
not yet having achieved quadripartitism, but reflected its 
recognition that the plan could create conditions for 
weakening SoC. SoC also recognized this threat, and was 
treating the plan as a basis for discussions while demanding 
significant revisions of it. PDK's unhappiness with the plan 
and its concerns that SoC might obtain revisions of it were 
manifested in PDK's public defiance of the Permanent Five's 
call on all Cambodian parties to exercise maximum military 
1 self-restraint so as to create the peaceful climate required 
to facilitate the achievement and implementation of a 
comprehensive political settlement".35 This defiance was
32 VoNADK, 1 September 1990.
33 "10 September 1990 Joint Statement of the Informal 
Meeting on Cambodia, Issued at Jakarta on 10 September 1990".
34 Of the remaining ten, six were from SoC and two each 
from the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. The statement envisaged the 
possibility of Sihanouk joining as a thirteenth member.
35 UN, General Assembly, Security Council (A/45/472- 
S/21689), 31 August 1990, Annex: Statement of the Five Permanent 
Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia (28 August
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justified internally as necessary to compel immediate and 
total SoC compliance with the Five's plan, and aimed at 
subverting it in a way that reintroduced quadripartitism. At 
a secret meeting in late September and early October convened 
in the presence of Pol Pot, leading NADK cadre resolved that 
NADK activities must continue in order to "force" SoC to 
"abide by" the Jakarta declaration of 10 September and 
Permanent Five framework.36 This was one of a series of 
gatherings of PDK diplomats and military cadre at which the 
leadership declared that given what it said was the attitude 
of the population, PDK should support the Permanent Five 
initiative while refocusing and further intensifying its 
people's war political struggle to take account of their 
plan.37
This reflected hopes that, via a new twist in NADK's 
village-organizing tactics, PDK might be able to use what the 
Five were offering to achieve more than the plan in fact 
conceded. This military riposte to rejection of PDK demands 
for quadripartitism aimed to achieve the semblance of 
quadripartitism. This was to be done by describing NADK's 
ongoing war in the countryside with a revised terminology that 
replaced the notion of village administrations "belonging to 
the nation" with that of village "national councils" 
supposedly belonging to Sihanouk. This switch also allowed 
PDK again to sidestep the problems of popularity that it was 
unable to confront directly. It would be organizing at the 
village level neither in the name of the "nation" or of a 
supposedly Khieu Samphan-led PDK, much less in the name of Pol 
Pot, but in the name of Sihanouk. Even if it scored some 
successes, these would only demonstrate the usefulness of the 
ruse, not PDK popularity, although Pol Pot would certainly
1990) ,
36 Sina Than, p.95, quoting a statement by a "senior Khmer
Rouge".
37 Bangkok Post, 19 March 1991.
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interpret any sign of success as proof of just that.
PDK set the stage for a new armed offensive by announcing 
a set of "political slogans" to welcome the formation of the 
SNC. The slogans insisted that the SNC should be considered 
"Cambodia's sole legitimate body: there is no other state
organ apart from the SNC"38. They called on SoC
"administrative staff in villages and sub-districts" to cease 
fighting NADK and instead to "accept and respect the SNC".39 
A PDK claimed that after "the 10 September 1990 Jakarta Joint 
Statement", Cambodians had "refused to recognize" the SoC. 
Instead, they had begun cooperating with the NADK "in 
attacking and dismantling the village and sub-district state 
authorities" of SoC and had "successively set up national 
councils to replace these state authorities".40 This 
terminology was accompanied by an intensified propaganda push 
for installation of Sihanouk as SNC president. One asserted 
that with "the establishment of an SNC, with ... Sihanouk as 
Chairman", SoC "should no longer exist".41 This was more 
wishful thinking.
PDK also attempted to enforce acceptance of the Permanent 
Five's peace formula by launching NADK into new conventional 
military actions. However, this came amidst indications that 
SoC rainy season use of air power and artillery against NADK 
had succeeded in disrupting its logistics and thus PDK's 
apparent hopes of launching attacks on major provincial 
capitals like Siem Reap, Batdambang and Kampung Thom.42 In 
November, NADK nevertheless concentrated forces for a multi- 
division operation aimed at Batdambang provincial town, but it
38 emphases added.
39 VoNADK, 22 September 1990.
40 VoDK, 28 March 1991.
41 VoNADK, 2 and 3 October 1990.
42 Sina Than, pp. 95, 97.
102
"ran out of steam after 15 days", and there was no more of a 
popular uprising in favour of PDK than there had been in 
Kampung Thom.43
Nevertheless, Khieu Samphan made another try to get a 
better deal. He warned that unless SoC was dissolved, the UN 
would in fact "enjoy no rights whatsoever nor any means to 
supervise and organize elections".44 However, the Permanent 
Five pushed ahead to elaborate a draft agreement based on the 
framework. On 2 6 November 1990, the Five and the Paris 
Conference Co-Chairmen France and Indonesia finalised a 
"Proposed Structure for the Agreement on a Comprehensive 
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict". The main text 
of the draft agreement followed closely the language of the 
framework in spelling out "arrangements during the 
transitional period" as regards the administration of 
Cambodia.45
However, an annex to the draft broadened the powers of 
the UNTAC head vis-a-vis the SNC and UNTAC's mandate of 
supervision and control vis-a-vis existing administrative 
structures, SoC and PDK alike.45 The draft furthermore now 
specified that cantoned PDK, SoC and other Cambodian armed 
forces would also be demobilized, albeit according to a 
timetable still to be discussed.47
43 Bartu, p. 6.
44 VoNADK, 18 November 1990.
45 UN, Security Council, "Proposed Structure for the 
Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict" ["Draft"], Sections I, II and III.
46 "Draft", "Annex 1, Proposed Mandate for UNTAC", Section 
A, paragraphs 2,4,5,6 and 7.
47 "Draft", "Annex 2, Withdrawal, Cease-fire and Related 
Measures", Article I, paragraphs 1,2,4 and 6; Article 3, 
paragraph 3; and Article V, paragraph 1.
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PDK welcomed the draft agreement46, which could be 
interpreted as potentially more favourable to it than the 
earlier framework, but it was opposed by SoC. As the then 
SoC chief of state Heng Samrin put in a speech marking the 
anniversary of the collapse of the Democratic Kampuchea regime 
in 1979, the "draft agreement ... must be improved with the 
participation of the SoC's SNC members."49 In particular, SoC 
hoped to mitigate the powers of UNTAC vis-a-vis its 
administrative structures and to reduce the extent to which 
its armed forces would be disarmed and demobilized.
National Councils as Counter-Administration
After the Permanent Five put forward the draft agreement, 
the PDK put even greater emphasis on use of the NADK to 
establish local national councils, and it appears a few may 
have been established at the village and sub-district levels 
as a result of NADK actions. PDK also began to make much less 
plausible claims that National Councils had been established 
in certain provinces. VoDK asserted that provincial-level 
national councils were set up in Batdambang, Kampung Cham, 
Siem Reap and Kampung Thom in early December. The radio 
argued that the supposed existence of such bodies demonstrated 
that SoC was "disintegrating and will completely disintegrate 
soon."50 This contention seemed intended to set the stage for 
what PDK hoped would eventually be successful NADK 
conventional attacks in these provinces that could be 
presented as proof to itself and others of PDK's popularity. 
It pointed toward a scenario according to which provincial 
National Councils would emerge as the culmination of its 
village-level people's war, of conventional NADK attacks on 
district and provincial targets and the psychological impact 
of an enhanced political role for Sihanouk. If Sihanouk or
48 For an example, see VoNADK, 31 December 1990.
49 VoCP, 5 January 1991.
50 VoDK, 20 December 1990.
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the UN gave some credit to PDK's claims that a hierarchy of 
local councils from the village right up to the provincial 
level was being created, then it could put that hierarchy 
forward as an alternative to SoC. It could try to demand that 
the UN interact with this hierarchy instead of that of SoC and 
supposedly - instead of the PDK's own "existing 
administrative structures".
SoC Foils NADK's Renewed War Effort
In a new year message for 19 91, Khieu Samphan urged the 
NADK to intensify actions to set up local national councils. 
He proclaimed that Cambodia was still "moving toward 
liberation" and optimistically predicted it would "certainly 
be liberated in the near future". However, he also indicated 
that the PDK's position was "not yet conclusive," and that 
achieving liberation would require further "tenacious 
struggle".51 Son Sen said on the same occasion that 
diplomatic achievements had "enabled progress towards ending 
the ... war ... to make another step forward," but indicated 
that in order to make further steps, NADK would have 
successfully to resume big-unit warfare. He explained that 
its "current struggle" was aimed "directly against . . . the 
core of the puppet army," especially on the largely 
conventional battlefields in Batdambang, in Siem Reap and 
Kampung Thom, where NADK operations might give provincial 
national councils a chance to surface.52
However, NADK plans were spoiled by SoC counter-measures 
that outclassed NADK (and the armies of its CGDK partners) in 
conventional combat through the use of heavy artillery, tank- 
led assaults and airpower.53 Already in October 199 0, SoC had
51 VoNADK, 30 December 1990.
52 VoNADK, 1 January 1991.
53 Bangkok Post, 6 April 1991.
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launched attacks in the direction of Pailin,54 and, as one SoC 
commander in western Cambodia declared in late January, its 
forces were "on the offensive, not the defensive any more."55 
An attempt by NADK in early February to regain the military
initiative by launching "major attacks" to capture
Batdambang56 soon fizzled out.57 SoC attacks in Kampung Thom 
drove FUNCINPEC forces that had cooperated with NADK there in 
1990 out of their forward headquarters,58 and were allegedly 
accompanied by operations against NADK in Siem Reap.59
Further SoC probes in northwestern Cambodia in late March 
precipitated emergency meetings between Son Sen and other PDK 
leaders "to discuss the war situation".60 Perhaps at his 
urging, they began considering whether PDK might have to 
accept "revisions" of the Permanent Five plan in SoC's 
favour.61
Preemption of NADK's conventional war plans almost 
certainly undermined its subsidiary efforts to transform 
NADK's "people's war" into a village-based campaign for the 
establishment of local National Councils. As ever, these 
efforts were the subject of much propaganda, but had few
concrete results. A set of "new political slogans" put 
forward by the PDK for 1991 again stressed that there should 
be no more SoC administration in Cambodia. VoNADK called on
54 VoNADK, 13 March 1991.
55 "Cambodia: Gunfire", Reuter, Sre Ambel, 24 January 1991.
56 Bangkok Post, 5 February 1991.
57 VoNADK, 27 February 1991.
58 VoCP, 18 February 1991. In March, "resistance" sources 
admitted to having lost "some ground" in Kampung Thom. Bangkok 
Post, 22 March 1991.
59 VoNADK, 22 February 1991.
60 Xinhua, 28 March 1991.
61 "Rebels Prepared to Discuss Plan Revisions", AFP, 
Bangkok, 2 7 March 1991.
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NADK to join forces with PDK peasant supporters "to attack, 
scatter and dissolve the village, sub-district, district, 
provincial and municipal administrative networks of the . . . 
enemy ... and to replace them with national councils."62
The only place where this scenario seemed even briefly 
possible was Kampot province, which was weakly defended by 
SoC, but even with the opportunities this offered, NADK was 
unable to consolidate temporary gains there. VoNADK lauded 
the success of NADK's "guerilla warfare and people's war to 
launch military and political offensives at the same time" in 
the province by attacking "mostly in villages" with the aim of 
"dismantling the state authorities" of SoC.63 In fact, NADK 
forces in Kampot managed briefly to overrun one district town 
and penetrate to the outskirts of the Kampot provincial seat, 
taking advantage of the particularly poor quality of local SoC 
troops. However, while the population fled to avoid PDK 
control, counter-attacks by SoC reinforcements in early April 
pushed NADK "back to the mountains".64
In view of the overall course of military events since 
early 1991, it is not surprising that when reviewing them in 
April, Khieu Samphan once again evinced optimism while 
admitting that PDK's enemies were "not dead yet" and were 
still "trying militarily". He lamented that they might still 
have "adequate . . . forces" to oppose NADK "on battlefields 
throughout the country" and spoke of their efforts "to 
prevent" NADK actions "to cut off major strategic roads ... 
and besiege and attack major townships, especially the cities 
in various provinces." Although he claimed in general terms 
that PDK had "set up, reinforced and expanded national 
councils in many villages, subdistricts, districts and even
62 VoNADK, 1 January 1991.
63 VoNADK, 13 March 1991.
64 "Warships Land SRV Troops in Siege at Kampot", AFP, 
Kampot, 4 April 1991; Le Monde, 30 May 1991.
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some provinces, " he offered nothing as proof. As Ta Mok had 
done a year before, he revealed concern about NADK morale, 
even if he could not consider the possibility that it was 
discouraged because of poor popular response to its propaganda 
and military efforts. He called on it not to give up, but 
instead to uphold its "fighting spirit" and "constantly sharp 
sense of combat ... in continuing to fight."65
Khieu Samphan7s message came up against new international 
calls for an end to NADK attacks. On 22 April 1991, the UN 
Secretary-General and the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference 
issued a joint appeal for a temporary cessation of 
hostilities, "as a gesture of good faith", and the PDK 
indicated that it was in principle prepared to accept a stand­
still cease-fire as of 1 May.66 This would have confirmed 
NADK territorial loses during the 1990-1991 dry season, which 
were most noticeable in Siem Reap and Kampung Thom. It left 
SoC with a clear capability to resume offensive operations 
against Pailin and otherwise to exploit its proven superiority 
in terms of conventional firepower.67
While it appears that both SoC and PDK initially 
respected the cease-fire,68 PDK immediately began questioning 
its validity and soon announced it would no longer adhere to 
it. It made clear that it would not give up the military 
option until SoC agreed to at least UN supervision and 
control, and it seems that it still had lingering hopes of 
getting more than this through military feats. However, 
earlier NADK claims to have blunted the SoC offensive in
65 VoNADK, 11 April 1991.
66 "Background", p.vi.
67 Bangkok Post, 21 May 19 91.
68 Far Eastern Economic Review {FEER) , 30 May 1991.
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northwest Cambodia59 and hopes that the onset of the rainy 
season would frustrate renewed attacks, particularly in the 
Pailin area,70 were belied by further SoC operations in late 
May that prompted fears that NADK might not be able to ensure 
defence of the town.71 This SoC thrust that reached within 
a few kilometres of Pailin resulted in "huge seizures of 
weapons" from fleeing NADK troops, the apparent rout of which 
brought into question their fighting ability and boosted SoC 
confidence. Moreover, foreign journalists who visited the 
battlefield found that peasants in Batdambang to whom NADK had 
been preaching PDK's political message for years remained 
unconvinced.72
At the end of May, one foreign correspondent who had 
covered Cambodia for decades concluded that over the past year 
and a half, NADK had hardly gained any territory, although 
almost 200,000 people had been relocated under SoC auspices to 
deny PDK access to them. Some recent NADK activities had 
allowed it to confirm its presence in the interior, such as in 
Kampot, but it had suffered major casualties. SoC, not PDK, 
was showing a new confidence73 based on the battlefield 
evidence that NADK could "not occupy and maintain large tracts 
of territory."74 SoC head of state Heng Samrin seemed to be 
justified when he declared that its "1990-1991 counter-attack 
campaign" had "inflicted considerable losses" on NADK.75
69 "Khmer Rouge Claim to Roll Back Phnom Penh Offensive", 
Reuter, Bangkok, 4 April 1991.
70 VoNADK, 8 April 1991.
71 Bangkok Post, 4 June 1991.
72 "Phnom Penh Army Rolls Back Khmer Rouge in Western Rice 
Bowl", Reuter, Batdambang, 29 May 1991; FEER, 30 May 1991.
73 Le Monde, 3 0 May 1991.
74 Bangkok Post, 21 May 1991.
75 VoCP, 19 June 1991.
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PDK reacted to such setbacks by making another attempt to 
recoup its position militarily, and thus to turn the 
diplomatic situation around. In the end, it officially stuck 
to the cease-fire only until 6 June 1991. Allegations that 
SoC was violating it and being diplomatically recalcitrant 
laid the groundwork for an official return to warfare. As 
early as 14 May, VoNADK broadcast an "open letter" to Khieu 
Samphan from cadre and combatants of Ta Mok's Sector 1003 
Division 616 in Kampung Thom province alleging that CPAF had 
launched continuous attacks against it from the first day of 
the truce.76 VoNADK warned that if SoC continued "to oppose 
the UN documents", PDK would unleash the "people's force" 
against it.77 However, the only visible manifestation of this 
"people's force" was NADK, so in order to make the threat real 
PDK announced on 18 May that NADK would no longer observe the 
cease-fire after 5 June unless SoC signed up to the draft 
agreement.78 Finally, on 6 June 1991, the NADK formally 
issued "an order to all ... troops on all battlefields ... to 
stop implementing the ... cease-fire." They "should ... 
actively and constantly fight ... through ... people's war 
until the UN documents are accepted and implemented.1,79
In late June, PDK indicated it still hoped thereby to get 
endorsement of its demand for the dissolution of SoC political 
authority throughout Cambodia. VoDK expressed hopes that the 
framework document and draft agreement would be "fully 
implemented" by "the dismantling of the state authority, both 
military and civilian," of SoC.80 PDK got no joy on this 
renewed demand. Instead, under pressure from the Permanent
76 VoNADK, 13 May 1991.
77 VoNADK, 15 May 1991.
78 VoNADK, 18 May 1991.
79 VoNADK, 5 June 1991.
80 VoDK, 22 June 1991.
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Five, its delegation81 agreed at an SNC held in Phathayaa, 
Thailand, "to call for an open-ended and unconditional cease­
fire"82. However, PDK immediately indicated that it
considered this an agreement in principle only that did not 
prohibit NADK from trying to make real PDK claims about the 
emergence of a counter-administration based on national 
councils. As early as 28 June, VoDK suggested there was no 
cease-fire and the NADK should continue fighting to achieve 
its political goals.83
PDK also tried to take advantage of the fact that the 
Phathayaa SNC meeting had agreed in principle that the SNC 
would be moved to Phnom Penh after a final settlement was 
reached to give further impetus to NADK efforts to bring about 
the collapse of SoC. On 16 July VoDK optimistically declared 
that because of the announcement that the SNC was to be set up 
in the capital, the SoC "administration in all areas is 
shaking and collapsing morally and organizationally."84 PDK 
took further encouragement from the results of the SNC meeting 
convened that day (in Beijing), at which Sihanouk was 
installed as the body's President. Still, PDK was taking no 
chances: while continuing to treat popular support as a
reality and not a dream, it still considered the cease-fire a 
prospect rather than a fact. PDK had been explaining since 
early July that what had been agreed was a "cease-fire . . . 
under UN supervision", and that its "concrete implementation" 
was still to be discussed by the SNC.85 VoDK clarified that 
"without strict UN verification, . . . the cease-fire
81 The PDK was formally represented by Khieu Samphan and Son 
Sen. Pol Pot reportedly was secretly present. Nayan Chanda, 
"Pol Pot Directs Cambodia Peace Talks, Sparking Concerns About 
Future Role", Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 5 August 1991.
82 "Background", p.vi.
83 VoDK, 27 June 1991.
84 VoDK, 15 July 1991.
85 VoNADK, 5 July 1991.
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cannot materialize - no ifs, ands or buts about it."86 Khieu 
Samphan reiterated this position in late July,87 and PDK 
evidently held to it right through to the signing of the Paris 
Agreements on 23 October 1991.
However, there were no reports of major NADK actions 
between July and October. Although both PDK and SoC 
reportedly attempted "consolidation of territory",88 there are 
no indications that PDK was able to reverse SoC's "relative 
military success" of earlier in the year89 or was suddenly 
able, after years of trying and failing, to persuade the 
peasants of Batdambang or anywhere else to give it positive, 
enthusiastic support.
Signing- the Paris Agreements
Given PDK's at best unimproved position in 1991, it is 
not surprising that renewed debate took place among PDK's 
covert leadership about whether the movement could benefit 
from and should participate in a negotiated settlement. By 
1991, the first echelon of this leadership is believed to have 
comprised Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen, 
Sam Bit and Meah Mut. Ieng Sary had reportedly been excluded 
de facto from the inner leadership circle because of the 
"liberal" tendencies that were associated with his lack of a 
"military style". He was criticised by Pol Pot, Ta Mok and 
even Son Sen, who pointed to the frequent conflicts between 
Sector 102 and the neighbouring Sector 32, which remained
86 VoDK, 12 July 1991.
87 VoNADK, 27 July 1991.
88 "Guerillas Accused of Ignoring Cease-Fire", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 7 October 1991.
89 FEER, 30 May 1991.
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under Son Sen's brother, Ni Kan,90
This shift rebounded to the advantage of Ta Mok, whose 
retention of the number three position in the innermost circle 
seemed reinforced by the presence within it of his former 
deputy from the old Southwest Zone, Sam Bit, and his son-in- 
law, Meah Mut. Sam Bit was ensconced deep inside Cambodia at 
a base in Kampot province from which he exercised direct 
control over PDK activities throughout southwestern Cambodia. 
Meah Mut's position seemed to have been recently strengthened 
by a transfer that brought him down to the leadership team's 
headquarters area in Sector 505. After ten years operating as 
his father-in-law's Deputy in Sector 1003, Meah Mut had 
reportedly joined Nuon Chea in Sector 5 05, and he was soon 
said to be in charge of "political work".91
This was important because despite Ta Mok's remarks in 
April 1990 to the effect that PDK would be able to wrest 
advantages even from an imposed settlement, he reportedly 
continued to be the most sceptical of the senior leaders and 
began arguing that PDK should not accept the terms being 
offered. The decision to go ahead and sign the Paris 
Agreements in October 1991 is said to have been made at Pol 
Pot's insistence even though Mok neither "wanted or liked" the 
deal.92 Pol Pot's position reportedly attempted to "rally" 
elements who like Ta Mok were to the old Party Secretary's
90 These conclusions are based on the author's interviews 
with various current or former PDK and NADK cadre in 1992-1993 
and on the similar interview material compiled in Peschoux, "DK- 
Cadres-biographie" (1990) and "DK-bio and Military Data (June- 
September 1992)". See also Steve Heder, UNTAC, 
Information/Education Division, "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 
November 1992. Ieng Sary told the author in 1996 that by 1991 
he was no longer invited to participate in high-level discussions 
about PDK's negotiating position.
91 Peschoux, "DK-Bio Steve Heder, UNTAC, 
Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit to Kbal Toek- 
Voat Serei Utdam, 30 May 1992".
92 Heder,"PDK Leadership and Policy".
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"left" and elements to his "right", of whom Son Sen was 
perhaps one. Pol Pot's compromise view was that the deal 
offered by the Permanent Five was the PDK's "best bet for 
regaining power", and the PDK should be "very happy" about 
it.93
It certainly brought PDK much closer to obtaining what 
the Vietnamese would have liked to have gained in 1973, even 
if not as much more as Ta Mok would have liked. The consensus 
engineered by Pol Pot rested on the logic that even though the 
Agreements fell far short of quadripartitism, their terms were 
certainly more favourable than the 1954 Geneva Agreements had 
been for the Cambodian Communists and the 1973 Paris Agreement 
had been for the Vietnamese. They provided for more 
neutralization of the enemy's state structure and armed forces 
under better international guarantees. UNTAC was clearly a 
much more formidable body than the International Commission 
for Supervision and Control that had done so little to help 
the Cambodian Communists in 1955 and the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision described in the 1973 
Paris Agreement. The SNC was clearly more substantial than 
the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord 
that had been of so little use to the Vietnamese Communists 
after 1973. Unless things went terribly wrong, PDK should do 
much better than Cambodian Communists after Geneva and at 
least as well as the Vietnamese after 1973. And, according to 
the script, things could not go terribly wrong unless PDK was 
somehow denied its political due by gross manipulation of the 
Agreements or unless its prospects were somehow sabotaged by 
treason, or at least incompetence, within its own ranks. The 
possibility that PDK was much less popular than Pol Pot and 
most other senior leaders believed it to be was simply not in 
the script.
93 Notes on an interview by an UNTAC official with a Chinese 
diplomat intimately familiar with the PDK leadership, 21 November 
1992, np.
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Pol Pot's confidence in PDK's popularity was reflected in 
the fact that by signing the Paris Agreements of 1991 PDK was 
agreeing to go even further down the road away from military 
toward political struggle than the Vietnamese Communists had 
by the terms of the treaty they signed in 1973. He was 
demanding and expecting that PDK achieve even greater 
political results than the Vietnamese, despite less reliance 
on military means. Thus, PDK's signature of the Agreements 
revealed the breathtaking depth of the extent to which its 
isolated leadership that lived in a world of false optimism 
about PDK's political prospects. And as has been seen, 
despite other differences, this was an illusion that was 
manifest in the statements Pol Pot, Ta Mok and Son Sen had all 
made in support of their arguments about how PDK could best 
advance via people's war.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNAMICi WAITING FOR UNTAC
PDK's main hope in signing the Paris Agreements was to 
transform implementation of them into an intensification of 
the political aspects of people's war in the countryside. It 
wanted to use the Agreements as an opportunity for expanding 
its rural political infrastructure, in particular by using 
cadre and combatants released from strictly military duties to 
do what Pol Pot had said they should have been concentrating 
on all along: deploying the weapon of the mouth to foment mass 
rural uprisings by PDK supporters. Its expectation was that 
the cease-fire provisions of the Paris Agreements would allow 
demobilizing NADK cadre and combatants to enter villages more 
freely than ever before, indeed to do so "legally" as 
political activists. PDK hoped a cease-fire would preclude 
SoC armed forces from obstructing PDK political advances, and 
that disarmament of SoC armed forces, including local militia, 
would leave the countryside even more wide open to political 
work by ex-NADK and manifestations of popular enthusiasm for 
PDK. Thus, the Paris Agreements would achieve one of the two 
eliminations that NADK had been fighting for, that is, the 
elimination of the enemy's armed forces.
By activating village administrations that might 
incorporate former SoC officials but in which elements 
responsive to PDK would play a predominant role, demobilizing 
NADK would use the cover of the Paris Agreements to achieve 
the other elimination, that of SoC's local administrative 
structure. PDK nuclei stiffened by NADK cadre and combatants 
would mobilize popular forces propagandized during year after 
year of attack to rise up along with sympathetic SoC militia 
and local officials to establish these structures. In order 
both to undermine SoC and evade UNTAC's control mandate, these 
structures, from the village level on up, would be portrayed 
as local National Councils and be presented as such to
116
Sihanouk and the UN. They would purportedly answer to 
Sihanouk and, like the SNC itself, be shrines of Cambodian 
sovereignty that UNTAC would consult but would not control. 
To facilitate what PDK expected would be the emergence 
throughout the countryside of the pro-PDK "popular forces" 
supposedly built up since 1979, it hoped to maximize the 
extent to which the SNC itself functioned as a ruling body, 
and that Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF would back it up in 
this effort. Through the Paris Agreements, diplomacy in the 
SNC could thus be substituted for dramatic military action as 
a means for achieving political concessions in PDK's favour.
In order to undermine SoC as quickly and greatly as 
possible and thus unleash it supporters, PDK hoped to achieve 
a rapid deployment of UNTAC and to get the UN to focus on 
control of SoC. At the same time, it hoped to prevent any 
real UN control of PDK from above and avoid reminding 
Cambodians of the past by continuing to shroud Pol Pot, Nuon 
Chea, Ta Mok and additional key PDK leaders other than Khieu 
Samphan and Son Sen in clandestinity. Meanwhile, selected 
political and military cadre would join Khieu Samphan and Son 
Sen and try openly to enter Phnom Penh, provincial towns and 
other parts of Cambodia under UN protection, including those 
areas previously most tightly controlled by SoC, to create 
more fronts for garnering popular support to attack SoC 
politically.
Finally, despite Pol Pot's fantastic optimism about PDK 
political prospects, PDK hoped to hedge this bet by partially 
evading demobilization of NADK and using NADK participation in 
demobilization to project PDK political influence. Evasion 
was to be achieved by disguising a substantial proportion of 
NADK as "civil police", while projection would be achieved by 
getting UNTAC to move NADK forces as close to key contested 
areas as possible. NADK rechristened as police would not only 
provide protection for PDK leaders and forces, but ensure that 
PDK had enough armed strength to supplement political struggle
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as and when necessary, and that it would be in a position to 
resume full-fledged armed struggle whenever the circumstances 
warranted, NADK elements moved forward by UNTAC would also 
have greater opportunities not only to use "the weapon of the 
mouth", but to threaten with guns, especially if the whole 
process broke down, as some, like Ta Mok, expected,
Hopes for a Pincer Movement to Destroy SoC
PDK thus viewed the continued undermining of SoC from 
below, destabilization of it from the side and neutralization 
of it from above as necessary conditions for achieving a 
"proper" implementation of the Paris Agreements that would 
allow its popular support to emerge. This would make PDK 
participation in elections worthwhile and open up a myriad of 
other possibilities for advancing the revolution toward 
ultimate victory. PDK propaganda thus looked forward to an 
implementation of the Paris Agreements that would turn into a 
multi-prong pincer attack on SoC. In broadcasts just before 
and just after the signature of the Agreements, PDK publicly 
expressed its hopes that the combined effect of its actions to 
dismantle SoC and UNTAC's control of it would be to allow PDK 
to "crush" its enemies. The broadcasts also expressed fears 
that the implementation of the Paris Agreements would not 
allow PDK to proceed in such a manner. One commentary called 
on "every Cambodian" to cooperate in "dismantling the . . . 
administrative networks in the villages, subdistricts and 
districts and replacing them with National Councils under the 
auspices of the ... Sihanouk-headed SNC." It explained that 
it was "only by effectively fulfilling" this task that 
implementation of the Agreements could be achieved. It was 
left unsaid, for the time being, what would happen if 
Cambodians declined to rally to bodies that ostensibly 
answered to Sihanouk but in fact were controlled by PDK, and 
thus failed to cooperate.1 However, another broadcast called
1 VoDK, 10 October 1991.
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on the Cambodian people "to constantly heighten their 
vigilance in order to check" the "perfidious schemes" of PDK's 
"overt and covert enemies", who it said would "seek all means 
to sabotage" the kind of implementation of the Paris 
Agreements PDK wanted. It said that they would have to be 
equally vigilant with the UN.2 A third broadcast expressed 
anxiety that the UN might not act speedily to despatch 
"peacekeeping force with adequate staff members ... to 
supervise and control the ... general situation in Cambodia", 
thus leaving SoC a free hand against PDK supporters.3
The Reality of UNTAC's Slow Deployment
Such worries about the UN reflected clear indications 
that UNTAC would not arrive quickly, and that the UN's focus 
was on preventing further NADK military activity, not on 
neutralizing SoC's political dominance. Indeed, it was 
already clear that unless something changed, there was no 
prospect that the signing of the Paris Agreements and respect 
for its standstill cease-fire would bring about any immediate 
weakening of SoC by the UN.
The issue of how quickly UNTAC would begin its work had 
been engaged at meetings in mid-1991 to finalize the Paris 
Agreements, during which PDK calls for the rapid deployment of 
UNTAC had been rejected as impractical by UN negotiators.4 
The Agreements provided no specific time-table for the 
formation and deployment of UNTAC, and at the Paris 
Conference, UN officials predicted that it would take until 
February or March 1992 to work out UNTAC's structure and
2 Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia 
(VGNUFC) , 27 October 1991. VGNUFC was the successor to both 
VoDK and VoNADK.
3 VoNADK, 9 October 1991.
4 VGNUFC, 25 December 1991; author's interview with UN 
official Raffeudin Ahmed, Paris, October 22, 1991.
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budget and obtain Security Council approval for them. Full 
deployment would take an additional six months.5 The UN's 
capacity for deployment of large-scale, complex missions such 
as UNTAC was indeed so inadequate that it was impossible for 
the organization to do so expeditiously.6 It was thus not 
until the end of February that the Security Council approved 
an UNTAC 1 implementation plan".7 However, even once the 
structure and budget of UNTAC were agreed, it had to be 
recruited and supplied. Again, serious constraints were built 
into the UN system which meant inevitable delays. UNTAC did 
not formally begin deploying in Cambodia until 15 March 1992, 
when its head Yasushi Akashi arrived to take up residence in 
Phnom Penh. Thereafter, the deployment of "essential 
equipment, contingents and officials" still proceeded at a 
"snail's pace".8
The UN AM IC St op-crap
To fill the gap until the arrival of UNTAC, the Security 
Council had on 16 October approved the deployment of a United
5 Ahmed interview.
6 Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?", in The New 
York Review of Books, 12 May 1994, p.29; US General Accounting 
Office, Report to Congressional Requesters: U,N. Peacekeeping: 
Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions (Washington: 
GAO.NSAID-94-9, December 1993), pp.3,5,10,13,16-17,30-38.
7 See UN, General Assembly, Addendum, Initial Phase of the 
Implementation Plan Report of the Secretary-General 
(A/46/235/Add.1), 31 January 1992; UN, Security Council, Report 
of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23 613) [hereafter: SG 
Report], 19 February 1992; UN, Security Council, Report of the 
Secretary-General on Cambodia, Addendum (S/23613/Add.1) 
[hereafter: Addendum]; and UN, Security Council, Statement by 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, delivered to the Security 
Council on 28 February 1992.
8 General Accounting Office, pp.41-44; Yasushi Akashi, 
"UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peace-keeping" (paper 
delivered at the Third Charles Rostov Lecture on Asian Affairs 
at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at 
Johns Hopkins University, 14 October 1993), pp.22-23.
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Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).9 Contrary to 
PDK desires, the political work of UNAMIC did not include any 
of the powers of control or supervision set forth in the Paris 
Agreements.10 Its head was mandated merely to establish 
"liaison with the SNC on the preparations for the deployment 
of UNTAC", and his tiny office was to comprise just five 
professional staff. Its main purpose was to internationalize 
a freezing of the battlefield situation to preclude military 
advances by any partie, but most of all by PDK. Its 116 
mostly unarmed military officers and men, who constituted the 
overwhelming majority of UNAMIC personnel, were to use its 
"good offices" to "assist the Cambodian parties to maintain 
[a] cease-fire."11 Ataul Karim, a former Bangladesh 
Ambassador to the UN, was named UNAMIC head. He arrived in 
Phnom Penh on 9 November.12 The military chief of UNAMIC, 
French Brigadier General Jean-Michel Loridon, arrived four 
days later.13 SoC welcomed them with a broadcast endorsing 
UNAMIC's non-political objectives and its concentration on 
stabilizing the military situation.14
Trading- Military Information and a Military Stand-down for 
Opportunities to Launch a Rural Political Offensive
In order to take advantage of the political prospects 
offered by the Paris Agreements, PDK had to comply
9 Security Council Resolution on UNAMIC and Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Situation (S/RES/717 1991), 16 October 
199, in UN, Department of Information, The United Nations and 
Cambodia, 1991-1995 (New York: UN Publications, 1995), pp.131- 
132.
10 Interview with Ataul Karim, Phnom Penh, 11 December 1991.
11 SG Report j Addendum.
12 VoCP, 13 November 1991.
13 The Nation (Bangkok) , 14 November 1991; VoCP, 14 November
1991.
14 VoCP, 13 November 1991.
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sufficiently with their military provisions to create pressure 
for SoC compliance. As a first gesture, it began revealing 
facts about its armed forces, as required by the Paris 
Agreements. More fundamentally, however, it had to stop 
fighting, at least temporarily, and begin going through at 
least some of the motions of demobilization. All of this PDK 
was willing to do.
The Paris Agreements specified that PDK and other parties 
must provide the UN "immediately" with information on their 
military force structure. PDK handed over an outline of the 
information required at the Paris Conference,15 and eventually 
gave up some additional data. Much of the information appears 
to have been accurate, at least as far as it went.
One document said the NADK included a "regular army" with 
a troop strength of 25,175 combatants and porters, plus 
"guerilla forces" totalling 2,510 men. It noted that "on 
average, 65 percent of regular army units are armed". In 
other words, PDK claimed to have an average of 18,874 regular 
army combatants and militiamen under arms at any one time.16 
These figures were within the upper range of earlier estimates 
of NADK troop strength made by SoC and Vietnamese officials on 
the basis of their military intelligence. They also agreed 
with the figures arrived at through independent research.17
In other documents, the NADK High Command provided 
details about the chain of command, nomenclature, deployment, 
strengths and leading cadre of the units it said comprised the 
NADK. An organisational chart placed all regular units under
15 Ahmed interview.
16 [Partie of Democratic Kampuchea] , "The armed forces of 
the Democratic Kampuchea party (translation) ", 20 September 1991, 
p.l; National Army of Democratic Kampuchea High Command, "The 
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea" [hereafter: "The NADK"], 
August 1991, np.
17 Peschoux, Khmers .Rouges, pp. 127-130.
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the control of the High Command, headed by Commander-in-Chief 
Son Sen, assisted by a General Staff of whom five members were 
later named.18 The deployment information generally
corresponded with what was known about NADK activities before 
Paris and with information obtained from defectors 
afterward.19
Although the documents depicted the NADK as widely and 
deeply deployed, they also indicated that in many places it 
was very thinly spread. Some 60 percent of the total NADK 
strength of 27,325 was said to be in rear base areas near the 
Thai-Cambodian border, leaving only some 10,798 troops 
dispersed in forward battlefields.
Partial Compliance with the Cease-Fire: Standing- Down
Militarily. Curtailing Military Resupply. Getting Ready for a 
"Troop Cut"
The data on division and regimental cadre provided by 
NADK corresponded well with that available from other sources 
before the NADK provided lists, and with later information 
given by defectors from NADK ranks. Like the data on NADK 
troop strength, therefore, it seems to have been accurate, as 
far as it went.20 However, except for reaffirming that PDK
18 National Army of Democratic Kampuchea High Command, 
"Deployment of forces of NADK Divisions and Independent 
Regiments", and appendices, nd.
19 This conclusion is based on a comparison of the official 
NADK data with, on the one hand, NADK orders of battle prepared 
by Thai, US and FUNCINPEC sources and obtained by the author 
during trips to Thailand and Cambodia in 1989, 1990 and 1991, and 
with, on the other hand, the NADK orders of battle produced by 
UNTAC military intelligence officers in late 1992 and mid-1993. 
See UNTAC, Military Component [hereafter: UNTAC-MC] , "NADK
Orbat", December 1992; and UNTAC-MC, "NADK Order of Battle, 28 
June 1993" .
20 Again, this conclusion is based on a comparison of the 
official NADK data with, on the one hand, NADK orders of battle 
prepared by Thai, US and FUNCINPEC sources and obtained by the 
author during trips to Thailand and Cambodia in 1989, 1990 and
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Vice-President Son Sen was NADK Commander-in-Chief, the data 
gave away nothing about the higher levels of the NADK command 
structure. It thus denied that any role was being played in 
NADK affairs by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok. It also 
appears to have intentionally denied and thus hidden the 
existence of important intermediate levels of political and 
military command (see Map III) ,21
Selective disclosure of information was accompanied by 
partial compliance with other aspects of what the Agreements 
referred to as the cease-fire's "Phase One", which was to 
precede demobilization. PDK seemed prepared to "order [its] 
armed forces immediately to disengage and refrain from all 
hostilities" of an overtly military kind,22 but remained 
intensely wary of SoC intentions and coupled these orders with 
insistence on the need to be ready to fend off any SoC cease­
fire violations.
Evidence to this effect comes from former NADK cadre and
1991, and with, on the other hand, the NADK orders of battle 
produced by UNTAC.
21 Although it referred to a military Front 250, which was 
apparently a public name for NADK Sector 32, it did not name its 
leadership. It pretended that Sectors 1001, 1003, 102 and Sector 
505 and their leading cadre simply did not exist. Internal PDK 
documentation demonstrates that this was false. See, for example, 
"Message Number 05 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", signed Khiev [Son 
Sen] and dated 20 November 1991, in which Son Sen mentions the 
existence of Sectors 1001, 1003 and 102, as well as "the South 
of Sisophon Sector", which was apparently another name for Sector 
32 or "Front 250". Author's translation of a document obtained 
by Christophe Peschoux from the PDK compound in Phnom Penh that 
was ransacked on 27 November 1991. In addition, see the author's 
translation of Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled 
Views to Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 
1992" [hereafter: Pol Pot, "Clarification"], which refers to 
Sector 505. These two documents were obtained by Nayan Chanda.
22 UN, Department of Public Information, Agreements on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict 
(DPI1180-92077-January 1992-10M) [hereafter: Agreements], Annex 
2, Article 1, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 6. "Forces" were defined as 
including "all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary, and 
other auxiliary forces".
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combatants who later defected from NADK ranks and is broadly 
corroborated by SoC reports. The NADK defectors - or "self- 
demobilizers" as UNTAC dubbed them23 - stressed that they were 
under instructions from higher up within the NADK chain of 
command to cease all offensive military operations, and to 
restrict themselves to self-defence. They asserted that they 
adhered to these instructions, sometimes despite significant 
SoC pressures and probes. Almost all self-demobilizers also 
reported that soon after the Paris Agreements, their units 
began making serious preparations to comply to a considerable 
extent with the demobilization procedure set forth as "Phase 
Two" of the Paris Agreements' cease-fire.24 Above all, 
preparations were made to stand by for "demobilization of at 
least 70 percent" of each Cambodian Partie's armed forces.25 
Self-demobilizers described drawing up lists of troops and of 
arms and ammunition, selecting troops for demobilization, 
stocking arms, and constructing accommodation in which UNTAC 
personnel were to stay while overseeing the process.
SoC allegations of cease-fire violations up through the 
end of 1991, even if taken at face value, appear to 
corroborate the defectors' consistent assertions that NADK was 
ordered to cease offensive military operations. While
23 This and subsequent material from UNTAC interviews with 
NADK defectors is presented more fully in Steve Heder and Judy 
Ledgerwood, eds, Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: 
Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-keeping (Armonk: 
ME Sharpe, 1996). These interviews were conducted by the author 
and several of his Khmer-speaking colleagues in the 
Analysis/Assessment Unit of the Information/Education Division, 
who spoke to ex-NADK under circumstances that guaranteed them 
anonymity. Thus, where their testimonies are cited below, their 
identities are protected.
24 Agreements, Annex 2, Article 1, Paragraph 3; Article III, 
Paragraphs 1 and 3.
25 Agreements, Annex 2, Article V, Paragraphs 1 and 4.
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alleging scattered attacks26, they suggest only minor and 
declining NADK military activity in the weeks after 23 
October.27
The preparations for what NADK combatants colloquially 
described as a "troop cut1,23 were made throughout the country, 
including in the sceptical Ta Mok's Sector 1003. A defector 
who later left the Sector 1003 headquarters at Anlung Veng in 
northern Siem Reap recalled that "right after the Paris 
Agreements," the chairman of his unit convened a meeting at 
which he told its combatants that "now everybody would be 
disarmed, all but 30 percent," who would evidently hold on to 
their arms pending cantonment itself. He said that very soon 
after the Paris Agreements, a process began of "gathering up 
all the weapons" belonging to combatants from combat divisions 
with rear bases at Anlung Veng "and putting them into 
storage".29 Testimony from Posat province indicates that 
disarmament in advance of and in preparation for 
demobilization was also practised in this part of northwestern 
Cambodia.30 However, evidence given by self-demobilizers 
serving on the front lines in Son Sen's Sector 1001 and Ta 
Mok's Sector 1003, while confirming preparations for 
demobilization, indicates that arms were kept by some 
combatants to maintain a self-defense capability. A self- 
demobilized combatant from Sector 1003 Division 980 said that 
at the time of the Paris Agreements, "a register was made of 
the names of those in the 70 percent" who were to be cut from
26 See SPK [SoC News Agency], 2 November 1991; "Phnom Penh 
Claims Khmer Rouge Attacks After Peace Agreement", Reuter, 
Bangkok, 2 November 1991; "Phnom Penh Forces Say Cambodian 
Fighting Diminishes", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 November 1991; and 
VoCP, 13 November 1991.
27 "Phnom Penh Forces Say Cambodian Fighting Diminishes", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 November 1991.
28 kat toap.
29 Interview of 29-year-old source on 11 November 1992.
30 Interview of 29-year-old source on 10 May 1993.
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the division in Siem Reap province. Those designated for 
demobilization were told "they would be going home" once 
demobilization took place, but "while they were waiting for 
the demobilization, they remained armed and organised in their 
units. "31
Subverting Demobilization
At the same time, numerous and consistent testimonies 
from self-demobilizers revealed that PDK plans to appear to 
comply with the demobilization process were belied by a scheme 
to subvert it in order to maintain a substantial military 
force in the guise of "civil police", and this evidence is 
corroborated by official PDK information. The scheme aimed to 
turn into a loophole the Agreement's provisions that all 
parties would be allowed to maintain police forces in order to 
perform "law enforcement" in the zones under their control. 
NADK cadre apparently hoped to engage in a sleight of hand 
whereby NADK elements would either jump to the police before 
demobilization, or would join it afterwards. This would give 
PDK much more than a police force.
Several self-demobilizers described plans by NADK units 
to fiddle demobilization through the creation of new "police 
forces" either manned by combatants transferred from regular 
units or armed with weapons taken from combatants, or both.32 
Some perhaps overly candid remarks which NADK cadre made to 
UNTAC Civil Police officers after they deployed into rural 
Cambodia appear to confirm that the PDK plan was to move some 
of the best NADK cadre and combatants out of the "army" into 
the "police" in order to keep them under arms.33
31 Interview of 28-year-old source on 11 November 1992.
32 Interviews of 34-year-old source on 6 June 1993 and of 
31-year-old source on 4 May 1993.
33 UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Special Report About NADK 
Civilian Police Banteay Meanchey Province", 14 October 1992; See 
also UNTAC, Civil Police Component, "Meeting with Khamerues
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However, successful implementation of these plans to 
maintain formed units that could resume the military aspects 
of people's war would require a degree of UN acquiesence. As 
with their armies, the Paris Agreements required each 
Cambodian partie immediately to provide to the UN information 
on their police forces similar to that which they were 
required to give about their military forces.34 Moreover, the 
head of UNTAC was empowered then to determine how many police 
were "necessary to perform law enforcement", albeit "after 
consultation with the Cambodian parties".35 Pursuant to these 
obligations, PDK and SoC both gave information to a UN public 
security survey mission that visited the country between 19 
November and 17 December 1991. SoC told the UN it had 47,684 
police, of whom almost 40,000 were deployed outside Phnom Penh 
from the provincial down to the village level.36 PDK claimed 
to have a grand total of 9,435 police answering to the High 
Command of the NADK via its subordinate divisions and 
independent regiments. This number was 37 percent of the 
previously-stated strength for NADK regular armed forces as a 
whole, and 58 percent of what PDK had said was the armed 
strength of the NADK regular army. PDK furthermore claimed 
that 5,559 of these police were performing law enforcement 
duties deep inside Cambodia, which was 47 percent of the army 
forces it had said were deployed in front-line areas.37 It
(NADK)", 9 September 1992.
34 Agreements, Annex 2, Article 1, paragraph 3, sub- 
paragraph d.
35 Agreements, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 5, sub- 
paragraphs a and b.
36 SoC, "Data Informations Concerning Military Forces and 
Police of the State of Cambodia", 24 September 1991, p.4; and UN, 
"Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public 
Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd, pp.19,28-33. 
See also SG Report, paragraph 115.
37 See "Civil Police of the Democratic Kampuchea Party: 
Organisation Chart", nd, np. This appears as an annex to UN, 
"Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public 
Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd.
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seems likely that these forces in fact to a significant extent 
did not yet exist. Although pre-Paris official PDK material 
and accounts by independent observers demonstrate that the 
NADK had for many years had a military police that functioned 
as a/i auxiliary force, they do not suggest that the size of 
such forces was anything like what the PDK was claiming.38
The cantonment and demobilization of SoC's Cambodian 
Peopled Armed Forces (CPAF) , including its militia forces, 
and the acceptance of a PDK "civil police" of more than 9,000 
men composed of elite elements from NADK would have brought 
about a significant shift in the ratio of armed power in 
Cambodia. Previously an NADK with 16,364 men under arms in 
regular units and 2,510 armed guerillas had faced a CPAF of 
120,000 regular and regional troops and 220,000 militia, plus 
more than 47,000 SoC police39, and was thus outnumbered more 
than 20 to one. After cantonment and demobilization of the 
military, 9,435 PDK civil police would face 47,684 SoC civil 
police nation-wide, and although they would be outnumbered 
five to one, this would reduce SoC's advantage by a factor of 
four. Regardless of how much popular support PDK enjoyed, its 
military position would be greatly improved.
Non-Compliance With Rearoupment: Rearoupment as a Projection 
of Power
Moreover, a close examination of other evidence suggests 
that hidden within the PDK's readiness to demobilize the NADK 
was an intent to use the demobilization process to project the
38 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Kampuchea: After 
the Worst (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 
1985), pp.183-200; and Peschoux, Khmers Rouges, pp.124-125.
39 SoC, "Data Informations", p.2. The authorized CPAF 
strength was 140,000, but it admitted that those in "permanent 
attendance" could be as low as 120,000. These figures were 
roughly confirmed after the arrival of UNTAC. See UNTAC-MC, 
"Force Structure and Organizations of Armed Forces SoC", 16 
September 1992, p.3.
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PDK's political power. On 14 December 1991, Son Sen met with 
a UN Military Survey Mission. The two sides discussed 2 6 
points where the NADK wanted to regroup in preparation for 
demobilization.40 These included forward regroupment points 
for NADK personnel now said to be deployed in front-line 
positions and rear regroupment points for the remainder. The 
figure Son Sen gave for total NADK strength was thus the same 
as that provided in August 1991, ie, 27,325. However, the 
proportion he now claimed were deployed in front-line areas 
was one-quarter larger than before. Moreover, the points Son 
Sen proposed for regroupment of the front-line troops of many 
units represented a forward movement for them compared to 
locations where they were said to have been deployed four 
months earlier.41 The pattern suggests that the NADK planned 
to use regroupment in Sectors 1001, 1003 and 32 (Front 250) to 
concentrate increased numbers of troops near population 
centres under SoC control and communications routes of 
importance to SoC. This would create opportunities for 
expanding PDK political influence power in these areas. And 
if, as Ta Mok had predicted, the political process quickly 
collapsed, then these concentrations would be well placed to 
break out of regroupment and attack strategic points 
militarily.
A General Political Offensive
PDK's demobilization ploys, however, were only a subplot
40 See PDK, "26 Regroupment Points of the NADK Were 
Discussed and Agreed Between HE Mr Son Sen, Member of the SNC and 
the High Commander in Chief, and the UN Military Survey Mission 
on December 14, 1991 at Malay Region", np. Although the title
of this PDK document implied that the regroupment sites had been 
agreed by the UN, in fact the survey mission had no authority to 
designate them. This power was vested in the commander of the 
military component of UNTAC. Agreements, Annex 2, Paragraph 4.
41 This conclusion is based on a comparison of the map 
coordinates provided by the NADK for deployment of front-line 
troops in "The NADK", and for their regroupment in "26 
Regroupment Points of the NADK".
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in plans for a nation-wide political offensive to use NADK 
cadre and combatants to stiffen, assist and where necessary 
lead popular uprisings by the covert nuclei they had 
recruited, trained, organized and in some cases armed in those 
repeated dispersals, dismantlings and liberations of villages 
and subdistricts throughout Cambodia reported by PDK 
propaganda since the 1980s. They were ordered to take 
advantage of the cease-fire by stepping up activities to 
dissolve SoC local administrations and set up PDK-controlled 
local National Councils, all the while pretending they 
answered ultimately not to Pol Pot, but to Sihanouk. This 
would intensify the basically political people's war 
activities they were supposed to have been conducting since 
197 9, even though the results would contravene the Phase One 
requirement that NADK forces refrain from "any deployment, 
movement or action that would extend the territory they 
control or that might lead to a resumption of the fighting."42 
Self-demobilizers typically reported that when they ceased 
offensive military action, they attempted to escalate 
subversive political activity. They said this included 
efforts to propagandise and agitate among peasants in 
contested and SoC-administered zones, but that in at least 
some instances, the NADK elements involved in such "political 
work" did not rely solely on the "weapon of the mouth", even 
a disingenuous mouth that misrepresented the real political 
import of local national councils. Instead, contrary to the 
script, but perhaps prudently given the reality of popular 
attitudes, they remained armed.
The shift in the pattern of PDK activity was remarkably 
consistent throughout the various sectors into which PDK had 
divided Cambodia, suggesting that despite differences among 
them, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan 
agreed that PDK should be able to advance the revolution 
through political tactics by relying on the popular strength
42 Agreements, Annex 2, Article 1, Paragraph 1.
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built up through people's war. In Son Sen's Sector 1001, 
combatants of Division 802 who stopped fighting focused 
instead on an intensified "programme of political education of 
the people".43 Units in Ta Mok's Sector 1003 were also 
instructed to marshall their strength for political action. A 
defector from Division 607 said that after the Paris 
Agreements, the "first priority" for it in Preah Vihear 
province was "to do popular work by remoulding the people to 
support the PDK".44 A ex-combatant of Sector 1003 Division 
912 said that starting in October 1991, its troops in Siem 
Reap province began political work in preparation for 
elections by telling "the people that they were free to vote 
for whomever they wanted, but that they should vote for the 
political party that served the people and the nation."45 The 
presumption was that "the people" would support a PDK party 
led by Khieu Samphan.
A similar offensive was ordered in Sector 505, over which 
Ta Mok's former deputy Sam Bit presided, NADK were told they 
should "do political work among the people and also try to 
convince CPAF troops to join us in implementing the Paris 
Agreements by setting up little National Councils at the 
village and subdistrict levels," although they were also told 
they could "take their guns if they liked".46 In Mong Reuhsei 
district of Batdambang province, Sector 505 Division 3 6 
combatants "were supposed to do political work to convince the 
people not to support or assist the SoC side." They were also 
to explain to the people that SoC should co-operate "properly 
with the PDK, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF" so that elections could 
be held.47
43 Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.
44 Interview of 34-year-old source on 6 June 1993.
45 Interview of 27-year-old source on 27 November 1992.
46 Interview of 18-year-old source on 28 October 1992.
47 Interview of 22 year-old-source on 16 January 1993.
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SoC Reacts
SoC recognized that PDK was not trying to seize territory 
in the same way as before the Paris Agreements, and even 
conceded that many NADK elements had been gathered "to defend 
the areas [PDK] controls along the border" with Thailand. 
However, it was deeply concerned that PDK was also "seeking by 
every method to move its forces into infiltration pincers 
around villages and subdistricts by increasing propaganda and 
conversion actions." It was not about to allow NADK to 
conduct such "propaganda actions combined with threats" to 
displace SoC administration with local National Councils. SoC 
therefore moved to establish new police posts at the village 
level and dispatched police reinforcements to the countryside 
to strengthen "the effectiveness of the work of administrative 
governance and public order" there.48
NADK efforts at propaganda work, and particularly armed 
propaganda work, in SoC-administered areas thus led to 
confrontations between NADK and SoC forces, both CPAF and 
police. Defectors from NADK later described incidents in 
which NADK elements who entered SoC-administered or contested 
villages were greeted with gunfire or found themselves 
detained. A defector from Sector 505 Division 36 described 
how NADK combatants were repulsed when they went armed to try 
to visit in SoC-controlled villages of Batdambang province. 
He said "when they did this, CPAF opened fire and the NADK 
returned the fire to defend themselves."49 In interviews 
about the situation in the opposite end of Cambodia, two self- 
demobilizers from Sector 1001 Division 709 described similar
48 Cambodian People's Party, Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robah 
Kampuchea Kraoy Pel Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban 
Neung Tih Dav Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dal Pel Bah Chhnaot 
("The Most Recent Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris 
Agreements Until Now and Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through 
the Elections"), nd, pp.1-2. This document apparently dates from 
late January or early February 1992.
49 Interview of 22 year-old-source on 16 January 1993.
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clashes in Steung Treng province, which they said were the 
only military engagements that had occurred in their area of 
operations in the immediate post-Paris period. They said these 
firefights had broken out when they "were visiting people in 
the rice fields" and "trying to do political work," but "CPAF 
had a defensive line there and opened fire."50
Sometimes, NADK appeared to gain some successes in its 
attempts to displace the local SoC political administration 
with PDK-controlled National Councils or other such efforts. 
One former Division 802 combatant said that his detachment 
managed to set up such grass-roots renditions of the SNC in 
several villages in Kampung Thom.51 A former Division 3 6 
combatant said that in Posat parts of his unit were able to 
arrange a meeting with local CPAF as a result of which they 
succeeded in instituting a local cease-fire.52
However, SoC's resistance was not the fundamental reason 
why few self-demobilizers reported such feats. SoC counter­
measures certainly hindered PDK from mobilizing such support 
as it enjoyed, but the underlying cause of the failure of PDK 
efforts to bring about the disintegration of SoC in the 
countryside was that PDK had so little positive popular 
support to draw upon. Without the actual threat of NADK 
military operations, NADK people's war could get almost 
nowhere. Thus, although NADK was trying to step up political 
action, its military standdown may actually have reduced its 
ability to achieve even the semblance of rural insurrection. 
Moreover, there is evidence that its few apparent success^were 
politically hollow. In the wake of the Paris Agreements, 
Cambodian agents working for Thai military intelligence were 
instructed to collate reports from inside Cambodia about the
50 Interview with 22-year-old source on 6 November 1992, and 
with 26-year-old source on 8 November 1992.
51 Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.
52 Interview of 29-year-old source on 10 May 1993.
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results of PDK activities. A summary report covering the last 
several months of 1991 could cite only one instance of a PDK 
political "success". It described how two NADK combatants, 
probably from Sector 1003 Division 785, entered a village 
Kampung Thom where they had family connections. They treated 
a relative and three other villagers to a feast of chicken 
stew and liquor. During the meal, they tried to persuade them 
to declare themselves the village National Council and to 
promise that in this capacity they would conduct propaganda on 
behalf of the PDK. The combatants explained NADK would 
provide them every support if they agreed, but warned it would 
attack the village and kill them and their families if they 
refused. The four assented only out of fear.53
53 From Robaykar Poramean VI. Nayobay Khmser Kraham 
("Information Reports: VI. Khmer Rouge Policy"), nd. This
document was obtained from a senior Cambodian intelligence 
analyst working for the Thai military.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PDK STYMIED IN POLITICAL STRUGGLE
The SNC in Phnom Penh: PDK Beset by Political Isolation and 
Violence
With UNAMIC performing no supervisory role vis-a-vis SoC, 
the PDK's hopes of undermining SoC from above were contingent 
upon using the SNC to do so. This in turn depended on Khieu 
Samphan's and Son Sen's efforts to enlist the backing of its 
President Sihanouk and its FUNCINPEC and KPNLF members. The 
PDK's gameplan rested in particular on convincing Sihanouk to 
accept the position that with the signature of the Paris 
Agreements all SoC, PDK, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC "governmental 
structures" had ceased to exist, and that the SNC, with the 
Prince at its head, should henceforth "administer Cambodia 
with UNTAC".1 PDK continued to assert the existence of local 
National Councils that were offered up to Sihanouk as "his" 
administration.2 It also hoped to parlay the Prince's return 
to Phnom Penh on 14 November into a situation in which "the 
entire Cambodian people" would "recognize only the SNC ... as 
the unique legitimate body" of Cambodian political authority 
and the "civilian, military and police officials" of SoC "from 
top to bottom" might be persuaded to "join the SNC".3
PDK hopes of thus facilitating uprisings by the peasant 
supporters it believed it could count on throughout the 
countryside were not only obstructed by SoC, but also dashed 
by Sihanouk himself and FUNCINPEC. First, its request that 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sen join SoC premier Hun Sen and 
FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh on the plane that 
was to carry Sihanouk from Beijing to Phnom Penh on 14
1 VGNUFC, 31 October 1991.
2 VGNUFC, 7 November 1991.
3 VGNUFC, 15 November 1991.
November was rejected.4 This followed the failure of PDK to 
gain acceptance for its proposal for the establishment of a 
UN-protected neutral enclave and "safe corridors" in Phnom 
Penh over which SoC would have no authority in order to ensure 
that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen could return safely to Phnom 
Penh.5 PDK decided that only Son Sen would follow Sihanouk 
to the capital to assess the security situation and make 
arrangements for Khieu Samphan to join him.6
Unable to enter Phnom Penh at the side of the Prince, PDK 
still tried to exploit the opportunity of his homecoming 
dramatically to penetrate the outskirts of the capital under 
his banner and that of the SNC. Cadre of Sector 505 military 
units were assigned to lead peasants from PDK-controlled zones 
in Kampot, Takaev and Kampung Speu provinces and converge on 
the airport to welcome Sihanouk. The effort, however, came to 
naught and showed that Sihanoukist and SNC trappings afforded 
no cover for PDK actions. SoC police in Kampung Speu pre­
empted PDK with a series of arrests which began the day 
before Sihanouk7 s scheduled arrival and prevented any 
marches.7
4 "KR Plan Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, Bangkok, 2 
November 1991; VoCP, 14 November 1991; Voice of the Khmer (VoK) 
(VoK was a Thailand-based radio station run jointly by FUNCINPEC 
and KPNLF) , 14 November 1991; author's interview with Tim Carney, 
then of the US National Security Council, Washington, DC, 8 
November 1991.
5 "Khmer Rouge Want Protected Zone", Reuter, Paris, 23 
October 1991; "Sihanouk Attacks Khmer Rouge", AFP, Paris, 23 
October 1991; "Sihanouk, in Eccentric Form, Talks of Foie Gras 
and the Vatican", Reuter, Paris, 24 October 1991; Khieu Samphan 
interview with "international reporters" in Paris, VoDK 23 
October 1991; SPK [SoC News Agency], 27 October 1991.
6 "KR Not Interested in Fighting Anymore", AFP, Phnom Penh, 
12 November 1991.
7 Amnesty International, State of Cambodia: Human Rights 
Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992 (AI Index ASA 
23/02/92, April 1992), pp.33-34 [hereafter: Human Rights]; and 
Appendices (AI Index: ASA 23/02/92/APP), pp.74-76.
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The arrests provoked no protest from the Prince. 
Instead, immediately after stepping off the plane from Beijing 
on 14 November, Sihanouk signalled strong support for SoC. He 
effusively expressed his "greatest satisfaction" at its 
"excellent achievements", declaring it had "proved to be 
capable of bringing prosperity to the country and of promoting 
unity and freedom".8 At a public rally organized by SoC two 
days later, he rejected the PDK position. He spurned any 
suggestion that SoC should be dissolved, or that PDK had 
disappeared into a nation-wide structure of National Councils, 
insisting that their administrations should "be maintained" 
and declaring that "those who say the SNC is a government are 
wrong." He stressed it had no powers of administrative 
control, and that the Paris Agreements had specified that the 
UN would "rely on the existing administration" of SoC, which 
he described as a "de facto government" and said he 
"recognized". While characterizing the SoC leadership as 
"wise and patriotic", he excoriated covert PDK leaders like 
Pol Pot and Ta Mok as "Hitlerites" who had "committed the most 
heinous crime of murdering innocent and nationalist 
compatriots". For this, he said, they should be tried by an 
international tribunal.9 Although Sihanouk did not mention 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sen in this connection, such talk had 
negative implications for their security, since both had been 
deeply involved in the kinds of crimes against humanity the 
Prince was denouncing, Son Sen as Pol Pot's chief for security 
and Khieu Samphan as Pol Pot's chef de cabinet.10
Moreover, instead of endorsing a structure of "National
8 VoCP, 15 November 1991.
9 VoCP, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Recognizes Hun Sen 
Government", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Plans 
to Visit Hanoi", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Hun Sen, 
Sihanouk's Son Forge Electoral Alliance", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 16 
November 1991.
10 Steve Heder, Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan (Clayton: Monash 
University, 1991).
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Councils” under PDK control, Sihanouk backed the formation of 
an alliance between the FUNCINPEC organization he had formerly 
headed and the SoC ruling party, the Cambodian People's Party 
{CPP). This alliance presaged the possible amalgamation of 
FUNCINPEC into a coalition government of SoC, marginalized the 
SNC and suggested the results of the elections envisaged in 
the Paris Agreements were being transformed into a foregone 
conclusion, according to a scenario reminiscent of the Sangkum 
sweep of 1955. This dealt another severe blow to PDK's hopes 
of destroying SoC from above. Certainly, prospects for 
rallying the population behind organs of political 
administration ostensibly answering to the Prince but in fact 
dominated by PDK seemed to be fast disappearing. PDK was 
being put into the position where it would have to rely on its 
own political support in the countryside, and could not borrow 
the legitimacy or popularity of anyone else.
The CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance had been announced on the eve 
of Sihanouk's and Ranariddh's arrival in Phnom Penh by Hun 
Sen, who explained that the two political organizations would 
be working "hand-in-hand" in "many fields".11 Sihanouk 
revealed that CPP and FUNCINPEC had already agreed that they 
would share power after elections, while noting his belief 
that the CPP would "certainly . . . win" these, probably with an 
"absolute majority".12 Hun Sen was meanwhile trying even more 
obviously than Sihanouk to warn PDK against sending Khieu 
Samphan and Son Sen into Phnom Penh. On 15 November, he 
prophesied that if they arrived in the capital, they might be 
greeted by violent demonstrators wielding "sticks and
11 "Phnom Penh Authorities Fear Violence Will Greet Khmer 
Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 November 1991.
12 VoCP, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Recognizes Hun Sen 
Government", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Sihanouk Plans 
to Visit Hanoi", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991; "Hun Sen, 
Sihanouk's Son Forge Electoral Alliance", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 16 
November 1991.
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stones".13 He said, that certain "groups and individuals" 
wanted to demonstrate against PDK leaders and would "probably 
go into the Khmer Rouge residence and maybe commit some 
violence" if they dared to establish a presence in Phnom 
Penh.14 Despite such threats and a political situation 
rapidly changing to PDK's disadvantage, VGNUFC announced on 16 
November that Son Sen was coming into town the next day to 
"set up PDK's permanent office there".15 Upon arrival, Son 
Sen and his party were whisked to a SoC state hotel.16 The 
next day, Son Sen was told he could continue looking for a 
residence with a SoC escort.17 This courteous cocooning had 
been accompanied by more threatening noises from Hun Sen, 
which were endorsed by Sihanouk. As Son Sen arrived, Hun Sen 
alluded to the possibility of putting him and Khieu Samphan on 
trial by describing them as "murderers", after which Sihanouk 
said he and Hun Sen held "identical views".18
Meanwhile, Sihanouk suggested that the international 
community should provide SoC with extensive economic aid. 
After anointing the CPP as the direct successor to his Sangkum 
political organization,19 he called upon foreign governments 
and international organizations to provide economic aid
13 "Phnom Penh Authorities Fear Violence Will Greet Khmer 
Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 November 1991.
14 Human Rights, pp.34-35.
15 VGNUFC, 15 November 1991.
16 "KR Leader Meets Hun Sen", Reuter, Phnom Penh 18 November 
1991; "Hun Sen Visits Khmer Rouge", AFP, Phnom Penh, 19 November 
1991; VGNUFC 20 November 1991.
17 "[Message] Number 03 to 87 and Phem [Pol Pot]", dated 21 
November 1991 and signed Khiev [Son Sen] . (Author's translation 
of a document obtained by Christophe Peschoux.)
1B VoCP, 17 November 19 91.
19 VoCP, 18 November 1991.
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directly to the Hun Sen government.20 SoC then formally 
incorporated Sihanouk into its political fold by declaring he 
was again "the legal and legitimate head of state of Cambodia 
just as he was before the coup d'etat of 18 March 1970".21 
This paved the way for a firming up of the CPP-FUNCINPEC 
alliance,22 which was made official in a memorandum between 
what Ranariddh called two "Cambodian nationalist political 
movements".23 They agreed "to cooperate in the framework of 
the future national assembly resulting from free elections 
organised by the UN and, if necessary, to set up a coalition 
government".24 The "agreement was that if CPP won" the 
elections, "it would give 50 percent of the power to 
FUNCINPEC, and if FUNCINPEC won, it would give 50 percent of 
the power to CPP" . This aimed to make possible the 
establishment of a government strong enough to deal with any 
threats to it that might be posed by PDK.25 As a CPP circular 
to its members indicated, a situation had now been created 
making it possible for them to cooperate with FUNCINPEC to 
"prevent the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime."26 
Meanwhile, Ranariddh began making plans to bring together 
members of the FUNCINPEC underground, border and exile 
organizations in Phnom Penh to transform it into a political 
party. He also made plans to visit SoC-administered rural 
areas to launch pre-campaign organizational activities. He 
predicted that FUNCINPEC and CPP would "be the only two
20 VoCP, 19 November 1991.
21 VoCP, 20 November 1991.
22 Bangkok Post, 2 December 1991.
23 VoCP, 21 November 1991.
24 VoK, 11 December 1991.
25 UNTAC-MC, "Interview with General Kan Rat, Former ANKI 
Now with CPAF", 18 May 1993.
26 VoCP, 21 November 1991.
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winners" in the election.27 Paris was becoming another 
Geneva.
On 19 November, VGNUFC warned that PDK's "enemies, old 
and new," were already striving to sabotage the Paris 
Agreements.28 Later that day, Ranariddh visited Son Sen and 
suggested that PDK could avoid further isolation if it was 
willing to join FUNCINPEC and CPP in a pre-election coalition 
government of SoC in which Hun Sen would remain premier, 
Ranariddh would become a deputy premier and PDK would take the 
number three post.29 Initially, PDK appeared negative, and 
VGNUFC again bitterly complained that its "enemies - both near 
and far, and both open and secret" were trying to wreck the 
Paris Agreements.30 FUNCINPEC meanwhile initialled a military 
agreement with SoC on 23 November, according to which its
National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI) was to
cooperate with CPAF by "every possible means".31 Because of
the interspersing of ANKI and NADK forces in several parts of 
the country, this pact represented an immediate threat to some 
NADK units.
The same day, Sihanouk announced that a CPP-FUNCINPEC 
coalition government would be established by 3 0 November, and 
that they had agreed that they would run joint slates of 
candidates in the elections.32 On 26 November, Hun Sen
27 The Nation, 19 November 1991.
26 VGNUFC 18 November 1991.
29 "Message Number 05 to 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nan [Khieu 
Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen], 20 November 1991.
30 VGNUFC, 20 November 1991.
31 VoK, 11 December 1991; "Ranariddh Defends Alliance with 
Phnom Penh", AFP, Bangkok, 26 November 1991; The Nation, 26 
November 1991; VoCP, 25 November 1991.
32 "Sihanouk Announces New Coalition Government" and 
"Coalition Government Plan Detailed", AFP, Phnom Penh, 23 
November 1991.
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confirmed that Ranariddh was slated to become SoC deputy 
premier and said that other FUNCINPEC figures were being 
invited to become deputies to SoC ministers and to head SoC 
provincial administrations.33
On 22 November, Son Sen requested in a secret message to 
Pol Pot that the PDK leadership reassess whether participation 
in a tripartite coalition would shift the balance of forces in 
PDK's favour or against it,34 and it began considering the 
potential "good and ... bad factors" of such a possibility.35 
Son Sen nevertheless remained wary about developments. On 23 
November, he announced Samphan's arrival would be delayed 
because an appropriate residence had not yet been found.36 
In another message to Pol Pot, he expressed concern that the 
situation in Phnom Penh was "chaotic" and advised caution.37 
However, the next day, PDK informed SoC that Khieu Samphan 
would be arriving in Phnom Penh on 2 7 November,38 and on 26 
November the PDK delegation moved out of the SoC hotel into 
private accommodation which it had finally managed to find. 
It appeared PDK was hoping to set up a kind of open house at 
which it would be able to establish wide contacts with people
33 "Ranariddh to Join Government as Deputy Premier", Kyodo, 
Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991; "Ranariddh Named Deputy Premier", 
AFP, Phnom Penh, 26 November 1991.
34 "Message Number 06 to 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nan [Khieu
Samphan]", signed Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 22 November 1991.
{Author's translation of document obtained by Christophe 
Peschoux.)
35 Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to 
Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992" 
[hereafter: Pol Pot, "Clarification"].
36 "SNC Meets Without Khieu Samphan", AFP, Phnom Penh, 23 
November 1991; "Son Sen: I'm Happy to Be Here", AFP, Phnom Penh, 
2 6 November 1991.
37 "To 87, Phem [Pol Pot] and Nan [Khieu Samphan]", signed
Khiev [Son Sen] and dated 23 November 1991. (Author's
translation of a document obtained by Christophe Peschoux.)
38 "Cambodia's Prince Ranariddh, SNC Member, in Bangkok for 
Ten Days", Reuter, Bangkok, 24 November 1991.
in Phnom Penh.39
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Clearly, it had been decided that Khieu Samphan7s 
presence in the capital was urgently needed. PDK appeared to 
be reversing its position on a SoC-dominated coalition, 
perhaps hoping that it might not be too late to explore 
Ranariddh's suggestion that it join in. Khieu Samphan was 
PDK's natural choice to be second deputy premier.
On 2 6 November, Son Sen signalled the turn-around when he 
declared that PDK was not worried about plans for the 
formation of a CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government. Describing 
them as a legitimate part of "the game of democracy", he 
declared the PDK "choice [was] to respect their decision".40 
At dawn the next day, as Khieu Samphan boarded a plane in 
Bangkok for Phnom Penh, VGNUFC broadcast an NADK communique in 
a sudden new tone of approving friendliness and optimism. It 
declared that since Sihanouk's arrival in Phnom Penh the "four 
Cambodian parties in the SNC" had "gradually begun to trust 
each other".41 In adopting this new position, PDK had perhaps 
been encouraged by indications that SoC had backed off from 
threats of violence against Khieu Samphan and Son Sen. For 
example, on 21 November, CPP Chairman Chea Sim had declared 
that SoC had "persuaded the public not to stage 
demonstrations" against PDK's SNC members.42
The 2 7 November Attack on the PDK Residence
However, such assurances proved of no value, and any
39 "Son Sen: I'm Happy to Be Here", AFP, Phnom Penh, 26
November 1991.
40 "Son Sen Declares No Need to Speak About the Past", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 2 6 November 1991.
41 VGNUFC, 2 6 November 1991.
42 Human Rights Developments, p. 35.
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prospect that PDK might be allowed freely to organize 
politically in Phnom Penh was shattered later that day by a 
violent attack on Khieu Samphan at the PDK compound rented by 
Son Sen. The attack proceeded in exactly the manner that had 
been outlined in advance by Hun Sen. It was lauded in CPP 
internal documents as a "popular violent demonstration 
opposing the return of Khmer Rouge leaders to Phnom Penh".43 
Some ten thousand people converged on the PDK residence after 
CPP-organized students denouncing Khieu Samphan and Son Sen as 
murderers lined the route that the two men had taken from the 
airport to the compound. At the compound, some among a core 
of several hundred to a thousand active demonstrators who were 
shouting "kill them, kill them" breached the perimeter and 
climbed up into the house. While Hun Sen stood on a balcony 
of a building across the street making statements urging the 
crowd to remain calm and commit no killings, a few 
demonstrators armed with makeshift weapons cornered Khieu 
Samphan and strung up a wire from which to lynch him. He 
received a gash on the head before armed SoC security forces 
intervened, removed him and Son Sen from the compound and 
escorted them to a plane which flew them out of the country.44
In a message to the nation on 28 November, Hun Sen 
described the violence against Khieu Samphan as "regrettable" 
and "unplanned", and declared that "violent demonstrations 
that cause damage to property or bodily injury or death" were 
unacceptable, and that "attacks or murders of a few Khmer 
Rouge leaders cannot solve the problems of the entire nation." 
Despite such statements, the violence against Khieu Samphan 
was probably part of the pre-arranged script that Hun Sen
43 CPP, Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robah Kampuchea Kraoy Pel 
Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav 
Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dal Pel Bah Chhnaot ("The Most Recent 
Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and 
Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections") 
[hereafter: "Recent Situation"], nd, p.2. By context, this
document dates from January 1992.
44 Human Rights Developments, pp.34-36.
145
himself had laid out.45 It is likely that this was an early 
example of the use of what the SoC security apparatus dubbed 
"reaction forces" against the CPP's enemies. Such "reaction 
forces" were purportedly "ordinary citizens" who were covertly 
encouraged by SoC security personnel to attack opposition 
elements so that such attacks would be carried out by people 
whose connections to the security apparatus could be plausibly 
denied. To further hide SoC complicity, its officials were 
publicly to condemn and oppose the attacks, and even to appear 
to be cooperating in efforts to prevent them.46 It may be 
that in this case, the "reaction forces" went further than at 
least some SoC officials wanted, or that they simply followed 
orders intended to make it appear that this is what happened. 
In either case, they succeeded in showing, as Hun Sen asserted 
during the demonstration, that there was "no safe place in 
Cambodia" for PDK representatives.47
An Enemy "Alliance"
The attack on Son Sen and Khieu Samphan certainly helped 
convince PDK that its hopes for implementation of the Paris 
Agreements were being thwarted, and it reacted by blaming the 
turn of events on a group it dubbed "the alliance".48 EbL Rt 
would define the alliance as comprising "the Western Great 
Powers and the West" in general, with the US at its core.49
45 Cf, Human Rights, pp. 35-36.
46 0n »reaction forces", see "Text of Undisclosed UN Report 
on Undercover Units Formed by the Phnom Penh Regime to Oppose 
Political Rivals", appendix "Part III" to Asia Watch, a 
Committee of Human Rights Watch, An Exchange on Human Rights and 
Peace-Keeping in Cambodia (New York: Volume 5, Number 14, 2 3
September 1993).
47 Serge Thion, "Cambodia 1992: United Nations Traditional 
Apathy in Cambodia", in his Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter 
the Cambodia Tangle (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993), pp.192-193.
48 The group was sometimes referred to as "the allies" or 
the "entente".
49 Pol Pot, "Clarification"
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Son Sen's brother, Ni Kiln, identified the chief members of the 
alliance as the US, France, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
Japan. He said its objective was at least "to bring about the 
dissolution" of PDK and at worst to "annihilate" it.50 The 
alliance was cast in the same sabotage role that the 
Vietnamese had accused the US of playing vis-a-vis the 1973 
Paris Agreement, except that in the 1991 PDK version the US 
was in cahoots with the Vietnamese Communists in support of 
SoC instead of fighting against them. It also cast the US in 
the same role that the Vietnamese said American imperialism 
had played throughout Indochina after World War Two and after 
the Geneva Agreements.51 From this point on, PDK's lack of 
political success could and often would be attributed to 
alliance machinations, thus further severing its problems from 
the question of its popularity.
The first public PDK reaction to the events of 27 
November blamed the attack on unidentified group of foreigners 
who VGNUFC said had masterminded it as part of a plot to 
sabotage the Paris Agreements.52 On 2 December, VGNUFC 
publicly introduced the concept of the anti-PDK "alliance" and 
broadly hinted US leadership of it.53 A series of follow-up 
broadcasts drove home the idea that "the alliance" was 
manoeuvring to turn Sihanouk against PDK, destroy the SNC and 
to scrap the Paris Agreements while relying on hard-line SoC 
elements to do its dirty work.54
50 Steve Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "A 
Note on PDK Attitudes and Intentions" [hereafter: Heder, "PDK 
Attitudes"], 4 May 1992.
51 See An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers Party 
(1930-1970) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970),
pp.44,50; and Carlye A Thayer, War By Other Means: National
Liberation in Viet-Nam, 1954-1960 (London: Allen and Unwin,
1989), p .41.
52 VGNUFC, 2 9 November 1991.
53 VGNUFC, 1 December 1991.
54 VGNUFC, 2, 3,5,6 and 9 December 1991.
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The 3 December SNC Meeting in Thailand
These broadcasts implied the possibility that the 
alliance might also be eager to use the UN against PDK as 
well. Nevertheless, PDK apparently continued to hold out hope 
that the UN in some guise or another would eventually vitiate 
or at least dilute the alliance's schemes and thus allow PDK 
to obtain some real benefit from the implementation of the 
Paris Agreements. PDK was still watching and waiting as 
regards the stance of the UN.
Thus, in its diplomatic correspondence with the UN about 
27 November, PDK held its rhetorical fire. It omitted mention 
of the alliance, while pressing its demands that steps be 
taken to make it possible for PDK to establish a presence in 
Phnom Penh. On 2 8 November, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen wrote 
to Sihanouk and to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
asking the Prince to convene an SNC meeting to discuss the 
issue and calling on the UN to "take appropriate measures" to 
ensure the security of SNC members.55 On 3 0 November, 
Sihanouk left Phnom Penh to hold an SNC session in Thailand. 
He came with a SoC offer to provide PDK with a "well-defended" 
new house guarded by SoC police who would constantly monitor 
the situation, supposedly in order to ensure there were no 
further outbreaks of violence.55 This offer of virtual house 
arrest was understandably turned down by PDK, which demanded 
instead a UN "involvement in the protection of its 
representatives" that would give them more freedom of 
political action.57
On 2 December, PDK delegates indicated they would not 
return to Phnom Penh unless the UN undertook to increase its
55 VGNUFC, 29 November 1991.
55 Bangkok Post, 2 December 1991; VoK, 30 November 1991.
57 "Khmer Rouge Wants UN Military Protection in Phnom Penh,"
AFP, Pattaya, 1 December 1991; Bangkok Post, 2 December 1991.
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military strength in the capital rapidly up to 800 troops.59 
NADK then issued a statement that not only condemned SoC, but 
also for the first time publicly rebuked the UN, thus 
revealing mounting PDK concern that its enemies were 
subverting the world body's activities. It warned the UN 
against using "technical reasons" as a cover for rejecting its 
latest proposals.59 PDK's proposals were nevertheless 
rebuffed by the UN that same day.60 Instead, in a meeting 
with Sihanouk on 3 December, the Permanent Five proposed that 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sen take up residence at the SNC's 
headquarters at SoC's Voat Phnum state mansion and be joined 
in residence there by a small number of UNAMIC officials.61 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sen accepted the offer at the SNC 
meeting later that day, after Sihanouk agreed to make a public 
appeal for the establishment of a "neutral political 
atmosphere" throughout Cambodia.62 Nevertheless, neither 
Khieu Samphan nor Son Sen would be returning immediately. 
Instead, a lower-ranking advance team would go to Phnom Penh 
first to test the waters.63
Weakening of the Sihanouk-CPP-FUNCINPEC Alliance
The terms under which they were returning meant there was 
little chance they could take any direct advantage of the
59 "Khmer Rouge Demand UN Troops Sent Immediately," AFP, 
Phatthaya, 2 December 1991.
59 VGNUFC, 3 December 1991.
60 "UN Unlikely to Undertake Protection of Khmer Rouge", 
AFP, Pattaya, 2 December 1991.
61 "Khmer Rouge Seek Security for Their Lives, Political 
Future" and "Khmer Rouge to Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, 
Pattaya, 3 December 19 91; "Khmer Rouge Close to Compromise on 
Returning to Cambodia", AFP, Pattaya, 3 December 1991.
62 "Khmer Rouge to Return to Phnom Penh", Reuter, Pattaya, 
3 December 1991.
63 "Khmer Rouge Close to Compromise on Returning to 
Cambodia", AFP, Pattaya, 3 December 1991.
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popular reaction against the violent way in which Khieu 
Samphan and Son Sen had been forced to leave Cambodia. 
Regardless of how unpopular PDK was, there was considerable 
public revulsion at what were seen as violent tactics that 
were antithetical to prospects for political peace more 
generally.64 These were precisely the kinds of sentiments PDK 
wished to promote and exploit, but semi-confinement of PDK 
representatives to a building belonging to SoC made trying out 
their hopes at best difficult.
The 27 November incident had also shaken FUNCINPEC in a 
way that PDK might exploit, but it was given little room to do 
so. The attack seems to have wrecked prospects for a 
FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition government of SoC, although the 
political alliance between the two parties survived for the 
time being.65 Ranariddh declared that the idea of him and Hun 
Sen forming a coalition had been put off.66 Some senior 
FUNCINPEC officials believed that PDK had been intentionally 
duped by SoC into thinking that it was safe for its 
representatives to come to Phnom Penh, and that the incident 
showed that the CPP could not be trusted to fulfil the 
commitments it had undertaken in the memoranda it had signed 
with FUNCINPEC.67 However, Ranariddh maintained his distance 
from PDK. While he condemned the attack on Khieu Samphan and 
Son Sen, he still characterised his pre-Paris Agreements 
alliance with PDK as "perverse" and said continued FUNCINPEC- 
CPP cooperation against PDK was more "natural" .68
Sihanouk's position remained even less favourable to PDK,
64 Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 December 1991.
65 International Herald Tribune, 4 December 1991.
66 "Hun Sen Says Cambodia Factions to Meet This Month", 
Reuter, 4 December 1991.
67 Author's interview with Nhek Bunchhay, commander of ANKI 
Division 2, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1991.
68 Der Spiegel, 9 December 1991.
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as became clear on 6 December, when he made his promised 
speech to appeal for a neutral political atmosphere. Instead, 
he condemned PDK, declaring that it was during its rule that 
the Cambodian people "suffered the most serious disaster", and 
expressed sympathy for those who had demonstrated against 
PDK' s entry into Phnom Penh.69
Hun Sen confirmed that a pre-election coalition 
government of SoC was off, but declared the original CPP- 
FUNCINPEC compact remained valid and expressed hopes that CPP 
and FUNCINPEC would still run joint slates of candidates in 
the elections and form a coalition government after them.70 
While accompany Hun Sen on a provincial tour, Sihanouk lauded 
SoC's "highly patriotic, capable and astute leadership", 
especially Hun Sen, whom he described as his "darling" and 
whom he said he wanted "to lead the country" after elections. 
He called again for foreign countries to provide economic aid 
directly to SoC "without strings attached."71
PDK Still Stymied in the Countryside
SoC was meanwhile intensifying the measures by which it 
was successfully thwarting PDK subversion in the countryside. 
While complaining bitterly that NADK involvement in attempts 
to set up local National Councils were serious cease-fire 
violations and were causing numerous casualties among 
civilians and local officials, senior SoC figures indicated 
that few villages were actually changing hands. In interviews 
on 5 and 16 December 1991, Hun Sen admitted that "generally 
speaking", NADK was implementing the cease-fire "in major 
strategic areas", and cited only one specific case where NADK 
had succeeded in its subversion: an incident in Kampung
Chhnang on 2 December during which it had "captured one
69 VoCP, 6 December 1991.
70 SPK, 9 December 1991.
71 VoCP, 9,11 and 12 December 1991.
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village and dissolved" its administration, "setting up the SNC 
at the village level".72 On 18 December, Sin Sen, a SoC 
deputy minister in charge of "political security", alleged 
that in course of such attempts nation-wide, the NADK had 
killed 52 people since the Paris Agreements, mostly ordinary 
villagers and local SoC authorities in outlying villages and 
subdistricts. Sin Sen said SoC was reacting vigorously to 
NADK attempts to establish local National Councils. He 
stressed that the main task of CPAF and SoC police forces was 
to prevent such NADK subversion, and that they were being 
concentrated in specific areas to counter them.73
By any objective measure, PDK was dead in the water 
politically. Its limited political potential left it without 
prospects for advancement in the absence of military back-up. 
Its political forays were being easily repulsed by SoC, 
whether in Phnom Penh or in the countryside. It had gotten no 
help from the UN and was getting nothing from Sihanouk. It 
could still blame its troubles on SoC and "the alliance", but 
the superficial plausibility of such scapegoating only hid the 
real problem that Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders were 
simply unable to face.
72 "Cambodia's Hun Sen Accuses Khmer Rouge of Peace
Violations", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 5 December 1991; VoCP, 17
December 1991, The Reuter dispatch characterized SoC's 
allegations as "sporadic reports of clashes", and noted they 
referred to areas in which the NADK had been operating before the 
Paris Agreements.
73 Human Rights, pp. 26-27. This report's account has been
supplemented by the author's notes on Sin Sen's remarks to
Amnesty International.
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CHAPTER SIX
PDK REASSESSES AND REACTS
The 13 December Gathering of the PDK Leadership Team
By the second week of December, the self-deluded PDK 
leadership was gathering covertly for what was evidently its 
first major meeting since the signing of the Paris Agreements. 
As it did, UNTAC was nowhere in sight, UNAMIC had yet to 
conduct any significant military or political activities, the 
SNC had never met in Phnom Penh, the Sihanouk-CPP-FUNCINPEC 
alliance was shaken but still intact, and the NADK's political 
offensive in the countryside appeared to have achieved nothing 
except to provoke effective SoC counter-measures. There was 
certainly no sign of a popular upsurge in favour of PDK in the 
villages. PDK was still standing by to provide selected 
information about the NADK to the UN and to put into motion 
its plans to subvert the Agreements by using demobilization to 
project its power and by forming a large "civil police" force. 
PDK had vociferously if somewhat cryptically denounced the 
Western alliance, but its public criticism of the UN remained 
minimal.
In a commentary broadcast on 12 December, VGNUFC summed 
up the PDK view of events since the signing of the Agreements. 
It declared: "An alliance of a small group of culprits . . .
continues to oppose the peace process." Expressing both the 
PDK's fantastic hopes and implausible demands, VGNUFC went on*, 
"the Cambodian . . . people . . . want the SNC headed by . . . 
Sihanouk to join hands" with PDK "to implement the peace 
accord ... at the earliest date." However, the commentary 
also for the first time hinted what PDK would do if in fact 
most people did not want Sihanouk or anyone else to join hands 
with it. It ominously warned that PDK would "eradicate" 
anything it considered was "bad" for "splitting" the people 
off from it. It thus threatened violence against anyone who
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was supposedly preventing the people from manifesting their 
support for PDK.1
The warning was combined with a PDK attempt to reactivate 
its diplomatic and political work via the SNC in Phnom Penh. 
PDK informed Sihanouk that its "advance party" was scheduled 
to arrive in Phnom Penh on 17 December. Sihanouk's response 
indicated that PDK still faced an uphill battle with him. He 
warned that at least until Khieu Samphan and Son Sen also 
arrived, he would "continue to work with SoC" for the economic 
rehabilitation of Cambodia.2
The Decision of 13 December 1991
At their meeting to discuss the implementation of the 
Paris Agreements, Pol Pot and other PDK leaders endorsed the 
notion that PDK had been "implementing the Agreements" by 
trying to activate its popular support base to overthrow SoC 
from below, but condemned "old enemies" like SoC for resisting 
and "new enemies" like Sihanouk and the UN for not helping to 
neutralize SoC from above. While the leadership reaffirmed 
that PDK policy was "to push for the implementation of the 
Agreements" by attacking SoC "from all angles using mostly 
political struggle as the base", it confirmed the public 
threat of violence by agreeing to supplement this with a 
degree of resumed reliance on military force. PDK was to 
redouble its efforts to try "to make breakthroughs in 
dissolving the village and subdistrict political 
administrations" of SoC. Although these attempts would be 
"taking political strength as the more important" tactic, PDK 
would now be attacking "both militarily and politically". 
Meanwhile, renewed attempts must still be made to facilitate 
NADK activation of PDK nuclei in the villages by opening "up 
a battlefield in Phnom Penh." Pol Pot explained this meant
1 VGNUFC, 11 December 1991.
2 Bangkok Post, 13 December 1991.
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"negotiating for the implementation of the Agreements" in the 
SNC and other forums. If things went well, PDK could soon 
move "from politics ... to organization and from organization 
to action" both in the villages and the towns.3 The bottom 
line, however, was the beginning of a shift back toward 
violence that would - although of course this was not admitted 
- close the gap between the PDK's beliefs about its popularity 
and the reality of a lack of popular enthusiasm for its 
political offensive in the countryside.
The meeting produced a "Decision 13-12", the general 
outlines of which can be gleaned from a discussion document 
produced about it produced by Sector 1001.4 The document 
confidently declared that it was "plain" that the Paris 
Agreements would "be implemented first by one step and then 
the next," even if it would "require a period of time during 
1992" to make things happen according to the script. Still, 
in order to ensure this, PDK would have to strike at its 
enemies with both its "right and left hands". The right hand 
would "eliminate and disperse the political administration" of 
SoC and replace it with local National Councils. While trying 
to do this by "regular leafleting" and organizing popular 
"protest demonstrations" against SoC, the right hand could 
also punch "militarily [and] psychologically ... by cutting 
the roads, denying it rice, frightening the enemy somehow or 
another."
Discussing follow-up punches by the left hand, the 
document emphasized the importance to the PDK strategy of
3 Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to 
Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992". [Pol 
Pot, "Clarification"].
4 Author's translation of "Document for Study in Every 
Location. This Document Elaborates on the Leadership Team's 
Decision Document of 13 December 1991: Decisions of the Meeting 
of 1001 Leading Cadre, 10 January 1992" [hereafter: "Decision 
Document"] . This document was obtained by the author from Nayan 
Chanda.
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"infiltrating forces from the rear to the front", that is, 
moving cadre, combatants and civilians from base areas near 
the Thai border to base areas deeper inside Cambodia. Such 
infiltration would serve PDK's "strategic objective" of 
enhancing its "position as a national force . . . within a 
bourgeois system" of electoral politics. The document warned, 
however, that those moving from the rear to the front 
"shouldn't be going without" proper security. Decision 13-12 
thus required the establishment of secure corridors through 
which the various categories of PDK forces could move from the 
Thai-Cambodian border to the Cambodian interior. This 
people's war by moving people was seen as a prerequisite to 
the success of the PDK "political party" which was supposed to 
operate within the "bourgeois" political system.
The Decision's approval of the use of military means in 
connection with the establishment of local National Councils 
suggested that such means might also be used to establish 
secure infiltration corridors. This general shift seemed to 
be confirmed in a VGNUFC broadcast that authorized the use of 
"all activities ... to completely do away with" whatever 
obstacles were placed in the way of PDK political progress by 
"near and distant enemies".5
Implementation of Decision 13-12: Beginning of an Escalatory 
Spiral on Route 12
Decision 13-12 seems to have been implemented with the 
earliest and greatest military vigour by troops of Sectors 
1003 and 1001 operating along Route 12 in north-central 
Cambodia. Route 12 was a derelict secondary road running 
through northern Cambodia from the provincial town of Kampung 
Thom across Preah Vihear province to the Cambodian-Laos border 
in Steung Treng province. In Kampung Thom, it formed the 
boundary between NADK Sectors 1003 and 1001. For SoC, it was
5 VGNUFC, 18 December 1991. Emphasis added.
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a lifeline connecting Kampung Thom town to CPAF outposts in 
Kampung Thom and Preah Vihear provinces. For the NADK, it was 
a vital membrane lying between its "liberated zones" in 
northwestern and north-central Cambodia, on the one hand, and 
northeastern and eastern Cambodia, on the other. It was a 
logistics line across which anything coming from supply bases 
west of it in Sector 1003 had to pass to reach "liberated 
zones" east of it in Sector 1001. (See Map IV.)
Apparently in implementation of Decision 13-12, cadre of 
Sectors 1001 and 1003 began trying to convince people to move 
from the NADK rear base at Anlung Veng in Siem Reap into 
Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham, and also to move from the PDK- 
administered camp of Au Trav in Thailand to Anlung Veng and 
beyond.6 According to defectors from Sector 1001 Division 
802, the immediate political goal of the infiltration was "to 
expand the NADK political base prior to elections." 
Infiltration began in December 1991, with Sectors 1001 and 
1003 apparently working together to try to send families "to 
every province" east of Route 12. Thus, after the period 
during which Division 802 was only supposed to do "political 
work to set up National Councils in the villages and 
subdistricts," some detachments of it were ordered in December 
to cooperate with Sector 1003 Division 616 in securing 
"unhindered crossing" of Route 12. Their objective was to 
make it possible for civilians and combatants alike to cross 
the road "without fear of CPAF observation or interdiction".7
Although only parts of Divisions 616 and 802 were
6 Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced 
Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng 
to Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 
1992)", p.l.
7 Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992; 
UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP" [hereafter; "MMWG LO SITREP"], 1 May 
1992, pp.1-2.
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mobilized to secure a corridor across Route 12,8 the NADK's 
efforts to prevent CPAF from contesting its ability to 
establish safe passage for civilians and others across Route 
12 very quickly turned the road into a place of military 
confrontation. Almost immediately after 13 December, SoC 
complained of NADK cease-fire violations along infiltration 
routes in Siem Reap that connected Anlung Veng to Kampung Thom 
and on Route 12 itself.9 CPAF responded to NADK movements by 
shelling areas controlled by PDK in Kampung Thom.10
SoC was also continuing to respond vigorously to NADK's 
increasingly violent people's war to establish local National 
Councils. These efforts were reflected in SoC allegations 
about continuing NADK harassment of people in several other 
remote areas. These included Kravanh (Leach) district of 
Posat province, where the NADK was accused of having "launched 
various operations ... in a number of subdistricts";11 Tbaung 
Khmum district of Kampung Cham province, where a SoC 
subdistrict chief was said to have been killed;12 and Prek Koy 
subdistrict in Kang Meah district of Kampung Cham, where 
Division 7 85 allegedly opened fire on peasants in four 
villages, killing three and wounding 19, setting fire to 
eleven houses and prompting some 3,500 people to flee the 
area. How SoC reacted to such NADK activity is suggested by 
its account of the incident in Kang Meah, according to which
8 Interviews on 12 November 1992 of 20-year-old and 22- 
year-old sources.
9 "UN Peace-keepers Meet Khmer Rouge in Guerilla Territory", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1991; VoCP, 25 December 1991 and 
6 February 1992.
10 VoK, 31 December 1991 and VGNUFC, 22 January 1992; Steve 
Heder, UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Report on a Visit 
to Phum Sophi (Kanda[o?]l Thmei), 22 June 1992", p.5.
11 SPK [SoC News Agency] , 24 December 1991.
12 SPK, 21 December 1991.
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a CPAF counter-attack killed 29 men of Division 785.13
With CPAF thus fending off PDK, SoC Foreign Minister Hor 
Nam Hong conceded on 1 January that NADK had "generally 
respected" the cease-fire despite "instances of violations and 
land-grabbing",14 and a week later, foreign news reports 
concluded that the "cease-fire appears to be holding".15 
However, SoC was determined to respond vigorously to NADK 
efforts to move people and troops across Route 12, and decided 
that the best way to do this was to take the war to PDK.16 
In early January, CPAF launched a new round of the fighting by 
attempting to "seize key villages around Kampung Thom".17 
CPAF detachments were trying to clear NADK out of contested 
villages and also entered PDK-administered areas, thus 
escalating the fighting in the province into "a little local 
war".18 At the same time, "CPAF made it difficult to cross" 
Route 12. NADK immediately counter-escalated and launched "a 
major operation ... to bust open a corridor through which it 
would be possible to send families or troops" to areas east of 
Route 12 "even during the daytime".19 All this provided grist 
to the mill of those in the PDK leadership like Ta Mok who 
were eager to declare that the Paris Agreements had broken 
down, and that it was time to escalate the level of violence 
even more in order to make it possible for the people to show 
their support for the revolution.
13 SPK, 28 December 1991.
14 VoCP, 1 January 1992.
15 "Cambodia Cease-fire", AFP, Phnom Penh, 9 January 1992.
16 The Nation, 24 January 1992.
17 "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampung Thom", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992.
18 Bangkok Post, 31 January and 22 February 1992.
19 Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992; 
"MMWG LO SITREP", pp.1-2.
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Opening the Phnom Penh Battlefield
Meanwhile, in Phnom Penh, the PDK advance team had 
arrived on 17 December, hoping to relaunch preparations for a 
diplomatic and political offensive in the capital in 
accordance with Decision 13-12. The delegation, headed by PDK 
"senior ambassador" Chan Yourann, the former head of the 
Democratic Kampuchea embassy in Beijing, took up temporary 
residence in a SoC guesthouse and then moved to the SNC 
headquarters in Voat Phnum as soon as premises for them there 
were furnished.20
The tasks of Chan Yourann and his delegation no doubt 
included assessing security measures around Voat Phnum and the 
general political atmosphere in the capital.21 It was 
immediately obvious that the former were lax,22 while the 
latter remained highly volatile. As the advance team arrived, 
Hun Sen pointedly declared that SoC had "no right to ban 
people from demonstrating" peacefully, including against a PDK 
presence in the capital.23
Hun Sen's statement inadvertently opened the floodgates 
of anti-SoC feeling in Phnom Penh. A series of initially non­
violent demonstrations broke out on 17 December that were 
directed not against PDK, but against corruption among SoC 
officials. Then, during a demonstration on 20 December, a 
house which protesters complained had been misappropriated by
20 "Khmer Rouge Delegation Arrives in Phnom Penh", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 17 December 1991.
21 Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1991.
22 As regards security measures, the author notes that on 19 
December, he and another foreign researcher simply walked past 
SoC and UN guards on duty on the perimeter of Voat Phnum by 
smiling and adopting a composure suggesting that we were 
authorized access to the SNC headquarters.
23 Amnesty International, State of Cambodia: Human Rights 
Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992 (AI Index ASA 
23/02/92, April 1992) [hereafter: Human Rights], p.36.
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a SoC minister was ransacked and burned, and the unrest 
spilled over into a nearby market. Looting took place while 
some demonstrators threw rocks at police. After this
incident, SoC municipal officials began conferring with SoC 
police and CPAF officers about the deployment of additional 
security forces at key points around the city. SoC leaders 
became concerned that dissatisfaction was spreading from the 
specific issue of corruption to general opposition to its 
political administration, and that unrest might take on 
increasingly mass proportions.24
A golden opportunity for PDK to attack SoC from above and 
within had arisen, an opportunity that seemed to be taken 
straight from the people's war script, but which also would 
provide a test of PDK's real political potential. If PDK 
could take advantage of the popular unrest, SoC might begin to 
disintegrate from the top down, and the people's war from 
below might suddenly take off. A PDK-fabricated "National 
Council" for Phnom Penh might even get a chance to emerge.
PDK hastened to exploit the situation. On 19 December, 
VGNUFC had announced that Khieu Samphan and Son Sen would 
arrive in Phnom Penh on 21 December to attend a full-fledged 
SNC session earlier scheduled by Sihanouk for that day. 
Referring to the demonstrations, it warned that "the foreign 
alliance" might again sabotage the peace process, and that 
this might involve repression of opposition forces in Phnom 
Penh using SoC "Interior Ministry's secret agents", SoC 
municipal police forces and CPAF troops from the capital's 
garrison. Hoping nevertheless to capitalize on the unrest, it 
contended that the only way to prevent repression of the
24 Human Rights, pp.36-37; CPP, Central Committee, Robaykar 
Neung Kar Veay Tamlay Ampi Preuttekar Batokam Nov Roattheani 
Phnum Penh Pi Thngay Ti 17 Dal Thngay Ti 22 Khte Thnu Chhnam 1991 
Prom Teang Tih-dav Neung Vitheanakar Samrap Royea' Pel Khang Muk 
("Report and Evaluation of the Events of the Demonstrations in 
Phnom Penh Capital City from 17 to 22 December 1991 and 
Objectives and Measures for the Future") [hereafter: "Report and 
Evaluation"], 8 January 1992, pp.1-3.
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popular will was to reinterpret the Paris Agreements to allow 
PDK to play a role in running SoC ministries responsible for 
the five "fields" of administration slated by the Paris 
Agreements for direct UNTAC supervision or control.25 With 
SoC perhaps beginning to crumble, PDK apparently hoped that 
its reintroduction of outright quadripartitism might succeed.
Phnom Penh Becomes a Battlefield Between SoC and Demonstrators
However, after the confrontation between the 
demonstrators and the police, Sihanouk contacted Khieu Samphan 
and Son Sen and advised them to postpone their return to the 
capital. They heeded the Prince's clear implication that he 
did not want to see them trying to foment a mass popular
uprising in the capital. Instead of plunging into the
erupting Phnom Penh battlefield, they decided to "wait for a 
few days to see how the situation develops".26
Even in their absence, it deteriorated from SoC's point
of view. At 8.00 am on 21 December, Hun Sen appealed for an
end to violent protests and reversed the SoC position on 
demonstrations in general by declaring that they could no 
longer be allowed unless the authorities granted permission in 
advance.27 However, as Hun Sen's speech was being broadcast, 
police officers arrested several young people whom they 
suspected were part of a group about to launch an anti- 
corruption action at Phnom Penh University's Faculty of 
Medicine. Their detention precipitated a series of
spontaneous protest marches by students and others that 
resulted in violent confrontations with some of the SoC police 
and CPAF units about which VGNUFC had warned. In the ensuing 
riots, at least eight people were killed, some as the result 
of indiscriminate firing by angry and undisciplined individual
25 VGNUFC, 18 December 1991.
26 VGNUFC, 21 and 22 December 1991.
27 Human Rights, pp. 38-39.
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police and soldiers. In public, SoC officials alleged that 
the unrest was part of "an armed insurrection with a political 
aim .... instigated by armed reactionaries" who they said had 
"ordered and incited students" to demonstrate. They denied 
any wrongdoing by SoC police or CPAF and hinted that PDK was 
behind the whole incident. However, internally the CPP 
admitted that SoC was unable to unearth any "clear evidence" 
to substantiate its assertion that the demonstrations were 
orchestrated by PDK, KPNLF or FUNCINPEC. It also conceded 
that the SoC police and CPAF forces had "in some cases opened 
fire unnecessarily" ,28
PDK Attempts to Take Advantage of the Reaction Against SoC
The political fall-out from the events of 17-21 December 
was similar to that of 27 November, but more intense. It 
generated a strong popular political reaction against SoC.29 
PDK tried to take advantage of this with radio statements 
aimed at fomenting further unrest in Phnom Penh30 and in the 
provinces, particularly those where provincial National 
Councils had supposedly been set up in 1990.31 However, these 
efforts to promote the collapse of parts of the SoC political 
superstructure came to naught. No one answered the PDK call 
to insurrection. If the part of the script about unbridled 
enemy repression was confirmed, the course of events indicated 
that SoC's unpopularity did not equate with enthusiasm for 
PDK. Instead, the majority of the student and other leaders 
of the demonstrations who decided to continue their anti-SoC
28 Human Rights, pp.39-50,61; "Report and Evaluation", pp. 3- 
6; author's interviews with two leaders of the demonstrations, 
Siem Reap, 20 July 1998.
29 "Diplomats Blame Violence on Frustration, Anger", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 23 December 1991.
30 VGNUFC, 23 December 1991.
31 VGNUFC, 25 December 1991. The radio's propaganda focused 
on Kampung Cham and Batdambang.
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activities began gravitating toward FUNCINPEC,32 which 
according to the guesses of many diplomats before the Paris 
Agreements was possibly already the most popular of the 
Cambodian parties. However, they had not seen FUNCINPEC as 
overwhelmingly popular, and unlikely to get more than "20 
percent to 35 percent" of the vote in a free election.33 The 
drift of demonstration leaders toward FUNCINPEC was an early 
sign of what would later become a growing trend suggesting 
Ranariddh's organization might be able to improve on those 
estimates.
While generating support for FUNCINPEC, the suppression 
of the demonstrations also turned it and Sihanouk away from 
SoC. PDK tried to use the opportunity to enlist their support 
to push again for a rapid deployment of UNTAC. However, its 
apparent hopes that it would thus be able to undermine SoC 
control from above before SoC could recover from the unrest 
were not fulfilled.
Although for the time being, FUNCINPEC continued to 
adhere to some aspects of its alliance with SoC,34 Ranariddh 
reacted to the killings of demonstrators by distancing himself 
from popular anger against SoC, declaring that the FUNCINPEC 
arrangement with CPP was "really a very, very loose" affair 
and might be abandoned.35 He moved toward a complete break 
with SoC by securing Sihanouk's permission to change 
FUNCINPEC's name to the "Sihanoukist Party" in order to 
contest openly against CPP in elections. After SoC persuaded 
Sihanouk to reverse this decision, Ranariddh angrily declared
32 Author's interviews with two leaders of the 
demonstrations, Siem Reap, 20 July 1998.
33 The Australian, 4 June 1991.
34 Most notably, on 24 December, a CPAF deputy chief of 
staff had a working meeting with his ANKI counter-part in Phnom 
Penh. VoCP, 2 6 December 1991.
35 Bangkok Post, 2 January 1992.
164
that the CPP had "never been sincere" in its dealings with 
him.36
Similarly, in a statement on 22 December, Sihanouk had 
publicly criticized SoC for the first time since the Paris 
Agreements, rebuking it? "use of force of arms resulting in 
deaths" . However, he hinted that the best way to achieve the 
goal of restoring order was to endow him, not PDK, with 
"political or material power" and "administrative or 
governmental power".37
The events also forced CPP into a re-think that revealed 
that if PDK's hopes for an unravelling of SoC as a result of 
a pro-PDK uprising were fanciful, CPP itself recognized that 
a collapse of SoC was not impossible. Internally, it 
concluded that promoting popular anger at PDK risked 
unleashing dangerously threatening anti-SoC forces. This had 
to be "avoided at all costs" lest it "fan the flames of the 
situation and lead to a state of chaos" and further "undermine 
... the popularity" and "influence" of SoC. In a worst case 
scenario, SoC might indeed be compelled to "turn over its 
existing administrative structures to the SNC" or the UN, 
especially if the unrest spread to other towns and the 
provinces. At the same time the analysis stressed CPP's 
determination to regain and maintain a strong political 
advantage by "using violence and military measures" if 
necessary, while rushing legislation regulating demonstrations 
into force.38
Preparing Again to Open the Battlefield in Phnom Penh
PDK attempted to take advantage of Sihanouk's 
vacillations by declaring it hoped the Prince agreed with its
36 VoK, 17 January 1992.
37 VoK, 22 December 1991; Bangkok Post, 3 January 1992.
38 "Report and Evaluation", pp.4-8.
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desire for "an early dispatch of UNTAC to Cambodia, 
specifically to Phnom Penh". However, in a renewed criticism 
of the UN, it characterised any reasons put forward for delays 
in UNTAC's arrival as "pretexts".39 Sihanouk responded to PDK 
concerns by using a meeting of the SNC Secretariat to call for 
the urgent dispatch to Cambodia of the UN Special 
Representative who was to head UNTAC, noting that no one had 
so far been designated to take up this post.40 Sihanouk's 
agreement with PDK about deployment of UNTAC did not extend to 
other issues, however, particularly not to any use of military 
means to achieve its ends. Thus, after Mdk Baan, a member of 
the PDK advance team who attended the meeting, warned that if 
there were any more "attacks" on Khieu Samphan or Son Sen, PDK 
"would return to the battlefield, "41 Sihanouk urged UNAMIC to 
convene an early meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group 
(MMWG) envisaged in the Paris Agreements as the forum for 
preventing cease-fire violations.42 This move threatened to 
put the focus on NADK activities contrary to the Paris 
Agreements.
PDK on the Defensive in the MMWG and SNC
A first meeting of the MMWG was duly convened on 28 
December under the chairmanship of UNAMIC General Loridon and 
with NADK represented by Mak Baen. It satisfied Sihanouk's 
hope that the MMWG would concentrate on allegations of NADK 
cease-fire violations and ignored a PDK request that NADK be 
allowed to expand its presence into SoC-administered zones. 
UNAMIC chief Ataul Karim opened the meeting by saying the
39 VGNUFC, 24 December 1991,
40 VoCP, 24,25 and 28 December 1991; Bangkok Post, 26 
December 1991; VGNUFC, 24 December 1991 and 1 January 1992.
41 VoCP, 25 December 1991.
42 Agreements, Annex 2, Article 2.
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purpose of the MMWG was to maintain the cease-fire.43 
Concerned by allegations against the NADK, Loridon obtained 
from Mak Bsen an affirmation of PDK's commitment to the 
truce.44 On the other hand, the MMWG meeting did not discuss 
a letter from Son Sen to Karim in which the NADK Commander-in- 
Chief reintroduced the notion of quadripartitism, suggesting 
that NADK should enter SoC-administered territory under UN 
protection. The letter asked that NADK be represented in the 
positions that UNAMIC was establishing in the SoC-administered 
towns of Batdambang and Siem Reap and in eight more UNAMIC 
locations he wanted set up in SoC territory.45
The proposal was discussed but not agreed at a follow-up 
MMWG. Instead, Mak Basn assented in principle that CPAF, ANKI 
and KPNLF liaison officers would be posted to Pailin and that 
MMWG meetings would be convened there as part of an 
arrangement by which representatives of the four armies would 
meet weekly in each other's headquarters.46 Moreover, 
although the meeting took place at a time when CPAF was 
reacting to NADK implementation of Decision 13-12 by attacking 
areas under PDK control, Loridon only expressed concern about 
NADK actions in Kampung Thom. He appealed to it to "give 
orders" to its combatants "to stay in place" and to implement 
"a real cease-fire".47
PDK was thus being kept almost entirely bottled up. It
43 "MMWG Holds First Meeting", AFP, Phnom Penh, 28 December
1991.
44 SPK, 31 December 1992; Bangkok Post, 3 January 1992; 
VoCP, 31 December 1991.
45 VGNUFC, 1 January 1992.
46 "Factions Agree to Meet in Each Other's Camps", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992.
47 "Cambodia Says Cease-fire Holds Despite Claims", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992; "Factions Agree to Meet in Each 
Other's Camps", AFP, Phnom Penh, 2 January 1992; SPK, 3 January 
1992 .
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could not enter provincial towns either on the crest of a 
popular insurrectionary wave or in UN vans, and it was being 
kept on notice that NADK military actions, for whatever 
purpose, would not be countenanced. PDK also achieved little 
when a full-fledged SNC finally met in the capital on 3 0 
December. This was its opportunity to exploit the broad 
reaction against SoC's suppression of the demonstrations. 
SoC, however, was taking no chances that PDK might take 
advantage of the meeting to parlay anti-SoC sentiments into 
support for PDK. On 27 December, as Hun Sen announced that 
"security had been prepared" for Khieu Samphan's return to 
Phnom Penh,48 the SoC National Assembly adopted a law that 
required anyone wishing to hold a demonstration to apply for 
a permit three days in advance. It empowered the authorities 
to "categorically prohibit" any gatherings which they 
considered might be "detrimental to public tranquillity, order 
or security".49
Part of the PDK agenda for the SNC meeting was revealed 
in VGNUFC broadcasts that repeated the demand that PDK should 
be "jointly responsible for the . . . five ministries" of SoC 
along with the other Cambodian parties to the SNC and UNTAC.50 
Boarding a plane in Bangkok bound for Phnom Penh, Khieu 
Samphan revealed another part by demanding that an UNTAC troop 
contingent of 1,000 should be deployed to Cambodia in January, 
with 800 put in Phnom Penh.51 Meanwhile, a VGNUFC "press 
communique" confirming Khieu Samphan's attendance announced 
that Son Sen would not accompany him.52 NADK issued a 
statement endorsing "Khieu Samphan's decision to go to Phnom
48 "Hun Sen: Khmer Rouge Leaders to Return 30 Dec", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 27 December 1991.
49 Human Rights, pp. 51-53
50 VGNUFC, 29 December 1991.
51 Bangkok Post, 31 December 1991.
52 VGNUFC, 2 7 December 1991.
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Penh alone . . . because . . . Phnom Penh is not a neutral place" . 
Its declaration that the capital could "only be a neutral 
place with the stationing there of at least 1,000 staff of 
UNTAC" stepped up PDK demands and suggested this was a 
condition for Son Sen's presence.53
Upon arrival in Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan was escorted to 
the Royal Palace by hundreds of CPAF soldiers and SoC 
police.54 The first session of the SNC to be held on 
Cambodian soil was thus finally convened. Sihanouk opened the 
meeting by introducing a letter appealing to the UN Secretary- 
General for the quick dispatch of UNTAC, which all present 
approved.55 However, it also adopted the "view" that "what 
is needed for a smooth peace process is respect for the cease­
fire",56 and thus implicitly credited SoC allegations against 
the NADK with regard to events in Kampung Thom and elsewhere. 
Moreover, it did not take up the PDK demand for a role in 
running SoC ministries. Although PDK seemed to have gained on 
the issue of UNTAC deployment it had made no progress on 
others. Moreover, the appeal for deployment of UNTAC was just 
that, and did not bring about any immediate change in the 
situation in Phnom Penh. Thus, Khieu Samphan left the capital 
on 31 December, after spending only 24 hours there.57
NADK Re-escalation on Route 12
With so little or nothing to show as a result of its 
diplomatic and political combat in Phnom Penh, NADK went ahead 
with moves to turn the situation on Route 12 around through
53 VGNUFC, 29 December 1991.
54 "Khieu Samphan Returns to Phnom Penh, Cambodian Council 
Meets", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 3 0 December 1991.
55 VGNUFC, 31 December 1991; SPK, 31 December 1991.
56 VoCP, 31 December 1991.
57 "Khieu Samphan Departs", AFP, Phnom Penh, 31 December
1991.
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the more reliable method of armed attack.58 However, although 
NADK troops advanced, at least for the time being, PDK 
attempts to translate this into political and diplomatic gains 
backfired. NADK in Kampung Thom made a mockery of Mak Bsen's 
assurances and Loridon's pleas in the MMWG context for a 
genuine cease-fire by carrying out large-scale ground, mortar 
and rocket attacks in response to CPAF's efforts to prevent it 
from seizing a permanent corridor across Route 12.59 The NADK 
attacks killed at least 13 peasants and wounded some 34 
others. They also generated the flight of some 10,000 
people,60 who appeared to prefer refuge in SoC zones to 
participation in NADK-led actions, military or political.
Sihanouk invited SoC to fight fire with fire in a public 
statement on 6 January condemning PDK "terrorism" against 
villagers in Kampung Thom. He said he put his trust in CPAF 
and SoC police "to effectively combat, prevent and suppress" 
such acts.61 These remarks overshadowed his calls for the 
early dispatch of UNTAC and suggested he was more concerned 
about NADK attacks than the problems of security in Phnom Penh 
raised by PDK and FUNCINPEC.
In the run-up to the next SNC, PDK tried to turn the 
spotlight back onto Sihanouk's calls for UNTAC deployment to 
Phnom Penh.62 That SNC was convened on 11 January, on the 
heels of an announcement that Boutros Boutros-Ghali had 
designated Yasushi Akashi, a senior UN career official, to 
head UNTAC as his Special Representative. Khieu Samphan
58 Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992;
"MMWG LO SITREP", pp.1-2.
59 SPK, 14 January 1992; VoCP, 23 January 1992; VGNUFC, 22 
January 1992.
60 "Khmer Rouge Kill 13 in Worst Breach Since Peace",
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1992; The Nation, 21 January 1992.
61 VoK, 6 January 1992.
62 VGNUFC, 7 January 1992.
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welcomed his appointment, as did Sihanouk and the 
representatives of other parties in attendance, but the PDK 
Chairman made it clear it was far from satisfied with this. 
He proposed that this SNC gathering and all future ones should 
focus on agenda items of most concern to PDK. He gave highest 
priority to discussion of SNC-UN action "to create a neutral 
atmosphere in Phnom Penh for the smooth functioning of the 
SNC" by urgently dispatching an initial "team of 1,000 to 
2,000 men" to the capital. He suggested rather than waiting 
for approval of an UNTAC budget, which was still pending, 
"existing UN funds be used" for this. The placement of 
discussion of arrangements for demobilization of NADK and 
other armies lower in Khieu Samphan's list suggested that PDK 
wanted to make disarmament conditional on solution of the 
first problem.63
PDK got only apparent satisfaction when the SNC resolved 
to continue pressing for the rapid deployment of UNTAC, 
because there was no guarantee the UN would respond. 
Moreover, the meeting's communique suggested that although 
Sihanouk was willing to take Khieu Samphan's proposed agenda 
items into account, he would not necessarily accept any of 
them. Although this left the door open for consideration of 
PDK concerns, it did the same for matters raised by SoC.64 
These included SoC complaints about action by NADK "announcing 
the dissolution of local authorities at the village level and 
... appointing there the SNC as the local authorities".65
The day after the SNC, SoC counter-attacked in Kampung 
Thom.66 PDK condemned the SoC attack as an "open and
63 VGNUFC, 13 January 19 92,
64 VoCP, 12 January 1992; "Cambodia Council Meets, Minus 
Three Members", AFP, Phnom Penh, 11 January 1992.
65 The Nation, 13 January 1992 .
66 VGNUFC, 20 and 22 January 1992.
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deliberate violation" of the Paris Agreements,67 but its 
protest fell on deaf ears because of the credibility it had 
lost through its own actions. Sihanouk continued to excoriate 
PDK for NADK's "dreadful and malevolent acts" in Kampung 
Thom,68 and to declare the CPAF was not guilty of cease-fire 
violations because the villages from which the population had 
fled earlier in January were "under control of [SoC]. "69 
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF also focused on and denounced the NADK 
attacks, which they characterized as "fierce" and as "bullying 
the people".70 PDK was similarly taken to task in the next 
MMWG, to which the NADK General Staff had dispatched a cadre 
named Mav Savy to represent it, with Son Sen's brother Son 
Chhum accompanying him to Phnom Penh as an "adviser" . On 16 
January, Mav Savy was confronted at his first MMWG in Phnom 
Penh with questions about NADK actions in Kampung Thom and 
elsewhere, for which he had no answer.71
A Glimpse of the Future: Akashi Visits Cambodia
Although there was no sign that the SNC's call for a more 
rapid deployment of UNTAC was resulting in any significant 
improvement on the timetable mooted by Boutros-Ghali and UN 
planners back in October 1991, the newly-appointed Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Akashi arrived 
in Phnom Penh on 22 January for a one-week familiarization 
tour72 that gave PDK and other Cambodian parties a glimpse of 
what UNTAC might be like once it deployed. For PDK, the
67 "Khmer Rouge Accuse Phnom Penh forces of Large-Scale 
Attacks", AFP, Bangkok, 19 January 1992.
68 VoK, 15 January 1992 .
69 "Sihanouk to Visit Area", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 January
1992 .
70 VoK, 21 and 25 January 1992.
71 VoCP, 21 January 1992; VGNUFC, 21 January 1992.
72 VoCP, 22 January 1992.
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initial signs were not encouraging.
Akashi attended two SNC meetings, on 23 and 2 6 January. 
He was treated to further accounts of the NADK's early January 
attacks in Kampung Thom and to reports of NADK obstructionism 
in the MMWG. He met with PDK's most clear-cut declaration yet 
that it would not cooperate in implementation 7 the Paris 
Agreements unless its concerns were addressed and resolved and 
its first explicit public proclamation that in the meantime 
the NADK would engage in military action in exercise of its 
"right of self-defence" if they were not. He witnessed 
Sihanouk's vociferous and vigorous rejection of PDK on several 
crucial points, including the use of the NADK to establish 
local National Councils and the PDK pretence that its 
political administration belonged to him, not to its covert 
leadership structure.
On the eve of Akashi's arrival, PDK emphatically warned 
that "if UNTAC has not yet come to Cambodia and the SNC and 
UNTAC are not yet prepared" to take its position into account, 
"other . . . problems cannot be resolved."73 S i h a n o u k  
responded to this open threat of non-implementation of the 
Paris Agreements by declaring on 22 January that he and PDK 
were "living on two different planets".74 In statements 
broadcast on the morning of the SNC gathering, PDK responded 
in kind. One implicitly attacked Sihanouk by rejecting 
"propaganda" it said was turning PDK into "offenders" and its 
enemies "into innocents".75 Another proclaimed an NADK right 
to exercise self-defence "retaliating" against its 
adversaries.76
73 VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.
74 "Sihanouk to Visit Area", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 January
1992
75 VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.
76 VGNUFC, 22 January 1992.
173
Meanwhile, detailed descriptions of the results of the 
NADK attacks in Kampung Thom were reverberating in Phnom Penh. 
PDK hopes they might create a sense of urgency about the need 
for a rapid deployment of UNTAC as a whole77 had proved ill- 
founded. Instead, they prompted the diplomatic envoys of the 
Permanent Five in the capital to call for the urgent 
stationing of UNAMIC military observers in Kampung Thom to 
prevent further attacks.78
Khieu Samphan thus found himself on the diplomatic 
defensive in a bilateral meeting with Akashi on the morning of 
23 January. He highlighted the PDK ultimatum that the "major" 
political clauses of the Paris Agreements must be implemented 
if "other issues" were to be resolved. Akashi responded by 
urging PDK to defer its demands and immediately to "respect 
the cease-fire" and "cooperate with UNAMIC".79
On 24 January, the Phnom Penh battlefield shifted to the 
MMWG, at which Loridon protested to Mav Savy about NADK 
actions in Kampung Thom. When Savy tried to stonewall by 
refusing to discuss the matter,80 UNAMIC moved to subject NADK 
to greater scrutiny in the province. On 25 January, UN 
military personnel were redeployed to Kampung Thom to 
establish an initial presence in the provincial capital.81
77 Financial Times, 21 January 1992.
70 "Khmer Rouge Kill 13 in Worst Breach Since Peace", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 20 January 1992; "Sihanouk Urges Peace as 
Khmer Rouge, Phnom Penh Cry War", AFP, Phnom Penh, 21 January 
1992 .
79 "Khmer Rouge Says It Is Victim of Violations", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 23 January 1992; VGNUFC, 24 January 1992.
80 UNAMIC, "Cooperation in Progression of the Peace 
Process", 14 February 1992.
81 "Cambodia's Generals Make Significant Progress in Peace 
Transition", AFP, Phnom Penh, 24 January 1992; "Government 
Concerned by New Khmer Rouge Conditions", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 25 
January 1992; "UN to Send Observers to Cease-fire Violation 
Site", AFP, Phnom Penh, 25 January 1992.
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Four days later, a second contingent of UN military observers 
was sent to Kampung Thom to keep an eye on NADK.62
The next day, PDK found itself under further attack in 
the second SNC meeting attended by Akashi. That morning, 
before the meeting, it made another attempt to portray itself 
as a supporter of Sihanouk and to present NADK efforts to set 
up local National Councils as a form of political homage to 
him.83 However, at the SNC meeting, Sihanouk dealt the final 
blow to PDK's hopes of obtaining his legitimization for PDK- 
controlled local National Councils. He declared that PDK had 
no right to set up such bodies or otherwise extend its
territorial control. This was agreed by FUNCINPEC and the
KPNLF.84 Sihanouk also declared at this SNC that PDK had no 
right to fly the SNC flag in territory under its control.85 
This signalled his rejection of any PDK argument that its 
administration was an SNC administration rather than a PDK 
"existing administrative structure".
On military matters, Sihanouk manoeuvred Khieu Samphan 
into joining with SoC and the other Cambodian parties to
express "deep sorrow" about "the loss of lives" and 
displacement of villagers resulting from its attacks in
Kampung Thom. In a moved aimed at outflanking Mav Savy's 
refusal to discuss specifics at the MMWG, Sihanouk also 
obtained Khieu Samphan's assent that further allegations of 
cease-fire violations would be mediated by the UN.86 Adopting 
the proposal urged by the Permanent Five that UNAMIC focus on
82 "UNAMIC Deploys Observers to Fifth Post", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 29 January 1992.
83 VGNUFC, 25 January 1992.
84 "KR Said Refusing to Cooperate with SNC", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 2 7 January 1992; VoK, 2 February 1992.
85 VoCP, 27 January 1992.
86 "Factions Pledge Support for Peace Agreement", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 26 January 1992; SPK, 27 January 1992.
175
Kampung Thom rather than Son Sen's 28 December request to 
spread NADK representatives around the provinces, the SNC also 
approved the establishment of a "joint post of UNAMIC and the 
four Cambodian parties" in Kampung Thorn.87 While Akashi 
promised to return to Phnom Penh in March along with "fully- 
qualified UN civilian officials" to begin implementation of 
the control and supervision aspects of the Agreements,88 he 
added that it was unlikely that UNTAC could begin serious 
deployment before April.89 PDK's deep dissatisfaction with 
Akashi's remarks was expressed by a VGNUFC warning that unless 
UNTAC was deployed "as soon as possible", PDK would be 
compelled to conclude that the UN was "lying to others, to 
itself and to the victimized Cambodian people" about 
implementation of the Agreements.90 This was the strongest 
anti-UN rhetoric broadcast so far. It suggested that PDK saw 
Akashi's appointment as a blow to its hopes that UNTAC would 
serve its interests more than those of its enemies.
PDK Under Further Pressure from Sihanouk, Akashi and Loridon
Indeed, things seemed to be going increasingly badly for 
PDK. After the SNC meeting of 26 January, Sihanouk tilted 
even further back toward SoC and against PDK. On 27 January, 
in the presence of Akashi, the Prince resumed his earlier 
practice of criticising PDK and praising SoC during provincial 
tours.91 Moreover, Sihanouk indicated that the setbacks 
suffered by PDK in the SNC in January would be followed by 
worse. He pointedly ignored PDK's calls for urgent 
strengthening of the SNC and insistently rejected its agenda
87 SPK, 27 January 1992; VGNUFC, 2 February 1992.
88 VoK, 2 February 1992.
69 "Akashi Sees April Deployment as 'Difficult'", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 27 January 1992.
90 VGNUFC, 27 January 1992.
91 VoCP, 28 and 29 January 1992.
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in favour of one it opposed. He announced that he was going 
to leave Cambodia at the end of February for a two-month trip
to China and north Korea, and that the next SNC meeting would
not be held until mid-April in Beijing. Thus, it would cease 
functioning for two and a half months. Moreover, the Prince 
said once it resumed functioning it would concentrate on his 
abiding concern with "national reconstruction",92 and not the 
agenda put forward by Khieu Samphan on 11 January.
Son Sen countered by using a meeting with Akashi in 
Bangkok on 2 8 January to convey the contents of a letter he 
had written to Karim that reintroduced quadripartitism on a 
new front. It proposed that NADK be represented at eight 
joint UNAMIC observation posts in SoC-administered points in 
eastern Cambodia, along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.93 
Loridon shunted this aside at the next MMWG, which was
convened under the close but indirect watch of Son Sen. The
NADK Commander-in-Chief had arrived in Phnom Penh on 3 0 
January to act for a brief period as senior PDK representative 
there, making his first trip to the capital since the anti-PDK 
violence of late November. The MMWG failed to discuss his new 
proposal for an NADK presence in SoC territory. Instead, Mav 
Savy agreed that two CPAF liaison officers could be posted to 
Pailin, and that the first NADK liaison officers to deploy in 
the provinces would go to Kampung Thom.94
Political Violence in Phnom Penh
However, as will be seen in the next chapter, these minor 
concessions were already being belied by other PDK moves, 
public and private, that presaged a new wave of NADK military
92 "Next Meeting in April in Beijing", Kyodo, Batdambang, 27 
January 1992; SPK, 28 January 1992.
93 VGNUFC, 1 and 2 February 1992.
94 "All Factions to Be Represented in Military HQs", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 31 January 1992; "Rival Factions Agree to Deploy in 
All Zones", Reuter, Phnom Penh, 31 January 1992.
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activity and a further hardening of attitude vis-a-vis the UN. 
These moves took place in the context of continuing 
indications of political insecurity in Phnom Penh. Khieu 
Samphan's ability to attend the SNC meetings since 30 December 
without incident suggested that the CPP was now prepared to 
acquiesce in at least a temporary PDK presence in Phnom Penh. 
However, other events suggested that it remained intolerant of 
opposition political party activities, and that at least some 
elements within it were prepared to resort to political 
assassinations to prevent them. Although CPP actions 
suggested it realized that non-PDK opposition posed the 
greatest threat to it, these events allowed PDK to continue to 
imagine that Jrhe in the absence of enemy repression, its 
political fortunes would flourish. At the same time PDK fears 
of SoC repression deterred it from political action in Phnom 
Penh and apparently prompted it to continue not to allow both 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sen to be present in the capital at the 
same time. The repression also deeply worried FUNCINPEC and 
the KPNLF, and their fear of SoC reinforced PDK suspicions.
In December, several former political prisoners who had 
been jailed by SoC in 1990 for organizing a Liberal Social 
Democracy Party (LSDP) decided to begin reorganizing it, 
despite death threats and other warnings from SoC security 
force personnel that they not resume political activities. 
They planned to contest the elections envisaged in the Paris 
Agreements, possibly by forming an alliance with FUNCINPEC 
against the CPP. In mid-January, the LSDP's original leader, 
Ung Phcin, publicly declared that the Party had already been 
re-established de facto and steps would soon to taken to 
register it de jure.
A few days later, Tea Bunlong, a former KPNLF member who 
had become a SoC official but was involved in discussions 
about formation of an opposition political party, was abducted 
from his home. His body was discovered dumped outside Phnom 
Penh on 24 January. Mourners at Tea Bunlong's funeral said he
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was the victim of a political assassination and revealed that 
he had been criticizing CPP corruption and CPP Chairman Chea 
Sim. On 2 8 January, an attempt was made to assassinate Ung 
Phan. He was hit by three bullets, but survived after 
surgery. The perpetrators were almost certainly elements of 
the SoC security apparatus. The events convinced Ung Phan and 
other members of the LSDP to cease their activities at least 
temporarily, and created fears of a SoC willingness to engage 
in political terrorism that generally prevented opposition 
political activism in Phnom Penh.95
The shootings also convinced Ranariddh that the situation 
in Phnom Penh still did not allow him to live there, and that 
it was unsafe for FUNCINPEC supporters among "citizens, civil 
servants, civilian and military workers, pupils, students, 
intellectuals" and others to "come forward" and make contact 
with the party.95 KPNLF member of the SNC Ieng Mouly voiced 
similar anxieties.97 VGNUFC asserted that Tea Bunlong had 
been murdered by members of a unit of SoC Interior Ministry 
special police, and connected it with the incidents of 27 
November and 21 December.98 In another statement, PDK 
described "the execution of Mr Tea Bun Long . . . and the armed 
attack on Mr Ung Phan" as further evidence of a strategic plan 
by SoC to destroy the Paris Agreements.99
95 Human Rights, pp.10-12. Author's interview with LSDP 
founding member Kan Man, Phnom Penh, 5 July 1992.
96 VoK, 15 February 1992.
97 VoK, 24 February 1992 .
98 VGNUFC, 28 January 1992.
99 "Communique of the PDK Rejecting the Phnom Penh Faction's 
Accusation that the PDK Has Shot a Helicopter of UNAMIC", 27 
February 1992.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POL POT WEIGHS IN AS FAILURE GENERATES DIVISION
"Full Ricrhts to Struggle"
VGNUFC commentaries broadcast on 29 and 31 January 19 92 
publicly signalled PDK's cumulative reaction to the failures, 
setbacks and pressures that it had confronted since Decision 
13-12. They were tantamount to a warning that PDK was 
prepared to reinstate any and all of the military aspects of 
people's war in order to achieve political goals that it 
believed the implementation of the Paris Agreements had so far 
denied it by preventing "the people" from supporting it.
The broadcasts insistently asserted an NADK right to fight 
freely to counter alleged violations of the Paris Agreements 
and to accelerate their "correct" implementation, at least 
until the arrival of UNTAC. They argued it had "full rights 
to .... continue [to] struggle and fight against" PDK's 
enemies1 and to "destroy" enemy "stratagems" by doing 
"whatever [it] can do to implement the Paris . . . Agreements."2
NADK self-demobilizers interviewed later revealed that, 
meanwhile, detachments of Divisions 802 and 616 assigned to 
secure a corridor across Route 12 were being resupplied. Even 
as the rest of both units were generally denied replenishment 
of military supplies, new shipments of ammunition allowed 
these detachments to replace expended stocks or lay in 
reserves in preparation for renewed fighting.3 A defector 
from Division 616 recalled that the unit's chairman, Pech 
Nhan, explained that NADK "had to struggle more in order to
liberate our country ..., so that we could get peace as soon
1 VGNUFC, 28 January 1992.
2 VGNUFC, 30 January 1992.
3 Interview of 22-year-old source on 13 November 1992; 
interview of 35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.
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as possible."4
A Meeting of PDK Leaders "On Station Higher Up"
This acrobatic logic was the same as that enunciated by- 
Pol Pot and apparently agreed among the predominant elements 
in the PDK "leadership team", who met in early February to 
make "an all-round assessment of the workings of all the many 
aspects" of the Paris Agreements.5
In his speech summing up the results of the gathering, 
Pol Pot combined utter fantasy with prescient foreboding about 
PDK's political prospects, although the latter was shrouded in 
a bizarre form of denial. Pol Pot's vague assertion that PDK 
was already "on the march" in rural areas masked the fact that 
the combined result of PDK's lack of popularity, SoC's use of 
CPAF to block NADK actions at the village and subdistrict 
level and Sihanouk's refusal to countenance PDK territorial 
expansion had been to prevent any significant shift of local 
power.
Pol Pot insisted that PDK's people's war had given it and 
would continue to give it the popularity it needed to do well 
both in elections and if elections were blocked. He put 
forward fantastic statistics about the extent to which PDK had 
already liberated the countryside and even more fantastic 
targets for quickly liberating what was left. At the same 
time, he admitted that PDK seemed weaker than before the Paris 
Agreements, blamed its problems on sabotage of the Agreements 
by the alliance and SoC, on treachery by FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF 
and Sihanouk, and on dissidence and deviance within senior PDK 
ranks. While still optimistically predicting extraordinary 
PDK electoral victories if conspiracies to prevent people from
4 Interview of 35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.
5 Pol Pot, "Clarification of Certain Principled Views to 
Act as the Basis of Our Views and Stance, 6 February 1992". [Pol 
Pot, "Clarification"].
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voting for PDK could be defeated, he also revealed profound 
worries that a cabal of unpopular enemies and rivals would be 
able not only to do just that, but somehow even reverse the 
gains made by people's war since 1979 to the point that PDK's 
very existence would be threatened. While dismissing out of 
hand the possibility that any other Cambodian parties could be 
anything but vastly less popular than PDK, his treatment of 
FUNCINPEC seemed inadvertently to point to a kind of 
subconscious recognition that it posed a popular threat not 
only to SoC, but to PDK.
Pol Pot referred his listeners back to the model 
established by the Vietnamese Communists in their 
implementation of agreement reached in negotiations with the 
US in 1973, presenting it as something to be emulated but 
surpassed. He suggested this approach would help arm the PDK 
with "a view and stance" that would ensure it would not 
"tremble" in the face of its enemies. He stressed that when 
their progress was obstructed, the Vietnamese Communists had 
taken "advantage of the 1973 Paris Agreement ... to marshal 
their forces, and then in 1975 they launched an offensive and 
were able to seize Saigon." He said the main lesson was that 
"in the battle to gain advantage" in the implementation of the 
1991 Agreements, victory or defeat will come to whoever is the 
more tenacious" in political, military and diplomatic combat.
In making these points, Pol Pot drew on the World War Two 
Indochinese Communist image of a US-led "alliance", which he 
said was now aiming at "gathering forces to ... attack 
Democratic Kampuchea" and "prop up" SoC, while using UNAMIC as 
a proxy in its efforts "to dissolve the SNC". In explaining 
how to be tenacious in confronting these "protagonists" of PDK 
diplomatically, Pol Pot brought the discussion back to the 
Vietnamese model of the 1970s. He noted that "in
negotiations" in those days, the Vietnamese had just said "no 
and no, until those negotiating with them" got "fed up" and 
the Vietnamese won what they wanted. In doggedly pursuing
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their victory, the Vietnamese did not "get a headache no 
matter how much they are cursed by anyone." Twenty years on, 
PDK should behave even more tenaciously. It would thus be 
"able to beat" its enemies "into submission".
Pol Pot re-affirmed that in the long term, PDK remained 
determined "to take the whole" of Cambodia just as his 
Communist Party had done once before. He cautioned that such 
a seizure of total power was not yet the immediate PDK goal, 
but argued that by signing the Paris Agreements, PDK had put 
itself into a position to make steps in that direction because 
the Agreements' "contents" were to PDK's "advantage". The 
problem was not a lack of popular support, but that PDK's 
enemies had been actively attempting to turn the situation 
around by subverting the Agreements. They had been "diverting 
and twisting the Agreements" in order to "defeat" PDK. The 
alliance had been responsible for the UN Security Council 
Resolutions that had "decided the mandate of UNAMIC" and made 
the UN unable "to do the work of implementing the Agreements" 
that PDK wanted done. The alliance had also decided "there 
would be ... a delay" in the deployment of UNTAC.
To pursue its goals, the alliance had from the beginning
maintained the initiative as regards "the problem of security 
in Phnom Penh". It had "set things up" in the capital so that 
PDK's enemies were in a position to "do something" against PDK 
representatives "whenever they want[ed] to". Their "clear 
objective" had always been "to eliminate the [PDK] presence in 
Phnom Penh", to ensure that any PDK representatives who came 
to the capital "to engage in negotiating battles" were "not 
allowed to stay".
Militarily, CPAF had been "attacking ... all the time.
. . . with impunity" to blunt PDK attempts at "consolidation and
expansion" in the countryside. Indeed, he complained, it
seemed that it was "easier" for CPAF to attack the NADK than 
before the Agreements. Pol Pot suggested that the anti-PDK
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statements that had been made in the SNC, MMWG and on other 
occasions were merely the diplomatic flip side of this SoC 
military activity. This was shown by the fact that these 
statement always accused NADK "of violating the Agreements", 
while maintaining "Phnom Penh isn't committing any 
violations". Pol Pot added that another angle of attack on 
PDK had been accelerating plans for "aid from . . . 
international organizations" and "humanitarian aid" for SoC. 
Such assistance aimed to prevent the disintegration of SoC and 
to make CPAF attacks on NADK financially possible.
In sum, PDK's enemies had "already got a foot in the door 
on the military, political and diplomatic battlefields" and 
were "already diverting the Agreements, in accordance with 
their objectives." Pol Pot conceded that after three months 
of being "constantly barraged," PDK had suffered some 
"attrition of the forces lower down" in its political and 
military structures. Its enemies were still trying to make 
PDK "disappear," hoping that "then they can just snap 
everything up". Efforts to eliminate its "presence among the 
four parties" and roll back its rural political offensive 
were aimed at ensuring that PDK would not be " allow [ed] ... to 
win elections", because as long as PDK's enemies could make 
certain that the voters remained vulnerable to SoC coercion, 
they would "be able to beat [PDK] " through the ballot box and 
thus "prevent PDK from having a presence in the National 
Assembly".
Although there was much reason to be concerned that PDK's 
chances for gaining something from elections were therefore 
fading, Pol Pot insisted PDK should not despair: it still had 
a vast popular rural support base and an enormous potential to 
expand it further through intensification of the political and 
- as necessary - military aspects of people's war. This 
remained the key to achieving all PDK's immediate and long­
term goals. First, it would accelerate the capture of rural 
power in a way that should scare the alliance into deploying
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UNTAC. Second, if the alliance interminably delayed the 
deployment of UNTAC, PDK's advances in taking control of SoC- 
administered villages would render UNTAC's presence no longer 
necessary for further PDK political advances. Third, in 
either case, PDK's long-term objective of winning complete 
power would be served by forging ahead toward seizure of "the 
entire countryside".
In making his case, Pol Pot made an utterly fantastic 
claim that revealed the extent to which PDK planning was based 
on a gigantic overestimation of the achievements of its 
people's war. He declared that, "according to the most recent 
statistics", PDK had already "liberated" one-third of 
Cambodia's villages, and that "villages that are contested 
between us and the enemy comprise another one-and-a-half 
thirds."5 He called on these "forces already in [PDK] 
possession" to "continue the offensive" to dissolve the SoC 
political administration in villages and subdistricts 
following the basic combat line and "strategic orientation" 
adopted on 13 December 1991. He imagined PDK had virtually 
unlimited prospects for further rapid advances. If it 
implemented people's war correctly and tried tenaciously 
enough, there was no good reason why it could not - within a 
matter of months - "take these one-and-a-half thirds of the 
villages that are contested and the half-third of villages 
that are temporarily controlled by the enemy." He looked
6 In his speech in December 1988, Pol Pot had claimed a 
degree of PDK political penetration of some 2,000 of the 7,000 
to 8,000 villages he said existed in Cambodia. He had said a 
political solution to the Cambodian problem would only become 
possible "once four to five of the seven to eight thousand 
villages throughout the country have been attacked a lot and 
well" to dismantle their SoC administration. The statistics he 
presented in February 1992 entailed a claim that PDK had now 
"liberated" some 2,300 to 2,700 villages, and achieved political 
penetration of another 3,500 to 4,000, leaving only 1,200 to 
1,300 under uncontested SoC administration. There is no evidence 
to suggest that PDK had made such spectacular advances in 
expanding its political influence in the countryside in the three 
years since the end of 1988.
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eagerly forward to being informed of "how many villages we get 
in February" and "then in March, how many more villages will 
we have got." He envisioned that by March PDK could and 
should "have, counting old and new villages, two-thirds of 
them, " and predicted that this would provoke an anti-PDK 
outcry which the PDK could exploit diplomatically to bring 
about the deployment of UNTAC. This was because what made the 
alliance "afraid" was evidence that PDK was "always able to 
get [its] hands in everywhere" . And if UNTAC still did not 
appear, the success of PDK's people's war would render 
alliance sabotage of the Paris Agreements meaningless. Thus, 
Pol Pot said, "if by March the new and old liberated villages 
are increased to two-thirds, if by April the number goes up 
again, and if by May it still keeps going up, we therefore 
won't have to be worried that UNTAC isn't coming quickly, 
because if UNTAC doesn't come, then" PDK's enemies would 
"simply be left with nothing at all".
In highlighting the village people's war, Pol Pot argued 
that the purely military battlefield was still of less 
importance than before. The situation remained one "in which 
the level of military combat has been reduced to a certain 
extent". As a result, "the extent of political and diplomatic 
combat" remained relatively high "both in terms of its 
substance and of the elements involved", and was relatively 
important. On the other hand, purely military activity was 
taking on a new importance as a supplement to village people's 
war in pushing the diplomatic process forward. Here, Pol Pot 
insisted that, contrary to reality, NADK action on Route 12 
had not been counter-productive. He stuck to the hopes 
earlier mooted by PDK that NADK attacks had concentrated the 
minds of the international community on the need to accelerate 
the deployment of UNTAC. Indeed, he argued that spectacular 
military action was the key to this, declaring that it was 
only when PDK "scared .... these Westerners" the way it had 
done in Kampung Thom in early January that they would "decide 
quickly that UNTAC must come in a hurry."
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Pol Pot also expressed complete confidence that, 
fundamentally, there was "nothing too wrong with the military 
situation" facing PDK. NADK remained deployed "everywhere" 
throughout Cambodia, still had "arms and ammunition" and it 
would be able to deal with CPAF because CPAF lacked real 
"muscle power" . He recommended that the NADK respond to any 
CPAF probes with "strong" counter-attacks, and indicated that 
these could include not only operations aimed directly at 
retaking lost territory, but also at punishing CPAF and 
diverting it by attacking some nearby target.
Meanwhile, to enhance its chances of success even more, 
PDK must also maintain the Decision 13-12 line of launching 
storming diplomatic attacks in Phnom Penh "with no 
modifications". This was essential because PDK would be in 
the best position to "win in the implementation of the Paris 
Agreements" if it was as "tenacious" in engaging now UNAMIC 
and later UNTAC on the diplomatic battlefield as in countering 
CPAF militarily. PDK must not "abandon the Phnom Penh
battlefield". Rather, it was "imperative" for PDK
representatives to keep going back to Phnom Penh "to make sure 
that the SNC gradually becomes active, so that we will have a 
presence in the SNC, so that both us and the Prince will have 
a presence in Phnom Penh." In this way, PDK would attack in 
"Phnom Penh to capture things politically" in order to "set
right the objectives for the implementation of the
Agreements" . Although attacking in this way "on the Phnom 
Penh battlefield" did not mean that it could "fight there and 
take the whole thing", it would still "make things more
complicated" for SoC, which no longer had "the initiative 100 
per cent" in the capital because of the presence of the SNC 
and the UN. This was why "the role of the SNC must ... be 
grasped firmly and constantly."
Pol Pot had some specific advice for PDK negotiators in 
Phnom Penh. First, because of the apparently intractable 
problem of establishing a secure PDK residence in the capital,
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its representatives would "not take up continuous residence" 
but go there "rotation style". Second, in using "the 
documents of the Agreements to combat" the PDK's enemies, its 
negotiators must "specify when there are ... things that are 
different from" what PDK defined as "the objectives in the 
documents". If anyone raised "new problems" contrary to PDK 
objectives, then the PDK tactic should be to argue that the 
only way out would be "renegotiation" of the peace treaty. 
Pol Pot seemed here to be thinking among other things about 
Sihanouk's advocacy of economic aid directly to SoC, and he 
advised that if the Prince "gets angry with us, let him be 
angry for the time being. What has to be done to prevent 
anything that is contrary to the main issue, that would 
constitute a new modification of the Agreements." The PDK 
position should be that aid from international organizations 
must go exclusively to the SNC. Concretely, it must not be 
handed over to SoC officials for disbursement. Instead, "it 
must be the SNC which manages its administration."
Pol Pot still saw reasons for optimism about the UN. He 
argued that although UNAMIC had been functioning as a proxy of 
PDK's enemies, it was internally split along national lines. 
He depicted Loridon as primarily responsible for compelling 
UNAMIC to serve the alliance. The Frenchman and other 
Caucasian "long-noses" in UNAMIC had been "setting up things 
however they damn please" in order to achieve their anti-PDK 
aims . Pol Pot suggested they had been running roughshod over 
politically "correct" non-Western UNAMIC figures like Ataul 
Karim, who was allowed a "merely ... formal presence". Pol 
Pot was sceptical about whether the newly-designated Akashi 
would act according to PDK interests. He doubted whether the 
Japanese UNTAC head would be as correct as the Bangladeshi 
Karim. Although Akashi might "pretend to be flexible" with 
PDK, this was probably "merely part of how" PDK's adversaries 
would continue taking "turns playing theatre" in their efforts 
to destroy it. Nevertheless, Pol Pot's analysis implied that 
UNTAC would also be internally divided, and this was something
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of which PDK should be able to take advantage. This was why, 
despite his misgivings about Akashi, Pol Pot insisted that 
bringing about the rapid deployment of UNTAC was still a PDK 
objective.
The flip-side of Pol Pot's bravura about PDK's political, 
military and diplomatic prospects was his dark foreboding 
about the possibility of its demise. Pol Pot seemed
inadvertently to recognize signs that, contrary to the 
people's war script according to which only PDK could have an 
extensive popular base, FUNCINPEC was somehow doing rather 
better than PDK among the people. However, he attributed 
FUNCINPEC's successes to the machinations of the "alliance". 
Thus, he argued, PDK was endangered not only by direct
sabotage of the Paris Agreements by "the alliance" and direct 
repression of PDK and the people by SoC, but also by the
alliances' promotion of treacherous collusion with SoC by
Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. The picture Pol Pot painted 
suggested that FUNCINPEC's and KPNLF's electoral hopes were 
based in the possibility that the alliance SoC would arrange 
for them to receive votes and seats as a reward for their 
treacherous behaviour, not because many people might be 
genuinely enthusiastic about voting for one or another of 
them. Pol Pot could not imagine that FUNCINPEC was continuing 
to keep its distance from PDK because FUNCINPEC's greater and 
growing political potential gave it real electoral prospects 
that PDK did not have.
Pol Pot alleged that the alliance had been assiduously 
using "various kinds of persuasion and peaceful alliances" 
with Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF to create splits 
between them and PDK. They were being offered "inducements" 
as part of the plot to make PDK "disappear" . They were 
susceptible to inducements because of their "hopes for the 
elections and the like" . This had made them turn "tepid" 
about their relationship with PDK.
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On the other hand, Pol Pot also indirectly admitted that 
FUNCINPEC, at least, had a significant political organization 
of its own that gave it some room for political manoeuvre and 
even independence. This became clear when Pol Pot suggested 
that because Sihanouk had no armed forces or organized 
political party that remained strictly his own, he would tend 
to rely upon PDK whenever SoC did something to repel him. 
Implicitly, at least, the same might not be true of FUNCINPEC. 
This may explain why Pol Pot seemed particularly agitated 
about what he saw as negative traits that had emerged in 
Ranariddh. Of course, Pol Pot insisted, Ranariddh was 
virtually a puppet of the alliance. It was because Ranariddh 
needed Western aid and was otherwise "influenced by the West" 
that he had been pursuing "a calculus of accommodation" with 
SoC.
Still, what worried Pol Pot most was what would happen if 
FUNCINPEC and PDK's other former coalition partners pursued an 
electoral calculus rather than following PDK's lead. He 
warned that without them, PDK could not "be strong all on its 
own". If the alliance isolated PDK with its popular strength, 
it could "drag" FUNCINPEC and KPNLF "into joining with Phnom 
Penh" to attack PDK. The resulting unity between the West, 
SoC, FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and possibly Sihanouk against PDK 
would mean that SoC would continue to dominate Cambodia's 
political administration and deny PDK electoral opportunities, 
and might ultimately somehow smother PDK's people's war. Pol 
Pot said it was in order to avert such an end that "the bottom 
line" for PDK was that it needed "friends" like Sihanouk, 
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF "until the day we die".
The solution to PDK's troubles with its former coalition 
partners was, predictably, more people's war. Pol Pot argued 
that if PDK was to reverse the process by which they were 
becoming politically cool to it, it must act on its own to 
"heat them back up again both in the countryside and in Phnom 
Penh" by "jump[ing] into a renewed offensive". The resulting
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popular pressure for an implementation of the Paris Agreements 
that would "accept the existence of quadripartitism" in the 
political realm would bring FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and Sihanouk back 
into coalition with PDK and ensure the bleak scenario he had 
outlined would not come true. Thus, spreading insurrection in 
the countryside not only would put pressure on the alliance, 
but also help reestablish the life-or-death united front with 
Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF.
However, it was not only the perfidy of FUNCINPEC about 
which Pol Pot was worried: there were also problems within PDK 
ranks, and this was Pol Pot's other way of explaining away 
why, so far, PDK's acting out of the people's war script was 
not achieving the expected results. There were, it seems, 
"left" and "right" deviations in thought and deed. The 
"leftists" were underestimating the diplomatic aspects of 
people' s-war-by-peace agreement, and thus undermining attempts 
to facilitate revolutionary advance from above. The 
"rightists" were slighting the political aspects of people's 
war insurrection from below and were also soft on the UN and 
the alliance. By blaming internal problems for PDK failures, 
Pol Pot seemed to be sliding back toward the kind of blood 
purging through which he had virtually destroyed his Communist 
Party in 1975-78, This pointed to the deepening crisis for 
PDK as a whole, which other parts of the speech had both 
denied and revealed.
Pol Pot clearly indicated that the members of the PDK 
leadership team were not entirely agreed on their assessment 
of events since Paris and the way forward. Some of his 
remarks seemed to be elliptically alluding to Ta Mok's 
"leftist" stream of thought that was sceptical about the 
wisdom of having signed the Paris Agreements in the first 
place, about the possibilities for deriving any benefit from 
professing continued adherence to them, about the usefulness 
of courting Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, and about 
continuing to accord importance to the SNC and other aspects
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of the Phnom Penh battlefield. He appeared to be speaking 
against such doubts when he called on everyone to recognize 
that "the contents of the Agreements" were to PDK's advantage 
and to maintain the "perspective" that the Agreements were 
"the weapon that we must use to defeat" the PDK's enemies. He 
also seemed to have leftist doubters in mind when he warned 
again and again against squandering the PDK's remaining 
advantages by failing to engage tenacious struggles on all 
fronts, declaring, "we cannot allow a situation which is 
evolving" badly from the PDK point of view "to continue to 
evolve further",
Pol Pot was more explicit, although hardly 
straightforward, about what he seemed to be saying was a 
"rightist" deviant tendency - associated with Son Sen - that 
was intentionally or unintentionally undermining PDK's rural 
struggle. He attacked this tendency not for advocating an 
approach that would fail, but for having brought about the 
failure of the implementation of the line that had been 
pursued since Paris.
Pol Pot discussed the problem in general terms while also 
suggesting it was worst in Sector 1001. He expressed concern 
about discouragement, disillusionment and inactivity within 
the PDK ranks. He noted that some comrades had reported 
"there's not much hope" in the ranks, and that the PDK's 
situation was generating an attitude of "either waiting to see 
or something like desperation, like a sinking feeling". 
Indeed "a certain number" were "simply standing by for peace". 
He complained that PDK strength had been undermined by such 
attitudes, which he said would only invite a "frontal attack" 
on PDK politically and diplomatically. He castigated cadre 
whose perspective was allegedly that the best approach to 
disagreements with the UN was to try "to smooth things over" 
with it.
Pol Pot did not identify any erroneous leading cadre at
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the leadership team level. However, he singled out two Sector 
1001 division cadre for criticism by name. He said one had 
been "pretty inactive" and another had become "distracted" 
when it "appeared to him that the situation" in Cambodia "was 
about to be resolved" by the mere signature of the Paris 
Agreements. Therefore, actions to dissolve the SoC local 
administration in Sector 1001 had been "not so active".
Pol Pot also seemed to imply that such shortcomings 
should not be blamed entirely on the cadre at the division 
level, but had resulted from a failure of their superiors to 
give them proper leadership. He asserted that "as long as 
things are explained to them," such cadre would "agree 
immediately" to do what was required. Thus, with proper 
leadership, such problems should pose "no severe difficulty". 
He suggested "the only problem remaining" was for PDK leading 
cadre "to improve their grip on the situation", "to push" 
their subordinates into action and then to "keep on pushing" 
to ensure the disintegration of the local SoC administration.
The results of the leadership gathering were summed up 
in a succinct internal directive, "Guiding Views for All 
Locations", dated February 1992. Echoing the language of 
Decision 13-12 and conforming to Pol Pot's perspective, it 
called on PDK to "carry out storming attacks in accordance 
with the slogan that the right hand carries out break-through 
attacks militarily and politically, adopting politics as the 
basis, in particular to eliminate, disperse and dissolve the 
village political administration" of SoC. The way to go "all 
out to have the Paris Agreements implemented" was thus still 
to "consolidate and expand liberated villages". To do this it 
was "imperative to use" NADK cadre and combatants "as the key 
weapon to open the door for fashioning core forces and popular 
strength" in SoC-administered areas. While the immediate 
purpose of this was to make sure that the UN was sent to 
Cambodia to begin carrying out its control functions, if it 
did not, this would be no "headache" for PDK. PDK would
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"simply strive to move forward with both military and 
political attacks to bring about the liberation of from 50 to 
60 per cent of the villages" in the heartland of Cambodia 
during February 1992 and "from 70 to 80 per cent of these 
villages in March 1992".7
The directive was more explicit than Pol Pot had been 
about leadership problems. While naming no one, it attacked 
"some ... leading comrades, leading committees and cadre" who 
it said were "half-hearted, vacillate and ... confused in one 
way or another ... by pacifism and a desire to wait." It 
suggested that they were not "fully aware of the situation and 
of the activities of ... the Western Great Powers, who are 
wrecking, opposing and not implementing the Paris Agreements." 
They had therefore failed to ensure that there was "no let-up 
in consecutive storming break-through attacks .... to 
eliminate, disperse and dissolve the village political 
administration" of SoC. It was because of them that the PDK 
had failed to "incessantly consolidate and expand". It 
implied that unless their views were rectified or they were 
eliminated, the PDK's work would not "move . . . ever onward and 
upward" and might even "fall back". It hinted they had to 
change their minds or be purged if PDK was to force the 
"Western Great Powers to act against their will and dispatch 
the UN" to Cambodia. For the time being, however, it said 
they had to "cleanse" their "perspective" and "stipulate plans 
for February and March so as to maintain the initiative".
It appears that the criticism by Pol Pot and in the 
directive signalled an at least de facto loss of control by 
Son Sen over Sector 1001. By February 1992, Son Sen had left 
Sector 1001 for good and was working out of an office at a 
place called Au Da, in southwestern Batdambang in Sector 505. 
Starting that month, many of the cadre who had previously 
staffed his Sector 1001 office in Preah Vihear province were
7 "Guiding Views for All Locations", 5 February 1992. 
(Author's translation of a document obtained by Nayan Chanda.)
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dispersed. Some were relocated to Au Da, while others were 
eventually transferred to Front 250 to work under his brother, 
Ni Kan.8 While Son Sen continued to function as deputy to 
Khieu Samphan's presidency of PDK, separating him from his 
troops left him in a much weakened power position and 
vulnerable to further marginalization or worse.
The Military Battlefield: The Fight for Route 12
Pol Pot's argument that PDK would gain diplomatically and 
politically from attacks in Kampung Thom was transmitted to 
units there by the weakened Son Sen9 and immediately launched 
NADK into sustained actions along Route 12 in some other parts 
of the province. These actions continued right up to the 
moment that UNTAC was finally initiated with the return of 
Akashi to Phnom Penh on 15 March. A new round of attacks 
began immediately on 5 February, when NADK seized "several 
rice-rich villages". After CPAF recaptured at least one of 
them,10 fighting intensified.11 NADK reportedly began 
mobilizing more troops, ammunition and artillery for use in 
Kampung Thom12 and allegedly started shelling CPAF positions 
in Siem Reap province.13 CPAF also reinforced and tried but 
failed to push NADK off Route 12.14 Instead, NADK forces 
mobilized "to make a big counter-attack", forced CPAF to
8 Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced 
Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng 
to Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 
1992)", pp.2-3; UNTAC-MC, "A Talk with Christophe Peschoux, 20 
September 1992".
9 Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992.
10 Bangkok Post, 13 February 1992.
11 SPK, 16 February 1992 .
12 The Nation, 1 March 1992 .
13 SPK, 7 March 1992.
14 The Nation, 27 February 1992; VGNUFC, 15 March 1992.
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abandon two villages,15 blew more bridges on Route 12, 
attacked more CPAF outposts along the road,16 and carried out 
new ground probes which on 14 March brought it to within ten 
kilometres of Kampung Thom provincial town.17 When Akashi 
returned to Phnom Penh on 15 March, NADK held this ground, as 
well as "many strategic parts of Route 12" and "a number of 
villages" along the road.18 Thus, the net result of NADK's 
"well-coordinated" offensive" since 5 February19 had been 
finally to secure a reasonably well-held corridor across Route 
12 in Kampung Thom which also denied CPAF the possibility to 
use the road to resupply outposts in Preah Vihear.20
Although, contrary to Pol Pot's argument, NADK's attacks 
had not hastened Akashi's arrival, its successes on Route 12 
did make possible full-scale implementation of Decision 13- 
12's calls for infiltration of PDK "forces" from the rear to 
the front. Thus, in February, the earlier trickle was 
replaced by "important movements" of people out of the Anlung 
Veng area into Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham provinces.21 The 
opened corridor also made it possible for the NADK to move 
military supplies across Route 12 easily in order to sustain 
the detachments west of the road that were involved in
15 The Nation, 1 March 1992; "UNAMIC Chief: Factions 
Battling for Land", AFP, Phnom Penh, 10 March 1992; VoCP, 27 
March 1992.
16 SPK, 13 March 1992; VGNUFC, 14 March 1992; VoK, 14 March 
1992; VoCP, 21 March 1992; VoCP, 27 March 1992.
17 "Fighting Called 'Worst' Violation", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 
March 1992; "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampung Thom", 
AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; VoK, 15 March 1992.
18 VoK, 15 March 1992.
19 "Cambodian Factions Discuss Truce Violations", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992.
20 UNTAC-MC, Cambodia: A Military Assessment of the
Situation [8 April 1993], "Background to the Current Situation", 
pp.1,3,4-5 .
21 Peschoux, "Investigation", pp.5-7.
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ensuring safe passage. 22 All this did not mean, however, that 
NADK units on the Kampung Thom battlefield abandoned 
preparations for demobilization. Thus, an ex-combatant of 
from the Route 12 front revealed later in the year, even as 
this fighting intensified, "preparations were made toward the 
implementation of Phase Two" by the whole division.23
Nor did it mean that PDK was succeeding in the more 
important task of bringing about a fundamental change in the 
balance of rural power. Indeed, there is no evidence of any 
significant gain in terms of the number of "liberated" 
villages under PDK control, anywhere in Cambodia, between 
early February and mid-March. None of the ambitious targets 
outlined in the directive of 5 February and Pol Pot's speech 
had been met in the least. There was no outcry against PDK 
advances, and the situation certainly had not become one in 
which PDK was in control of so much of the country that the 
possibility of the UN neutralizing SoC politically and 
disarming CPAF had become irrelevant. 24 PDK's rural people's 
war was still dead in the water.
Sihanouk versus PDK on Reconstruction Aid
The situation suggested that the only thing about which 
Pol Pot had been right was that in the absence of success in 
the countryside, PDK could not win victories on other fronts. 
Thus, despite a new diplomatic and political offensive 
spearheaded by Khieu Samphan, neither PDK's former allies nor
22 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp.1-2.
23 Interview of 22-year-old source on 12 November 1992.
24 On 25 March, a SoC military spokesman summed up 
allegations of NADK cease-fire violations during the five months 
since 23 October 1991, alleging it was responsible for 47 such 
breaches. The data suggests most of these were conventional 
military operations, and that they had taken place in Kampung 
Thom and Siem Reap. The spokesman said nothing about any NADK 
takeovers of villages by means of establishment of local National 
Councils. VoCP, 25 March 1992.
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the UN came round to PDK's position on crucial issues like how 
international financial and other assistance to Cambodia would 
be distributed.
PDK, SoC, Sihanouk and the UN had all become convinced 
that unless aid to SoC included budgetary support, its
administration might collapse. PDK continued to hope that 
obstructing such support and aid in general might spark
another, bigger popular uprising or have equally destabilizing 
effects that would rebound massively in its political favour,
even though this had not happened in December 1991. The
battle over this issue was therefore a crucial contest between 
PDK and SoC.
SoC had concluded internally that budget-related problems 
like the slow payment of salaries to its civil servants were 
a major source of popular dissatisfaction and had fed the 
unrest of late December. It had decided to make "all-out 
efforts for a maximum solution of the salaries problem" in 
order to avoid a recurrence of events it feared could lead to 
a collapse of its political administration. 25 This was the 
immediate reason why SoC was so happy about having Sihanouk's 
enthusiastic public support for taking "advantage of the 
implementation of the Agreements to pull in foreign aid from 
international organizations". It was also confident that 
reconstruction aid would help it win popular support by giving 
the people under its administration a "comfortable standard of 
living" , 26
25 CPP, Central Committee, Robaykar Neung Kar Veay Tamlay 
Ampi Preuttekar Batokam Nov Roattheani Phnum Penh Pi Thngay Ti 
17 Dal Thngay Ti 22 Kha? Thnu Chhnam 1991 Prom Teang Tih-dav Neung 
Vitheanakar Samrap Royea' Pel Khang Muk ("Report and Evaluation 
of the Events of the Demonstrations in Phnom Penh Capital City 
from 17 to 22 December 1991 and Objectives and Measures for the 
Future"), pp.5,10.
26 CPP, Sapheapkar Chong Kraoy Robah Kampuchea Kraoy Pel 
Kech Prom-prieng Parih Mok Tul Pachchoban Neung Tih Dav 
Phearea'kech Pi Nih Rohaut Dal Pel Bah Chhnaot ("The Most Recent 
Situation in Cambodia Since the Paris Agreements Until Now and
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In all this, it had already obtained the backing of the 
future UNTAC head, and new international moves were afoot to 
accelerate assistance. Akashi had concluded from what he had 
learned during his familiarization tour that because of the 
parlous financial state of SoC, steps should be taken to 
prevent it from unravelling.27 Khieu Samphan's warning in a 
message to Sihanouk of 12 February against taking "advantage 
of the Paris Agreements" to advocate provision of aid to SoC 
thus seemed a little late, 28 but PDK then tried to make up 
lost ground. On 14 February, VGNUFC denounced proposals by 
international financial institutions and UN agencies "to 
provide the Phnom Penh faction with aid totalling more than 84 
million [US] dollars" . The commentary said PDK was 
"categorically opposed" to all such aid, and - echoing Pol 
Pot's dictum - said instead "aid of all kinds should be given 
to the SNC" . 29 Sihanouk's counter-punch came in a speech in 
which he praised CPP leaders for their "clear-sighted 
leadership" of "work toward rebuilding" Cambodia, and revealed 
that he himself had contacted UN and other organizations 
asking them for help in this regard.30
The SNC Meeting- of 22 February and Sihanouk's Visit to Pailin
Sihanouk then suddenly cancelled his plans to visit China 
and north Korea and announced that he would convene the SNC on
Objectives of Duties From Now Up Through the Elections"), nd, 
pp.11-13.
27 Timothy Carney's notes on the UNTAC Senior Staff Meeting 
[hereafter: SSM] of 11 June 1992, at which the UNTAC economic 
advisor recalled that "Akashi himself had decided this" and it 
had been reflected in an "economic and financial report". Carney 
was the Director of the UNTAC Information/Education Division, and 
senior staff comprised other UNTAC officials who headed its major 
components.
28 VGNUFC, 13 February 1992.
29 VGNUFC, 13 February 1992.
30 VoCP, 16 February 1992.
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22 February. Khieu Samphan flew back into Phnom Penh, but 
Sihanouk's decision to reactivate the SNC was not a victory 
for PDK .31 The SNC was called so UNAMIC could present UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 19 February 
"implementation plan" outlining the structure and timetable 
for the deployment of UNTAC.32 The timetable did not improve 
on the promises Akashi had made at the end of January, and 
which PDK had so vociferously denounced. Moreover, the plan 
contained major blows to PDK's schemes to maintain an armed 
force by transforming NADK elements into police forces and to 
use demobilization to project NADK power. It followed the 
advice of an UN public security survey team that had 
recommended that the Secretary-General correct the "imbalance 
of police power" that would be created if the UN accepted 
PDK's "police" figures. The plan declared PDK certainly had 
no need for a "police force ... of over 9,000 men", and that 
"a strength of about 5,000 men would seem sufficient." Even 
this figure would be subject to "further verification" and 
thus further reduction. On demobilization, the plan 
superseded the proposals Son Sen had put forward in December 
for some 2 6 NADK regroupment points that would move NADK 
forward in key areas like central Cambodia. Instead, it 
allowed NADK only ten regroupment points and a mere three 
cantonment sites. 33
Sihanouk also used the meeting to highlight what he 
described as progress toward the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of Cambodia. He taunted PDK by saying that the
31 "Sihanouk Lauds Peace Process", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 
February 1992.
32 VoCP, 22 February 1992; VoK, 24 February 1992.
33 Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23 613) , 19 
February 1992, paragraphs 67, 117, 120 and Annex I; and UN,
"Preliminary Survey Report, UN Survey Mission to Cambodia, Public 
Security and Civil Police in State of Cambodia", nd, p.36.
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SNC had "done a lot of work already" in this area . 34 This was 
followed by more bitter propaganda war between PDK and the 
Prince. While VGNUFC inveighed against the "huge amount of 
assistance" which it said had flowed to SoC, 35 Sihanouk on 6  
March offered "special thanks" to "foreign friends . . . for 
their very kind assistance" to SoC, and suggested that because 
SoC was making such good "progress in all fields", Cambodians 
should vote for CPP in the upcoming elections.36 Sihanouk 
followed this up with his most direct and explicit criticism 
of PDK to date. With the scheduled arrival of Akashi little 
more than a week away, he publicly accused it of being "the 
cause of all problems" relating to the Paris Agreements.37
The MMWG
PDK was faring no better in the MMWG than the SNC. 
First, PDK's "long-nosed" bete noire Loridon was unwilling to 
accommodate the kind of "rotational" representation of NADK 
that Pol Pot had recommended. The day after Pol Pot's speech, 
the MMWG held a working meeting with no NADK cadre in 
attendance.38 The officers present from the other three 
armies went ahead without NADK to agree that their officers 
should deploy to Pailin and officers from all four armies 
should join UNAMIC in setting up a local MMWG in Kampung 
Thom . 39 PDK could only respond in absentia that it wanted 
priority given to placing NADK cadre alongside UN personnel in
34 "Sihanouk Lauds Peace Progress", AFP, Phnom Penh, 22 
February 1992.
35 VGNUFC, 28 February 1992.
36 VoCP, 6 and 7 March 1992.
37 "Sihanouk: Khmer Rouge 'Deliberately Stalling7", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 7 March 1992; Le Monde, 12 March 1992; VoCP, 8 March 
1992 .
38 UNAMIC, "Cooperation in Progression of the Peace 
Process", 14 February 1992.
39 VoK, 9 February 1992.
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SoC provincial towns and in checkpoints in SoC-administered 
areas of Cambodia's eastern frontier. 40
On 14 February, Loridon held another MMWG without the 
NADK at which he "vehemently criticized" its absence and 
condemned it for continued "truce violations" . 41 Son Sen 
responded on 16 February by formally nominating two new NADK 
representatives to the MMWG: Nuon Bunnau and Mon Keumthon. 42 
They flew to Phnom Penh along with Son Sen's brother Son 
Chhum, who was again described as an adviser to the NADK 
delegation. 43 At the same time, Bunnau made his first attempt 
at diplomatic tenaciousness on the NADK's behalf by writing to 
Loridon44 urging UNAMIC to give further consideration to the 
NADK's proposal for NADK to be deployed alongside UNTAC in 
provinces throughout Cambodia and along its border with 
Vietnam.
On 18 February, UNAMIC officers in Phnom Penh met with 
the newly arrived Nuon Bunnau to complain again that the NADK 
had failed to provide any NADK liaison officers for deployment 
in Kampung Thom .45 At an MMWG on 20 February, Loridon 
dismissed NADK allegations of cease-fire violations against 
it, declaring that its "fears of attack from other parties" 
were "unfounded." Loridon warned that unless NADK liaison 
officers were dispatched to Kampung Thom by the end of 
February, he would consider PDK was operating in bad faith.
40 VGNUFC, 9 February 1992.
41 SPK, 17 February 1992.
42 NADK, "Nomination of Military Officers of the NADK to the 
MMWG", 16 February 1992.
43 NADK, "Message Telegraphique", 17 February 1992.
44 Armee Nationale du Kampuchea Democratique, Delegation au 
Groupe de Travail Militaire Mix te, Pail in, 17 February 1992; 
VGNUFC, 22 February 1992.
45 UNTAC-MC, "Meeting with NADK on 18 February 1992 at 1900 
hours", nd, np.
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He said that in the meantime, he would inform the SNC and the 
UN Secretary General of the NADK's non-cooperation with 
UNAMIC.45 At an MMWG on 28 February, Loridon showed "anger 
and frustration" when the NADK said it still could not meet 
the deadline UNAMIC had imposed for deploying its liaison 
officers to Kampung Thom and for accepting officers from other 
armies in Pailin. 47
This was still the situation when the MMWG met on 9 
March, as NADK was blowing up bridges on Route 12 and 
advancing on the ground toward Kampung Thom provincial town. 
UNAMIC's agenda for the meeting centred on the need to 
implement an immediate cease-fire in the province. Loridon 
again criticized NADK non-cooperation.48 VGNUFC replied with 
renewed threats that NADK would "carry out all types of 
activities to smash and rout" PDK's enemies until the UN did 
what PDK wanted. 49
On 14 March, as NADK troops advanced closer to Kampung 
Thom provincial town, 50 Karim met with Son Sen, who had come 
to Phnom Penh to welcome Akashi. Karim appealed to Son Sen to 
order a cease-fire as a gift to UNAMIC on the eve of its 
dissolution. However, at another emergency meeting of the 
MMWG that day, Nuon Bunnau rejected a cease-fire proposal put 
forward by Loridon. Loridon replied that his priority was to
46 UNAMIC, "Record of MMWG Seventh Meeting, Thursday, 20 
February, 0910-1050 Hours, SNC Building"; UNAMIC, "Large-Scale 
Incursions by CPAF", 10 February 1992, np.
47 "UN Complaints Detailed", AFP, Phnom Penh, 2 8 February
1992 .
48 "Khmer Rouge Officials Missing from Army HQ", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 9 March 1992; VoCP, 15 March 1992.
49 VGNUFC, 10 March 1992.
50 VoCP, 21 March 1992.
203
send additional UN forces into Kampung Thom . 51 For his part, 
Khieu Samphan welcomed the impending arrival of Akashi with 
another warning that NADK would continue to fight unless UNTAC 
accepted PDK positions. 52 PDK was edging closer and closer 
to substituting military force for a political popularity PDK 
could not admit it did not have, to using armed struggle to 
preempt UN exposure of the gap between NADK (military) 
strength and PDK political weakness that Pol Pot refused to 
concede but could not totally ignore, and to preempt a 
popularity that FUNCINPEC was not supposed to enjoy by putting 
a premium on violence, not voting.
51 "Fighting Called 'Worst' Violation", AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 
March 1992; "UN General on Continuing Battle in Kampung Thom", 
AFP, Phnom Penh, 14 March 1992; VoK, 15 March 1992.
52 VGNUFC, 14 March 1992.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PDK VERSUS UNTAC AND THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
The First Days of UNTAC: Akashi. Sanderson and Sihanouk Versus 
PDK
The misgivings that Pol Pot had expressed in February 
about the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) Yasushi Akashi and thus about UNTAC seemed justified 
from the very beginning. From the moment he set foot back in 
Phnom Penh, Akashi concentrated on halting NADK military 
activities and was determined rapidly to demobilize NADK along 
with other Cambodian armed forces. The SRSG declared that his 
priority was "the establishment of peace" . 1 He warned PDK 
that further cease-fire violations might be met with Security 
Council "enforcement" of the Paris Agreements. 2 Akashi's 
political position also fell far short of satisfying PDK 
demands. First, while he promised to deploy UNTAC
"expeditiously", he said its arrival would be "incremental" . 3 
Second, he indicated that the UNTAC personnel arriving first 
would focus not on neutralizing SoC but on ensuring that 
demobilization of NADK and other armies could "begin by 
June" . 4 Third, although Akashi vowed to strengthen the 
political role of the SNC, he said he would achieve this by 
doing "everything possible to work with Prince Sihanouk 
towards" this objective. 5 This linked UNTAC to Sihanouk's 
consistent rejection of PDK's attempts to transform the SNC
1 The Times (London), 16 March 1992.
2 "Cambodia Accord Problems Worry UN Mission Head", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 15 March 1992; The New York Times, 16 March 1992.
3 UNTAC, "Statement by Mr Yasushi Akashi, SRSG for Cambodia, 
upon his Arrival in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992".
4 "UN Peace-keeping Operation Leaders Arrive", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 15 March 1992.
5 "Cambodia Accord Problems . . ."
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into a political body through which PDK could neutralize SoC 
from above or be linked to PDK-led insurrections from below, 
should they ever materialize. It indicated a readiness to 
follow Sihanouk's political lead in his confrontation with PDK 
over rehabilitation aid and with the Prince's condemnations of 
PDK's past and present acts of violence and human rights 
violations. The latter point was immediately driven home at 
an SNC to "clarify the role of UNTAC" , 6 at which Sihanouk 
proposed that the SNC sign human rights conventions7 
fulfilling Cambodia's Paris Agreements obligations to "ensure 
that the policies and practices" pursued by PDK in the past 
would "never be allowed to return" . 8
Demobilization Versus PDK's "New Slogans"
In a set of "New Slogans" made public on 15 March, PDK 
voiced hopes that it might still find some way of using the 
SNC as a vehicle for facilitating people's war. While the 
slogans studiously avoided any mention of the wayward 
Sihanouk, they asserted that the SNC and UNTAC must act as 
"the two legitimate authorities administering Cambodia in the 
transitional period". The slogans also warned that war in 
Cambodia could be ended only if "UN peace-keeping forces, 
including the four Cambodian parties," were "deployed at ... 
checkpoints in eastern Cambodia" along the Vietnamese border. 9 
This renewed demand to ensconce NADK cadre under UN protection 
in parts of Cambodia hitherto under solid SoC control aimed to 
take advantage of UNTAC's Phase Two obligations under the 
Paris Agreements to establish such checkpoints to "verify the 
withdrawal and ensure the non-return" of Vietnamese forces and 
to "monitor the cessation" of Vietnamese military assistance
6 "Parade of UN Troops Marks UNTAC Start", Reuter, Phnom 
Penh, 16 March 1992; SPK [SoC News Agency], 16 March 1992.
7 VGNUFC, 30 March 1992.
8 Agreements, Article 15.
9 VGNUFC, 14 March 1992. Emphasis added.
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to SoC . 10 As in the UNAMIC period, it was a cutting edge for 
reintroduction of quadripartitism in all things.
This demand was accompanied with hints that if UNTAC was 
prepared to settle the armed conflict in Kampung Thom along 
lines advantageous to PDK, a cease-fire to halt NADK advances 
there was possible, but if PDK demands were not met, NADK 
military operations would continue. 11 Apparent corroboration 
of a shift in the PDK position came from Son Sen, who remained 
in Phnom Penh as the sole PDK member of the SNC. 12 He 
reversed PDK's earlier refusal to accept a truce in Kampung 
Thom by declaring that he had ordered "a new cease-fire" by 
NADK. However, Son Sen tied this undertaking to fulfilment of 
a new twist on PDK's old demand for rapid deployment of UNTAC. 
He indicated that NADK could be expected to maintain the 
cease-fire only if some 800 UNTAC troops were immediately 
deployed to Kampung Thom to stabilize a truce, thus confirming 
NADK's advances. In one of his first acts, the UNTAC Force 
Commander, Australian General John Sanderson, in turn implied 
that UNTAC would not allow PDK to achieve its political and 
military goals by dictating how the UN would deploy its armed 
forces. 13
A Hardening of PDK Negotiating Position Combined with Relative 
NADK Restraint
Son Sen tried to do precisely this on 17 March, when he 
challenged Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 19 
February implementation plan by demanding an increase in the 
number of UNTAC checkpoints in eastern Cambodia at which PDK
10 Agreements, Annex 2, Article VI, paragraphs 2,3, and 
Article VII, paragraphs 2,3.
11 VGNUFC, 14 March 1992.
12 "Cambodia Accord Problems . . .11; "Parade of UN Troops
ii
13 "... Operation Leaders Arrive".
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wanted NADK cadre present. 14 However, this request was 
ignored at the first MMWG to be held under UNTAC auspices, 
which was convened on 20 March. Instead, it focused on "the 
mutual disengagement" of NADK and CPAF troops in Kampung 
Thom. 15 Sanderson obtained agreement from NADK representative 
Nuon Bunnau and CPAF officers to negotiate a cease-fire in 
Kampung Thom, 16 which UNTAC hoped to transform into an 
"unconditional truce" . 17 However, SoC alleged attacks by 
Sector 1003 Division 616,18 and CPAF launched what it 
described as a "counter-attack" on Route 12 on 25 March. 19
The next day, Son Sen made what he described as NADK's 
"final proposal" on the establishment of UNTAC checkpoints 
with NADK representation in eastern Cambodia, asking for 
another increase in their number. 20 In a meeting with 
Sanderson, he also insisted that demobilization of NADK should 
proceed much faster than envisaged in Boutros-Ghali's 
implementation plan, asked for an increase over the number of 
NADK cantonment sites for which the blueprint provided, and 
tried to get around its attack on the NADK "police" scheme by 
claiming that the proportion of NADK under arms had turned out 
to be significantly lower than the 65 percent originally 
reported to the UN. In internal discussions, UNTAC decided it 
would not countenance Son Sen's attempts to turn NADK 
demobilization into a political revolving door, to use
14 VGNUFC, 19 March 1992.
15 UN Information Service (Bangkok) , "Press Conference of Mr 
Yasushi Akashi, SRSG, Noon, 19 March 1992".
16 "Military Group Fails to Agree to Stop Fighting", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 2 0 March 1992.
17 "Peace-Keepers Helpless as Cambodia Fighting Rages", 
Reuter, Phum Serei, 26 March 1992.
18 VoCP, 25 March 1992.
19 "Cambodians Fight on as Faction Commanders Meet", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 27 March 1992.
20 VGNUFC, 28 March 1992.
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demobilization to project NADK political power and to evade 
demobilization by under-reporting the number of guns in NADK 
hands. 21
Sanderson nevertheless publicly expressed hope that NADK 
and CPAF might agree at an MMWG on 27 March to his proposals 
for a separation of forces in Kampung Thom .22 At the meeting, 
Sanderson demanded that NADK present a specific proposal for 
solving the Kampung Thom conflict.23 Son Sen proposed an 
"unconditional cease-fire on the spot" that would have the 
effect of preserving NADK gains and included a demand that SoC 
remove from Kampung Thom all "intervention" units previously 
sent into the province to reinforce CPAF there. 24 This 
proposal countered a CPAF call for mutual pull-backs to 
positions occupied before 25 February.25
Son Sen's proposal was accompanied by signals of flagging 
PDK hopes about the usefulness of UNTAC. VGNUFC warned that 
the Cambodian people were about to lose "confidence and trust" 
in the U N .26 Moreover, SoC was making bellicose noises, which 
were soon followed by military action. On 29 March, SoC 
warned that it was about to launch a full-fledged CPAF 
operation "to open Route 12" . 27 It began the next day with 
an endorsement from Sihanouk for SoC's "strong measures"
21 Timothy Carney's notes on the UNTAC Senior Staff Meeting 
[SSM], 26, 27 and 31 March 1992.
22 Antara (Jakarta) , 27 March 1992 .
23 "Second Day of Peace Talks Ends Without Results", Reuter, 
Phnom Penh, 28 March 1992.
24 NADK, "Democratic Kampuchea Party's Proposal for Solving 
the Issue of Fighting in Kampung Thom", 28 March 1992; VGNUFC, 
30 March 1992.
25 "Second Day of Peace Talks . . . " .
26 VGNUFC, 27 March 1992.
27 SPK, 30 March 1992.
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against NADK .28 By 31 March, CPAF achieved most of its 
objectives and thus "gained the upper hand" on Route 12, 
advancing "after meeting little resistance" from NADK .29
As CPAF reversed earlier NADK gains, General Loridon 
picked up two Division 616 liaison officers by helicopter from 
a jungle rendezvous to fly them to Kampung Thom town to 
negotiate a truce. 30 At an MMWG there, Loridon proposed a 
resolution to the fighting that would halt the CPAF counter­
offensive but roll back NADK gains ■ while providing for 
withdrawal of CPAF intervention units from outside Kampung 
Thom. CPAF representatives indicated agreement in principle 
with Loridon's package, but said they could not fully commit 
CPAF to it without further consultations with Phnom Penh. 
Despite this and the chairmanship of the UN official most 
derided by Pol Pot, NADK's liaison officers said their unit 
would in the meantime carry out a "unilateral" cease-fire, 31 
and it appears that CPAF suspended its offensive. 32 NADK also 
responded positively to Loridon's pleas at a follow-up MMWG 
for an at least "temporary cease-fire" that would allow him to 
"show the UN flag" in contested areas. 33 It agreed "to 
withdraw to its initial positions" 34 and immediately began 
pulling back from Route 12, while CPAF began demining the
28 "Generals Meet; Kampung Thom Fighting Continues", AFP, 
Sisophon, 30 March 1992.
29 "Peace Talks Make 'Headway' in Kampung Thom", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 31 March 1992; "UN Peace Team Due in Embattled Cambodia 
Region", Reuter, Kampung Thom, 1 April 1992.
30 SSM, 31 March 1992; SPK, 1 April 1992.
31 SSM, 31 March 1992.
32 "Peace Talks Make 'Headway' . . ." .
33 "UN Peace Team Due , . " .
34 VGNUFC, 8 April 1992,
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road.35
The Political Atmosphere in SoC Zones
However, the tentative movement toward a cease-fire in 
Kampung Thom had meanwhile been undermined by the death of an 
activist of Ung Phan's Liberal Social Democracy Party, who was 
fatally injured in what appeared to be a traffic accident. 
Suspicions voiced by his family that he had been killed by SoC 
provoked new fears about security for opposition political 
activities.36 PDK's issuance of "new slogans" supplementing 
those it had broadcast the day of Akashi's arrival seemed to 
be connected to the incident. They highlighted PDK's demand 
of 15 March that UNTAC and the SNC should administer 
Cambodia.37 Son Sen reacted by renewing the PDK demand for 
a concentration of UN forces in the capital. 38 A VGNUFC 
broadcast on 1 April then reiterated the call for "immediate 
deployment" of UNTAC troops to eastern Cambodia and other SoC- 
administered areas in which PDK wanted to follow with a 
presence of its own .39
Such posturing got PDK nowhere, however, because Sihanouk 
remained much more interested in presiding over the 
rehabilitation of Cambodia via the SoC administration than in 
curbing SoC power and certainly showed no signs of fulfilling 
Pol Pot's prediction that he would soon begin accommodating 
PDK. The Prince down-played concerns about possible SoC 
political violence and instead stressed the close 
interrelations between himself, SoC and the "international
35 SSM, 1 April 1992; Carney's notes on Sanderson's remarks 
at Akashi's press conference of 1 April 1992.
36 iipress Conference of Mr Yasushi Akashi, ... 19 March
1992" .
37 VGNUFC, 25 March 1992.
36 VGNUFC, 30 March 1992.
39 VGNUFC, 31 March 1992.
211
and humanitarian organizations that have come in to help and 
assist" Cambodia. In a virtual campaign endorsement, he called 
on Cambodians to "follow the good policy" of CPP Chairman Chea 
Sim and characterized the CPP as a "big party" that had "the 
national interest at heart" . 40
Moreover, Akashi's statements of support for Sihanouk 
were being transformed into a close working relationship that 
further isolated PDK and seemed to provide additional evidence 
that the two men's plans for strengthening the SNC would 
thwart rather than promote PDK desires to use it against SoC. 
In particular, the way in which Akashi and Sihanouk handled 
the rehabilitation question revealed the extent to which 
things were going against PDK. To coordinate their approach, 
the SRSG and the Prince met to discuss plans for a visit by 
Boutros-Ghali to Cambodia and the agenda for upcoming SNC 
meetings. They aimed to make sure that during his visit the UN 
Secretary General would issue an appeal for aid for Cambodia41 
pursuant to the call in the Paris Agreements for 
"international, regional and bilateral assistance" in 
achieving Cambodian rehabilitation and reconstruction. 42 
Sihanouk's obvious enthusiasm about Boutros-Ghali's appeal43 
was boosted by news that potential donors among international 
organizations and governments were gathering in Tokyo for a 
meeting attended by a senior UNTAC official. On 31 March, 
they announced a decision to convene a ministerial-level 
international conference on rehabilitation and reconstruction 
aid to Cambodia in June .44 Thereafter, internal UNTAC 
discussions on rehabilitation turned to worries about how
40 VoCP, 25 March 1992; VoCP, 26 March 1992.
41 SSM, 27 March 1992.
42 Agreements, Declaration on the Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia.
43 SSM, 28 March 1992.
44 "Tokyo Meeting Sets June Date for a Cambodian 
Reconstruction Conference", Kyodo, Tokyo, 31 March 1992.
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SoC's budgetary problems in general and inability to pay its 
civil servants in particular might make rehabilitation 
impossible.45
In their discussions on upcoming SNCs, Sihanouk and 
Akashi also ignored PDK concerns in favour of proceeding with 
preparations for elections and formalizing the Council's 
substructure. Sihanouk and UNTAC agreed that UNTAC itself 
should alone draft the electoral law that the Paris Agreements 
empowered it to adopt "in consultation with the SNC" . 46 
Sihanouk also accepted Akashi's proposal that strengthening of 
the SNC take the form of the establishment of joint UNTAC- 
Cambodian "technical advisory committees" . 47 UNTAC's
conception of these was diametrically opposed to PDK's hope 
that the SNC could be made to function as an administrative 
organ. UNTAC saw the committees as working forums in which 
Cambodian parties could express views about matters over which 
UNTAC was mandated to exercise "direct supervision or control" 
and about which UNTAC might take advice from or was required 
to consult the SNC. Given the SRSG's ultimate authority to 
determine what was in line with the Paris Agreements, UNTAC 
held it could never be bound by any "advice" the Cambodian 
parties might give in an "advisory committee". Moreover, 
committees established in areas over which UNTAC had a mandate 
for direct supervision or control could not have any 
"consultative" functions. 48
The SNC Meeting of 1 April
Sihanouk and Akashi faced Son Sen with these agenda items 
at an SNC meeting on 1 April. After Akashi expressed the hope
45 SSM, 2 April 1992.
46 Agreements, Annex 1, Section D, paragraphs 1 and 3a.
47 SSM, 28 March 1992.
48 SSM, 2 April 1992.
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that NADK was prepared to cooperate with UNTAC about 
demobilization, he moved to obtain assent to UNTAC's notion of 
technical advisory committees and proposed that the first to 
be established should comment on a draft electoral law that he 
immediately tabled. Sihanouk backed both proposals. Son Sen 
was evidently caught without authority from Pol Pot to 
respond, and did not comment. Akashi swiftly declared UNTAC's 
proposals adopted. Son Sen could only present a prepared text 
calling for NADK demobilization to be conducted within a 
quarter of the time proposed by Boutros-Ghali. Akashi shot 
back that too short a period for cantonment would defeat its 
purpose. The SRSG and Sihanouk also ignored Son Sen's call 
for a quick build-up of UNTAC troops in Phnom Penh . 49
A Shaky Cease-Fire in Kampung Thom and the Struggle for Access 
to PDK Zones
The SNC revealed Akashi as more than a match in terms of 
tenaciousness and nimbleness for PDK's wooden dogmatism, which 
was backed politically by nothing except Pol Pot's flights of 
fantasy about the past successes and future prospects of 
people's war. UNTAC's senior staff concluded that the SNC 
demonstrated the UN's ability to assert its will , 50 and 
decided to follow it up by pressuring NADK to stick to a 
cease-fire in Kampung Thom, so that UNTAC could move 
immediately into its "liberated zones" there. UNTAC 
intervened to defuse renewed fighting that broke out on 2  
April, when NADK launched shelling attacks while alleging that 
CPAF forces had assaulted "liberated villages" on or near 
Route 12 . 51 However, after UNTAC complained about the
49 untaC, Office of the Political Adviser, "Report of the 
SNC Meeting" [hereafter: UNTAC-0PA-SNC, 1 April 1992; Carney's 
notes on SNC Meeting [hereafter: Carney-SNC], 1 April 1992; SSM, 
2 April 1992; VGNUFC, 2 April 1992.
50 SSM, 2 April 1992.
51 VGNUFC, 3 April 1992.
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shelling to Division 616, the firing ceased. 52 A local MMWG 
on 2 April to discuss the cease-fire thus seemed to take place 
in a "constructive atmosphere" as some 200 Indonesian UNTAC 
infantry arrived53 "to open up roads and villages" in Kampung 
Thom. 54 On 4 April, Sanderson declared that UNTAC was "on the 
verge" of "moving ... in greater depth into the countryside 
and ... deploying troops" into contested villages. 55
However, a PDK that had been making military concessions 
but no political gains suddenly shifted NADK in Kampung Thom 
back into an offensive gear. After a VGNUFC broadcast warned 
that PDK enjoyed "a clear basis, legal and concrete," to 
"struggle" against "those opposing . . . and delaying the 
implementation" of those parts of the Paris Agreements it 
considered most important, 56 the military situation unravelled 
again. According to SoC, Sector 1003 Division 616 and Sector 
1001 Division 802 initiated a series of ground and shelling 
attacks along Route 12. Although CPAF artillery counter-fire 
blunted the NADK action, the renewed fighting put further 
UNTAC deployments on hold57 as Khieu Samphan flew into Phnom 
Penh to replace Son Sen at the SNC.
The SNC of 6 April: Khieu Samphan Presents a Hardened PDK
Position
Khieu Samphan came to the 6 April SNC bringing a hardened
52 SSM, 2 April 1992.
53 SSM, 3 April 1992.
54 "Indonesian Peacekeepers Sent to Cambodia Province", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 2 April 1992.
55 SPK, 4 April 1992.
56 VGNUFC, 4 April 1992.
57 VGNUFC, 6 April 1992; UNTAC-MC, "NADK LO KPT", 6 April 
1992; "Landmine Threat Postpones UN Cambodian Mission", Reuter, 
Phum Rundas, 7 April 1992; VoCP, 9 April 1992; SPK, 10 April 
1992 .
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PDK negotiating position. It reflected Pol Pot's continued 
hopes of kick-starting PDK political struggle from above but 
a readiness to accede to Ta Mok's desire to fall back on much 
greater use of military means if Pol Pot's political dreams 
did not begin to come true. It undercut Son Sen's attempts to 
facilitate people's war by keeping both military and 
diplomatic options open through trying to find opportunities 
at least to appear to be reasonable.
Khieu Samphan declared that demobilization of NADK was 
conditional on the fulfilment of PDK demands with regard to 
deployment of UNTAC military personnel and NADK 
representatives in SoC-administered locations in eastern 
Cambodia, specifying that PDK would not be satisfied with the 
placement only of unarmed UNTAC military observers at the 
border posts. He demanded "the urgent deployment" of three 
UNTAC infantry battalions to the Vietnamese frontier, where 
they could provide security for NADK representatives against 
attacks. Akashi and Sihanouk forcefully rebuffed Khieu 
Samphan's attempt to dictate UNTAC's deployment and 
repudiating any notion of preconditions for demobilization of 
NADK .58 On 16 April, UNTAC formally inaugurated three border 
checkpoints, but they were manned by UNTAC military observers, 
not troops. 59 They thus fell far short of what PDK believed 
was necessary in order to ensconce NADK cadre in eastern 
Cambodia to do political work safely under UNTAC protection.
Khieu Samphan's hardened line at the SNC was also 
apparent in a statement that challenged the way in which 
Akashi and Sihanouk had been setting the SNC agenda without 
reference to PDK priorities, and that put forward a counter­
agenda. In addition to the deployment of UNTAC armed forces
58 VGNUFC, 6 April 1992; UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 6 April 1992; 
Carney-SNC, 6 April 1992; "Foreign Minister on KR Stance on UN 
Troops", AFP, Phnom Penh, 7 April 1992.
59 UNTAC, Information/Education Division, "Proposed 
Questions and Answers", 20 April 1992.
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and NADK cadre in SoC-administered territory, it gave priority 
to the issues of the "rights and power of the SNC as the sole 
legitimate source of power in Cambodia, and relations between 
the SNC and UNTAC"; and the "elimination of the terrorist 
atmosphere and the establishment of security and a neutral 
atmosphere in Phnom Penh and in the provinces. " 60 Akashi 
indicated that the upcoming SNC would instead concentrate on 
discussion of UNTAC's draft electoral law. He did agree to 
discuss delineation of authority between SNC, UNTAC and 
existing administrative structures, 61 but gave no reason to 
expect that UNTAC would come round to the PDK position on this 
issue.
Relative Calm in Kampung Thom
Nevertheless, in a letter to UNTAC on 12 April, Son Sen 
revealed a willingness to compromise that virtually made 
public a split in the PDK senior leadership. He backed away 
from Khieu Samphan's position of pre-conditionality on 
demobilization, and said he was prepared to accept 
simultaneity instead: NADK would proceed toward cooperation
with UNTAC on demobilization at the same time as UNTAC 
deployed in eastern Cambodia. UNTAC access to NADK for 
purposes of demobilization would proceed step-by-step as UNTAC 
troops deployed in eastern Cambodia. He indicated that NADK 
would meanwhile maintain a cease-fire in Kampung Thom, 62 and 
events in the first few days after the SNC seemed to suggest 
NADK restraint. 63 CPAF began withdrawing some of its troops 
from the province in line with the cease-fire agreement
60 VGNUFC, 6 April 1992.
61 UNTAC-0 PA-SNC, 6 April 1992; "Communique of the SNC 
Meeting, 6 April 1992".
62 VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.
63 SSM, 8 April 1992.
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brokered by Loridon at the end of March . 64 However, a senior 
SoC military official confirmed that some CPAF intervention 
forces remained when he said they would not be "withdrawn 
completely" from Kampung Thom until SoC was convinced NADK had 
really ceased its "destructive activities" in the province. 65 
Moreover, by 11 April NADK began contradicting UNTAC by 
privately asserting that the CPAF was not withdrawing but 
merely rotating troops in Kampung Thom . 66 The next day Son 
Sen wrote to Sanderson from Pailin warning that CPAF must 
withdraw all of its reinforcements from the province if 
further NADK-UNTAC discussions were "to bear fruit" . 67 The 
situation became more ominous when VGNUFC went public on 14 
April with the claim that "the Phnom Penh side" had staged a 
"troop withdrawal farce" in Kampung Thom . 68 Nevertheless, 
NADK remained inactive in the province until 19 April, 69 and 
UNTAC troops continued to advance up Route 12 into areas 
previously seized by NADK .70
A Gathering in Pailin
As UNTAC troops advanced up Route 12, PDK cadre from all 
over the country began gathering near Pailin for a major 
unpublicized meeting, evidently the first such conclave since 
UNTAC's arrival. 71 They were coming to report on their 
experiences in implementing Decision 13-12 and the 5 February
64 SSM, 10 April 1992.
65 VoCP, 11 April 1992.
66 SSM, 11 April 1992.
67 VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.
68 VGNUFC, 13 April 1992.
69 "Khmer Rouge Thwart UN in Northern Cambodia", Reuter, 
Kampung Thom, 26 April 1992.
70 SSM, 15 and 16 April 1992.
71 SSM, 15 April 1992.
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directive in preparation for a meeting of the PDK leadership 
at the end of April . 72 The gathering at Pailin came amidst 
increasing public indications of disagreements within the 
leadership. VGNUFC broadcasts since the 6 April SNC revealed 
disarray in the PDK line vis-a-vis UNTAC. For example, on 9 
April, the radio gave a quite positive evaluation of that 
SNC . 73 The next day, however, VGNUFC broadcast an
unprecedentedly harsh public assessment of the SNC and UNTAC. 
The radio said that it was "obvious" that both bodies were 
under the control of PDK's enemies because they had not 
created the kind of neutral political environment in SoC- 
administered areas that would allow PDK safely to organize 
overt political activities.74
A VGNUFC commentary broadcast on 17 April seemed to cut 
through the confusion to pose a stark question for the 
gathering cadre. It suggested what the main item for 
discussion by them should be and what they should decide. It 
asserted that UNTAC was allowing the implementation of the 
Paris Agreements to "be carried out under the authority" of 
PDK's enemies. It asked rhetorically whether PDK should 
implement the Paris Agreements or resort to military means, 
and implicitly warned it would adopt the latter course unless 
UNTAC took "stringent measures to deploy its monitoring force" 
into SoC-administered parts of "eastern Cambodia without 
delay" . 75 This appeared to endorse the hardline position 
presented by Khieu Samphan on 6 April, but it would turn out 
that the more conciliatory position put forward by Son Sen had 
not yet been totally rejected by Pol Pot. PDK was veering 
between "leftist" and "rightist" positions, but the lurches 
back and forth were indicative of a crisis to which there was
72 Steve Heder, UNTAC Information/Education Division [UNTAC- 
IED] , "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.
73 VGNUFC, 8 April 1992.
74 VGNUFC, 9 April 1992.
75 VGNUFC, 16 April 1992.
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no happy solution, and perhaps no solution at all. With Ta 
Mok chaffing at the military bit, with Son Sen as in the past 
prepared to be (relatively) more realistic than Pol Pot about 
PDK's immediate prospects, all possibilities remained 
profoundly constrained by PDK's weak popular base.
VGNUFC's 17 April threat was accompanied by a new series 
of attacks in Kampung Thom that significantly escalated the 
level of fighting there, both in terms of the numbers of NADK 
troops involved and the type of targets attacked, which 
included district towns. It was also accompanied by the 
initiation of small-scale actions in a second province, 
Kampot. Although these actions seem to have aimed to extend 
geographically Decision 13-12's demand for establishment of 
secure corridors for movement of PDK "forces" from the border 
to the interior, they also seemed to be a substitute for PDK's 
failure to provoke a political and diplomatic panic through 
popular uprisings. Instead, more purely military means were 
being used to dramatize PDK's diplomatic and political 
interests in the context of the visit to Cambodia of UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who arrived on 18 
April and stayed in the country for two days to assess the 
Cambodian peace process.
NADK attacks in Kampot reportedly began on 17 April and 
were apparently carried out on the instructions of senior 
Sector 505 cadre Sam Bit, the former Deputy Secretary of the 
Southwest Zone under Ta Mok .76 An ex-NADK later affirmed that 
starting in April 1992, "a lot of people" from Sector 505 rear 
bases on the Thai border were moved by his unit deep into 
Cambodia. 77 SoC allegations about NADK activities in Kampot 
described them in terms reminiscent of those that had 
accompanied the early stages of implementation of Decision 13-
76 Interview of 28-year-old source on 9-10 January 1993.
77 Interview of 25-year-old source on 30 April 1993.
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12 in north-central Cambodia in December 1991.78
The attacks in Kampung Thom reportedly began on 19 April. 
They moved the focus of the fighting from Route 12 to the 
valley of the Steung Sen river, which bisects Sandan and 
Prasat Sambaur districts in northeastern Kampung Thom before 
flowing past the provincial capital and into the Tonle Sap 
lake. 79 As a defector from Division 802 explained, Ta Mok had 
"ordered NADK forces to secure a 'gateway' across the [Steung] 
Sen river similar to the gateway secured by the Route 12 
operation." While the defector explained that the actions in 
the Steung Sen valley were still part of PDK preparations for 
eventual elections because they aimed to ensure the free 
movement of what PDK presumed were its supporters from the 
Thai-Cambodian border to eastern Cambodian provinces like 
Kracheh and Kampung Cham, he added that the establishment of 
such infiltration corridors would also allow NADK to open up 
new military fronts there . 80 Thus, if the civilian supporters 
moving in from below could not link up with NADK cadre brought 
in under UNTAC protection, or if their arrival did nothing to 
give a boost to PDK-led rural insurrections, troops answering 
to Ta Mok would be in place to use weapons other than their 
mouths to make people's war happen.
According to SoC, between 19 and 21 April, NADK shelled 
the outskirts of the district seat of Sandan and launched 
ground assaults on two villages in the Steung Sen valley. 81 
NADK seized at one village, provoking a "small fight" . 82 A 
new upsurge in NADK action on 26 April gave further substance
78 VoCP, 12 May 1992.
79 Notes by the author and Tim Carney on an MMWG in Kampung
Thom on 10 May 1992.
80 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp.1-2; UNTAC- 
IED, "Report on a Visit to Phum Phm, 28 April 1992".
81 SPK, 24 April 1992; VoCP, 29 April 1992.
82 SSM, 23 April 1992.
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to threats that unless PDK negotiating demands were met, the 
war would never end. Some 800 NADK83 launched five separate 
artillery and ground attacks, hitting targets up and down 
Steung Sen valley, including the outskirts of Kampung Thom 
provincial town . 04
Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Visit
VGNUFC had meanwhile greeted Boutros-Ghali's 18 April 
arrival with a full-force propaganda barrage in the form of a 
very negative assessment of the results of the first six 
months of the implementation of the Paris Agreements and 
UNTAC's performance since its arrival. It called upon the 
Secretary-General to recognize that "the true essence of the 
Paris Agreements is not being implemented." It wanted him to 
agree that UNTAC was failing in its duties to "consult" with 
PDK via the SNC about "all administrative tasks in 
Cambodia" . 85
Instead, Boutros-Ghali's visit confirmed UN opposition to 
PDK demands. It proceeded according to a scenario UNTAC had 
discussed on 15 April in which it would use the Secretary- 
General's presence to focus authoritative pressure on PDK to 
demobilize NADK and to confirm that rehabilitation aid for 
Cambodia would include budgetary assistance to SoC . 86 At an 
MMWG on the morning of the day Boutros-Ghali arrived, 
Sanderson advised Nuon Bunnau that it would be in PDK's own 
best interests to "offer some encouraging news to the 
Secretary-General" about readiness to demobilize, and 
suggested that PDK might otherwise face Security Council
83 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG LO SITREP", 1 May 1992, pp. 1-2.
84 SPK, 1 and 2 May 1992; "Factions Refuse to Be First to 
Mark Minefields", AFP, Phnom Penh, 28 April 1992.
85 VGNUFC, 17 April.
85 SSM, 15 April 1992.
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action. 87 Meanwhile, UNTAC drafted a rehabilitation appeal 
in the Secretary-Generals' s name and containing budgetary 
aid88 for presentation to Sihanouk and the SNC . 89
Statements by Sihanouk and Boutros-Ghali on 18 April 
threw cold water on PDK hopes to use the Secretary-General to 
turn UNTAC around. Sihanouk's welcoming speech rejected PDK's 
contentions that UNTAC could be blamed for problems with the 
Paris Agreements. 90 The Secretary-General highlighted the 
UN's "unreserved support" for the Prince. He indicated he 
intended to discuss with PDK "the means to promote 
cooperation" with UNTAC on demobilization of NADK, and warned 
PDK must prove it had the "political will ... to ... take up 
the challenge of peace." SoC media gave full play to Boutros- 
Ghali's praise for Sihanouk, which reproduced its own and thus 
seemed to associate the UN with SoC , 91
Moreover, while Boutros-Ghali also made statements that 
seemed intended to reassure PDK, the content of his 
undertakings were hardly in line with PDK demands. When the 
Secretary-General declared that his visit aimed to "stress the 
importance ... of ... full realization of the mandate assigned 
to UNTAC," he said nothing to suggest this involved an UNTAC 
role in administering Cambodia. While he vowed that 
"everything will be done to speed up the deployment" of UNTAC, 
he indicated this aimed to ensure that conditions were created
87 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Fourteenth Meeting, Saturday 18 
April 1992 UNTAC Headquarters"; VGNUFC, 20 April 1992.
88 SSM, 11 April 1992.
89 SSM, 17 April 1992.
90 UNTAC-IED, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News 
Media: State of Cambodia (Broadcast Media)" [hereafter: UNTAC- 
IED-D&A-SoC] , 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April 1992.
91 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing VoCP and SPK, 20 
April 1992.
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"for the elections to be held in twelve months . " 92 He thus 
endorsed Akashi's and Sihanouk's emphasis on moving straight 
ahead with election preparations.
On the morning of 19 April, VGNUFC stipulated that PDK 
wanted more than vague promises from the Secretary-General. 
It expressed the hope that he would get UNTAC to ensure "most 
quickly the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in eastern 
Cambodia" and urge "the SNC and UNTAC to take over all 
administrative duties in Cambodia". It warned that otherwise, 
Cambodia would not "enjoy genuine peace. " 93 However, Boutros- 
Ghali's internal discussions with UNTAC senior staff later 
that morning revealed no inclination to give in to PDK's 
political demands. He said UNTAC must "avoid the impression 
of creating ... a [UN] state within a [Cambodian] state" and 
advised UNTAC to adopt "a humble approach" in implementing its 
mandate. A similarly cautious tone was evident in the remarks 
made by several UNTAC senior staff present. One warned 
against any "unrealistic expectations of the UN's ability to 
correct human rights problems". Another said there could be 
no question of putting Cambodia under UN "tutelage". 
Discussions about rehabilitation also went badly for PDK. 
UNTAC urged Boutros-Ghali to support budgetary aid for SoC, 
and in agreeing he suggested it should be used as a "carrot" 
to maintain SoC's cooperation in the peace process. 94
Provisions for budgetary and balance of payments support 
were thus prominently maintained in the Secretary-General' s
92 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April
1992 .
93 UNTAC-IED, "Digest and Analysis of the Cambodian News 
Media: Partie of Democratic Kampuchea (Broadcast Media)" 
[hereafter: UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK], 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 18 
April 1992.
94 UNTAC, [no component indicated], "Notes: Meeting with
UNSG, 19 April 1992".
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draft rehabilitation appeal95 that was conveyed to PDK on 19 
April. Khieu Samphan immediately assessed it as "a violation 
of the Paris Agreements".96 He said it aimed "to legalize and 
consolidate" SoC.97 PDK's account of the discussion that 
followed suggests that the Secretary-General nevertheless did 
not back away from fiscal assistance to SoC. Although he said 
the text would be presented "for discussion [and] . . . 
agreement within the SNC before ... any decision" about its 
final contents was made, he would go ahead to "make a short 
appeal" as scheduled.98 This approach in fact kept the 
substance of the draft appeal intact, and by putting it before 
the SNC left the ultimate decision up to Sihanouk and Akashi.
While thus finessing PDK's opposition to the 
rehabilitation package, Boutros-Ghali also used his dialogue 
with Khieu Samphan to back up UNTAC's threats to subject PDK 
to Security Council censure. Taking what SoC lauded as a "a 
strong line",99 he told PDK that if it wanted to get any 
benefit out of the Paris Agreements, it would have to 
cooperate with UNTAC on demobilization. He explained that 
otherwise, the UN Security Council might "postpone" the UNTAC 
operation,100 and thus do nothing at all to undermine SoC. 
In public, Boutros-Ghali vigorously rejected PDK's criticisms 
of UNTAC's performance. As SoC media happily reported, he 
declared that UNTAC was doing "wonderful work".101
95 SSM, 17 April 1992.
96 VGNUFC, 26 April 1992.
97 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 April
1992 .
98 VGNUFC, 26 April 1992.
99 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 21 April
1992 .
100 "Notes: Meeting with UNSG, 19 April 1992".
101 UNTAC -IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing SPK, 20 April
1992 .
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The SNC Meetings of 20 April
VGNUFC's disappointment was expressed on the morning of 
20 April. For the first time since the end of 1991, the radio 
publicly attributed moves against it to foreign "allies" of 
SoC within UNTAC. It warned once more that unless things
changed, the war could never end.102 PDK faced further
disappointment in the two SNCs held on that day. At the
earlier meeting, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, together in Phnom 
Penh for the first time since November 1991, joined other SNC 
members in agreeing to Sihanouk's earlier proposal that 
Cambodia accede to two human rights conventions. This was an 
occasion for embarrassment of PDK. Boutros-Ghali's remarks at 
the signing ceremony highlighted the implications for PDK, and 
SoC exploited the Secretary-General's intervention to its
advantage, describing it as a "strongly-worded statement" that 
"reminded the Khmer Rouge of their past."103
The second SNC took place after the Secretary-General had 
left Cambodia. At a press conference before departing, 
however, Boutros-Ghali foreshadowed what was going to happen. 
First, he went ahead and launched an abbreviated 
rehabilitation appeal that called for assistance to the 
"supportive institutions" of existing administrative 
structures, an easily decodable reference to financial aid for 
SoC. Second, he put PDK on the spot by expressing the 
expectation that the main impact of his visit would be to 
convince PDK to begin allowing UNTAC into PDK areas to prepare 
for NADK entry into Phase Two, that is demobilization.104
PDK's unpropitious position was confirmed by UNTAC's
102 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 April
1992 .
103 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 27 April 1992, citing VoCP and SPK, 
21 April 1992.
104 "Transcript: Press Conference of Dr Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, 10:00 am, 20 April 1992".
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agenda for the second SNC. It largely ignored PDK priorities, 
and to the extent that it covered matters that PDK wanted 
discussed, it contradicted PDK demands. PDK found itself 
isolated on almost every item on the agenda and failed in its 
attempts to impede the immediate adoption of UNTAC proposals. 
Akashi overrode PDK by exercising his authority under the 
Paris Agreements to make decisions in the absence of 
consensus, thus giving further evidence of how unlikely it was 
that PDK could use the SNC against SoC.
The full version of the Secretary-General's appeal 
presented to the meeting indeed maintained provisions on 
budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC to prevent 
its "disintegration".105 A report on the situation of 
refugees from the fighting in Kampung Thom was a reminder of 
the human cost of NADK activities in the province and called 
for aid to be distributed to them via SoC.106 An UNTAC 
proposal about procedures for investigation of human rights 
violations was not to PDK's liking because it denied PDK a 
role in investigations. When Akashi asked for comments,107 
Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SoC approved the procedures. 
When Khieu Samphan expressed reservations and asked for more 
time for further consideration, Akashi pre-empted him by 
making it clear that UNTAC would go ahead and implement the 
procedures unless PDK came up with valid objections to them. 
A progress report by Sanderson on the deployment of UNTAC 
proved to be an opportunity for the Force Commander to keep 
after PDK about preparations for Phase Two. He insisted that 
full UNTAC access to NADK areas would be necessary to oversee
i°s nThe Secretary-General' s Consolidated Appeal for 
Cambodia's Immediate Needs and Rehabilitation".
106 "Needs Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons In 
Kompong Thom Province, 9-10 April 1992",
107 UNTAC, "Investigation of Human Rights Complaints: 
Principles for UNTAC Involvement", 20 April 1992.
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its demobilization.108
This was Khieu Samphan's cue to speak from a prepared 
text to announce the concessions that Boutros-Ghali had 
pressured PDK to make.109 He dropped all reference to his 
own demand of 6 April for the deployment of armed UNTAC forces 
in eastern Cambodia, and even backed down from Son Sen's 12 
April proposal that UNTAC could begin to gain access to NADK 
areas only as troops deployed in the east.110 Instead, Khieu 
Samphan outlined a schedule for UNTAC reconnaissance of 
cantonment sites in PDK territory between 25 and 28 April, 
which included visits to cantonment sites near Anlung Veng for 
troops from Sectors 1001 and 1003 and for Sector 505 troops at 
Kampung Ropov, near the covert PDK headquarters area in 
southwestern Batdambang. In addition, Khieu Samphan seemed to 
drop PDK's demand that the SNC and UNTAC go further than the 
Paris Agreements provided and play an administrative role. 
Instead, he more vaguely insisted that "the SNC . . . and the 
UNTAC, acting in close cooperation," should be "in charge of 
putting into practice all the provisions of the Paris 
Agreements" .111
Khieu Samphan's sudden softening was confirmed on the 
morrow of the SNC by VGNUFC. Although the radio warned that 
if the SoC was allowed to continue "to decide everything at 
will in Phnom Penh and the provinces, " the Paris Agreements 
were "meaningless", it left open the possibility that PDK 
might be satisfied if UNTAC neutralized SoC by aggressive 
implementation of its mandate for direct supervision and
108 UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 20 April 1992; Carney-SNC, 20 April 1992; 
"Communique of the SNC Meeting of 20 April 1992".
109 "Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS a la 
Reunion du CNS, au Palais Khemarin, le 20 avril 1992".
110 VGNUFC, 18 April 1992.
111 VGNUFC, 9 April 1992.
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control.112 However, PDK closed this opening the next day in 
reaction to UNTAC's insistence on inclusion of budgetary 
support for SoC in the rehabilitation package. Decrying the 
subversion of UNTAC by "foreign groups" that wanted to "shore 
up" SoC financially, VGNUFC declared that the SNC and UNTAC 
were "duty-bound to administer" Cambodia's "internal and 
external affairs".113 This new lurch toward a hard position, 
while signalling continued dissention in the PDK leadership, 
remained rhetorical hot air in the absence of political 
support or military punch.
PDK denunciations merely increased UNTAC's determination 
to out-manoeuvre it on the rehabilitation issue. On 22 April, 
anticipating that PDK would attempt to use UNTAC's 
quadripartite technical advisory committee on rehabilitation 
to obstruct Boutros-Ghali's appeal, UNTAC decided simply to 
by-pass this forum114 and instead to deal bilaterally with 
SoC.115 A letter from Khieu Samphan to Akashi on 26 April 
complaining that the rehabilitation appeal "only help[ed]" SoC 
and demanding that "all aid must be given to the SNC"116 did 
not budge UNTAC. Nor did UNTAC change its position when PDK 
warned that it would not allow elections to take place until 
its demand that UNTAC and SNC should "run all affairs in 
Cambodia" was met.117
112 UNTAC-1 ED-D&A-PDK, 23 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 April
1992 .
113 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 2 7 April 1992, citing VGNUFC, 22 April
1992 .
114 SSM, 22 April 1992.
115 SSM, 24 April and 16 May 1992.
116 VGNUFC, 4 May 1992.
117 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 8 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 27 April
1992 .
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In the absence of Akashi118, his Iranian deputy Behrooz 
Sadry, a career UN official, held that UNTAC should not back 
off from the substance of the rehabilitation appeal already 
presented to the SNC, In a letter that also rejected PDK's 
position on elections, Sadry wrote to PDK on 30 April to 
remind it that no "specific SNC/UNTAC administrative agencies" 
were "foreseen in the Paris accords", and that neither the SNC 
nor UNTAC were "administratively equipped to implement" aid 
projects. Therefore, rehabilitation would be implemented 
through "the active cooperation of the existing administrative 
structures" of SoC and the other parties,119 Sadry's 
behaviour closed off another of Pol Pot's fond hopes: that 
"Third World" UN officials could be counted on to be more 
sympathetic to PDK than those from big capitalist powers 
closely allied with the US. Sadry had shown a potential for 
being just as tenacious with PDK as the Japanese Akashi, and 
further evidence would soon confirm that PDK could expect no 
respite from the Iranian.
Meanwhile, Sanderson had flown to Pailin on 24 April to 
explain to Son Sen that unless access to NADK areas was 
widened immediately, the imminent rainy season would delay the 
whole demobilization process for months, leaving CPAF totally 
intact. Discussing UNTAC deployment to eastern Cambodia, 
Sanderson told Son Sen that reconnaissance of Vietnam border 
checkpoints was continuing,120 but offered no concessions to 
PDK's earlier position.
118 Akashi was at this time visiting UN headquarters in New
York.
119 Letter from Behrooz Sadry to Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, 
30 April 1992.
120 SSM, 23 April 1992.
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CHAPTER NINE
PDK RESORTS TO CONVENTIONAL AND MILITARIZED PEOPLE'S WAR
Decision 30-4: From Politics and Diplomacy Toward Violence
As Pol Pot and other top PDK leaders discussed PDK's 
prospects and options in late April, they had somehow to come 
to terms with the failure of PDK efforts to displace SoC 
political authority at the local level and to achieve other 
goals, political, military and diplomatic. Whatever
statistics may have been put forward about the supposed 
liberation of villages, the reality was that political efforts 
to overthrow the SoC administration at the local level had 
borne no fruit. Instead of an outcry reflecting panic about 
such PDK advances, SoC and UNTAC complaints were focused on 
NADK's conventional military operations in Kampung Thom. 
Moreover, the situation on Route 12 had barely changed since 
the end of the UNAMIC period, and NADK may have suffered a net 
loss, having failed to recapture the ground retaken from it 
during the CPAF counter-attacks up the road in late March. 
The more recent operations in the Steung Sen valley had given 
NADK control of one or two villages, but there was no 
indication that NADK momentum could be sustained, and UNTAC 
had not been scared into doing anything PDK wanted. UNTAC was 
continuing to pressure PDK on access and for an end to the 
fighting in Kampung Thom. UNTAC had ignored PDK attempts to 
get it to go further than the Paris Agreements as regards 
neutralization of SoC. It had shown that it was prepared to 
override PDK in the SNC, and it seemed determined to push 
through budgetary and balance of payments support for SoC. 
The attempt to use Boutros Boutros-Ghali against UNTAC also 
had come to naught. Finally, there was no sign that FUNCINPEC 
and KPNLF were politically closer to PDK than they had been in 
December 1991 or February 1992.
In their deliberations, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son
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Sen and Khieu Samphan reportedly had little difficulty 
agreeing that UNTAC was being seriously subverted by elements 
who wanted to use it to strengthen SoC.1 Khieu Samphan 
maintained that the experience with Boutros-Ghali's
rehabilitation appeal demonstrated that PDK's interests were 
not receiving "due consideration by UNTAC", regardless of 
their merits.2 Ta Mok underscored the disadvantages of the 
Paris Agreements. He urged an end to PDK cooperation with 
UNTAC, apparently arguing that given its "essential reality", 
allowing UNTAC to oversee demobilization of NADK would be 
suicidal and leave PDK and its supporters vulnerable to 
destruction. He advocated intensified NADK military action, 
claiming this was necessary in order to counter the CPAF 
attacks. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen argued back that although 
the Agreements were being undermined as a result of subversion 
of UNTAC, they still might offer PDK opportunities for
political advancement that could be exploited through
diplomatic interaction with the UN. They also warned that
outright non-cooperation with UNTAC and the Paris Agreements 
would result in a further breakdown of PDK relations with 
KPNLF and FUNCINPEC, which would isolate PDK politically and 
thus leave it more vulnerable to attack. As he had done with 
the Paris Agreements themselves, Pol Pot then brokered a 
compromise that combined the main elements of both outlooks. 
Limited cooperation with initial UNTAC preparations for Phase 
Two would continue for the time being, while the question of 
NADK participation in demobilization remained under review, 
pending a further assessment of the extent to which UNTAC was 
siding with PDK's enemies. At the same time, Pol Pot backed 
Ta Mok's demand for an intensification of NADK military 
action, maintaining his view that such pressure would increase 
the chances that UNTAC would adopt positions beneficial to 
PDK. However, in general, NADK was to remain on stand-by
1 Steve Heder, UNTAC Information/Education Division [UNTAC- 
IED], "PDK Leadership and Policy", 3 November 1992.
2 UNTAC, [no component indicated], "DK's Views on the Peace 
Process", 17 November 1992, p.l.
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pending entry into Phase Two and could still not attack CPAF 
unless first attacked.3 The discussions and the compromise 
kept PDK well within the parameters established by the 
Vietnamese people's-war-through-peace-agreement script, but 
still, in the face of all the mounting evidence to the 
contrary, reflected Pol Pot's insistence that his 
revolutionary movement was fundamentally more popular than 
that of the Vietnamese had ever been.
The results of the meeting were codified in a "Decision 
30-4".4 It implicitly recognized that PDK was failing in its 
political and diplomatic efforts to wrest significant new 
advantages from the implementation of the Paris Agreements. 
It inadvertently admitted not only that in the absence of more 
sustained and widespread purely military action by NADK, PDK 
was unable to make advances in the countryside, but also that 
PDK might have to fall back on military means merely to 
sustain its position.
The new line combined resumption of full-fledged 
conventional warfare in north-central Cambodia with 
militarization of people's war everywhere. Decision 3 0-4 thus 
declared that "in order to promote to the maximum extent 
possible" the "good implementation" of the Paris Agreements, 
it was "imperative to conduct storming attacks on three major 
battlefields". Kampung Thom became "Battlefield Number One", 
and the decision added - no doubt to Ta Mok's delight - that 
it was "to be expanded to the east and the north", into the 
adjacent provinces of Preah Vihear and Kampung Cham. These 
operations were now to be PDK's de facto main priority. The
3 "PDK Leadership and Policy"; Nate Thayer, "Shake-Up in KR 
Hierarchy", Phnom Penh Post, 28 January-10 February 1994.
4 The contemporary text of Decision 30-4 is not available to 
the author. The following reconstruction of its contents is 
based on the references to it in a later document obtained by 
Nayan Chanda and translated by the author: "Learning, Supervising 
and Re-fashioning in Accordance with the Seven Precepts and Eight 
Precepts, Altogether Making 15 Precepts", dated 6 July 1992.
233
objective was evidently to seize district towns in order to 
neutralize significant numbers of enemy troops, to back up 
PDK's renewed demands for a share in the national political 
administration and maybe to materialize some provincial 
National Councils.
A lower priority was assigned to "Battlefield Number 
Two" : the rural areas "of the country as a whole" . The
objective here was to try again to conduct "storming attacks 
... to remove, eliminate, disperse and dissolve the political 
administration belonging to the contemptible puppets ... in 
the villages and sub-districts" . In particular, efforts were 
to be made "starting in May to do so in 30 to 40 villages per 
month on active battlefields, 2 0 to 3 0 villages in medium 
battlefields, and four to five villages on weak battlefields." 
This suggested an impossible target of bringing about a change 
in the administration of something like 2 0 villages per day 
nation-wide.5
Despite their implausibility, these optimistic statistics 
still pointed to the failure so far of the PDK political 
campaign at the village and sub-district level. In early 
February Pol Pot had called on PDK to use the methods outlined 
in December to displace SoC administrative influence at a rate 
of 35 to 5 0 villages per day. The data suggests that the 
number of SoC-administered villages "liberated" between Pol 
Pot's February speech and the end of April had fallen far 
short of what he had demanded be achieved in a single day. 
Decision 3 0-4 was, very distantly, conceding this catastrophic 
fact by halving the quota and by the means it advocated for 
achieving this reduced target. It called for an
intensification of resort to murderous violence and a further 
militarization of PDK's people's war to overthrow SoC from
5 This calculation is based on the presumption that, as in 
earlier periods, each NADK division and independent regiment was 
responsible for one "battlefield", and that the resulting 27 
battlefields were more or less equally divided among those 
categorized as strong, medium and weak.
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below. It specified that in order to liberate villages, NADK 
cadre on each battlefield should aim at "removing, eliminating 
or dispersing an average of ten to 20 agents of village and 
sub-district political administrations per month." This 
authorized a full return to the practice of kidnapping and 
killing local SoC officials. It suggested that 400 local SoC 
officials should be seized or executed every month.e 
Moreover, PDK's goals were also to be achieved by "joining 
guerilla attacks with the political and armed strength of the 
people". These not only authorized the use of armed 
guerillas, but seemed to call for arming PDK sympathizers - 
its "guerilla nuclei" - so that they could cooperate with NADK 
in overthrowing SoC from below.
The lowest priority - "Battlefield Number Three" - was 
now assigned to the diplomatic and political contest in Phnom 
Penh. The bottom rank assigned to it was an indication of the 
extent to which PDK was increasingly unlikely in reality to 
pay great attention to it, PDK would still try to win support 
there for dismantling of SoC by trying to "gathering in upper 
[class] strata forces" like Sihanouk and members of KPNLF and 
FUNCINPEC, but this was now a defensive effort to prevent SoC 
from further "seizing" such forces politically. The only 
other serious combat in Phnom Penh was "at the negotiating 
table and over the contents of the ... Paris Agreements." On 
this diplomatic front, PDK must continue to probe in hopes of 
finding some sympathetic UN officials who might help it 
"isolate" PDK's "diehard enemies" in UNTAC and eventually get 
UNTAC to agree that the SNC must "function as the unique 
source of authority in Cambodia".
Decision 30-4 combined this pipe-dreaming with a further 
recognition of problems: scapegoating those who had supposedly 
sabotaged people's war from within. Taking a step further 
down the road toward a return to Pol Pot's destruction of his
6 This figure is based on an average of 15 such actions on 
each of 27 battlefields.
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own Communist Party apparatus in 1975-78, the decision called 
for punishment of those responsible for the failure of the 
implementation of people's war to live up to his expectations. 
It followed up earlier expressions of concern about the 
quality of some PDK cadre with calls for the replacement of 
those leaders who had not been performing well. It indicated 
that this would have to be done if they failed to maintain 
"their status as persons who regularly struggle and fight" or 
to maintain "their status in terms of constant storming 
attack". The decision implied that if there continued to be 
serious failures as regard their "work attitudes", it would be 
necessary "to fashion new leadership teams to maintain the 
initiative" and do so "in a timely manner".
Implementing Decision 3 0-4 on the Kampung Thom Battlefield
The impact of Decision 30-4 was very soon felt in Kampung 
Thom. However, an NADK offensive there only served to confirm 
that without a political base, purely military action could 
not fundamentally improve PDK's position. Not only was little 
achieved, but what was achieved could be lost to CPAF counter­
attacks .
On 4 May, Divisions 616 and 802 launched province-wide 
actions that targeted villages, subdistrict seats and district 
seats in a way that clearly went beyond the needs of 
establishing safe infiltration corridors, even if some of the 
attacks also took place in areas where this effect could also 
be achieved.7 Amidst shelling of district and subdistrict 
towns throughout the province, the units seized three 
villages. However, despite concentrating ground forces of up 
to battalion strength and continued heavy fire support, 
attacks on ten more villages between 5 and 7 May failed, and
7 Author's notes on briefing by UNTAC military observers, 
Kampung Thom, 10 May 1992.
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villagers did not rise up to support PDK but fled NADK.8
After four days of provocation, CPAF launched a counter­
offensive on 8 May during which it recaptured the three 
villages Division 802 had seized on 4 May, the only targets 
NADK had been able to hold. This undid most of the gains NADK 
had made in the Steung Sen valley and demonstrated that SoC 
had the capacity to regain the initiative in the area.9
Criticising the Rehabilitation Appeal: Akashi as "Bad Element"
The NADK offensive was accompanied by a drumbeat of new 
diplomatic assaults via VGNUFC, which combined criticism of 
the rehabilitation draft appeal with increasingly serious 
public condemnation of UNTAC and insinuations that Akashi and 
other senior UNTAC officials were guilty of bad faith. The 
solution, the radio insisted, was to strengthen the SNC along 
the lines advocated by PDK. The alternative was an ever 
widening war. On 3 May, VGNUFC echoed Decision 3 0-4 by 
supplementing PDK's March "slogans" with proclamations that 
there should be "no other state authority" in Cambodia except 
the SNC, and that "all kinds of economic assistance should . . . 
go through the SNC and not through the Phnom Penh side." 
Referring to Akashi and others in UNTAC who had shown 
themselves as supportive of the draft rehabilitation appeal, 
the radio said darkly that "some bad elements" wanted SoC "to 
administer the country." It warned that unless something was
8 For SoC reports and UNTAC confirmations, see VoCP, 8 and 
18 May 1992; SPK, 15 and 20 May 1992; SSM, 6 May 1992; UNTAC-MC, 
"MMWG Level One Seventeenth Meeting, Saturday 09 May 1992 UNTAC 
Headquarters" and "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, 
UNTAC Headquarters".
9 Briefing by UNTAC military observers, Kampung Thom, 10 May 
1992; Carney's and the author's notes on the MMWG in Kampung Thom 
on 10 May 1992; UNTAC-MC, "Situation Report" [hereafter: 
MilSitRep], 9 May 1992.
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done to prevent this, the "war will continue,"10
On 5 May, PDK reiterated its position in a meeting during 
which UNTAC presented a slightly revised version of the 
Secretary-General's appeal that changed some language but kept 
the substance intact.11 In reply, VGNUFC excoriated both 
Sihanouk and senior UNTAC officials as "bad elements who want 
to ... upgrade the role of the regime installed at gunpoint 
by the Vietnamese."12
The SNC of 7 May: Cornering- PDK on Rehabilitation
UNTAC was ignoring all this invective. At UN
headquarters in New York, Akashi had already on 4 May 
expressed hope that it would soon be possible to finalize 
recommendations by international financial institutions "on 
how to cope with over-expenditures and lack of revenues in the 
Phnom Penh administration".13 On the military front, 
Sanderson used an MMWG on 2 May to inform NADK that until its 
forces began entering cantonments under UNTAC supervision, 
UNTAC would "not expect" CPAF to demobilize; and that because 
of NADK's obstructionism, UNTAC could not meet the original 
target date of 1 June for the commencement of Phase Two.14 
This made it clear to PDK that CPAF was being left in a 
position to counter NADK militarily.
For his part, deputy SRSG Sadry used the SNC of 7 May to 
corner PDK on rehabilitation. Taking advantage of the support 
of Sihanouk and the backing of both FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF on
10 VGNUFC, 2 May 1992.
11 VGNUFC, 7 May 1992.
12 VGNUFC, 5 May 1992.
13 UN Secretariat, "Press Briefing by Special
Representative for Cambodia", 4 May 1992.
14 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Sixteenth Meeting, Saturday 02 
May 1992 UNTAC Headquarters".
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this issue, he demonstrated that when faced with PDK 
obstructionism, he was just as prepared as Akashi to use 
procedural gambits to override it. Sadry stressed that a 
consensus must be urgently achieved on the "outline" of the 
Secretary-General's appeal so that approaches to potential 
donors could be made before the Tokyo conference scheduled for 
June. Asserting that the very discussion by the SNC of the 
rehabilitation programme was evidence of the SNC "control" of 
such matters that PDK wanted, Sadry called upon the SNC as a 
whole to "agree unanimously to presentation of the appeal to 
donor countries and to the Tokyo Conference". Khieu Samphan 
responded that everything should be discussed further, but 
Sadry said more talk was "not timely", and Khieu Samphan did 
not challenge Sadry's comment.15 On this flimsy basis, UNTAC 
drafted a communique in the name of the SNC that read: "Mr
Sadry invited the SNC to agree that the appeal for the 
rehabilitation programme . . . would go forward. It was so 
decided." This formulation was passed on to Sihanouk, who 
approved it.ie Khieu Samphan immediately sent a message to 
the Prince to object to the appeal, to UNTAC's "improper" 
tactics during the meeting and to the public announcement that 
the SNC had adopted the rehabilitation programme,17 but the 
deed had been done in a way that could only undermine hopes of 
finding PDK sympathizers in UNTAC.
The MMWG of 9 May: Cornering PDK on Phase Two
A further sign that such hopes were a chimera was Sadry's 
use of the SNC to call upon PDK to comply with all the 
conditions necessary for participation in demobilisation.
15 Carney-SNC, 7 May 1992; and UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 7 May 1992.
16 "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, 7 May 1992". The author's copy of this document 
includes Sihanouk's handwritten notation "vu et approuve".
17 VGNUFC, 9 May 1992; SSM, 9 May 1992.
239
Khieu Samphan's refusal to offer concessions18 was coupled 
with VGNUFC insinuations in advance of an MMWG scheduled for 
9 May to follow up the SNC that Sanderson was manoeuvring to 
sabotage the Paris Agreements . The radio demanded that UNTAC 
"monitoring forces ... be completely deployed . . . along the 
eastern border" by the end of May, and said that otherwise 
NADK would not begin cooperating with UNTAC on 
demobilization.19
For his part, Sanderson came to the 9 May MMWG determined 
to get NADK to recommit itself to a cease-fire in Kampung Thom 
and elsewhere and to allowing UNTAC access to PDK zones 
throughout the country. In return he offered to go ahead with 
setting a date for Phase Two and to establish more checkpoints 
in eastern Cambodia, but continued to insist that UNTAC itself 
would decide where UNTAC troops would be sent and for what 
purpose. He warned PDK that unless NADK proceeded with Phase 
Two, it could not expect UNTAC to establish the "neutral 
political environment" necessary "for . . . free and fair 
elections".
Sanderson's tactic to obtain NADK commitments was to 
present the meeting with a text of an announcement on behalf 
of UNTAC, NADK, CPAF, ANKI and KPNLF to be made public 
immediately after the MMWG. The text condemned NADK attacks 
in Kampung Thom and said NADK had given specific assurances 
that it would prevent cease-fire violations and give complete 
"freedom of movement for UNTAC" throughout PDK zones to 
oversee demobilization of NADK. It announced that Phase Two 
would begin on 13 June. It said nothing about Vietnam border 
checkpoints, although in presenting the text, Sanderson said 
UNTAC was "striving" to establish more, manned by unarmed 
military observers, on a "priority" basis. PDK diplomat Tep
18 Carney-SNC, 7 May 1992; UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 7 May 1992;
"Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 7 May 
1992" .
19 VGNUFC, 7 and 8 May 1992.
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Khunnal, a rising young protege of Pol Pot,20 who had replaced 
Son Sen's brother Son Chhum as Nuon Bunnau's "adviser", 
promised that if the process of checkpoint establishment was 
completed by the end of May, NADK would implement "a formal 
cease-fire" in Kampung Thom "commencing on 2 June" . After 
Sanderson revealed UNTAC was planning to have three more 
checkpoints in place by the middle of May, Tep Khunnal said 
that PDK was prepared to accept Sanderson's text "in 
principle" if UNTAC established these plus an eleventh that 
PDK wanted at the Srse Ambel road junction in Kah Kong 
province. However, he explained, PDK still wanted UNTAC armed 
forces deployed in addition to military observers.
Sanderson replied that UNTAC would not and could not 
accept such demands. He then proceeded to press for NADK 
acceptance of conditions for announcing that Phase Two would 
begin on 13 June. These included the NADK assurances that 
Sanderson had included in his prepared text, and despite his 
earlier demands, Tep Khunnal said "yes" when asked to confirm 
each one.21
Recommitting Son Sen and NADK in Kampung Thom
Sanderson moved quickly after the MMWG to try to solidify 
the concessions he had extracted from Tep Khunnal by writing 
for confirmation to a Son Sen who had been shorn of his troops 
but still enjoyed the opportunity to correspond. Son Sen 
telegrammed back to affirm that Tep Khunnal's commitments, 
which Son Sen may have genuinely felt were justifiable 
diplomatic tactics, were "the position of the NADK".22
20 This characterization of Khunnal is based on a series of 
conversations between the author and Nate Thayer, who repeatedly 
interviewed Khunnal between 199 2 and 199 8 and observed the 
relationship between him and Pol Pot in July and October 1997.
21 "MMWG Level One Seventeenth Meeting ...".
22 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Eighteenth Meeting, Saturday,
23 May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters".
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However, this was the last time Son Sen would speak on PDK's 
behalf, and UNTAC realized his telegram might not count for 
much when Sanderson flew to Kampung Thom on 10 May to try to 
get further reconfirmation directly from NADK in the province 
and the immediate reestablishment of a cease-fire there.
Although CPAF's 8 May counter-attacks had driven NADK out 
of the villages it had captured in Kampung Thom and apparently 
blunted the unit's ground offensive,23 NADK was allegedly 
continuing to launch artillery attacks on district towns in 
Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham provinces.24 At the MMWG in 
Kampung Thom, Sanderson declared to Sector 1003 Division 616 
liaison officer Chou Chin that NADK had agreed to a truce and 
free UNTAC access throughout Cambodia. To this Chou Chin 
replied that he could not promise to comply until Sanderson's 
assertions were confirmed by the NADK High Command. The CPAF 
representative then protested that although CPAF had earlier 
reduced its forces in Kampung Thom, NADK artillery harassment 
had continued. He said that fighting would not stop unless 
NADK desisted from further military activity; withdrew its 
troops from Route 12 and villages along it; and allowed UNTAC 
to establish "control" of the road. He warned that if NADK 
seized more villages, CPAF would "again . . . counter-attack to 
retake them".25
Back in Phnom Penh, Tep Khunnal tried to forestall such 
CPAF moves by calling for SoC adherence to Loridon's original 
formula for a Kampung Thom cease-fire,25 while in Kampung Thom 
NADK stood down militarily, perhaps because division cadre
23 Carney's and the author's notes on the MMWG in Kampung 
Thom on 10 May 1992; MilSitRep, 9 May 1992.
24 SPK, 20 May 1992.
25 Notes on the MMWG in Kampung Thom on 10 May 1992.
25 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, 
UNTAC Headquarters"; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 May 1992, 28 May
1992, citing VoCP, 25 May 1992.
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there gave Sanderson's assertions the benefit of the doubt as 
they sought clarification from the High Command. SoC reported 
only one NADK ground attack in the province, which UNTAC could 
not confirm, before the next MMWG in Phnom Penh on 23 May. 
CPAF, however, took advantage of this to seize the military 
initiative. It captured two villages on and demined parts of 
Route 12, "without encountering NADK resistance".27
More Rebukes for PDK. the Powers of the SNC and New Threats of 
NADK Military Action
VGNUFC meanwhile relaunched PDK's demands about border 
checkpoints, specifying that PDK wanted UNTAC forces already 
in the country redeployed to put "infantry troops at each" 
post.28 On 11 May, VGNUFC demanded that one-third of the some 
4,000 UNTAC troops that had arrived in Cambodia should be 
"immediately deployed" to its eastern border.29 However, that 
day, acting SRSG Sadry and Sihanouk made public statements to 
the effect that PDK would not be allowed to dictate UNTAC 
troop movements.30 VGNUFC responded by implying the 
Cambodian people were "furious" with Sihanouk and UNTAC.31 
PDK's ire was further inflamed by Sihanouk's hammering of PDK 
for trying to obstruct the rehabilitation of Cambodia via SoC 
and by the Prince's renewed heavy hints that people should 
vote for the CPP in the future elections.32
In the face of what they clearly perceived as
27 MilSitRep, 16, 18 and 21 May 1992.
26 VGNUFC, 9 May 1992.
29 VGNUFC, 10 May 1992.
30 "UNTAC Deputy Chief Says No SRV Troops Found So Far", 
AFP, Phnom Penh, 11 May 1992; VoCP, 11 May 1992.
31 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 24 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 20 May 
1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 May 1992.
32 VoCP, 11 May 1992.
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provocations, those PDK leaders in favour of the most 
militant, optimistic and unrealistic reading of the people's 
war script escalated PDK political demands while upping 
threats of NADK military action. While on the one hand 
demanding that UNTAC dismantle SoC completely, even though 
there was no sign UNTAC was at all likely to do so, PDK warned 
of a politico-military conflagration if these demands were not 
met, even though there was no evidence of a PDK capacity to 
conjure up such a maelstrom.
Immediately after the SNC chaired by Sadry, VGNUFC had 
set the end of May as the deadline for UNTAC and the SNC to 
begin consultations about running "all administrative 
services" in Cambodia.33 The radio then began declaring that 
the only way to prevent war "in Cambodia, both in Kampung Thom 
and nationwide, " was to have "the SNC and UNTAC . . . administer 
... all ... matters nationwide until the election."34 The 
threat of war was given a new edge when VGNUFC began stressing 
the legitimacy and necessity of NADK self-defense action in 
broadcasts that contradicted the reassurances contained in Son 
Sen's confirmation of Tep Khunnal's pledges at the 9 May MMWG. 
One warned that if SoC was "allowed to further control state 
affairs", the Cambodian people were not about to "remain idle 
to be massacred at will".35
On 14 May, a letter to UNTAC from Khieu Samphan put 
forward additional demands that went beyond calling for the 
SNC and UNTAC to play an administrative role to insisting that 
UNTAC's mandate for direct supervision and control of SoC be 
displaced by a formula according to which PDK would be given 
a significant supervisory role vis-a-vis a rump SoC authority 
structure. This was the logical extension of PDK's conclusion
33 VGNUFC, 7 May 1992.
34 VGNUFC, 8 May 1992.
35 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 14 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 11 and 12 
May 1992.
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that UNTAC was too subverted by the alliance to be of much use 
to it: if there was to be any "neutralization" of SoC from 
above, PDK would have to be deeply involved in control SoC 
itself. Khieu Samphan thus said it was necessary that PDK 
representatives "take part .... in the supervision of every 
matter relating to the civilian administration" mentioned in 
the Paris Agreements.36 Finally, in a VGNUFC broadcast on 15 
May that greeted Akashi upon his return to Cambodia from New 
York, PDK signalled that pre-conditionality was being applied 
across the board. PDK would demobilize NADK only if UNTAC 
deployed infantry along Cambodia's eastern border and only 
after SNC-UNTAC "joint control" had been imposed on SoC in 
such a way that SoC's "existing old or new personnel" would 
function as "only the technical machine at offices that should 
come under the control and administration of the SNC and 
UNTAC."37 The next day it explained this meant that SoC's 
"so-called ministers and prime minister" should no longer be 
in "charge or in control" of its administrative structures. 
Instead, UNTAC and the SNC should "run ministries, services, 
and other administrative organs and decide by a consensus of 
UNTAC and the SNC" what should be done.38
Sihanouk immediately rejected any suggestion that SoC 
leaders should be neutralized,39 and continued to tour the 
provinces with senior CPP officials, calling on all Cambodians 
to join hands with them to rehabilitate Cambodian 
economically.40
36 VGNUFC, 16 May 1992.
37 VGNUFC, 14 May 1992.
38 VGNUFC, 15 May 1992.
39 VoCP, 17 May 1992.
40 VoCP, 20 and 21 May 1992; SPK, 21 May 1992; see also 
UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 May 1992, 28 May 1992.
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New NADK Activities: Outside Kampung Thom
VGNFUC's suggestions that NADK should not "remain idle" 
were immediately followed by a serious clash between Division 
320 of Front 250 and CPAF forces in Bavel district of 
Batdambang province.41 On 24 May, VGNUFC warned that the 
fighting in Bavel could escalate to the level already reached 
in Kampung Thom.42 Meanwhile, NADK in Sectors 10 03 and 1001 
were becoming more active in provinces north and east of 
Kampung Thom43 by, among other things, stepping up 
exterminations of SoC officials.44
Both Sihanouk and UNTAC responded with denunciations of 
NADK violence.45 Loridon used MMWGs in Phnom Penh on 14 and 
16 May to raise CPAF grievances about NADK attacks, describing 
them as "most serious, unacceptable violations" of the Paris 
Agreements.46 UNTAC also responded by working out plans for 
deployment of military observers to the CPAF headquarters at 
Sala Visai (Sala Vichey) on Route 12 and to the district seat 
of Kulaen in Preah Vihear.47 The plans for Sala Visai were 
part of an effort to stabilize the situation on Route 12, 
while those for Kulaen reflected UNTAC's assessment that if 
NADK were to widen its military efforts, this part of Preah
41 MilSitRep, 13, 14 and 15 May 1992; SPK, 2 0 May 1992; 
UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level II Meeting, Saturday, 16 May 1992, UNTAC 
Headquarters'1; SSM, 18 May 1992; Steve Heder, UNTAC-I ED, 
"Demobilization of NADK Division 450 and Other Information on the 
NADK", 9 June 1992.
42 VGNUFC, 23 May 1992.
43 MilSitRep, 14,15 and 16 May 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:20-26 
May 1992, 28 May 1992, citing VoCP, 23 May 1992.
44 SPK, 21 May 1992.
45 VoCP, 17 May 1992.
46 UNTAC-MC, "Report on MMWG Level II, 14 May 1992".
47 MilSitRep, 11, 12 and 13 May 1992.
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Vihear would be a likely target. UNTAC infantry was in place 
at Sala Visai by 18 May,48 and its first military observers 
were in Kulaen by 19 May.49
Impasse
Upon his return to Cambodia, Akashi met with Sihanouk and 
then with Khieu Samphan to discuss rehabilitation and 
"military matters."50 On the morning of the meeting, VGNUFC 
launched its most direct attack yet on UNTAC's leadership, 
warning that "the Cambodian nation and people" could "never 
agree" to its "foul play" aimed at "eliminating" PDK.51 
Akashi used the meeting to present a list of complaints about 
NADK violations of the Paris Agreements in Kampung Thom, 
Kampung Cham and elsewhere.52 Khieu Samphan simply refused 
to talk about any of these points.53 Akashi also reiterated 
that PDK concerns about rehabilitation could only be taken 
care of by imposition of UNTAC control over SoC finances, as 
envisaged in the Paris Agreements.54 Khieu Samphan responded 
by dwelling on PDK's opposition to budgetary support for SoC 
in whatever form, and the need for the SNC to take on a more 
governmental role, but Akashi replied that PDK representation 
in technical advisory committees provided it with sufficient 
input to fulfil the requirements of the Paris Agreements.55
46 MilSitRep, 18 May 1992.
49 MilSitRep, 19 May 1992.
50 SSM, 15 May 1992.
51 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 19 May
1992 .
52 UNTAC-MC, "Areas of Concern with NADK, 20 May 1992", p.l.
53 MilSitRep, 20 May, 23 May 1992.
54 SSM, 20 May 1992.
55 SSM, 21 and 22 May 1992.
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Four days later, VGNUFC made its first broadcast 
threatening UNTAC personnel. It called on the Cambodian 
people to "decimate the criminal, foul plays” of those it 
accused of being "accomplices" of its enemies.56 NADK was 
also making propaganda attacks on UNTAC. An NADK High Command 
"note" dated 15 May criticized Sanderson for not saying 
"anything about the deployment of UNTAC forces ... along the 
Cambodian-Vietnamese border".57 A week later, an NADK High 
Command "press communique" excoriated Sihanouk and the UNTAC 
leadership as "ill-intentioned .... partisans" of its enemies, 
and proclaimed that NADK would "never agree" to do what they 
wanted, "no matter what".58
Confirmation of the impasse came at an MMWG on 23 May. 
Sanderson opened by complaining to Nuon Bunnau that despite 
Tep Khunnal's commitments on 9 May and Son Sen's subsequent 
assurances, NADK was responsible for "further cease-fire 
violations". Nuon Bunnau tried his best to turn the meeting 
toward discussion of PDK's demand that UNTAC "deploy all the 
way on the eastern border".59 Sanderson responded that UNTAC 
had "concluded the positioning of the checkpoints on the 
border", and that it simply would "not accept any conditions 
placed on [it] ... by the NADK".60
VGNUFC's broadcast greeting the 2 6 May SNC thus fumed
that the "actual deeds" of "the allies" inside UNTAC "at the
negotiation table" had now "clearly proved" that they were 
"definitely not implement[ing] " the Paris Agreements. The 
radio declared that PDK must therefore "heighten . . . its
56 VGNFUC, 23 May 1992. Emphasis added.
57 VGNUFC, 15 May 1992.
58 UNTAC-1 ED-D&A-PDK, 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 21 May
1992 .
59 "MMWG Level One Eighteenth Meeting ...".
60 MilSitRep, 25 May, 25 May 1992.
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vigilance" to "check all" their "tricks and schemes".61 
Akashi and Sihanouk were indeed ready with tactics to use 
against anticipated PDK stonewalling and to ensure PDK 
isolation in the SNC. Akashi had already decided to ensure 
that PDK suffered maximum public embarrassment if it remained 
obstructionist on demobilization.62 After reading a letter 
from Boutros-Ghali reminding PDK of earlier Security Council 
calls on it to comply fully with the Paris Agreements, Akashi 
took PDK to task for having failed to take the steps necessary 
for NADK to demobilize.63 He demanded that it join the other 
three armies in taking these steps.64 He said that if PDK did 
not begin doing so within a few days, he would "have no choice 
but to ask the Secretary-General to convene the Security 
Council to review the whole question." Sihanouk, fulfilling 
promises made to Akashi in their discussions before the SNC, 
voiced his full support for the UNTAC position.65
Warning that this SNC gathering was of "particular 
importance", Khieu Samphan answered with a prepared statement 
that restated the hard line of pre-conditionality PDK had 
adopted since 14 May.66 He came up against an equally solid 
wall of rejection. In particular, Akashi was determined to 
deflect PDK political demands by pushing forward 
implementation of UNTAC's plans for the kind of modest 
supervision and control of SoC that had been agreed between
61 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 25 May
1992 .
62 SSM, 22 May 1992.
63 "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, 2 6 May 1992".
64 "Statement by Mr Akashi at the SNC Meeting, 26 May 1992".
65 Author's notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.
66 "Intervention de SEM Khieu Samphan, Membre du CNS du 
Cambodge, President de la partie Kampuchea Democratique a la 
reunion du CNS du 26 Mai 1992, Palais IChemarin" .
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UNTAC and Boutros-Ghali back in April.67 To facilitate this, 
Sihanouk emphasized that Akashi was entitled to "the last 
word" in the absence of SNC consensus, and that he wanted the 
SRSG to exercise this power in order to avoid delay in 
implementation of the Paris Agreements. Akashi proclaimed his 
readiness to use this authority whenever necessary. Although 
armed with a militant stance, Khieu Samphan was rendered 
flatfooted when confronted with specifics about which he had 
no clear instructions from the covert PDK leadership, but 
managed to remark PDK would consider Akashi7s exercise of the 
SRSG's powers appropriate only if he acted "in accordance with 
the letter and spirit of the Agreements".68
This pathetic performance set the scene for SNC 
discussion of UNTAC proposals regarding its mandate for 
control and supervision of existing administrative structures. 
The contents of the proposals and the way in which PDK was 
consulted about them only served to highlight UNTAC7s refusal 
to give in to the substance of PDK demands and seems to have 
intensified PDK's anger that UNTAC was impervious to its 
influence. Akashi's presentation dealt with the extension of 
UNTAC supervision or control to administrative bodies that 
"could directly influence the outcome of elections".69 It 
gave no hint of any concession to PDK demands for more direct 
PDK involvement in UNTAC's control or supervision work or to 
any of PDK's various calls for the de facto dismantling of 
SoC. Sihanouk and SoC spoke in favour of the presentation. 
When Khieu Samphan asked for "time to study the document 
before responding", Akashi ruled that it was "adopted with the 
proviso that Khieu Samphan may reflect upon it". When Khieu 
Samphan reiterated his "desire to have time for examination", 
Sihanouk cut him off to proclaim "I'm sure the Cambodian
67 Ordre du jour de la reunion du CNS du 26 mai 1992.
68 Notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.
69 "Note du Representant Special du Secretaire General au 
Counseil National Supreme (CNS)", 20 May 1992.
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people will welcome all decisions Yasushi Akashi makes."70 
Akashi then declared the UNTAC proposals adopted ad
referendum.11 This prompted Khieu Samphan to criticize him for 
acting improperly.72 The public communique of the SNC
nevertheless went ahead to state that Akashi's recommendations 
had been "generally accepted".73
NADK Resumes the Offensive in Kampuncr Thom and Expands the 
Battlefield North. East and West
The MMWG scheduled to follow the SNC was used by 
Sanderson to remind NADK of Akashi7s warning that if UNTAC7s 
requirements regarding preparations for demobilization were 
not quickly met, the matter would be taken to the Security 
Council, and to reiterate that PDK had no right to set pre­
conditions about UNTAC troop deployments. Tep Khunnal replied 
that he would be leaving Phnom Penh on 29 May to attend a
meeting in Pailin at which the PDK political leadership and
NADK 1 field commanders" would make a "major decision" about 
what PDK should do next.74
NADK actions, of course, had already signalled the 
direction PDK was taking. By 23 May, the confusion resulting 
from Son Sen7s telegram and Sanderson7 s presentation of it to 
division cadre in Kampung Thom had been cleared up. On that 
day, NADK resumed ground attacks in Kampung Thom by sending
70 Notes on the SNC meeting of 26 May 1992.
71 Memo from Yasushi Akashi, SRSGC, to Mr Marrack Goulding, 
USGPKO, "Meeting of the Supreme National Council, 26 May 1992".
72 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 1 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 27 May
1992 .
73 "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, 26 May 1992".
74 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level One Nineteenth Meeting, Tuesday, 2 6 
May 1992, UNTAC Headquarters".
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troops against a village on Route 12.75 On 28 May, NADK 
operations expanded into "a multiple violation of the cease­
fire . . . north of Kampung Thom, with attacks by artillery, 
rocket-propelled grenades and small arms," resulting in two 
civilian casualties.76 NADK also fired on SoC-administered 
villages in Kampung Cham,77 and NADK activities in Siem Reap 
took on a new quality, going beyond previous efforts to 
maintain logistics lines and suggesting that an order had been 
given to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield to the west as 
well as the north and the east. On 29 and 30 May, NADK 980 
shelled the district seat of Svay Loe and launched several 
ground attacks on CPAF positions in Angkor Chum district.78
But the most dramatic NADK offensive action was launched 
in Kulaen district of Preah Vihear on 28 May. Reportedly 
acting under direct instructions from Ta Mok, NADK attacked 
three CPAF battalion positions in villages west and south of 
Kulaen district seat. By 30 May all three positions had been 
abandoned after the CPAF units in them disintegrated, and many 
of the inhabitants of the villages had fled. The district 
seat itself then came under artillery fire. On 31 May, after 
the UNTAC military observer team in the town managed to 
contact the NADK gunnery commanders and demand a halt to the 
shelling, there was a lull when they consented. However, they 
warned they would resume firing if so commanded by their 
headquarters. They soon did so more intensely, such that 
shells were falling at a rate of one per minute. Meanwhile, 
NADK mined approaches to the town and concentrated infantry in 
two places in apparent preparation for a ground assault to
75 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC: 25-28 May 1992, 30 May 1992, citing
VoCP, 27 May 1992; MilSitRep, 25 May 1992.
76 MilSitRep, 28 May 1992.
77 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 2 June 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2 - 1  
June 1992".
78 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 2 June 1992.
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seize or at least enter the town, as NADK had done twice in 
early 1991.79
NADK shelling of Kulsn district seat was an apparent 
demonstration of PDK readiness to move beyond threatening 
words aimed at deterring UNTAC encroachments on PDK areas to 
violent action that genuinely put the lives of UNTAC personnel 
at risk, NADK may well have expected to be able thus to drive 
UNTAC out of Kulaen and thereby clear the way for its capture. 
Indeed, after NADK artillery fire escalated on 31 May, the 
UNTAC observer team withdrew, but when Sanderson learned of 
this, he ordered it immediately to return, which it did on 1 
June in the midst of continued shelling.80 Meanwhile, UNTAC 
was also moving to set up mobile military investigation teams, 
as envisaged in Boutros-Ghali7s implementation plan, to look 
into violations of the military provisions of the Paris 
Agreements.81 By 29 May, UNTAC had formed two such "strategic 
investigation teams" each comprised of several military 
observers.82 Its announcement that they were becoming 
operational indicated that their primary function was to 
investigate NADK attacks83 like the NADK offensive in north- 
central Cambodia.
The direction in which UNTAC was moving was put starkly 
at an MMWG chaired by Loridon in Phnom Penh on 3 0 May. He
79 MilSitRep, 1, 2, 3 June 1992; SSM, 1 June 1992; UNTAC-
IED-D&A-SoC : 30 May- 4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 June 
1992; UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Trip to Tbeng Meanchey-Phum Kulaan, 
8 June 1992".
80 MilSitRep, 1 June 1992; "Report on a Trip to Tbeng
Meanchey ...".
81 Agreements, Annex 2, Article VI, paragraphs 2,3 and 
Article X, paragraphs 1,2.
82 MilSitRep, 29 May and 2 June 1992.
83 UNTAC, "Press Release: Mr Akashi Visits Border
Checkpoints, Faction Headquarters; UNTAC Establishes Mobile 
Investigation Teams", 29 May 1992.
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said that forces remaining "outside the . . . cantonment process 
contrary to the Paris Agreements" could also be considered 
"outside the protection of the Paris Agreements and ... the 
law". He explained they might thus be "subject to law 
enforcement action by police forces under UNTAC control and 
supervision", and that where the strength required to deal 
with such forces exceeded "the capacity of police forces, 
UNTAC might be called on to assist and has measures at its 
disposal under the UN Charter". This put PDK on warning that 
if it did not demobilize, it might become fair game for joint 
SoC-UN armed police action against it.84
However, at emergency MMWGs convened by Sanderson on 31 
May and 1 June, NADK representatives Mon Keum Thon and Nuon 
Bunnau would not entertain the Force Commander's demand for a 
halt to fighting in Preah Vihear. Sanderson denounced this as 
"unacceptable" and said that UNTAC was reporting the NADK 
attack to Boutros-Ghali with a view to having it discussed by 
the Security Council.85 Sanderson also decided UNTAC should 
not only remain in place in Kulasn, but be reinforced there as 
part of an overall policy that available UNTAC armed forces 
must, as he put it, "not move away from wherever there is 
trouble", but be "persistent" and "move in strength to 
establish [a] presence in order to prevent cease-fire 
violations". He ordered one of UNTAC7 s two mobile 
investigation teams into the district and that plans be 
quickly drawn up to station a company of Pakistani infantry 
there.85 He also directed that other UNTAC armed detachments 
that were beginning to deploy in Kampung Thom, Preah Vihear 
and Siem Reap should respond to NADK initiatives by spreading 
out as much as possible throughout the countryside in these
84 UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Level Two, Saturday, 3 0 May 1992, 
Agenda"; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, citing VoCP, 2 
June 1992; MilSitRep, 30 May 1992.
85 SSM, 1 June 1992; UNTAC-MC, "MMWG Emergency Meeting No 2,
1 June 1992"; MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.
86 MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.
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provinces.87 By 11 June, UNTAC troops were in location 
throughout non-NADK areas of Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham.88 
It thus became clear that UNTAC7 s priority was to use its 
armed forces to deter NADK attacks and not to provide 
protection for the cadre PDK had hoped to place in SoC- 
administered areas in eastern Cambodia.
The widening NADK offensive was accompanied by an 
escalating VGNUFC rhetorical war that intensified as UNTAC 
resisted NADK pressure. Radio calls on NADK to be prepared 
for more fighting and other actions to weaken SoC that were, 
whatever PDK tried to say or wanted to believe, outside the 
terms of the Paris Agreements and hardly indicative of mass 
support,89 were followed by rising hostility against Akashi 
and Sanderson. It insinuated that the "Chief of UNTAC and the 
UNTAC Military Representative" had "arduously sought by every 
means to get rid of the PDK".90 Another broadcast 
characterized Akashi and Sanderson as "unjust and biased".91 
On 31 May came VGNUFC7 s most menacing denunciation of UNTAC 
itself to date. It declared that during "recent
negotiations," Akashi and Sanderson had "used their rights and 
power beyond the framework of the Paris Agreements." They 
"did not pay any attention to the opinion of" PDK. Instead, 
"they decided upon all problems arbitrarily, thus clearly 
showing their stance as the advocates" of SoC. They were 
applying "pressures of threats morally and with brute force" 
in a manner similar to that of a "foreign aggressor", and 
their "work procedures" were "of colonialist nature." This
87 SSM, 3 June 1992.
88 MilSitRep, 11 June 1992.
89 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 1 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 26 May 
1992; and UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 3 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 28 and 
29 May 1992.
90 VGNUFC, 29 May 1992.
91 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 3 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 29 May
1992 .
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was something that "the Cambodian . . . national resistance 
forces absolutely cannot accept". This rhetoric brought PDK 
close to a public suggestion that it was preparing to resist 
UNTAC in the way that it would resist any external enemy.92 
It also laid the foundation for a VGNUFC broadcast on 2 June 
indicating that PDK was about to implement measures to prevent 
UNTAC from entering PDK-controlled areas to oversee 
demobilization or do anything else.93
UNTAC was not about to make any substantial concessions 
in response to such bluster. In a letter addressed to Khieu 
Samphan on 3 0 May, Akashi revealed he had written to Boutros- 
Ghali advising the Secretary-General "to alert the Security 
Council" to PDK intransigence and proposing that "specific 
measures" be taken against PDK "if the situation does not 
improve in the next few days".94 The next day, he publicly 
denounced PDK for its "total lack of cooperation" on 
demobilization and reiterated UNTAC7 s demand that PDK halt 
cease-fire violations. He warned that "strong measures" might 
be taken against PDK if NADK failed to begin taking steps to 
enter Phase Two.95 PDK faced a situation where virtually 
everything it had hoped to achieve through the Paris 
Agreements and everything it had attempted to do in connection 
with them had been obstructed or at least blunted. From PDK7s 
earliest ruses to NADK7s most recent gambits, the people's war 
script was being invalidated, even if Pol Pot and other senior 
leaders living in their splendidly isolated world of dogma and 
faith refused to see this.
92 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 2 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 30 May
1992 .
93 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 1 June
1992 .
94 Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Khieu Samphan, 30 May 1992.
95 UNTAC, "Text", 1 June 1992; SSM, 1 June 1992.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE PEACE PROCESS ENDS
Debate and Purge within the PDK Leadership Team
The pattern of the NADK attacks that began on 2 3 May in 
Kampung Thom and expanded by 28 May to Preah Vihear and Siem 
Reap and the tenor of VGNUFC broadcasts over the same period 
suggest that the "major decision" to which Tep Khunnal had 
referred on 2 6 May had in fact already been made by the covert 
leadership team. The gathering he attended, which reportedly 
opened on 27 or 2 8 May near Pail in, was evidently an 
opportunity for the participating NADK division leading cadre 
to ratify the pre-ordained results, including a harder line 
against UNTAC.1 Talking to Sanderson on 2 June, after 
attending the Pailin meeting, Tep Khunnal gave an account of 
it in which he distanced himself from his earlier association 
with Son Sen. Khunnal said the PDK leadership had decided not 
to proceed with Phase Two unless Khieu Samphan could wrest 
further concessions from Sihanouk, SoC and UNTAC. Echoing the 
leadership's fears of a repetition of the events of the 1950s, 
he indicated that unless things changed substantially, PDK 
figures would only be exposing themselves to the danger of 
assassination if they emerged to contest elections. He 
suggested that if the concessions PDK wanted could be 
obtained, the leadership remained prepared to go ahead with 
demobilization of NADK on PDK terms. However, he noted this 
view had been opposed by certain NADK "field commanders" who 
wanted "to keep fighting to the last drop". All the evidence 
suggests this was an allusion to Ta Mok and cadre closely 
associated with him.
Tep Khunnal also hinted that there was another line of
1 Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Demobilization of NADK Division 
450 and Other Information on the NADK", 9 June 1992.
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thinking within the PDK leadership that was concerned about 
the danger that PDK would suffer political and diplomatic 
damage as a result of the course that had been adopted. He 
implied that this viewpoint had been overruled by Pol Pot with 
the argument that in the end, "the people will be the judge" 
of whether the decision was right.2 Contemporary
circumstantial evidence and subsequent reports make it clear 
that the voice that had been overruled was Son Sen, and that 
the putative NADK Commander-in-Chief and PDK Vice Chairman had 
been on the losing side in internal PDK policy debates since 
late April.
There had been several public indications since the end 
of April that the long-standing and deep-rooted internal 
disputes within the senior PDK leadership had been exacerbated 
by the crisis in the implementation of the Paris Agreements in 
such a way as to result in Son Sen's de facto exclusion from 
the inner circle. Thus, although Son Sen had previously 
signed PDK public correspondence to UNTAC jointly with Khieu 
Samphan on both political and military matters, he suddenly 
ceased, without explanation, to do so. His last jointly 
signed letter was dated 2 6 April, when he and Khieu Samphan 
had objected to the Secretary-General's rehabilitation appeal 
and Sanderson's threat to postpone Phase Two.3 Son Sen's 
telegrammed support for the commitments to a cease-fire and 
NADK demobilization made by Tep Khunnal at the MMWG on 9 May 
was never publicized by VGNUFC, and the commitments were then 
explicitly repudiated and blatantly violated. Finally, on 24 
May, VGNUFC had hinted at splits within the PDK leadership in 
a broadcast that called on listeners to be "resolved to 
further vigorously uphold solidarity" in their determination 
to decimate PDK's enemies. As an UNTAC analysis noted at the 
time, this appeared to be an attempt to rally PDK rank-and-
2 UNTAC-MC, "Record of a Conversation Between Lt Gen
Sanderson and Mr Tep Khunnal, 3 June 1992".
3 VGNUFC, 3 May 1992
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file behind the increasingly hard and violent line that PDK 
was adopting.4
A subsequent report by journalist Nate Thayer, based on 
his conversations with several PDK cadre and spokespersons, 
suggested that Son Sen had argued that PDK hopes of keeping 
people's war going over the longer term could best be served 
under the existing circumstances by continuing to emphasize 
political as opposed to military struggle. The report 
indicated that Son Sen believed that the course of intensified 
military action and threatened non-participation in Phase Two 
would reduce PDK's chances for capitalizing on PDK's popular 
support to gain a governmental role through participation in 
elections. Thayer concluded that Son Sen's arguments "did not 
prevail during high-level meetings of the leadership ... in 
May 1992". He reported that as a result, Son Sen was relieved 
of whatever real functions came with his nominal position as 
NADK Commander-in-Chief and was obliged to undergo 
"reeducation" starting from June.5 In 1996, Ieng Sary would 
declare that Son Sen had still "wanted to implement the Paris 
Agreements" in order to be able "to join in the elections with 
UNTAC" . Sary said Son Sen had argued in favour of sticking to 
what had previously been "the general view: that given the
situation, to avoid further defeats, [PDK] had to change the 
form of the struggle" to a parliamentary one. However, Pol 
Pot had switched to the position that this route "was no good, 
that [PDK] would end up with nothing, smashed to smithereens 
like after [the Geneva Agreements of] 1954." Pol Pot's 
position was that it had become clear it was "impossible" for 
PDK to advance unless it relied more on armed struggle to 
translate its popular support into concrete gains.6
4 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK,' 29 May 1992, citing VGNUFC, 23 May
1992 .
5 Nate Thayer, "Shake-Up in KR Hierarchy", Phnom Penh Post, 
28 January-10 February 1994.
6 Interview with Ieng Sary, Chanthaburi, Thailand, 17 
December 1996.
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Ta Mok was no doubt delighted that Son Sen, whom he had
long criticized for impractical theorizing, had lost the
internal debate and been reduced to a voiceless cipher. 
Moreover, although Pol Pot had not come completely around to 
Ta Mok's position, the political eclipse of Son Sen was
accompanied by a formalization of Mok's takeover of Son Sen's 
old troops in Sector 1001. The sector was officially 
abolished and incorporated along with Sector 1003 into a new 
geo-political and geo-military unit, Sector 1005, answering to 
Ta Mok.7 With the formation of Sector 1005, all of PDK
Cambodia except Front 250 and Sector 102 was answerable either 
to Ta Mok or to his former Southwest Zone deputy, Sam Bit, who 
remained in direct charge of Sector 505. (See Map V.) Ta Mok 
was well-positioned to push for a further militarization of 
people's war. And with both Ieng Sary and Son Sen outside the 
decision-making loop, Khieu Samphan was left more than ever as 
nothing but a mouthpiece for Pol Pot.
As the covert leadership imploded, PDK relied on resumed 
conventional warfare in another futile attempt to kickstart 
its unsuccessful village offensive and scare the alliance into 
directly or indirectly facilitating rural insurrection. In 
other words, the old troika continued to believe that a 
gradual return to people's war combining conventional with 
village warfare would, if successful, shift the rural power 
balance and force a return to a sufficient degree of 
quadripartitism at the national level to make elections 
attractive to PDK. However, as Son Sen may have believed, 
NADK's conventional military actions were immediately blunted 
by SoC counter-actions that were supported by UNTAC and the 
international community and left PDK politically no better 
off. No doubt egged on by Ta Mok, PDK then further escalated 
its conventional military actions, but Pol Pot evidently
7 Christophe Peschoux, "Investigation into Reported Coerced 
Movements by Democratic Kampuchea of Civilians from Anlong Veng 
to Kampung Thom and Kampung Cham Provinces (Au Trav, 18-22 June 
1992)", pp.2-3; UNTAC-MC, "A Talk with Christophe Peschoux, 20 
September 1992".
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concluded that PDK had little choice but to climb down from 
some of its political demands. However, the gap between what 
Pol Pot's people's war could obtain in the villages and on 
conventional battlefields and what he considered preconditions 
for an electoral process that would be advantageous to PDK was 
too enormously wide to be bridged by new lurches in what Khieu 
Samphan was instructed to say.
The Failure of NADK's Conventional Warfare
The failure of the NADK offensive on its Battlefield 
Number One in north-central Cambodia, which remained centred 
on Kulaen district of Preah Vihear, proved how wide the gap was 
on the conventional military front. Not only did NADK attacks 
fail, but they failed in the context of condemnation by 
Sihanouk and UNTAC and support from them for CPAF counter­
attacks .
Initially, it had appeared that NADK might achieve some 
of its Battlefield Number One objectives. By 4 June, 
continuous shelling had prompted the flight of all villagers 
from Kulaen town, leaving only CPAF infantry and UNTAC 
observers in place.8 Meanwhile, SoC alleged, NADK launched 
simultaneous ground attacks in three districts of Siem 
province starting on 3 June, capturing one major objective in 
Svay Loe district, the village of Ta Siem, the next day.9
Instead of prompting UNTAC to agree to a greater degree 
of weakening of SoC than the Paris Agreements provided, PDK 
provoked SoC into successful counter-attacks that were backed 
by UNTAC and PDK's former coalition partners. Sihanouk 
reacted to the NADK attacks by condemning its attempts to
8 MilSitRep, 4 June 1992.
9 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC, 4 June 1992", 8 June 1992, citing a
press communique from the SoC Ministry of Defence; UNTAC-IED-D&A- 
SoC, 8-10 June 1992: 15 June 1992, citing VoCP, 9 June 1992;
MilSitRep, 3,4 and 5 June 1992.
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seize CPAF positions. He coupled this with a statement 
effusively praising Hun Sen for working hard for Cambodia's 
"defence" against PDK.10 UNTAC's position increasingly 
reflected Sihanouk's conviction that only SoC counter-force - 
and not mere international condemnation - could thwart NADK 
military activities,11 It thus backed SoC's immediate 
counter-operations. At a press conference after an SNC
meeting on 5 June, Akashi indicated that SoC should enjoy a 
right of self-defence vis-a-vis PDK analogous to that which a 
UN member state could legally exercise under Article 51 of the 
organization's charter. His remarks suggested that CPAF could 
fight back as long as Security Council actions were unable to 
prevent NADK attacks.12
SoC had been creating conditions for countering NADK 
militarily since 4 June, when CPAF began bringing in 
reinforcements to Kulasn and reorganizing its besieged forces 
there.13 This process continued the next day14 while SoC 
officials capitalized on the propaganda value of SRSG's 
remarks during their own post-SNC press conferences.15 CPAF 
in Kulaen then began a counter-attack that by 6 June had 
compelled NADK to pull back its artillery, mortars and troops. 
This brought a temporary end to the shelling,16 as a result
10 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 2, 3 and 4 June 1992.
11 MilSitRep, 12 June 1992, citing remarks by the Prince on 
11 June 1992.
12 Article 51 declares that nothing "shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace 
and security".
13 MilSitRep, 4 June 1992.
14 MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.
15 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC: 8 June 1992, 11 June 1992, citing VoCP,
8 June 1992.
15 MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.
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of which some villagers had by 8 June begun to return to the 
town and an UNTAC humanitarian assessment team was able to 
visit it in order to determine the extent of need for 
emergency aid to people who had fled the NADK offensive. As 
CPAF launched a second major counter-attack into areas seized 
by NADK,17 Pol Pot reportedly visited Ta Mok to confer about 
the situation.18 This was followed by an attempt by NADK to 
push CPAF back into Kulaen.19 However, by 11 June, CPAF had 
retaken the two villages west of Kulaen that NADK had captured 
at the end of May, and by mid-month it was following this up 
with attacks into areas in western Preah Vihear under NADK 
control since before the Paris Agreements.20 SoC also 
counter-attacked successfully in Siem Reap province 
immediately after the 5 June SNC. The one position CPAF had 
lost, Ta Siem in Svay Loe district, was regained on 7 June.21 
This halted serious NADK offensive action west of Kampung 
Thom.22
NADK attempted to keep military pressure on SoC, but was 
unsuccessful in turning the tide of battle back against CPAF. 
PDK allegations that UNTAC was failing to prevent CPAF from 
resupplying itself in Preah Vihear, Kampung Thom and Siem Reap 
provided the justification for NADK attacks on SoC targets in
17 MilSitRep, 6 June 1992; "Report on a Trip to Tbeng 
Meanchey ...".
18 MilSitRep, 8 June 1992. According to the report, the 
conference took place on 5 or 6 June.
19 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:10-15 June 1992, 19 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 13 June 1992.
20 MilSitRep, 12 June, 16 June, 17 June, 19 June, 2 0 June
1992 .
21 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:11-12 June 1992, 18 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 12 June 1992.
22 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:16-18 June 1992, 22 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 16 June 1992; VoCP, 13 and 20 June 1992; MilSitRep, 11 
June 1992.
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these provinces.23 This was followed on 10 June by the 
shelling of one CPAF outpost in Rovieng district of Preah 
Vihear and a ground attack on another. The latter, however, 
failed to achieve its objective,24 and NADK efforts to expand 
the Kampung Thom battlefield were still essentially 
forestalled.
Moreover, with UNTAC approval, CPAF was extending its 
self-defence counter-attacks to Route 12. As the SoC defense 
minister warned that CPAF would fight back where it had been 
"violated militarily",25 and Sihanouk blamed PDK for the 
continuing fighting,26 CPAF initiated a full-scale counter­
offensive with artillery barrages and armour thrusts on 14 
June. While UNTAC reconnoitred up the road behind CPAF lines, 
reinforced CPAF infantry launched into a "major battle"27 
described as the "most violent act of war in many months",26 
and the outnumbered NADK fell back.29 CPAF simultaneously 
launched harassment attacks on rural areas into which PDK had 
moved families since the Paris Agreements.30 In announcing 
the Route 12 operation, SoC officials said it had moved after 
getting the "green light" from UNTAC, and that its objective 
was to reopen the road. Akashi described its attacks as
23 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June and 21 June 1992, citing 
various VGNUFC broadcasts between 2 and 18 June 1992.
24 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:10-15 June 1992, 19 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 13 June 1992.
25 VoCP, 14 June 1992.
26 "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting, New Blow to Peace", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 12 June 1992.
27 MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.
28 "Northern Counter-Offensive Begins", AFP, Phnom Penh, 15 
June 1992.
29 "'Heaviest Fighting7 Since Accord" and "Phnom Penh 
Forces Regain Positions", AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 June 1992; SPK, 17 
June 1992.
30 MilSitRep, 16 June 1992.
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"necessary to maintain military equilibrium on the 
battlefield",31 and internally UNTAC was pleased that CPAF 
appeared "very determined" to clear Route 12.32 KPNLF 
meanwhile warned that unless PDK agreed to enter Phase Two, 
its remaining armed forces might have "to take action to fight 
against" NADK in Kampung Thom and elsewhere.33 Sihanouk 
backed the CPAF counter-offensive with a new condemnation of 
PDK, this time launched from Beijing on 18 June. The SoC 
defense minister responded to all this by expressing CPAF's 
"most profound gratitude" for the contribution he said was 
being made to "the success of the search for peace in 
Cambodia" by the Prince, other "fair-minded nationalist 
forces", the "international community" and Akashi.34
Another round of NADK attempts to regain the military 
initiative on Decision 30-4/s Battlefield Number One achieved 
at best negligible results. Minor advances met with CPAF 
counter-attacks35 that demonstrated CPAF7s "capacity to take 
on the NADK", "give it a thrashing" and take the war into PDK- 
controlled territory.35 In short, almost two months after 
Decision 30-4 had called on NADK to use conventional military 
means to expand PDK territorial control north and east out of 
Kampung Thom, the situation had hardly improved from the PDK 
point of view and in some ways had worsened.
31 SPK, 16 and 17 June 1992.
32 MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.
33 "KPNLF May Switch Alliance", AFP, Phnom Penh, 17 June
1992 .
34 VoCP, 18 and 19 June 1992.
35 UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to Phum Sophi (Kand[o?]l 
Thmei)", 22 June 1992; UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC: 10-15 June 1992, 19 June 
1992, citing VoCP, 13 June 1992; MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.
36 MilSitRep, 15,16,17,18,19 and 20 June 1992
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On-Going Failure of People's War at the Village Level
PDK was doing no better with rural people's war on 
Battlefield Number Two. Although the results of Decision 30- 
4's authorization of the use of a greater degree of violence 
in attempts to overthrow the SoC local administration 
throughout the country were reflected in the increasing number 
of reports to UNTAC headquarters from its military observers 
in the field, they revealed that PDK was achieving very little 
except scattered killings. The reports showed that the call 
for PDK to seize control of 500-600 villages a month by means 
short of outright NADK attack, to arm politically friendly 
peasants everywhere, and to kidnap or kill 400 local SoC
officials was barely implemented if at all in May, and that 
although it was carried out a little more actively in June, 
implementation remained at a much lower level than Decision 
30-4 had demanded. It also suggests that in fact those
villages that did change hands did so as a result of military 
force, not political persuasion. Finally, it indicated that 
CPAF often took back villages temporarily seized by NADK and 
sometimes retaliated by temporarily occupying villages in PDK 
zones.
Reports refer to the killing of a SoC police officer in
northeast Cambodia in late May37 and the killing of two more
in Siem Reap on 15 June.38 They cite the distribution of 
weapons to villagers in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap.39 
There were allegations that NADK "robbed . . . people" and 
"raided" one sub-district in Mongkulborei district on 6 and 9 
June, that it shelled a village Mong Reuhsei district in 
Batdambang province on 9 June, and that it launched shelling 
attacks on two positions and a ground assault on one village 
in Rattanamondul and iEk Phnum districts of Batdambang province
37 MilSitRep, 25 May 1992.
38 MilSitRep, 17 and 18 June 1992.
39 MilSitRep, 11, 12 and 13 June, 8 July 1992.
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on 14 and 15 June, respectively.40 The evidence indicates 
that CPAF retaliated for the shelling attack in Batdambang by 
launching a three-day operation on 15 June, which resulted in 
the temporary occupation of one PDK "liberated village".41 
Elsewhere, NADK allegedly attacked one village in Siem Reap 
around mid-June and "captured" two hamlets in Chi Kreng 
district in late June, but faced immediate CPAF counter­
pressure. NADK "plundered" one SoC-administered village in 
Kampung Cham province in early June and captured another on 24 
June. In Kampot, NADK carried out two small operations in the 
first half of May, initiating one clash north of the district 
seat of Kampung Trach early in the month and attacking a sub­
district in the province at mid-month. Toward the end of the 
month, there were unconfirmed allegations that it attacked a 
village in Kampung Trach. It attacked in Angkor Chey district 
of Kampot province on 25 June and south of the district seat 
of Dang Tong in the province on 26 June, but was repulsed both 
times. There were also attacks on villages in Steung Treng 
province.42 In Kah Kong, CPAF surrounded, fired on and 
expelled a group of NADK who had come into a village hoping to 
go house to house contacting villagers.43
The data suggests that in the almost two months since 
Decision 30-4, PDK had liberated fewer than the 20 villages 
that the directive suggested they should seize in a single 
day. Its quota of displacing SoC from the administration of 
perhaps a thousand villages by the end of June remained an 
absurdity.
40 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:16-18 June 1992, 22 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 16 June 1992; VoCP, 13 and 20 June 1992; MilSitRep, 11 June 
1992 .
41 VGNUFC, 25 June 1992; MilSitRep, 15 June 1992.
42 MilSitRep, 8,15 and 26 May and 12,17,18,24,25 and 27 June
1992 .
43 MilSitRep, 24 June 1992.
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The Parameters of Breakdown
As Pol Pot had expected, the failure of both the village 
and conventional aspects of NADK's people's war had meant the 
failure of PDK's political demands. Moreover, the crisis 
engendered by attempting to use conventional warfare to turn 
the situation had not been of the sort that Pol Pot had 
predicted. Even during initial NADK advances, Sihanouk and 
UNTAC had not flinched, and their position was firmer than 
ever after SoC's counter-attack. Military failure was 
increasingly being translated into political and diplomatic 
isolation. The Pol Pot-Nuon Chea-Ta Mok troika was 
nevertheless more and more inclined to fall back on armed 
struggle to recoup its deteriorating position, even if this 
meant further isolation, including international condemnation. 
PDK thus responded to threats of isolation by signalling its 
readiness to oppose UNTAC's implementation of the Agreements 
regardless of the extent to which PDK might be opposed by 
Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and the international 
community. It repeatedly warned that isolation would not 
work, that it would fight to maintain its position even if it 
had to do so all alone. The essence of this threat was the 
prospect of a further escalation and generalization of the 
armed struggle aspects of people's war with a view toward 
trying to repeat the feats achieved by the Vietnamese 
Communists when faced with a similar situation when the 
implementation of their Paris Agreement had not gone to their 
liking.
Bilateral discussions between Khieu Samphan and Akashi on 
3 June provided additional confirmation - if any was needed - 
that PDK had no reason to be optimistic that its diplomacy was 
vis-a-vis UNTAC was succeeding. While Khieu Samphan damned 
UNTAC as "a Western operation", he probed Akashi to find out 
whether any of UNTAC's personnel might be sympathetic to the
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PDK position. Akashi disabused him of this hope.44 This was 
combined with warnings to PDK that further NADK military 
action would preclude any UNTAC neutralization of SoC,45 while 
Boutros-Ghali signalled his support for UNTAC's position by 
writing to Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan to criticize PDK for not 
having met any of UNTAC's demands.46
In a letter to Sihanouk the same day as his meeting with 
Akashi, Khieu Samphan made a last-ditch attempt to persuade 
the Prince to re-establish his earlier coalition with PDK. 
Only if Sihanouk shifted his ground would PDK participate in 
"a liberal democratic system" with the hope of being "given 
duties and a role in the future government".47 PDK was also 
"strongly lobbying" FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF "to support a 
delay of Phase Two".48 Private efforts toward this end were 
combined with public propaganda.49
However, a PDK statement on 4 June indicated that it no 
longer harboured any real hope that this high-level political 
work would succeed, at least in the short run. It implied 
publicly for the first time publicly implied that Sihanouk and 
PDK's former coalition partners were betraying the nation by 
failing to back the PDK position, and vowed that PDK would 
nevertheless maintain its stance, regardless of how isolated
44 SSM, 3 and 4 June 1992; MilSitRep, 3 June 1992.
45 UNTAC, [no component noted], "La strategie des Khmers 
rouges et leur perception de 1'avenir", 9 June 1992, pp. 1-6; 
UNTAC-MC, "Future Possible Operations by NADK", 30 May 1992, 
pp.1-4 .
46 SSM, 5 June 1992; author's notes on Akashi's press 
conference of 5 June 1992.
47 VGNUFC, 5 June 1992.
48 MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.
49 See, for example, VGNUFC, 2 June 1992.
it became.50
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Sihanouk's response to Khieu Samphan's letter indicated 
that PDK was right to be pessimistic. In another slap that 
was publicized by SoC media, he condemned PDK for "malevolent 
deeds", "human rights violations" and "terrorism" in Kampung 
Thom, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap and other provinces.51 Sihanouk 
also stood fast at "Cambodians-only" SNC on 4 June, at which 
Khieu Samphan threatened that PDK would not enter Phase Two 
unless it got some concessions.52 The Prince echoed Akashi's 
earlier admonition to Khieu Samphan53 by warning that unless 
NADK demobilized, PDK would face the Security Council 
action.54 Sihanouk privately told UNTAC he believed that PDK 
was now determined to "sabotage" the Paris Agreements, even if 
it might continue "to pay lip service to" them. Thereby 
encouraged "to be prepared for the worst" and resolved not to 
be "sucked in" by PDK tactics aimed at weakening SoC, UNTAC 
began to formulate elements for inclusion in a Security 
Council Resolution condemning PDK. In this context, it also 
began internal discussions "about possible ways to put the 
economic squeeze" on PDK by imposing international economic 
sanctions on it.55
This had been UNTAC's thinking when it decided to use the 
SNC of 5 June to "sharply display" that PDK was "solely
50 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 4 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 3 June
1992 .
51 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:4 June 1992, 8 June 1992, citing VoCP, 
4 June 1993.
52 UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992.
53 Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Khieu Samphan, 30 May 1992.
54 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:30 May-4 June 1992, 5 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 2, 3 and 4 June 1992.
55 SSM, 1 June 1992; MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.
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answerable" for obstruction of Phase Two56 and thus prepare 
the ground for Security Council action against it, including 
sanctions.57 At the same time, Akashi was determined not to 
allow PDK to undermine prospects for getting donor pledges of 
rehabilitation aid, which he feared it might be able to do if 
it appeared that the whole peace process was blocked by PDK 
refusal to demobilize NADK. In order to maintain at least the 
appearance of continued momentum towards an end to military 
conflict, he decided that UNTAC should adhere to the formal 
launch of Phase Two on 13 June. However, he insisted that 
cantonment of SoC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF armed forces should 
proceed initially in what he described internally as a 
"symbolic" way, and in particular that nothing should be done 
to expose CPAF to "danger".58
Sihanouk opened the 5 June meeting by declaring his 
continued full support for Akashi in all matters. A k a s h i  
reiterated UNTAC's position that PDK was obliged to implement 
the Paris Agreements "in their entirety", including above all 
demobilization of NADK. Khieu Samphan responded with a 
prepared statement that focused on dismantling SoC. He 
chastised Akashi and other UNTAC officials who he said were 
"taking pleasure" in maintaining co-operation with SoC. He 
declared that PDK must not simply "participate in the SNC" but 
through it "jointly manage state affairs". Akashi and 
Sihanouk roundly denounced Khieu Samphan for setting political 
pre-conditions for demobilization of NADK, and FUNCINPEC and 
KPNLF supported this stance. Akashi insisted that the Paris 
Agreements allowed UNTAC to "interact with" SoC, and Sihanouk 
chided Khieu Samphan for attempting to renegotiate the treaty. 
He called on PDK to proceed with Phase Two and then on that 
basis attempt to sort out remaining problems. FUNCINPEC and
56 SSM, 3 June 1992.
57 "UN Chief Challenges Khmer Rouge Leader on Impasse", 
Reuter, Phnom Penh, 3 June 1992.
58 SSM, 5 June 1992.
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KPNLF backed this position. Ranariddh stressed that ANRI 
forces had been entering regroupment sites since 3 June, and 
KPNLF declared that its armed forces would also very soon 
regroup and canton.59 With the backing of everyone else thus 
stated, Akashi announced his decision that UNTAC would 
initiate a modified cantonment process without PDK rather than 
allow its opposition to bring the implementation of the Paris 
Agreements to a halt.60
Threats of Sanctions
At a post-SNC press conference, Akashi called for a 
"concerted international effort" to pressure PDK to demobilize 
NADK. He expressed confidence that the Security Council would 
take "action" to try to get it to comply with its Paris 
Agreements obligations and revealed that the Permanent Five 
members of the Council were "already discussing what measures 
to adopt."61
However, PDK had already defiantly reiterated that it was 
prepared to struggle alone against Sihanouk's unchanged 
stance, UNTAC's threats of international and domestic 
isolation and CPAF military actions. Declaring, as the 
Vietnamese Communists had done when they were planning to 
escalate their military struggle in 1974, that it considered 
the situation "deadlocked", PDK indicated it was prepared to 
fight both biased individuals in UNTAC and an international 
cabal of hidden enemies who were implementing a secret pact 
aimed at the destruction of PDK.62 On 9 June, an NADK letter
59 UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992; and "Statement by Mr Akashi, 
Meeting of the Supreme National Council, Item 1: Readiness of 
Parties for Phase II, 5 June 1992".
60 UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 5 June 1992.
61 Author's and Carney's notes on the conference.
62 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 11 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 5 June
1992 .
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to Sanderson formally barred UNTAC from entering PDK- 
administered zones for any purpose, except to maintain its 
UNAMIC-era foothold in Pailin.63 This was followed by an NADK 
"joint communique" that again signalled the PDK's readiness to 
fight alone. It condemned "plans to violate the ... Paris 
Agreements" by those who it said were "continuing to maintain" 
SoC "to rule the country". It recalled that "in the past, . . . 
NADK" had "joined . . . other national and international forces" 
like Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, the West and the UN to 
"achieve the Paris Agreements" . Now, however, even if these 
forces would "not implement the Paris .. . Agreements" 
according to PDK demands, NADK would "earnestly do so" without 
them.64
The SNC of 10 June thus opened with UNTAC officially 
barred from entry into PDK zones but with CPAF having 
demonstrated an ability to hold its own against NADK. Akashi 
began by damning the NADK letter of 9 June as "a clear breach 
of the Paris Agreements". Sihanouk's criticism of the PDK's 
refusal to proceed with demobilisation was again backed by 
FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. While announcing that the initial 
steps to regroup and canton "selected" SoC, FUNCINPEC and 
KPNLF armed forces would "commence as planned", Akashi 
reiterated that they would continue to enjoy the right "to 
legitimate self-defence". UNTAC would not "do nothing to 
destroy the military balance" or otherwise weaken CPAF, ANKI 
or the KPNLF vis-a-vis NADK, which would not "be permitted to 
take advantage of the cantonment process".65 UNTAC's policy 
was that CPAF regular forces should not "be . . . disarmed 
unless the security situation permits", that SoC provincial 
forces should "continue defensive duties and not canton in
63 SSM, 9 June 1992; MilSitRep, 10 June 1992; "Statement by 
Mr Akashi, Readiness of the Parties for Phase II, 10 June 1992".
64 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 11 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 10 June
1992 .
65 UNTAC-OPA-SNC, 10 June 1992.
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areas where there is insecurity", and that SoC militia should 
"stay in place as long as" NADK "marauders" threatened SoC 
local authority.66
Khieu Samphan replied by insisting that the only solution 
to the deadlock was to strengthen the SNC vis-a-vis SoC.67 
Akashi cast aside this argument by declaring that UNTAC would 
proceed to establish "control mechanisms" in SoC-, FUNCINPEC- 
and KPNLF-administered areas along the procedural lines that 
Khieu Samphan had refused to accept in earlier SNCs.68 The 
SRSG then turned to preparations for the Tokyo conference on 
rehabilitation that UNTAC had been busily planning with 
various governments and international organizations, and which 
was now slated to open on 22 June. Laying down a 
justification for budgetary and balance of payments support 
for SoC, he explained that SoC must be "able to function 
adequately" in order for rehabilitation to work.69 The SRSG 
then revealed in order to ensure that PDK could not use the 
SNC to sabotage rehabilitation, UNTAC would for the time being 
unilaterally "take the decisions it deems appropriate" on this 
matter.70 Moreover, Akashi's proposal for by-passing PDK 
objections was, as the post-SNC communique put it, "adopted 
while [a] reservation was made by one partie".71 This 
prompted Khieu Samphan to repeat the criticism of Akashi's 
decision-making tactics that he had made on 2 6 May, and this 
time to add a new admonition, Khieu Samphan vowed not only
66 MilSitRep, 12 and 13 June 1992.
67 "Intervention of HE Mr Khieu Samphan, Member of the SNC 
and President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party, at the SNC 
Meeting on 10 June 1992: Agenda Item 1".
68 "... Readiness of the Parties for Phase II ...".
69 "Statement to the SNC By Mr Akashi, 10 June 1992".
70 "Statement on the Procedure for the Clearance of 
Rehabilitation Projects, 10 June 1992".
71 "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, 10 June 1992".
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that PDK could "not be forced to comply" with Akashi's 
decisions, but that it would not "remain idle" when confronted 
by his supposed breaches of the political settlement.72
However, as Akashi told the press after the SNC, UNTAC 
was not prepared to allow rehabilitation to be blocked by 
Khieu Samphan's "rigid position",73 which UNTAC believed aimed 
to make Cambodia financially "ungovernable". UNTAC therefore 
began conveying specific rehabilitation plans individually to 
the Cambodian parties in preparation for the gathering in 
Japan.74
UNTAC combined this position with exploration of ways of 
putting economic pressure on PDK. It began pursuing a route 
to which the Permanent Five had alluded at the 5 June SNC, 
which was to have Thailand convince PDK to change course.75 
After the SNC of 10 June, Akashi seems to have suggested to 
Boutros-Ghali that the Security Council consider requesting 
the Thai Government to close the Thai-Cambodian border to end 
Thai military dealings with PDK. While the US, Australian and 
French Governments worked to convince the Thai Government that 
it should do so, Boutros-Ghali began to apply step-by-step 
diplomatic pressure on PDK. In a report to the Security 
Council, he stressed persuasion but warned of further action 
when he declared it should continue to "consider what action 
it could take to achieve [its] objective" of obtaining PDK 
compliance with Phase Two,76 A statement by the Council's
72 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 21 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 11 June
1992 .
73 SPK, 11 June 1992.
74 SSM, 11 June 1992.
75 "Statement of the 'Permanent Five Plus' Coordinator", 5 
June 1992.
76 SPK, 13 June 1992, quoting AFP, 11 June 1992; "UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on Phase Two", AFP, New York, 12 
June 1992.
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president on 12 June expressed deep concern about the PDK's 
refusal to allow UNTAC deployment and called upon PDK to 
comply strictly with its commitments under the Paris 
Agreements.77 TIN headquarters had already decided that if 
this demarche had no effect, then a Security Council 
resolution incorporating stronger terms should follow.76
UNTAC7s steadfast position reflected its growing 
confidence, based on direct evidence, that PDK was militarily 
weak, diplomatically isolated, bereft of organized political 
allies and also, from everything it could surmise, lacked 
popular backing.
PDK Withdraws From the Phnom Penh Battlefield as SoC Threatens 
All-Out War
SoC was meanwhile laying out its preferred longer-term 
scenario if PDK continued to violate the Paris Agreements 
despite Security Council censure. It said the Council should 
in that case declare the PDK "rebels" who could have no part 
in the SNC and also endorse "the use of force" by the 
international community against it.79 It also mooted the 
possibility that PDK leaders - overt and covert - would be 
tried for genocide.80 After SoC warned that it was 
contemplating resumption of a full-scale war against PDK, 
"with or without the support of the international 
community",81 PDK effectively withdrew from Battlefield Number
77 UN, Security Council, "Statement of the President of the 
Security Council", 12 June 1992.
78 MilSitRep, 12 June 1992.
79 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC: 8 June 1992, 11 June 1992, citing VoCP, 
8 June 1992; "Hor Nam Hong Warns KR to Comply with Plan", AFP, 
Phnom Penh, 17 June 1992.
80 UNTAC-IED-D&A-SoC:8-10 June 1992, 15 June 1992, citing 
VoCP, 8 and 9 June 1992.
81 "Foreign Minister Warns of 'Inevitable War7", AFP, Phnom 
Penh, 12 June 1992.
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Three, thus abandoning a theatre of diplomatic combat that Pol 
Pot had insisted in February was essential to PDK survival. 
Apparently fearing that its representatives in Phnom Penh 
might be at severe risk from an attack like that of November 
1991, PDK started to remove them.82 Ever since Khieu Samphan 
had permanently replaced Son Sen as PDK's sole SNC 
representative, he had made only brief visits to Phnom Penh. 
Over the next fortnight, the PDK junior diplomats who manned 
PDK offices in the absence of Khieu Samphan stopped appearing 
at technical-level quadripartite gatherings they had 
previously attended. By 20 June, Nuon Bunnau, Tep Khunnal and 
all but the most junior PDK cadre who were assigned to MMWG 
duties had also left Phnom Penh, and from 22 June, NADK began 
failing to appear at MMWG gatherings in the capital.83
On 12 June, PDK declared that it would not attend the 
Tokyo Conference on the economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.84 
UNTAC interpreted the declaration as a PDK attempt to "doom 
major donor commitments" by giving donors the impression that 
the peace process was collapsing.85 It thus decided to compel 
it to attend. As part of this strategy, Akashi upped the 
diplomatic ante by warning PDK that the conference would be an 
opportunity for the foreign signatories of the Paris 
Agreements "to take stock of the situation" during sideline 
discussions about how to react to PDK intransigence.86 The 
PDK took this hint that unless it attended, it would give 
UNTAC an unopposed "opportunity to build up solidarity" 
against it. It could not help seeing that UNTAC was "shifting 
to a hard approach vis-a-vis the PDK" that ultimately aimed
82 SSM, 6 June 1992; MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.
83 MilSitRep, 20,22,26,28 and 30 June 1992.
84 "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting ...".
65 International Herald-Tribune, 13-14 June 1992;
MilSitRep, 16 June 1992.
86 "Khmer Rouge to Boycott Meeting ...".
277
"to isolate [it] internationally in such a way as to cut off 
[its] opportunities for resupply" if NADK did not 
demobilize.87
UNTAC7s determination not to give in to PDK's political 
demands was coupled with a conviction that it must proceed 
with implementation of the supervision and control aspects of 
the Paris Agreements vis-a-vis SoC, but in a way that was 
mindful not to weaken unfairly victims of NADK action.88 At 
the SNC of 5 June Akashi had implied that the failure of NADK 
to demobilize might mean "no sure UNTAC administrative control 
of the administrative apparatus" of SoC, "no neutral political 
environment; and "no certainty that human rights will be 
respected.1,89 However, proceeding with formal commencement 
of control of SoC was, like the symbolic beginning of Phase 
Two, a way of trying to maintain a peace process momentum in 
defiance of PDK non-cooperation. By moving toward supervision 
and control of SoC, UNTAC also undermined PDK's chances of 
carrying out united front work to take advantage of SoC's on­
going efforts to prevent or curtail FUNCINPEC and KPNLF 
political activities, including what UNTAC considered "absurd" 
justifications for threatening to arrest FUNCINPEC and KPNLF 
activists.90 It aimed to prevent PDK exploitation of 
"FUNCINPEC and KPNLF fears about finding themselves face-to- 
face with a CPP attempting to suffocate them and prevent the 
development of their activities among the population".91
UNTAC therefore decided to announce that it was going 
formally to inaugurate control and supervision of SoC on 1
87 MilSitRep, 12,13 and 15 June 1992.
88 "Strategie des Khmers rouges", pp.1-6; "Future Possible 
Operations by NADK", pp.1-4.
89 "Statement by Mr Akashi, Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, Item 1: Readiness of Parties for Phase II, 5 June 1992",
90 MilSitRep, 2 June 1992.
91 "Strategie des Khmers rouges ", pp.1-6.
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July, despite the serious delays and other deficiencies that 
were denying it the quantity and quality of civilian staff 
needed to effect its civil administration mandate.92 It would 
stick to this date despite recognition that the planned 
announcement was, as the senior UNTAC official in charge of 
this part of UNTAC's work put it, mere "cinema, not effective 
control". It would continue to insist that however imperfect 
UNTAC's attempts even at modest control of the SoC civil 
administration might realistically have to be, it was the only 
answer to PDK concerns about whether the SNC was accomplishing 
its mission.93
PDK's 14 June Proposal
PDK tried to regain the initiative on the political front 
on 14 June by for the first time clearly specifying what it 
wanted in terms of empowering itself vis-a-vis SoC. In a 
partial climb-down that conceded that PDK involvement in 
control of SoC must be subordinate to UNTAC, it called for the 
establishment of quadripartite commissions "under the direct 
control of UNTAC" in which PDK, the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC would 
sit alongside SoC "to carry out policies and decisions made by 
UNTAC and the SNC" in the five main administrative fields of 
foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security 
and information. It implied that these commissions would 
displace SoC's ministers, deputy ministers and the like, 
although "some section heads and personnel of the existing 
administrative structure could be maintained" under UNTAC 
"control or supervision" in order "to carry out the policies 
and decisions of UNTAC and the SNC".94
92 SSM, 6 June 1992.
93 SSM, 11 June 1992.
94 PDK, "Some Main Ideas of the Democratic Kampuchea Party 
to Make the Supreme National Council Become a Legitimate Body and 
Acquire Power and Means to Administer, Together with UNTAC, All 
Cambodian State Affairs and to Ensure the Implementation of the 
23 October 1991 Paris Agreements During the Transitional Period,
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Internally, UNTAC was "very opposed" to a proposal that 
it saw as a thinly disguised "call for the dismantling of the 
SoC" and a "recipe for paralysis of the administration", with 
which UNTAC could allow no compromise.95 Nevertheless, with 
the Tokyo meeting looming, UNTAC wanted to maintain and to be 
seen as maintaining a dialogue with PDK.96 It therefore 
decided to treat the 14 June proposal as "an opportunity to 
have a meeting" with PDK, but one at which UNTAC would simply 
reiterate its existing position. The resulting appearance of 
dialogue would buy time for UNTAC to get ready for "other 
measures" if PDK, as UNTAC expected, it did not back down.97
UNTAC thus continued working on ways to put economic 
pressure on PDK. It elaborated a concept, broached by 
Sihanouk at the SNC of 7 May,98 of establishing an SNC 
technical advisory committee on the environment.99 The 
objectives of this body included curtailing Thai military and 
commercial involvement in PDK's environmentally-damaging 
exploitation of gemstones and timber, thus using the 
environmental issue to reduce PDK revenues from taxation of 
such ventures. SoC, meanwhile, continued to demand that 
unless NADK demobilized, PDK should be written out of the 
Paris Agreements and UNTAC's mandate "be enhanced" to allow it 
to initiate military action.100
14 June 1992".
95 MilSitRep, 15 and 17 June 1992.
96 SSM, 6 June 1992; MilSitRep, 6 June 1992.
97 MilSitRep, 17 and 18 June 1992.
98 "Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National 
Council, 7 May 1992".
99 Author's notes on Akashi's briefing to UNTAC senior 
staff, 26 June 1992.
100 VoCP, 20 June 1992.
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Showdown in Tokyo and Remobilization of NADK
Faced with such cajoling and threats, PDK backed down and 
announced that Khieu Samphan would go to Japan with the now 
powerless Son Sen, whose function would be to appear but not 
to speak.101 Even though the military and political 
situations on the ground in no way lent strength to the 
already beleaguered PDK diplomatic position, it attempted to 
derail calls for an anti-PDK sideline meeting. Khieu Samphan 
addressed a letter (which the de facto non-person Son Sen was 
not allowed to sign) to Boutros-Ghali and Ali Alatas, the 
Indonesian foreign minister and a co-chairman of the Paris 
Conference, proposing "that all signatories of the Paris 
Agreements should meet in order to reaffirm the implementation 
of the various points" in them.102
Upon arrival in Tokyo, Khieu Samphan indicated that PDK 
wanted to attend both the ministerial conference on 
reconstruction and the sideline discussions on wider political 
issues,103 which it now appeared would take the form of an 
expanded SNC attended by the various foreign ministers who had 
come for the rehabilitation gathering.104 UNTAC informed 
Khieu Samphan that although it wanted to maintain dialogue 
with PDK, it was not prepared to drop budgetary and balance of 
payments support for SoC and not prepared to meet any PDK 
demands that went beyond the letter and spirit of the Paris 
Agreements. While UNTAC told donors in meetings from which 
Khieu Samphan was excluded that fiscal assistance to SoC was 
necessary to underpin rehabilitation by ensuring the
101 "Khieu Samphan to Attend Tokyo Conference", Reuter, 
Bangkok, 19 June 1992.
102 VGNUFC, 22 June 1992.
103 "Khmer Rouge Agree to Join Cambodian Conferences", AFP, 
Tokyo, 21 June 1992.
104 "Cautious Optimism as Khmer Rouge Comes to the Party", 
AFP, Tokyo, 21 June 1992.
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functioning of Cambodia's "administrative machinery",105 the 
Permanent Five conveyed a three-point message to PDK via 
Sihanouk. The Permanent Five had decided they would never 
allow PDK "to reopen major political questions" related to the 
Paris Agreements in a way that would rebound in its 
favour.106 The Prince therefore told PDK, first, that there 
was no question of reconvening the Paris Conference to 
consider the PDK's demands; second, that the international 
community was determined to insist on demobilisation of NADK; 
and, third, that it should resolve any differences with UNTAC 
by compromise. Khieu Samphan rejected these appeals as Son 
Sen said nothing.107
As VGNUFC blamed the continuing "deadlock" on the 
"allies" and warned that unless someone helped PDK to ensure 
that the "illegitimate puppet regime" of SoC ceased ruling 
Cambodia, war would resume,108 UNTAC and the Permanent Five 
were drafting a "non-paper" for presentation to a special SNC 
session scheduled for after the rehabilitation conference. 
The document aimed to establish clearly the limits of what the 
international community was prepared to offer PDK politically 
and to present PDK with an ultimatum about demobilization.109
Drafting took place as the ministerial conference went 
into session and proceeded to decisions that showed PDK had
105 "Presentation by the Director of Rehabilitation, UNTAC, 
Bernt Bernander, Ministerial Conference on the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation of Cambodia, Working Group Meeting, 20 June 1992".
106 MilSitRep, 17 June 1992.
107 UNTAC, "The Special Session of the SNC Meeting at Tokyo 
on 22 June: The summary of the meeting and various moves made
before the meeting", 23 June 1992.
108 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 28 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 21 June
1992 .
109 "Special Session of the SNC Meeting ...". "Non-paper" 
is diplomatese for an officially "unofficial" policy document.
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utterly failed to undermine donor confidence.110 To UNTAC' s 
pleasantly surprised delight, nearly $880 million in aid was 
pledged111, close to $300 million more than Boutros-Ghali had 
requested. This success prompted a standing ovation from all 
participants except Khieu Samphan and Son Sen. Both sat 
silently while others applauded, and Son Sen looked 
particularly "wrought".112 The conference declaration
crowned their discomfiture by calling on PDK to "cooperate 
with UNTAC in the full and timely" demobilization of NADK and 
praising UNTAC for the "progress" it was making toward 
organizing elections. It ignored PDK's 14 June proposal and 
instead called on the UN to "accelerate" the deployment of 
UNTAC so that "all essential UN civil administration 
personnel" could be deployed "as soon as possible" in order to 
effect UNTAC's supervision and control mandate according to 
the terms of Paris.113
The "Non-Paper"
PDK was then confronted with the non-paper put together 
by the Permanent Five. It demanded "as of this day a binding 
commitment" by PDK "to assure full and effective cooperation 
with UNTAC" to take the steps necessary for demobilization 
under UNTAC supervision. Reversing the conditionality that 
PDK had attempted to establish, it suggested that PDK 
compliance was necessary in order to make it possible for the 
SNC to "assume a more active role in developing advice" for 
UNTAC". In a phrase that seemed intended to entice PDK into 
the meeting that UNTAC wanted to have in response to PDK's 14 
June proposal, the paper further suggested that compliance 
would mean that the establishment of new SNC-UNTAC
110 MilSitRep, 23 June 1992.
111 "MCRRC, Tokyo, 22 June 1992, Commitments Made for the 
Rehabilitation Period".
112 MilSitRep, 25 June 1992; SSM, 25 June 1992.
113 "Declaration on peace", Japan Times, 23 June 1992
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"consultative mechanisms" could "be considered". However, the 
paper also endorsed "multilateral assistance and budget 
support activities" for SoC and other cooperating parties. 
UNTAC, not the SNC, would "coordinate" the aid and "supervise 
the delivery of assistance or expenditure of money."114
In what Khieu Samphan described as a "preliminary 
assessment" of the non-paper, he argued that the SNC needed to 
be strengthened not only vis-a-vis SoC, but also vis-a-vis an 
UNTAC that could no longer be trusted. Ali Alatas, to whom 
PDK had fruitlessly written to request a reconvening of the 
Paris Conference, then rose to ensure that PDK was not allowed 
to distort the meaning of the non-paper and to put a stop to 
its attempts to twist the Paris Agreements themselves. He 
said the issue at hand - and the main thrust of the non-paper 
- was what needed to be done to provide the SNC with the means 
of realising its advisory and consultative role without 
reopening negotiations about the "nature" of the SNC. Alatas' 
presentation made it clear that the non-paper rejected the 
substance of PDK's demands. In particular, while it promised 
PDK that UNTAC would talk to it about its proposal to 
establish quadripartite commissions in between UNTAC and the 
SoC administration, it gave no ground toward transformation of 
the SNC into an administrative body or the replacement of 
UNTAC control of SoC by PDK supervision of it.115
Upon his return from Tokyo, a buoyed Akashi insisted that 
UNTAC would stand fast that the SNC could not "function as a 
government", and that SoC's administrative structures must 
"continue to exist". It would not accept suggestions that
this position might have to be changed because of any 
"weaknesses or delays in UNTAC's implementation of supervision 
and control in the field of civilian administration". It
114 "Tokyo Non-Paper, 2 2 June 1992".
115 UNTAC, "Report on the Special Ministerial-level Supreme 
National Council (SNC) meeting, Tokyo, 22 June 1992".
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would not accommodate PDK demands even if SoC was able "to get 
away with things which it should not be able to do". At the 
same time, UNTAC would continue to "welcome the participation" 
of PDK in existing forums, like the SNC. It would not 
"exclude anyone", but would make "contingency plans" for "a 
fundamental reassessment of UNTAC's mandate" if PDK and NADK 
should continue "excluding themselves" . In the meantime, UN 
armed forces would remain "just outside NADK locations, ready 
to go into them at any time", and UNTAC would continue to "not 
push for cantonment" of CPAF where there was insecurity.116
PDK Climbs Down Politically While Remobilizina NADK
The enormity of PDK's diplomatic defeat in Tokyo, which 
stunned PDK as much as it brought unexpected jubilation for 
UNTAC, placed in even more stark relief the extent to which 
PDK's future would be decided by the level of popular support 
that it could mobilize through people's war. Certainly, as 
the people's-war-through-peace-agreement script suggested, SoC 
was not going to cede any real power to "the people" without 
a fight, and "the alliance" was not going to give anything of 
substance to PDK unless forced to do so. Although taken aback 
by them, PDK did not have to give up any illusions about the 
nature of "the alliance" because of what had happened in 
Tokyo. Similarly, although stung by incidents of SoC 
repression and successive CPAF counterattacks, such behaviour 
by "the enemy" was for PDK perfectly in character. The 
illusions remained with regard to the behaviour of "the 
people". If they were not acting according to the script, it 
still must be not because there was something wrong with the 
script, or even something wrong with the people, but for some 
other reason. That reason should not be sabotage at the 
decision-making level, since decision-making authority was 
more than ever in the hands of the old troika. Bad 
implementation of good decisions was always a possibility, and
116 Author's notes on Akashi's report to UNTAC senior staff, 
26 June 19 92.
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the solution would then be, as it had been in 1975-78, purges 
all up and down the hierarchy. For the time being, however, 
the leadership was convinced that they could still make the 
script work by adding more violence to the fight against SoC, 
rather than turning violence downward and outward. On the 
other hand, until violence could make popularity happen, PDK 
would also have to scale down some of its demands vis-a-vis 
UNTAC, so that when people's war finally got off the ground 
and created the necessary pressures, the process of working 
through UNTAC and the SNC to weaken SoC from above could be 
put back on track.
VGNUFC initially responded to Tokyo by repeating PDK's 
futile request that a reconvened Paris Conference consider its 
demands. In a broadcast that suggested the situation had 
become totally polarized, it said PDK and its enemies were 
"two essences" that were "completely different like oil and 
water" and therefore could not mix.117 It characterized 
Akashi and other senior UNTAC officials as "crooked" and 
"dishonest people" who had "used trickery at negotiating 
tables" in Tokyo to "sustain and allow the Phnom Penh puppet 
regime ... to further administer Cambodia". Apparently 
referring to UNTAC backing for CPAF counter-offensives in 
Kulaen, on Route 12 and elsewhere, the radio also condemned 
UNTAC's leaders for having "militarily used threats . . . to 
subdue" NADK. It warned that PDK would nevertheless continue 
to "unrelentingly insist" on its position.118
This rhetoric was, however, belied by a PDK diplomatic 
climb-down a few days later, which was contained in a new PDK 
"proposal . . . on cooperation between UNTAC and the SNC" put 
forward on 2 7 June. It conceded that the SNC was "not a 
government", and for the first time in months, there was no
117 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 28 June 1992, citing VGNUFC, 22, 23 
and 24 June 1992 .
118 UNTAC-IED-D&A-PDK, 2 July 1992, citing VGNUFC, 25 June
1992.
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suggestion that the SNC should play an administrative role. 
Moreover, for the first time since the Paris Agreements, it 
also admitted the reality that there were four "existing 
administrative structures", including one belonging to PDK, in 
the country. In addition it said all four, including SoC, 
should "be maintained and continue to operate in conformity 
with the provisions of the [Paris] Agreements" and dropped 
calls for the removal of senior SoC officials. However, it 
tried to stretch the passage in the non-paper offering talks 
about establishment of new SNC-UNTAC "consultative mechanisms" 
into a suggestion that an agreement had already been reached 
that such mechanisms would "be ... created as need be". To 
implement this supposed deal, it proposed that "within the 
existing administrative structures ... of all Cambodian 
parties, Consultative Committees of the SNC be set up."119
The Peace Process Is Dead
Although UNTAC read the PDK climb-down as an "essentially 
positive" signal, it internally rejected its proposal for the 
establishment of consultative committees as something "for 
which the Agreements do not provide".120 The gap on this 
point had been narrowed, but was still very far from closed.
It never would be. Despite Akashi's successful efforts 
to persuade international donors otherwise, the peace process 
that would include PDK was in fact dead. As an internal UNTAC 
assessment suggested, PDK leaders were now totally convinced 
the political and diplomatic situation was such that, as Ta 
Mok had insisted, they would be "nothing without their armed 
forces". Certainly, if they allowed NADK to be "disarmed and 
demobilised" by UNTAC, they would have no way of creating the 
appearance of popular strength or launching conventional NADK
119 PDK, "Proposal of the Democratic Kampuchea Party on the
Cooperation Between UNTAC and the SNC", 27 June 1992.
120 MilSitRep, 28 June 1992.
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operations against CPAF, and there would no longer be any
reason why anyone should accommodate PDK7 s position on any
issue.121
On the battlefield, CPAF's counter-offensive actions in 
Kulasn, on Route 12 and in Kampung Cham evidently prompted a 
decision in Sector 1005 to take the next step up the
escalatory staircase: to begin local remobilization of its
force structure. While this was justified to NADK combatants 
as a reaction to the threat that CPAF counter-offensives might 
pose to PDK "liberated zones",122 it was in fact a part of 
NADK efforts to sustain its so far failed attempts to expand 
the Kampung Thom battlefield and finally to realize its goals 
in this regard.
The first steps toward remobilization in Sector 1005 
included giving guns back to NADK combatants at Anlung Veng 
and sending them to the front. They also included giving 
weapons to porters previously conscripted to carry ammunition 
and other supplies in front-line areas. A defector from 
Anlung Veng reported that starting June-July 1992, "the troops 
who had previously been disarmed were re-armed and sent 
forward." He noted that "the rumour among the troops was that 
maybe there was going to be an attack to take Preah Vihear, 
Kampung Thom and Siem Reap." Although they went forward 
"without an attack plan", they "were told to establish the 
pre-conditions for launching an attack at a later date, if 
necessary.1,123
At the same time, Sector 1005 combatants were told that 
demobilization plans had not been dropped but merely put "on
121 UNTAC, [no component indicated] , "Leaflets Aimed at 
NADK", 26 June 1992, p.2.
122 Peschoux, "Investigation", pp. 3-4; author's interview of 
35-year-old source on 5 February 1993.
123 Interview of 29-year-old source on 11 November 1992.
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hold", as an Division 802 ex-combatant put it. Thus, despite 
renewed efforts to expand the Kampung Thom battlefield and 
ward off CPAF counter-attacks, Division 802 and other NADK 
units in his area were "still standing by to demobilize".124 
However, demobilization would never take place. Instead, the 
process of NADK remobilization would continue while PDK was 
politically condemned on all sides, domestically and 
internationally. Its only option was to continue further down 
the paths of remobilization of its armed forces and re­
militarization of its struggle in the hopes that its popular 
support would thus finally be materialized. Instead, the 
opposite would happen.
After another round of diplomatic dancing with UNTAC 
between June and September, PDK decided to resume all-out 
militarized people's war throughout the country in October 
1992. This effort peaked on the eve of elections in May 1993, 
when NADK troops briefly entered the capital of Siem Reap 
province, only to be driven out within hours amidst no sign of 
popular support. NADK attempts to disrupt voting failed 
almost totally, and to the surprise of both PDK and a SoC that 
UNTAC hardly neutralized, FUNCINPEC won the elections with a 
plurality of the popular vote. People's war had failed, and 
PDK was left in much deeper political, military and diplomatic 
isolation than before the Paris Agreements.125
124 Interview of 20-year-old source on 12 November 1992.
i2s For jiscussions, see the chapters by Penny Edwards, Judy 
Ledgerwood, David Ashley, Kate Frieson and myself in Steve Heder 
and Judy Ledgerwood, eds, Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in 
Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace­
keeping (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996).
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
POPULAR SENTIMENTS VIS-A-VIS PDK, SOC AND FUNCINPEC
PDK and the Growing Unpopularity of SoC
Despite some clear indications, the popular dynamics that 
would lead to all-round failure of PDK's people's war, 
electoral defeat for CPP and electoral victory for FUNCINPEC 
were not entirely obvious when PDK moved toward full-fledged 
remobilization of NADK in mid-1992. Regardless of all the 
circumstantial evidence of and historical reasons for PDK's 
unpopularity, there was still uncertainty about just how 
popular or unpopular PDK was vis-a-vis its old enemy SoC or 
its former coalition partners FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, and 
about how its resumption of armed struggle would affect 
popular sentiments.
Since Peschoux's 1989-1990 research showing that PDK 
appeared to enjoy the semblance of cooperation because of 
peasant deference to the armed authority of NADK combatants 
but not "spontaneous and sustained adherence", no one had 
attempted any similar inquiry. This had left the field open 
for academic speculation right up into 1992, which despite 
different political inclinations and disagreements on other 
points, had not ruled out the possibility that Pol Pot might 
be right to think that PDK had some popular prospects, that 
these had been growing since 1990, and that by 1992 they might 
be growing faster. All these speculations pointed to evidence 
of the growing unpopularity of SoC. Even those scholars whose 
political sympathies were most anti-PDK or pro-SoC concluded 
that SoC was in political trouble and PDK might be able to 
capitalize on this under certain conditions. To the extent 
that Pol Pot and other senior PDK leaders based their 
illusions about PDK popularity on facts, the increasing 
unpopularity of their main adversary gave them one reason for 
believing in PDK's prospects and disregarding all the contrary
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indications.
Academic Speculations
The by far best-informed Peschoux, writing in early 1992 
about the possibility of PDK participation in the kind the 
electoral and other non-military competition with SoC for 
which the Paris Agreements provided, had not excluded that it 
could achieve some successes, but argued that these would be 
less a reflection of PDK's popular strength than of SoC's 
increasing popular weakness. He warned that SoC "mistakes and 
excesses" might "play into the hands" of PDK. Among SoC's 
political errors he noted its reluctance to consider political 
reforms, long-term propensity to resort to systematic 
repression to deal with political opponents and its 
"authoritarian mobilization" methods, all of which had tended 
to increase "popular discontent". He stressed that "poor 
peasants" had "often been the first victims of these 
measures". He suggested that SoC had already lacked "any 
substantial popular base in the country" before what it 
portrayed as "economic reforms" had reduced the political 
system to its one-party monopoly and security apparatus, while 
giving rise to "perverse consequences, nurturing and 
generalizing corruption". Between the time these privatizing 
reforms were introduced in the late 1980s and the signing of 
the Paris Agreements, they had increased "the difficulties of 
the most vulnerable social groups", thus creating more 
"potential clients" for PDK. Peschoux warned that PDK would 
certainly be going all out to try to identify itself with the 
"afflictions" of these groups and to promise "them an 
improvement in their condition", to make itself into their 
only political alternative to SoC. Peschoux predicted that 
"in the long run," the continuation of a situation in which a 
repressive government became increasingly corrupt would 
"favour" PDK.1
1 Christophe Peschoux, Les "Nouveaux" Khmers Rouges, 1979- 
1990 (Paris; Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp.232-246.
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Other assessments had concurred in the basic outlines of 
Peschoux's position that SoC was politically weak and getting 
weaker, and PDK might be able exploit this trend, especially 
if it continued to enjoy international favour. Writing about 
the situation as of the end of 1991, historian Michael 
Vickery, a self-proclaimed supporter of SoC, insisted that PDK 
was "unpopular", and predicted that if an election were held 
in that year, PDK's showing would be "insignificant". 
However, he suggested that although SoC might have enjoyed "a 
burst" of enthusiastic support among the peasantry for 
privatizing land as part of its economic reforms, this could 
be short-lived. Like Peschoux, he considered that the 
"explosive corruption" that more and more characterized SoC 
was generating popular "disgust" that might increasingly 
rebound to the advantage of PDK, and especially of figures 
with a moderate, rational image, like Khieu Samphan. He saw 
PDK as having some prospects for taking advantage of the 
reaction to poor governance by SoC of a free-market system.2
Writing in 1990, the long-time scholar of Cambodian 
politics Laura Summers, whose perspective on SoC had always 
been critical, had refrained from making predictions. She 
recognized that PDK had "clear plans for transforming" the 
military power through which it had backed its coalition with 
FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF "into an electoral mandate". She 
argued that it hoped the Paris Agreements would signal to 
Cambodian voters that SoC "could no longer . . . command the 
status respect or deference which is associated with state 
power in Khmer political culture". However, she noted, this 
could only be achieved through demobilization of CPAF and 
neutralization of SoC. Under such circumstances, PDK hoped 
that "with no party possessing an a priori claim to state 
power," PDK, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF could "together outpoll" SoC 
in a national election. While not directly endorsing this
2 Michael Vickery, "Cambodia After the 'Peace'" (unpublished 
"Samizdat" paper, Penang, Malaysia, December 1991), 
pp.1,17,33,47-50.
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expectation, Summers suggested that SoC was becoming more and 
more vulnerable to electoral defeat because of Cambodians' 
"clear disaffection" from its political administration as a 
result, among other things, of its "corruption at all levels" 
and various exactions on the population.3
The ethnographer Marie Martin, whose profound anti­
communism was matched by open sympathies for FIMCINPEC and the 
KPNLF, also argued that the PDK was in a position to benefit 
from the post-Paris Agreements situation because of growing 
popular unhappiness with SoC and disappointment with both 
Sihanouk and the international community for their failures to 
curb SoC politically or otherwise. She asserted that, as a 
result, PDK increasingly appeared "to part of the people ... 
as true patriots" and "the only ones capable of defending the 
sovereignty of Cambodia".4 Sociologist Serge Thion, whose 
generally critical approach to all four Cambodian parties was 
nevertheless tinged with a tendency to be dismissive of 
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF and "understanding" of SoC, similarly 
stressed the political significance of the "social 
inequalities" that emerged with "incredible speed" to the 
detriment of society's "weakest elements" as result of SoC's 
granting of property rights in real estate and paddy land. 
This had generated "disgust in the population" as a whole and 
a "moral reaction" among intellectuals. He suggested that PDK 
would only be able to make use of "the enormous advantage of 
being able to come back on to the open political scene" 
offered by the Paris Agreements to advance by undermining SoC 
control over the rural population and isolating SoC's "corrupt
3 Laura Summers, "Cambodia: The Prospects for a UN-
Controlled Solution", in Asian Review (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn
University Institute of Asian Studies, Vol 5, 1991), pp.46-47,52- 
53,58 .
4 Marie Alexandrine Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.295-296. 
This is revised and updated edition in translation of her Le Mai 
cambodgien: histoire d rune societe traditionelle face a ses 
leaders politiques, 1946-1987 (Paris: Hachette, 1989).
political elite".5
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UNTAC' s Asses sment s
UNTAC's earliest impressions of PDK's popular potential 
were based on fleeting observations in PDK-administered zones 
and contested areas. UNTAC's first tours of PDK-administered 
villages (those that it was allowed to see) suggested that 
they were "prosperous",6 and that because individual NADK 
cadre seemed to be well-received by the population in their 
zones of operation, PDK's political prospects were perhaps not 
entirely bad.7 In contested areas of Kampung Thom, peasants 
seemed to be more angry about CPAF ill-treatment than afraid 
of NADK.8 As UNTAC spread out into contested parts of Kampot, 
its initial assessment was that villagers "were sympathetic 
to" PDK "objectives" because "the actions of corrupt local 
officials" meant the SoC administration was "hated". This 
suggested to UNTAC military observers that peasants might be 
susceptible to PDK attempts at "switching from military 
activity to a hearts and minds campaign to win over the local 
rural population".9
More concerted UNTAC investigations, however, eventually 
pointed to the illusory nature of support for PDK. While they 
confirmed again and again the unpopularity of SoC, they 
suggested that as PDK acted to try to transform this into 
active support for PDK by ratcheting up armed struggle, the
5 Serge Thion, "Cambodia 1992: United Nations Traditional 
Apathy in Cambodia", in his Watching Cambodia (Bangkok: White 
Lotus, 1993), pp.187-188,206-207 .
6 Carney's Notes on the Senior Staff Meeting [SSM], 27 and 
28 April 1992.
7 SSM, 10 April 1992.
8 SSM, 21 April 1992.
9 "UN Says Khmer Rouge Strength Dwindling", Reuter, Chhouk, 
28 August 1992.
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violence this entailed only turned a population fearful that 
such violence presaged an eventual return to pre-1979 
practices even more against it.
An analysis of NADK efforts to take advantage of 
opportunities afforded by the Paris Agreements and continuing 
SoC abuses to portray themselves as "defenders of the poor and 
the oppressed" in contested parts of Kampot indicated that 
they had at best "limited effect". Careful examination of 
opinions expressed by villagers revealed that "they regarded 
both the PDK and the government army as equally oppressive 
forces," but that although they had more immediate grievances 
against SoC than PDK, this "by no means meant a preference" 
for the latter. One woman aptly summarized what appeared to 
be the prevailing view, "We like neither side and we will 
certainly not vote for the Khmer Rouge, but we won't vote for 
the present government either". Another villager predicted 
that in a free and fair vote neither PDK nor CPP would win 
more than 10 per cent of the votes. A third stressed the 
underlying mistrust with which the PDK was viewed: "They
never do what they advocate. People know that, they are 
cautious. People say yes with the mouth, but no in their 
heart. "10
Villagers in a contested part of Kampung Speu province 
were even more damning. They told UNTAC visitors that PDK 
"just want to make us miserable forever", even though they 
also complained of ill-treatment by CPAF.11 In contested 
parts of rural Siem Reap, the fear of violence that came with 
NADK actions after it resumed guerilla and then conventional 
warfare there became "uppermost on the minds of villagers".12 
Similarly, in Preah Vihear, the threat of NADK violence was a
10 UNTAC, Information/Education Division [UNTAC-IED] , "Visit 
to Kampot Province", 26 January 1992.
11 UNTAC-IED, "SIT Visit to Amleang", 4 October 1992.
12 UNTAC-IED, "Sector 2 Report", 2 8 October 1992.
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cause of "much concern" among villagers.13 An assessment of 
political sentiments in Kampung Cham province pointed to the 
negative impact on SoC popularity of its campaigns of 
"political intimidation" against the population, but stressed 
that at the same time, "the population fears . .. the NADK". 
It suggested that the only real "strength of the NADK lies in 
[its] ability to terrify the population".14 A villager who 
was subjected to NADK propaganda actions in forested parts of 
Kampung Cham recalled that although PDK behaviour was "indeed 
different than" what it "had been in the DK period", he did 
not believe in the PDK propaganda about its future policies.15 
In those parts of Kampung Speu where especially abusive 
behaviour by particularly violent CPAF units had engendered 
intense unpopularity and widespread fear of SoC, UNTAC found 
that the activities of underground NADK political 
propagandists could not transform this into solid support for 
PDK.16 Soundings in rural Batdambang showed why: popular
desires for a lessening of "the iron grip" of "SoC repression" 
was matched by "great concern" about the threat of NADK 
violence.17 Even though the population was "sick of SoC 
corruption", it remained but "fearful of the PDK".18 Although 
people seemed "terrified of SOC", viewed it "as completely 
corrupt" and responsible for a widening gap between a CPP 
nouveaux riches and an increasingly impoverished and sometimes 
landless rural poor, this class stratification and
13 UNTAC-IED, "Trip Report to Sector 3", 31 August 1992.
14 UNTAC-IED, "Summary Report on Kompong Cham Province 20-2 6 
April 1993", 27 April 1993.
15 UNTAC-IED, "Report on Conversations with Residents of 
Kampung Cham City and the Vicinity", 31 August 1992.
16 UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to Amleang, 14-16 September 
1992".
17 UNTAC-IED, "Report on 'Local Perceptions of Batdambang 
Politics'", 7 December 1992.
18 UNTAC-IED, "Report on FUNCINPEC in Batdambang Province, 
7 December 1992".
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polarization did not mean the population was in favour of PDK. 
Indeed, when an UNTAC analyst "asked if people were so unhappy 
with SOC that they would choose to support the PDK, people 
seemed shocked at the idea and said no." This was true even 
though on an individual and immediate basis,"the relations 
between the NADK and the local population" were seemingly not 
unfriendly. The analyst "was told that there are many people 
who go back and forth and have contacts on both sides. People 
know each other so such relations are not problematic." 
Nevertheless, "no one wants to have a PDK government."19 
Similarly, in Siem Reap, people viewed SoC local officials as 
"repressive and brutal", blamed "pocket-lining" by them as the 
cause of widespread social deprivation and degradation, were 
"outraged" by SoC "corruption and neglect" and "very angry" 
about various forms of SoC "intimidation" and "pressure", but 
they still "expressed grave fear of potential and actual NADK 
attacks" and long term prospects that PDK might somehow regain 
power.20
The situation was fundamentally the same in areas 
administered by PDK's ex-coalition partners. In parts of 
Banteay Meanchey province controlled by FUNCINPEC, people 
complained that SoC was continuing to "threaten" them with 
imprisonment and even execution, but their "chief concern" was 
the threat of PDK violence.21 FUNCINPEC troops explained that 
although there were issues about which the PDK was "right", 
they did "not like the Khmer Rouge nor do we agree with them. 
We don't support and won't join them. 1,22
19 UNTAC-IED, "The Political Environment of Battambang
Province", 9 December 1992.
20 UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap
Province", 6 April 1993.
21 UNTAC-IED, "Visit to Au Smach (CT3) 14-17 November 1992", 
5 December 1992.
22 UNTAC-IED, "Political Environment in FUNCINPEC-ANKI-
Controlled Zones: A Report on the Perceptions and Feelings of 
ANKI Soldiers and Officers, and Civilians Toward Their Leaders",
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UNTAC7s attempts to gauge PDK's appeal in urban areas 
painted a similar picture of support for some of PDK's 
criticisms of SoC but not for PDK itself. They suggested that 
although there was support for PDK positions, this would not 
mean votes for a PDK-formed party, even one headed by Khieu 
Samphan.
UNTAC's first systematic effort to "assess the impact of 
PDK broadcast propaganda in Phnom Penh" solicited the views of 
"street-vendors, cyclo- and moto-drivers, small business- 
holders, university students, monks and temple-boys". They 
described VGNUFC as "dull," "repetitive" and "dishonest", but 
the evidence suggested it was nevertheless listened to because 
"the chief alternative, SoC radio", was "also considered to be 
extremely boring and full of untruths". The assessment found 
that people were "listening to PDK radio because they identify 
with some of the messages." A majority of those interviewed 
"expressed support for the PDK's platform on the need for the 
SNC to have more power" . Many capital residents were in 
agreement with its calls "for SoC's powers to be more 
effectively curbed" and for an end to "SoC land corruption, 
the rental of villas and offices to UNTAC and foreign business 
interests". Some clearly shared PDK concerns that most or all 
rehabilitation aid for Cambodia would go to SoC. The 
assessment thus concluded that PDK clearly had "a receptive 
audience across the social and political spectrum" in the 
capital. It also suggested that popular willingness at least 
to listen to PDK propaganda reflected a belief that it was 
"not . . . the party of Pol Pot but . . . the party of Khieu 
Samphan". Younger people seemed especially prone to "see 
Khieu Samphan as separate to Pol Pot" . They identified Pol 
Pot as the main architect of genocide in DK period, but 
credited Khieu Samphan with "a positive identity as an able 
diplomat and leader" who might even be prepared to help to
14 March 1993.
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bring Pol Pot to justice for crimes against humanity. 
However, the report also stressed that even given Pol Pot's 
potential to hide behind Khieu Samphan, Phnom Penh residents 
generally "did not think that the PDK, if it did participate" 
in elections, could come "anywhere near to winning" them. 
This was true although the urban poor believed corruption in 
SoC circles meant CPP would be unable to solve their "greatest 
current concern", namely that inflation had left them with 
"hardly enough to eat because of price rises".23
A follow-up assessment pointed again to popular agreement 
with PDK demands for bestowing more power on the SNC, 
"considerable fear" of SoC, "favourable views about Khieu 
Samphan" and unanimous "fear/hatred of Pol Pot".24 Former SoC 
officials in Phnom Penh who had become "highly critical" of 
its administration regarded PDK non-cooperation with UNTAC as 
a legitimate way of attempting to check what they saw as 
excessive UNTAC readiness to work with SoC and failure to 
provide a neutral political environment. However, they did 
not favour inclusion of PDK in a future Cambodian 
government.25 An assessment of public opinion in suburbs 
around the capital made it clear that popular hopes for a 
diminution of SoC power were often combined with hopes for 
protection against PDK.26 Another analysis looked at a group 
describing themselves as "students and intellectuals", and who 
had voiced support for PDK demands for a strengthening of the 
SNC vis-a-vis SoC. It discovered that they did "not trust or 
support the PDK". Although outraged by what they
characterized as "glaring social inequalities", including
23 UNTAC-IED, "Some Current Concerns of Cambodians in Phnom 
Penh", 2 November 1992.
24 UNTAC-IED, "Recent Conversations with Visitors to the 
Information Centre", 23 December 1992.
25 UNTAC-IED, "Conversations at Democratic Party Congress", 
19 October 1992.
26 UNTAC-IED, "Analysis Report: Kandal Province", 9 November
1992 .
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differences between urban wealth and rural poverty, they 
expressed a distrust of PDK figures that echoed those of 
peasants. They complained that PDK leaders' "deeds never 
match their words", and that they did "not put into practice 
the ideas they profess." Moreover, like poor villagers, they 
had no sympathy for PDK's advocacy of armed struggle.27
As PDK escalated its use of military forces, capital 
residents continued to wish that something be done about "SoC 
repression and corruption", and they still wanted UNTAC to 
take seriously the demands put forward by Khieu Samphan, whom 
"many people . . . appeared to perceive ... as distinct and 
separate from the 'Khmer Rouge'." However, UNTAC's soundings 
showed that most of them would rather "jump in the river 
today than live under the Khmer Rouge again tomorrow". It 
found they had increasingly "grave fears about the possibility 
of a 'Khmer Rouge return'" to power, and were in favour of 
"us[ing] force against the PDK/NADK, at a minimum, [to] 
prevent the NADK from gaining any more territory,"28
The FUNCINPEC Alternative
If people wanted neither SoC nor PDK, they had to look 
elsewhere for hope, and from early in the UNTAC mission there 
were indications of political gains by FUNCINPEC in Phnom 
Penh, despite the hardly neutral political atmosphere there. 
These indications were not fully corroborated until after the 
middle of 1992, but research in the latter half 1992 and into 
1993 amply confirmed the general trend.
This research revealed that it was its growing popular 
strength that allowed FUNCINPEC to work through fears of
27 UNTAC-IED, "Analysis Report: Preliminary Findings on the 
Khmer Students and Intellectuals Association (KSIA)", 7 December 
1992 .
28 UNTAC-IED, "Field Trip Report: Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 
1993", 18 January 1993.
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insecurity in Phnom Penh that kept PDK paralysed. PDK plans 
of late 1991 to establish a legal, overt political 
organization had been completely abandoned, not only because 
of anxiety that SoC could at any time arrange a repeat of the 
November 1991 attack on Khieu Samphan, but more fundamentally 
because PDK could only generate support for its policies, not 
for itself. It was thus the only partie that, even after 
UNTAC arrived, "did not open, even try to open, a place where 
it could receive the population of Phnom Penh." While PDK 
remained in Phnom Penh, its rotating leaders and cadre there 
continued to "surround themselves in the greatest secrecy" and 
to "avoid as much as possible contact with the outside. ... 
access to their offices and residences was constantly
prohibited to anyone who was not a member of their movement. "
On Pol Pot's Battlefield Number Three, their "political
activities totally sidestepped the Cambodian population."29 
FUNCINPEC, by contrast, was able cautiously but successfully 
to organize both overtly and covertly in Phnom Penh and 
elsewhere in the country.30
As of mid-April, according to one credible Cambodian
source, FUNCINPEC was already making "a strong popular
h  • *■“
showing" in * capital. Significantly, "many members of the
[C]PP, civil servants in the SoC" were "surreptitiously
joining FUNCINPEC without telling the [C]PP about it," 
FUNCINPEC seemed in good position to defeat the CPP 
electorally in the capital.31 UNTAC7s first full-fledged 
attempt to analyze the political strength of Cambodia7s main 
political parties indicated that FUNCINPEC was strong nation-
29 UNTAC, [no component indicated] , "Le Kampuchea 
Democratique: 6 mois apres 1'arrivee de 1'Organisation des
Nations Unies au Cambodge", 12 May 1992, pp.1-3.
30 Author's interview with Duong Khsem, who was responsible 
for FUNCINPEC7s underground organizing networks throughout 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 17 April 1992.
31 Author's interview with a leading official of the 
Cambodian Human Rights organization ADHOC, Phnom Penh, 17 April 
1992 .
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wide and getting stronger. This prescient September 1992 
report suggested that a FUNCINPEC election victory was likely, 
and that the CPP was in serious political trouble. It 
explained that FUNCINPEC was "very present throughout the 
country" had "made a strong impact among the population." The 
CPP, on the other hand, seemed "incapable of responding to 
such mounting opposition and has an image among the population 
of being a party which although powerful is less attractive." 
The report stressed that the emplacement of FUNCINPEC in the 
provinces very much predated the Paris Agreements. This long­
standing presence made it possible for them quickly to become 
"well-organised". FUNCINPEC had "throughout the country a 
very coherent and extended structure ready to make contact 
with the whole of its population". It enjoyed the political 
services of "personalities known generally among the 
population and inspired by a genuinely militant enthusiasm". 
Most of these were of the younger generation, but also in the 
FUNCINPEC ranks were those with education and professional 
qualifications dating from before 1970 and who seemed to be 
popularly associated with the "good old days". These 
activists were feeding on popular desires for "modernity" and 
"democracy" as well as anti-SoC feelings. The assessment noted 
that it was "remarkable that Prince Ranariddh sees his 
popularity rising rapidly in the provinces, even though he has 
still not acted to spread his wings, and FUNCINPEC is 
embodying the hopes of large segments of the population 
(peasants, petty 'bourgeois' merchants and those nostalgic 
about the past)."
The SoC political system was having "great difficulties 
adapting to this new situation" . CPP officials in the 
provinces seemed "seized with doubt" and only able to react 
with repression. While superficially expressing support for 
the Paris Agreements and the presence of opposition parties, 
such declarations were "almost systematically accompanied by 
psychological - if not physical - harassment and by guileful 
measures." They could only think in terms of applying a
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modified version of "the classic neo-communist police state 
model". In the countryside, the CPP was unable to capitalise 
politically on its alliance with Sihanouk because "in fact, it 
is very difficult for the population to associate their sub­
district chiefs ... with the Prince." They naturally 
associated Sihanouk with FUNCINPEC and with Prince Ranariddh.
According to the report, FUNCINPEC was thus very much a 
political threat to a CPP "which remains powerful but is beset 
by many maladies". FUNCINPEC enjoyed "a power of attraction" 
that it appeared might well grow as the elections came nearer, 
and be particularly accelerated once they opened permanent 
political offices in the provinces.32
Further UNTAC research revealed the extent to which anti- 
SoC feelings expressed in popular agreement with PDK positions 
did not constitute support for PDK. Instead, they were 
evidence of a vote bank for FUNCINPEC, which echoed many of 
PDK's complaints about SoC, but had no genocidal past and 
eschewed violence despite SoC repression and UNTAC's failures.
Thus, while "PDK's continual demands for the SNC to be 
given more power" were "striking an important chord with 
people, they did not want this additional power to accrue to 
PDK, but either to UNTAC or other non-CPP forces.33 Although 
the population shared PDK worries about allocation of 
rehabilitation aid, it was concerned not that aid would be 
denied to PDK, but that it might be denied to other non-CPP 
parties, especially FUNCINPEC. Other evidence that FUNCINPEC 
was "emerging as the strongest rival to SoC" in both urban and 
rural areas suggested that as soon as FUNCINPEC media became 
available, it was "likely less and less people" would listen
32 UNTAC, [no component indicated] , Evaluation du rapport de
force des partis politiques au niveau national, 11 September
1992 .
33 "... Kandal Province" .
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to VGNUFC or otherwise pay attention to PDK propaganda.34
An UNTAC field report noted that while people in Kampung 
Cham province were still listening to VGNUFC and "did not 
totally dismiss the ideas they heard there", the best 
available "specific evidence" indicated their political 
preference was FUNCINPEC. "Residents often talked about 
suffering during the DK period and expressed hatred" of PDK. 
One peasant explained that although VGNUFC "said good things", 
NADK "in actual practice" still "killed people". Even a CPAF 
trooper, however, admitted that FUNCINPEC forces "were 
different from the NADK".35 Villagers in contested areas of 
Kampot clearly looked forward to elections as "the first 
chance in decades to bring about an alternative" to PDK and 
SoC. Here, as elsewhere, the indications were that the 
favoured alternative was FUNCINPEC. An UNTAC investigation 
found that "villagers said their preference was going to the 
FUNCINPEC, and that FUNCINPEC was the most popular party in 
the district."36 In contested areas of Batdambang, villagers 
who appeared to have concluded that UNTAC was "ineffective in 
dealing with SoC repression", seemed to place their hopes in 
FUNCINPEC, about which they were positive even where fear of 
SoC meant they were most guarded in expressing their 
opinions.37 In short, where SoC was most unpopular, FUNCINPEC 
and not PDK was the beneficiary.38
These gains pointed toward the possibility that FUNCINPEC 
could advance in such a way as to obviate the need to side 
either with the SoC-Sihanouk alliance or rejoining a de facto 
coalition with PDK. PDK therefore not only increasingly fell
34 "Some Current Concerns
35 "... Conversations with Residents of Kampung Cham ...".
36 "Visit to Kampot . . . " .
37 " ... Local Perceptions of Batdambang ...".
38 "Political Environment of Battambang
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politically behind FUNCINPEC, it also was not in a position to 
take advantage of the common interests it had with FUNCINPEC 
opposing SoC to revitalize the pre-Paris coalition 
arrangement. Despite SoC's pressures on it, FUNCINPEC was not 
caught in the double-bind of a forced choice either of joining 
Sihanouk in a near-total alignment with SoC or of aligning 
themselves with PDK on the key questions of demobilization and 
election participation. Unlike PDK, FUNCINPEC could afford to 
demobilize its armed forces under UNTAC auspices and did not 
have to rely on violence forcibly to create the illusion for 
itself of "popular support", as long as it had some room for 
political organization and could look forward to reasonably 
free and fair elections. PDK was the one in a double-bind. 
Its pre-Paris political support had proved literally more 
apparent than real. Pol Pot's response - to purge Son Sen and 
move toward Ta Mok's position of intensifying violence in 
order to reveal and create political support through resumed 
armed struggle - only had the opposite effect, and with SoC 
still engaged in repressive activities and UNTAC seen as 
ineffectual, support flowed more and more to the party 
perceived to be the least violence-prone: FUNCINPEC.
Thus, while FUNCINPEC gave up its military capabilities 
except for a very minimal capacity for self-defense in parts 
of its old zones of administration, its political potential in 
SoC-administered zones, by contrast, continued to grow despite 
CPP efforts to prevent or at least curtail its activities. 
While PDK was drawing down its already small representation in 
Phnom Penh and gearing up for intensified armed struggle, 
FUNCINPEC was expanding in the capital and trying to do so in 
the provinces by relying on popular support rather than 
militarized people's war. By 23 June, FUNCINPEC had been able 
to enrol 20,000 new members in Phnom Penh, some of whom had 
provincial residences.39 Recruitment was much harder but 
nevertheless beginning in the provinces. Around the beginning
39 Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Meeting with 
FUNCINPEC Officials, 23 June 1992".
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of June, FUNCINPEC had started taking steps to open provincial 
party offices. By the middle of June, it had decided on 
locations for nine, and custodial staff had occupied the 
premises of some. Local SoC authorities reacted to 
FUNCINPEC's initiatives with acts of petty harassment. These 
seemed aimed in general at discouraging contact between 
FUNCINPEC and the population and in particular at deterring 
contact between the party and potential supporters within the 
SoC administration itself. Then, during the Tokyo conference, 
CPAF entered the newly-rented FUNCINPEC office premises in 
Batdambang and arrested the occupants.40 FUNCINPEC
nevertheless remained determined to push ahead with provincial 
organizing,41 even though UNTAC declined to treat the incident 
as a violation of the Paris Agreements.42
Thus, by the time the elections were held on 23-2 8 May 
1993, although more than 200 FUNCINPEC and other political 
activists had been killed or injured by SoC in election- 
related political violence,43 FUNCINPEC had built up a nation­
wide membership of several hundred thousand.44 Although PDK 
had killed at least 416 and perhaps as many as 676 people 
since the Paris Agreements, wounded at least another 655 and
40 ”... Meeting with FUNCINPEC Officials"; UNTAC-Military 
Component, "Situation Report" [MilSitRep], 23 June 1992.
41 Steve Heder, UNTAC-IED, "Report on a Visit to FUNCINPEC 
Offices, 2 July 1992".
42 MilSitRep, 28 June 1992.
43 Most of the victims were FUNCINPEC. Others were members 
of successor parties to the KPNLF or other, small non-Communist 
political parties. UNTAC, Human Rights Component, "Human Rights 
Component Final Report, September 1993", pp.27-29.
44 By October 1992, FUNCINPEC claimed a membership of 
120,000. Author's interview with Ung Huot, Phnom Penh, 2 October 
1992. By February 1993, it claimed 346,000 members. FUNCINPEC, 
Sechkadey Reaykar Kariyalay Bah-chnnaot Pracham-Chhnam 1992-1993 
("1992-1993 Annual Report of the Electoral Office), 2 8 February 
1993 .
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caused 362 to "disappear",45 the population ignored its call 
for a boycott of the elections, and 1,824,188 Cambodians, 45 
percent of those casting ballots, voted for FUNCINPEC, as 
opposed to 3 8 percent for CPP.46
45 "Human Rights ... Final Report", "Appendix Three: 
Investigation Statistics", pp.78-80, lists 417 people (CPAF, SoC 
officials and ordinary people) killed in combat and non-combat 
situations involving NADK, 655 wounded and another 3 62 who went 
missing, many of whom were probably also killed or wounded. 
According to SoC, by the eve of the elections NADK had killed 288 
CPAF and SoC officials and 388 other people. Cambodian People's 
Party, Central Committee, "Number of CPAF, Police and Population 
Died, Injured and Arrested After Paris Peace Accords", 20 May 
1993 .
46 UN, A Vote For Peace (Bangkok: Sriboon, 1993), p.92
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CONCLUSIONS
Works that have denied, underestimated or ignored PDK's 
(Indochinese) Communist roots have not been able to deal with 
the apparent paradoxes in PDK behaviour that resulted from Pol 
Pot's hyperfaithfulness to the people's war script. In 
attempting to resolve these paradoxes, they have typically 
overestimated the determining impact on PDK of the immediate 
international context and glided over or misinterpreted the 
importance of popular Cambodian political preferences. This 
can be illustrated by returning to an examination of the 
otherwise very different, even opposing analyses put forward 
by the historian Kiernan, the Cambodian political scientist 
Sorpong Peou, the international organizations theorist Stephen 
Stedman and other scholars of peace-keeping. If Kiernan's 
contention that PDK behaviour can in part by explained by UN 
assistance to it is factually untenable, other more plausible 
accounts that try variously to explain PDK behaviour in terms 
either of accommodation to foreign pressure or reaction 
against such pressure nevertheless also overestimate the 
importance of the foreign factor relative to doctrinal 
determinants and the impact of popular preferences. They put 
too much weight on the extent of influence exercised over PDK 
by such (erstwhile) foreign "friends" as the governments of 
China and the US. They overemphasize the extent to which 
PDK's plans were keyed around the SNC in Phnom Penh, 
underestimate the importance PDK attributed to the "people's 
war" at the village level, and fail to understand how 
delusions about the reasons for failure at this level drove 
PDK toward violence more fundamentally than any other factor.
Kiernan's attempt to explain PDK behaviour as resulting 
from the leadership of genocidists as opposed to Communists 
leaves him analytically lost in a sea of misinterpretations 
and misrepresentations. He takes no account of Pol Pot's good 
Communist ambitions to make a tactical shift in PDK's village- 
oriented people's war from primarily military to primarily
308
political struggle. He makes an unconvincing case that PDK 
never intended to go along with the Paris Agreements, and 
arrives at the untenable conclusion that while violating them
all along, PDK also from 23 October 1991 onward benefited more
than anyone else from them. In attempting to make this case, 
he lists a litany of PDK attacks and failures to meet various 
deadlines set by the Paris Agreements or the UN, above all its 
decision in early June 1992 not to proceed with demobilization 
under UNTAC auspices. He argues that this demonstrates a
consistent pattern proving his point about PDK intentions, and 
particularly that it never seriously contemplated a shift from 
military to political struggle.1
Kiernan recounts instances of NADK violations of the 
cease-fire as if they all resulted in PDK advances, ignoring 
evidence of SoC counter-measures and counter-attacks. Through 
this empirical sleight-of-hand, he leaves a misleading 
impression of how the military situation shifted between 
October 1991 and June 1992. On the basis of his false
picture, he tells readers that PDK then "withdrew from the 
peace process with the gains" he says "they had made from it" . 
He is ironically expressing PDK's hopes, but ignoring the 
reality, when he declares that PDK "gained the most" from the 
Agreements because they allowed it "to move into the political 
arena without abandoning . . . military options". His 
contention that PDK was allowed to make gains because UNTAC 
was soft on it due to some combination of wishful thinking, 
appeasement and on-going habits of sympathy or support for PDK 
within UN circles is contradicted both by the internal UNTAC 
documents and the open record of UNTAC's behaviour vis-a-vis 
PDK.2
1 For a more complete discussion of Kiernan's work on PDK 
and the Paris Agreements, see my review of it in the Phnom Penh 
Post, 16-2 9 June 1995.
2 Ben Kiernan, "Introduction", in Ben Kiernan, ed, Genocide 
and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations,
and the International Community (New Haven: Monograph Series No. 
41, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993), p.21.
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In suggesting that the US and China crafted an 
implementation of a peace process that would make possible 
massive PDK gains at the expense of the SoC, Kiernan implies 
that they ran roughshod over Cambodian public opinion. 
However, the views of Cambodian people themselves remain 
largely absent from his analytic schema. He asserts that 
"within Cambodia, the balance of forces favoured the incumbent 
SoC, 1 but it appears that he is referring to the military 
balance, and he in fact fudges the extent to which SoC enjoyed 
popular legitimacy. Similarly, he does not venture a
straightforward assessment about the extent of popular backing 
for FUNCINPEC. Instead, he insinuates it was politically weak 
because it was supposedly a mere creation of foreign (mainly 
US) interventionist designs in Indochina, with no domestic 
support in Cambodia. By skirting round popular preferences in 
this way, Kiernan is unable to make sense of the broader 
implications of PDK's unpopularity for the whole peace 
process .3
Kiernan concludes that PDK "called the world's bluff" by 
refusing to go along with the Paris Agreements they had 
signed.4 In fact, it was the other way around: SoC, Sihanouk 
and the UN all called PDK's political bluff, and so did 
Cambodians who were fed up with SoC, but who instead of 
following PDK down the path of people's war turned in their 
hopes for political peace toward FUNCINPEC.5
While rejecting the explanatory utility of Kiernan's 
"moralistic" focus on PDK's genocidal characteristics, Sorpong
3 Ben Kiernan, "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the 
Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences", in Genocide 
and Democracy, pp.208,213.
4 Kiernan, "Inclusion", p.241.
s For further discussion, see "Politics of Violence: An
Introduction", in Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds, 
Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic
Transition Under United Nations Peace-keeping (Armonk: ME Sharpe,
1996) .
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Peou portrays PDK in a manner that also washes away key 
aspects of its ideology and doctrine. Peou presents PDK as 
just another Cambodian partie, with no particular objectives 
other than security, other than wanting, like the other 
parties, "to be certain that it would not fall victim to the 
other either during or after the elections". This analysis is 
not plausible, even when qualified by Peou's suggestion that 
PDK might have been somewhat (but not fundamentally) 
distinctive because its past gave it needs in terms of 
security guarantees that were higher than other Cambodian 
parties. He is missing much when he interprets PDK's desire 
for parliamentary seats as aimed at nothing more than securing 
its "existence", even if he is right that Pol Pot, at least, 
believed that without parliamentary representation," PDK 
"would face persecution, prosecution, and ultimately 
extinction".6
Peou's logic is good that if PDK's plan all along "had 
been to destroy the peace process at all costs, [it] would 
never have signed the peace agreements that exposed [it] to 
the international community and the UN mission in the first 
place." However, his analysis goes seriously amiss when he 
denies the possibility that PDK tactics involved attempts at 
"undermining the peace process to ensure [its] eventual 
monopoly of power." His argument is that this could not have 
been so, because then PDK would have "waged a new war while 
UNTAC remained most vulnerable, at the early stage of its 
operation", and more particularly would have started a war 
aimed "at capturing or expanding territory".7 His reasoning 
here is flawed because he almost entirely ignores the 
importance of the political tactics of PDK's people's war to 
establish local National Councils.
6 Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: 
From Battlefield to Ballot-Box (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), pp.viii,40,205,230.
7 Peou, pp.183-184,269-270.
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There is some justice in Peou's effort to be evenhanded 
by arguing that although PDK became guilty of "refusal to 
abide by the established rules of the democratic agreement," 
both PDK and SoC "repeatedly violated the cease-fire" . 
However, he puts too much of the overall onus onto SoC for 
precipitating mutual violations. While he highlights SoC's 
attack on Khieu Samphan and Son Sen in November 1991, he gives 
insufficient attention to PDK's people's war efforts in the 
villages. He fails to notice the pattern of increasing PDK 
reliance on violence to make people's war move forward in the 
absence of political support, dismissing NADK actions as mere 
"sporadic incidents". Thus, although he is right that PDK 
"cease-fire violations were not the end in themselves; they 
were rooted in unresolved political problems,"a he fails to 
situate them in PDK's failure to advance via more political 
people's war in the villages.
Thus, while Peou's warning that PDK's "behaviour must not 
be taken at face value" is well taken, his argument that the 
best way to understand PDK is to "turn . . . attention away from 
the concept of power and focus on that of security" is 
unpersuasive. The real problem for PDK was not security, but 
unpopularity. It was not the threat from SoC, which was real 
enough, but the lack of protection from ordinary Cambodians, 
that made PDK so vulnerable, and pushed it towards violence. 
PDK was unwilling "to disarm and compete in the electoral 
process" not only because of the extent to which "UNTAC failed 
to show it merited ... confidence", but because unlike 
FUNCINPEC, PDK could not generate enough popular support to 
compensate for UNTAC's shortcomings. To argue, as Peou does, 
that PDK chose "to remain outside the electoral process" 
because UNTAC was "in no position to create a safe political 
environment" for PDK, and thus its "perceived security needs" 
were not satisfied,9 is at best a partial explanation. The
8 Peou, pp.51-54,57,61,76.
9 Peou, pp.270-274.
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effects of this were so devastating because in the absence of 
better UNTAC protection from SoC, PDK had nowhere to turn, 
especially after Cambodians began looking politically toward 
FUNCINPEC in increasing numbers. Moreover, they did so 
because they feared PDK wanted not just security, but power, 
and that PDK wanted UNTAC to provide it with security so that 
PDK could put itself in a position to seize power.
Stedman is well aware of some of the pitfalls of the 
assumptions underlying Kiernan's and Peou's analyses. Thus, 
he warns against assuming that actors like PDK must either 
simply be seeking "total power",10 as Kiernan suggests, or be 
"solely motivated by insecurity and only seek party 
survival",11 as Peou suggests.12 Instead, Stedman develops 
a generalized taxonomy of participants in peace processes that 
connects the degree of extremeness of their social, political 
and economic goals and the degree of their commitment to 
achieving their goals to the extent to which they "desire 
exclusive power and recognition of authority" ; "want dominant 
power"; "seek a significant share of power"; or "desire to 
exercise power subject to democratic controls". However, his 
attempt on this basis to divide spoilers into "limited, greedy
10 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace 
Processes", International Security (Vol 22, No 2, Fall 1997). 
Stedman's critique of this view is based on Richard K Betts, "The 
Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs (Vol 73, No 
6, November/December 1994), pp.20-33.
11 Here Stedman cites Barbara F Walter, "The Resolution of 
Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail", PhD dissertation, University 
of Chicago, 1994, passim.
12 He points out that the latter view implies that any 
violation of the peace must be committed "out of fear, not some 
other motivation" , and thus "peace" could be maintained by much 
improved international guarantees for security of parties to 
peace agreements, which is precisely what Peou appears to 
believe. As Stedman indicates, application of this argument to 
PDK is seriously misleading, since it takes no account of PDK's 
other goals in addition to security. Stedman's argument here is 
paraphrased from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), p.66.
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and total" still leaves him with difficulties in dealing with 
the nuances of PDK's people's war tactics. His analysis is 
unable clearly to relate Pol Pot's immediate determination to 
achieve electoral representation with his equal, but long­
term, determination to retake power. PDK fits into his 
category of a "total spoiler" to the extent that Pol Pot and 
other PDK leaders were ultimately still pursuing "total power 
and exclusive recognition of authority", and that PDK's long­
term goals were in this sense "immutable preferences". 
However, this does not mean PDK's goals were - as Stedman's 
taxonomy would have it - "not subject to change". While 
PDK's "commitment to peace" was indeed "tactical", the precise 
nature of its tactics were determined by the canons of 
people's war, which produced the anomalous behaviour that 
Stedman's analytical framework cannot handle. This is why,in 
the terms of his taxonomy, PDK's behaviour was 
"inconsistent".13 In particular, Stedman has difficulty 
reconciling PDK's initial commitment to parliamentary 
struggle, preparedness to reduce its armed forces to a 
defence-only posture and obsession with attempting to launch 
a political offensive in the villages with its later reversion 
to violence. This flip-flop within the terms of Pol Pot's 
ultra-optimistic twist on the Vietnamese people's war through 
peace agreement script is contrary to his characterization of 
total spoilers, which he argues will only comply with peace 
agreements to the extent it helps them "convince others of 
their goodwill", but will never voluntarily weaken their 
"offensive military capability."14
Because Michael Doyle's approach does not recognize the 
extent to which PDK signed the Paris Agreements in part out of 
a belief that it had the popular backing necessary for it to 
take advantage of the "open political space" the Agreements 
promised, he overstresses the extent to which PDK signed only
13 Stedman, pp. 9-12 ,19, 27 .
14 Stedman, pp.5,7-8. Emphasis added.
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because of "heavy pressure from [its] big-power sponsors".15 
This emphasis on external factors is also expressed in Steven 
Ratner's contention that PDK "ultimately accepted the 
Permanent Five's plan" only because of "external pressure",16 
and echoed in Trevor Findlay's suggestion that PDK was against 
a political settlement that had been "imposed" on it by 
foreign powers.17 It underlies Wang Jianwei's puzzlement 
about why PDK's foreign backers had the "clout" to push it 
into signing the Agreements but not to force PDK to "turn the 
Agreements into reality". Wang's confusion arises from his 
assumption that "PDK was sceptical about the peace settlement 
from the very beginning because it realized that there was no 
chance for it to regain power through a democratic election 
given its track-record".18
Overestimation of the extent to which PDK was concerned 
about the UN and not the countryside is again apparent in 
Wang's treatment of the reasons for PDK's eventual refusal to 
go through with demobilization. He stresses that already in 
the UNAMIC period, PDK was "disappointed" with UN 
"powerlessness" and questioned the UN's legitimacy because 
UNAMIC's "limited mandate and resources" meant it could not be 
used for PDK's purposes. He emphasizes that the slow 
deployment of UNTAC further undermined PDK hopes in the 
utility of political as opposed to armed struggle, and argues 
that the way in which the UNTAC attitude toward PDK seemed 
influenced by the "Western powers" was a major factor behind
15 Michael W Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's 
Civil Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 
pp.24,32,68-69.
16 Steven R Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace 
in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (London: MacMillan,
1997), pp.158-159.
17 Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.16-17.
18 Wang Jianwei, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia 
(New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), pp.83- 
86.
315
PDK's boycott of demobilization. Here he points in particular 
to PDK unhappiness with UNTAC's failure "to do much 
substantial to address [the] issue" of effective 
neutralization of "SoC's key government agencies".19 Even if 
all of these points are well-taken, this does not mean that 
UNTAC's non-neutralization of SoC was the most fundamental 
reason for PDK's boycott of demobilization and step-by-step 
resumption of armed struggle. Rather, it was the combination 
of a consistent pattern of UN actions with the even more 
consistent failure of PDK to achieve its political objectives 
that led to these PDK decisions.
In sum, a lack of attention to PDK's Vietnamese-derived 
doctrine and self-deluding belief in the popular results of 
its supposedly super-successful implementation of that 
doctrine is at the root of most of the mistaken hypotheses 
about the reasons both for its participation in and for its 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreements peace process. Taking 
the hypotheses collated in Trevor Findlay's overview one-by- 
one, this study's account incorporating these factors 
disproves the hypothesis that PDK had "never intended to 
comply" with the Paris Agreements, but was simply "buying time 
to regroup in preparation for a resumption of military 
hostilities". It shows why an only incomplete explanation of 
PDK behaviour can be based on the hypothesis that it 
"genuinely believed that UNTAC would dismantle the SoC 
administration to a point where a [PDK] takeover, either 
before or after the election, would be possible" . PDK may 
have hoped this, but its main hopes were focused on the 
villages. It shows why the hypothesis that PDK had 
"calculated its electoral prospects as good until the 
political landscape began to change after the Accords were 
signed" is also misformulated: the political landscape did not 
so much change for the worse in a way that prevented PDK from 
manifesting its support electorally, as it did to reveal the
19 Wang, pp . 15-16 , 45-51, 83-86 .
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non-existence of that support, even as PDK refused to be 
realistic about its political prospects. Finally, this study 
shows the element of naivete in the hypothesis that everything 
PDK did was part of an attempt "to effect a long-planned 
transition from military to political action": Pol Pot indeed
hoped to oversee a continuous politicization of PDK's 
struggle, and was prepared to preside over such a transition, 
but his long-term plans were still much more ambitious and 
sinister.20
However, he could not realize his dreams because his 
"people's war" was not a magic formula for Communist success 
in Cambodia, but a recipe for disaster. It constrained PDK 
political choices in a peculiarly self-defeating way. It kept 
very much alive the temptation to violence, even while 
precluding certain military options. Even if it allowed 
tactical reliance on elections and peace treaties, it insisted 
on the ultimate utility of violence. This had a seductiveness 
that PDK could not resist, but giving into the seduction meant 
paying an enormous political cost in terms of keeping alive 
fears of an eventual return to (auto-)genocide. At the same 
time, adherence to the script required an effort to win 
popular support that, given PDK's past, was an impossibly 
uphill battle. Yet, even if Pol Pot's guerillas relied on 
sheer terror to fill the gap (and dismissed it as a small dose 
of justifiable revolutionary violence), a residual adherence 
to the script meant that PDK's military assets were not 
converted into a terrorist force pure and simple. That might 
have been a militarily more "rational" choice than reminding 
everybody of the murderousness of 1975-78 by somewhat more 
measured use of killing. Giving up on violence entirely also 
might have been less suicidal than attempting to use it in a 
politically-correct manner. Certainly, the success of the 
1996 "breakaway" from PDK of Ieng Sary, long reviled as Pol 
Pot's other half, suggests that this was the case. For Ieng
20 Findlay, pp. 49-51.
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Sary and the NADK forces who proclaimed loyalty to his 
Democratic National Union Movement, genuine adherence to a 
cease-fire proved to be a way of maintaining a separate 
political identity and de facto autonomy of control over 
people and land. If PDK as a whole had done this five years 
earlier, it might have better escaped its past and even have 
won some votes through a posture of non-violence, as some 
guerilla movements with histories of horrific violence as 
insurgencies, but which were less ideologically self- 
constrained, have done.21 However, faithfulness to a people's 
war script originally written by what later became the enemy 
paradoxically stood in the way of such realism and cynicism.
21 One example of this is the Resistencia Nacionale 
Mocambique (RENAMO) . For a discussion, see Alex Vines, RENAMO: 
From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Centre for 
South African Studies, University of York, Eduardo Mondlane 
Foundation, 1996) . Despite its origins as a tool of sabotage and 
terror for South African military intelligence, RENAMO's 
adherence to the Mozambican peace process served it well, and it 
managed to win a very considerable proportion of the vote against 
a regime not dissimilar to that of SoC.
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